From f962796f0724d86f65322382bba9835f5c7abb42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Garry Tan <garrytan@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 20:31:14 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack
 visibility
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Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to
~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who
is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by
real attack data instead of speculation.

Design notes:
- Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the
  event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants
  (prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence).
- In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are
  counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
- Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the
  prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing
  security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations).

No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that
follows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts

diff --git a/browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts b/browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..26765940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/**
+ * Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials.
+ *
+ * Records every time a tunneled request is rejected by enforceTunnelPolicy
+ * (root token sent over tunnel, missing scoped token, disallowed command, etc).
+ * Gives operators visibility into who is actually probing their tunneled
+ * daemons so the next security wave can be driven by real attack data.
+ *
+ * Design notes:
+ * - Async via fs.promises.appendFile. NEVER appendFileSync — blocking the event
+ *   loop on every denial during a flood is exactly what an attacker wants.
+ *   (Prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence.)
+ * - Rate-capped at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are counted in
+ *   memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
+ * - Writes to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl, shared with the prompt-injection
+ *   attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing security pipeline.
+ */
+import { promises as fsp } from 'fs';
+import * as path from 'path';
+import * as os from 'os';
+
+const LOG_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.gstack', 'security');
+const LOG_PATH = path.join(LOG_DIR, 'attempts.jsonl');
+const RATE_CAP = 60; // writes per minute
+const WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
+
+const writeTimestamps: number[] = [];
+let droppedSinceLastWrite = 0;
+let dirEnsured = false;
+
+async function ensureDir(): Promise<void> {
+  if (dirEnsured) return;
+  try {
+    await fsp.mkdir(LOG_DIR, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    dirEnsured = true;
+  } catch {
+    // Swallow — log writes are best-effort. Failure to mkdir just means
+    // subsequent appends will also fail and be caught below.
+  }
+}
+
+export interface TunnelDenialEntry {
+  reason: string;
+  path: string;
+  method: string;
+  sourceIp: string;
+}
+
+export function logTunnelDenial(req: Request, url: URL, reason: string): void {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  // Drop stale timestamps
+  while (writeTimestamps.length && writeTimestamps[0] < now - WINDOW_MS) {
+    writeTimestamps.shift();
+  }
+  if (writeTimestamps.length >= RATE_CAP) {
+    droppedSinceLastWrite += 1;
+    return;
+  }
+  writeTimestamps.push(now);
+
+  const sourceIp =
+    req.headers.get('x-forwarded-for')?.split(',')[0]?.trim() || 'unknown';
+
+  const entry: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    ts: new Date(now).toISOString(),
+    kind: 'tunnel_auth_denial',
+    reason,
+    path: url.pathname,
+    method: req.method,
+    sourceIp,
+  };
+  if (droppedSinceLastWrite > 0) {
+    entry.droppedSinceLastWrite = droppedSinceLastWrite;
+    droppedSinceLastWrite = 0;
+  }
+
+  // Fire and forget. Never await, never block the request path.
+  void (async () => {
+    try {
+      await ensureDir();
+      await fsp.appendFile(LOG_PATH, JSON.stringify(entry) + '\n');
+    } catch {
+      // Swallow — log writes are best-effort. If disk is full or ACLs block
+      // us, we don't want to crash the server.
+    }
+  })();
+}
+
+// Test-only reset. Never called in production.
+export function __resetTunnelDenialLog(): void {
+  writeTimestamps.length = 0;
+  droppedSinceLastWrite = 0;
+  dirEnsured = false;
+}