fix: pre-landing review fixes (deleted paths are not executables, read two bytes of candidates only, wider egress line rules)

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

test/fixtures/review-pins/files/lib/review-risk.ts.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"sha":"31601b6b07f1be146652ed308f130b4a9688bddc08500d94e03696c372c8f67d","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}
+{"sha":"2b28089481c2209d319d8bd9e7a5feb4045a50aae6bccee1ca6c450804af87cc","replay":"GSTA-258-L7"}

test/fixtures/review-pins/replays/GSTA-258-L7.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"replay":"GSTA-258-L7","justification":"GSTA-258 L7 planner no-loss check (GST-1177, Addenda 1 and 7): the change only adds triggers (executables stay code; seal, sealed, custody and egress path tokens; redaction calls, redaction or outside-voice imports and SECRET or CREDENTIAL regex constants are security) and removes none; over the last 200 first-parent main commits to bf2cab34c5, planReview and collectCommit from origin/main and from this branch give the same depth, class, risk classes, next step and dispatches on 195, and the other 5 only raise: ed5c948eb6 (#3921, the GST-1164 secret-egress fix) and c197a139b7 (#3918, approval text in public PR bodies) and 514daebf5f (#3569, lib/sealed-guard.ts) go light to full on security, while 90a170c941 and 71acd83aa6 gain security at unchanged full depth and reviewers; no commit's depth drops (GStack Minder drive handoffs/GSTA-258/L7-planner-noloss/)"}
+{"replay":"GSTA-258-L7","justification":"GSTA-258 L7 planner no-loss check (GST-1177, Addenda 1 and 7): the change only adds triggers (executables stay code; seal, sealed, custody and egress path tokens; redaction calls (camelCase or snake_case), redaction or outside-voice imports (from, side-effect, require, dynamic and Python forms) and SECRET or CREDENTIAL constants set to a regex literal, a regex list or new RegExp are security; a deleted file is never an executable) and removes none; over the last 200 first-parent main commits to bf2cab34c5, planReview and collectCommit from origin/main and from this branch give the same depth, class, risk classes, next step and dispatches on 195, and the other 5 only raise: ed5c948eb6 (#3921, the GST-1164 secret-egress fix) and c197a139b7 (#3918, approval text in public PR bodies) and 514daebf5f (#3569, lib/sealed-guard.ts) go light to full on security, while 90a170c941 and 71acd83aa6 gain security at unchanged full depth and reviewers; no commit's depth drops ; rerun after the pass 1 review fixes gives the same 200 rows (GStack Minder drive handoffs/GSTA-258/L7-planner-noloss/, l7-200-v2.tsv)"}

test/review-collect.test.ts

@@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ describe('GSTA-258 L7 Addendum 1 and 7: executables among data-named paths', ()
     expect(pc.executables).toEqual([]);
     expect(depthOfCommitInput({ ...pc, gateTagged: 0 }).class).toBe('docs');
   });
+  // Value: protects=a deleted log is absent, not unreadable, and an unrelated large blob never forces the fail-closed default;
+  //   fails_when=removing logs/run classes as gate, or a big text file in the diff makes r.log executable; seam=executablesAt
+  test('a deleted log is not executable, and only candidates are read (two bytes each)', () => {
+    const r = repo({ 'logs/run': 'ok\n', 'r.log': 'ok\n', 'big.txt': 'a'.repeat(1024 * 1024) });
+    const del = r.commit({ 'logs/run': null, 'r.log': 'ok2\n', 'big.txt': 'b' + 'a'.repeat(1024 * 1024) });
+    const c = collectCommit(r.dir, r.baseSha, del);
+    expect(c.executables).toEqual([]);
+    expect(depthOfCommitInput({ ...c, gateTagged: 0 }).class).toBe('docs');
+    r.write({ 'r.log': null });
+    expect(collectLive(r.dir, 'main').executables).toEqual([]);
+  });
 });
 
 describe('collectLive: the working tree', () => {

test/review-depth-lean.test.ts

@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ describe('HARN-1 false triggers (harness-evals#231 on 1.93.7.0): data, config an
     expect(sec('lib/autoplan-lean.ts', ['  const redacted = (patch: string) => redactFindingSpans(patch) ?? "";'])).toBe(true);
     expect(sec('lib/autoplan-lean.ts', ['const SECRET_NAME = /(^|\\/)(\\.env[^/]*)$/i;'])).toBe(true);
     expect(sec('lib/review-x.ts', ["import { runOutsideVoice } from './outside-voice-runner';"])).toBe(true);
+    for (const l of ['out = redact_secrets(text)', 'from gstack.redact import scrub', "import './outside-voice';", 'SECRET_PATTERNS = [/sk-[a-z]+/]', 'const CREDENTIAL_RE = new RegExp(src);']) expect(sec('lib/x.ts', [l])).toBe(true);
     expect(sec('lib/autoplan-lean.ts', ['const INLINE_DRAFT_BYTES = 64_000;'])).toBe(false);
+    expect(sec('lib/x.ts', ['const SECRET_COUNT = total / 2;', "import { readFile } from 'node:fs';"])).toBe(false);
     expect(sec('lib/seasonal.ts')).toBe(false);
     expect(classifyDiff({ paths: ['scripts/sealed/seal.ts'], gateTagged: 0 }).risk).toContain('security');
   });