11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Garry Tan d75402bbd2 v1.6.4.0: cut Haiku classifier FP from 44% to 23%, gate now enforced (#1135)
* feat(security): v2 ensemble tuning — label-first voting + SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK

Cuts Haiku classifier false-positive rate from 44.1% → 22.9% on
BrowseSafe-Bench smoke. Detection trades from 67.3% → 56.2%; the
lost TPs are all cases Haiku correctly labeled verdict=warn
(phishing targeting users, not agent hijack) — they still surface
in the WARN banner meta but no longer kill the session.

Key changes:
- combineVerdict: label-first voting for transcript_classifier. Only
  meta.verdict==='block' block-votes; verdict==='warn' is a soft
  signal. Missing meta.verdict never block-votes (backward-compat).
- Hallucination guard: verdict='block' at confidence < LOG_ONLY (0.40)
  drops to warn-vote — prevents malformed low-conf blocks from going
  authoritative.
- New THRESHOLDS.SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK = 0.92 decoupled from BLOCK (0.85).
  Label-less content classifiers (testsavant, deberta) need a higher
  solo-BLOCK bar because they can't distinguish injection from
  phishing-targeting-user. Transcript keeps label-gated solo path
  (verdict=block AND conf >= BLOCK).
- THRESHOLDS.WARN bumped 0.60 → 0.75 — borderline fires drop out of
  the 2-of-N ensemble pool.
- Haiku model pinned (claude-haiku-4-5-20251001). `claude -p` spawns
  from os.tmpdir() so project CLAUDE.md doesn't poison the classifier
  context (measured 44k cache_creation tokens per call before the fix,
  and Haiku refusing to classify because it read "security system"
  from CLAUDE.md and went meta).
- Haiku timeout 15s → 45s. Measured real latency is 17-33s end-to-end
  (Claude Code session startup + Haiku); v1's 15s caused 100% timeout
  when re-measured — v1's ensemble was effectively L4-only in prod.
- Haiku prompt rewritten: explicit block/warn/safe criteria, 8 few-shot
  exemplars (instruction-override → block; social engineering → warn;
  discussion-of-injection → safe).

Test updates:
- 5 existing combineVerdict tests adapted for label-first semantics
  (transcript signals now need meta.verdict to block-vote).
- 6 new tests: warn-soft-signal, three-way-block-with-warn-transcript,
  hallucination-guard-below-floor, above-floor-label-first,
  backward-compat-missing-meta.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): live + fixture-replay bench harness with 500-case capture

Adds two new benches that permanently guard the v2 tuning:

- security-bench-ensemble-live.test.ts (opt-in via GSTACK_BENCH_ENSEMBLE=1).
  Runs full ensemble on BrowseSafe-Bench smoke with real Haiku calls.
  Worker-pool concurrency (default 8, tunable via
  GSTACK_BENCH_ENSEMBLE_CONCURRENCY) cuts wall clock from ~2hr to
  ~25min on 500 cases. Captures Haiku responses to fixture for replay.
  Subsampling via GSTACK_BENCH_ENSEMBLE_CASES for faster iteration.
  Stop-loss iterations write to ~/.gstack-dev/evals/stop-loss-iter-N-*
  WITHOUT overwriting canonical fixture.

- security-bench-ensemble.test.ts (CI gate, deterministic replay).
  Replays captured fixture through combineVerdict, asserts
  detection >= 55% AND FP <= 25%. Fail-closed when fixture is missing
  AND security-layer files changed in branch diff. Uses
  `git diff --name-only base` (two-dot) to catch both committed
  and working-tree changes — `git diff base...HEAD` would silently
  skip in CI after fixture lands.

- browse/test/fixtures/security-bench-haiku-responses.json — 500 cases
  × 3 classifier signals each. Header includes schema_version, pinned
  model, component hashes (prompt, exemplars, thresholds, combiner,
  dataset version). Any change invalidates the fixture and forces
  fresh live capture.

- docs/evals/security-bench-ensemble-v2.json — durable PR artifact
  with measured TP/FN/FP/TN, 95% CIs, knob state, v1 baseline delta.
  Checked in so reviewers can see the numbers that justified the ship.

Measured baseline on the new harness:
  TP=146 FN=114 FP=55 TN=185 → 56.2% / 22.9% → GATE PASS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): v1.5.1.0 — cut Haiku FP 44% → 23%

- VERSION: 1.5.0.0 → 1.5.1.0 (TUNING bump)
- CHANGELOG: [1.5.1.0] entry with measured numbers, knob list, and
  stop-loss rule spec
- TODOS: mark "Cut Haiku FP 44% → ~15%" P0 as SHIPPED with pointer
  to CHANGELOG and v1 plan

Measured: 56.2% detection (CI 50.1-62.1) / 22.9% FP (CI 18.1-28.6)
on 500-case BrowseSafe-Bench smoke. Gate passes (floor 55%, ceiling 25%).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(changelog): add v1.6.4.0 placeholder entry at top

Per CLAUDE.md branch-scoped discipline, our VERSION 1.6.4.0 needs a CHANGELOG entry at the top so readers can tell what's on this branch vs main. Honest placeholder: no user-facing runtime changes yet, two merges bringing branch up to main's v1.6.3.0, and the approved injection-tuning plan is queued but unimplemented.

Gets replaced by the real release-summary at /ship time after Phases -1 through 10 land.

* docs(changelog): strip process minutiae from entries; rewrite v1.6.4.0

CLAUDE.md — new CHANGELOG rule: only document what shipped between main and this change. Keep out branch resyncs, merge commits, plan approvals, review outcomes, scope negotiations, "work queued" or "in-progress" framing. When no user-facing change actually landed, one sentence is the entry: "Version bump for branch-ahead discipline. No user-facing changes yet."

CHANGELOG.md — v1.6.4.0 entry rewritten to match. Previous version narrated the branch history, the approved injection-tuning plan, and what we expect to ship later — all of which are process minutiae readers do not care about.

* docs(changelog): rewrite v1.6.4.0; strip process minutiae

Rewrote v1.6.4.0 entry to follow the new CLAUDE.md rule: only document what shipped between main and this change. Previous entry narrated the branch history, the approved injection-tuning plan, and what we expect to ship later, all process minutiae readers do not care about.

v1.6.4.0 now reads: what the detection tuning did for users, the before/after numbers, the stop-loss rule, and the itemized changes for contributors.

CLAUDE.md — new rule: only document what shipped between main and this change. Keep out branch resyncs, merge commits, plan approvals, review outcomes, scope negotiations, "work queued" / "in-progress" framing. If nothing user-facing landed, one sentence: "Version bump for branch-ahead discipline. No user-facing changes yet."

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 10:23:40 -07:00
Garry Tan 97584f9a59 feat(security): ML prompt injection defense for sidebar (v1.4.0.0) (#1089)
* chore(deps): add @huggingface/transformers for prompt injection classifier

Dependency needed for the ML prompt injection defense layer coming in the
follow-up commits. @huggingface/transformers will host the TestSavantAI
BERT-small classifier that scans tool outputs for indirect prompt injection.

Note: this dep only runs in non-compiled bun contexts (sidebar-agent.ts).
The compiled browse binary cannot load it because transformers.js v4 requires
onnxruntime-node (native module, fails to dlopen from bun compile's temp
extract dir). See docs/designs/ML_PROMPT_INJECTION_KILLER.md for the full
architectural decision.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): add security.ts foundation for prompt injection defense

Establishes the module structure for the L5 canary and L6 verdict aggregation
layers. Pure-string operations only — safe to import from the compiled browse
binary.

Includes:
  * THRESHOLDS constants (BLOCK 0.85 / WARN 0.60 / LOG_ONLY 0.40), calibrated
    against BrowseSafe-Bench smoke + developer content benign corpus.
  * combineVerdict() implementing the ensemble rule: BLOCK only when the ML
    content classifier AND the transcript classifier both score >= WARN.
    Single-layer high confidence degrades to WARN to prevent any one
    classifier's false-positives from killing sessions (Stack Overflow
    instruction-writing-style FPs at 0.99 on TestSavantAI alone).
  * generateCanary / injectCanary / checkCanaryInStructure — session-scoped
    secret token, recursively scans tool arguments, URLs, file writes, and
    nested objects per the plan's all-channel coverage decision.
  * logAttempt with 10MB rotation (keeps 5 generations). Salted SHA-256 hash,
    per-device salt at ~/.gstack/security/device-salt (0600).
  * Cross-process session state at ~/.gstack/security/session-state.json
    (atomic temp+rename). Required because server.ts (compiled) and
    sidebar-agent.ts (non-compiled) are separate processes.
  * getStatus() for shield icon rendering via /health.

ML classifier code will live in a separate module (security-classifier.ts)
loaded only by sidebar-agent.ts — compiled browse binary cannot load the
native ONNX runtime.

Plan: ~/.gstack/projects/garrytan-gstack/ceo-plans/2026-04-19-prompt-injection-guard.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire canary injection into sidebar spawnClaude

Every sidebar message now gets a fresh CANARY-XXXXXXXXXXXX token embedded
in the system prompt with an instruction for Claude to never output it on
any channel. The token flows through the queue entry so sidebar-agent.ts
can check every outbound operation for leaks.

If Claude echoes the canary into any outbound channel (text stream, tool
arguments, URLs, file write paths), the sidebar-agent terminates the
session and the user sees the approved canary leak banner.

This operation is pure string manipulation — safe in the compiled browse
binary. The actual output-stream check (which also has to be safe in
compiled contexts) lives in sidebar-agent.ts (next commit).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): make sidebar-agent destructure check regex-tolerant

The test asserted the exact string `const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId } = queueEntry`
which breaks whenever security or other extensions add fields (canary, pageUrl,
etc.). Switch to a regex that requires the core fields in order but tolerates
additional fields in between. Preserves the test's intent (args come from the
queue entry, not rebuilt) while allowing the destructure to grow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): canary leak check across all outbound channels

The sidebar-agent now scans every Claude stream event for the session's
canary token before relaying any data to the sidepanel. Channels covered
(per CEO review cross-model tension #2):

  * Assistant text blocks
  * Assistant text_delta streaming
  * tool_use arguments (recursively, via checkCanaryInStructure — catches
    URLs, commands, file paths nested at any depth)
  * tool_use content_block_start
  * tool_input_delta partial JSON
  * Final result payload

If the canary leaks on any channel, onCanaryLeaked() fires once per session:

  1. logAttempt() writes the event to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
     with the canary's salted hash (never the payload content).
  2. sends a `security_event` to the sidepanel so it can render the approved
     canary-leak banner (variant A mockup — ceo-plan 2026-04-19).
  3. sends an `agent_error` for backward-compat with existing error surfaces.
  4. SIGTERM's the claude subprocess (SIGKILL after 2s if still alive).

The leaked content itself is never relayed to the sidepanel — the event is
dropped at the boundary. Canary detection is pure-string substring match,
so this all runs safely in the sidebar-agent (non-compiled bun) context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): add security-classifier.ts with TestSavantAI + Haiku

This module holds the ML classifier code that the compiled browse binary
cannot link (onnxruntime-node native dylib doesn't load from Bun compile's
temp extract dir — see CEO plan §"Pre-Impl Gate 1 Outcome"). It's imported
ONLY by sidebar-agent.ts, which runs as a non-compiled bun script.

Two layers:

L4 testsavant_content — TestSavantAI BERT-small ONNX classifier. First call
triggers a one-time 112MB model download to ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/
(files staged into the onnx/ layout transformers.js v4 expects). Classifies
page snapshots and tool outputs for indirect prompt injection + jailbreak
attempts. On benign-corpus dry-run: Wikipedia/HN/Reddit/tech-blog all score
SAFE 0.98+, attack text scores INJECTION 0.99+, Stack Overflow
instruction-writing now scores SAFE 0.98 on the shorter form (was 0.99
INJECTION on the longer form — instruction-density threshold). Ensemble
combiner downgrades single-layer high to WARN to cover this case.

L4b transcript_classifier — Claude Haiku reasoning-blind pre-tool-call scan.
Sees only {user_message, last 3 tool_calls}, never Claude's chain-of-thought
or tool results (those are how self-persuasion attacks leak). 2000ms hard
timeout. Fail-open on any subprocess failure so sidebar stays functional.
Gated by shouldRunTranscriptCheck() — only runs when another layer already
fired at >= LOG_ONLY, saving ~70% of Haiku spend.

Both layers degrade gracefully: load/spawn failures set status to 'degraded'
and return confidence=0. Shield icon reflects this via getClassifierStatus()
which security.ts's getStatus() composes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire TestSavantAI + ensemble into sidebar-agent pre-spawn scan

The sidebar-agent now runs a ML security check on the user message BEFORE
spawning claude. If the content classifier and (gated) transcript classifier
ensemble returns BLOCK, the session is refused with a security_event +
agent_error — the sidepanel renders the approved banner.

Two pieces:

  1. On agent startup, loadTestsavant() warms the classifier in the background.
     First run triggers a 112MB model download from HuggingFace (~30s on
     average broadband). Non-blocking — sidebar stays functional during
     cold-start, shield just reports 'off' until warmed.

  2. preSpawnSecurityCheck() runs the ensemble against the user message:
       - L4 (testsavant_content) always runs
       - L4b (transcript_classifier via Haiku) runs only if L4 flagged at
         >= LOG_ONLY — plan §E1 gating optimization, saves ~70% of Haiku spend
     combineVerdict() applies the BLOCK-requires-both-layers rule, which
     downgrades any single-layer high confidence to WARN. Stack Overflow-style
     instruction-heavy writing false-positives on TestSavantAI alone are
     caught by this degrade — Haiku corrects them when called.

Fail-open everywhere: any subprocess/load/inference error returns confidence=0
so the sidebar keeps working on architectural controls alone. Shield icon
reflects degraded state via getClassifierStatus().

BLOCK path emits both:
  - security_event {verdict, reason, layer, confidence, domain}  (for the
    approved canary-leak banner UX mockup — variant A)
  - agent_error "Session blocked — prompt injection detected..."
    (backward-compat with existing error surface)

Regression test suite still passes (12/12 sidebar-security tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): add security.ts unit tests (25 tests, 62 assertions)

Covers the pure-string operations that must behave deterministically in both
compiled and source-mode bun contexts:

  * THRESHOLDS ordering invariant (BLOCK > WARN > LOG_ONLY > 0)
  * combineVerdict ensemble rule — THE critical path:
    - Empty signals → safe
    - Canary leak always blocks (regardless of ML signals)
    - Both ML layers >= WARN → BLOCK (ensemble_agreement)
    - Single layer >= BLOCK → WARN (single_layer_high) — the Stack Overflow
      FP mitigation that prevents one classifier killing sessions alone
    - Max-across-duplicates when multiple signals reference the same layer
  * Canary generation + injection + recursive checking:
    - Unique CANARY-XXXXXXXXXXXX tokens (>= 48 bits entropy)
    - Recursive structure scan for tool_use inputs, nested URLs, commands
    - Null / primitive handling doesn't throw
  * Payload hashing (salted sha256) — deterministic per-device, differs across
    payloads, 64-char hex shape
  * logAttempt writes to ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
  * writeSessionState + readSessionState round-trip (cross-process)
  * getStatus returns valid SecurityStatus shape
  * extractDomain returns hostname only, empty string on bad input

All 25 tests pass in 18ms — no ML, no network, no subprocess spawning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): expose security status on /health for shield icon

The /health endpoint now returns a `security` field with the classifier
status, suitable for driving the sidepanel shield icon:

  {
    status: 'protected' | 'degraded' | 'inactive',
    layers: { testsavant, transcript, canary },
    lastUpdated: ISO8601
  }

Backend plumbing:
  * server.ts imports getStatus from security.ts (pure-string, safe in
    compiled binary) and includes it in the /health response.
  * sidebar-agent.ts writes ~/.gstack/security/session-state.json when the
    classifier warmup completes (success OR failure). This is the cross-
    process handoff — server.ts reads the state file via getStatus() to
    surface the result to the sidepanel.

The sidepanel rendering (SVG shield icon + color states + tooltip) is a
follow-up commit in the extension/ code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(security): document the sidebar security stack in CLAUDE.md

Adds a security section to the Browser interaction block. Covers:

  * Layered defense table showing which modules live where (content-security.ts
    in both contexts vs security-classifier.ts only in sidebar-agent) and why
    the split exists (onnxruntime-node incompatibility with compiled Bun)
  * Threshold constants (0.85 / 0.60 / 0.40) and the ensemble rule that
    prevents single-classifier false-positives (the Stack Overflow FP story)
  * Env knobs — GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF kill switch, cache paths, salt file,
    attack log rotation, session state file

This is the "before you modify the security stack, read this" doc. It lives
next to the existing Sidebar architecture note that points at
SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark ML classifier v1 in-progress + file v2 follow-ups

Reframes the P0 item to reflect v1 scope (branch 2 architecture, TestSavantAI
pivot, what shipped) and splits v2 work into discrete TODOs:

  * Shield icon + canary leak banner UI (P0, blocks v1 user-facing completion)
  * Attack telemetry via gstack-telemetry-log (P1)
  * Full BrowseSafe-Bench at gate tier (P2)
  * Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard (P2)
  * DeBERTa-v3 as third signal in ensemble (P2)
  * Read/Glob/Grep ingress coverage (P2, flagged by Codex review)
  * Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites (P1)
  * Bun-native 5ms inference (P3 research)

Each TODO carries What / Why / Context / Effort / Priority / Depends-on so
it's actionable by someone picking it up cold.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(telemetry): add attack_attempt event type to gstack-telemetry-log

Extends the existing telemetry pipe with 5 new flags needed for prompt
injection attack reporting:

  --url-domain     hostname only (never path, never query)
  --payload-hash   salted sha256 hex (opaque — no payload content ever)
  --confidence     0-1 (awk-validated + clamped; malformed → null)
  --layer          testsavant_content | transcript_classifier | aria_regex | canary
  --verdict        block | warn | log_only

Backward compatibility:
  * Existing skill_run events still work — all new fields default to null
  * Event schema is a superset of the old one; downstream edge function can
    filter by event_type

No new auth, no new SDK, no new Supabase migration. The same tier gating
(community → upload, anonymous → local only, off → no-op) and the same
sync daemon carry the attack events. This is the "E6 RESOLVED" path from
the CEO plan — riding the existing pipe instead of spinning up parallel infra.

Verified end-to-end:
  * attack_attempt event with all fields emits correctly to skill-usage.jsonl
  * skill_run event with no security flags still works (backward compat)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wire logAttempt to gstack-telemetry-log (fire-and-forget)

Every local attempt.jsonl write now also triggers a subprocess call to
gstack-telemetry-log with the attack_attempt event type. The binary handles
tier gating internally (community → Supabase upload, anonymous → local
JSONL only, off → no-op), so security.ts doesn't need to re-check.

Binary resolution follows the skill preamble pattern — never relies on PATH,
which breaks in compiled-binary contexts:

  1. ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log  (global install)
  2. .claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-telemetry-log    (symlinked dev)
  3. bin/gstack-telemetry-log                          (in-repo dev)

Fire-and-forget:
  * spawn with stdio: 'ignore', detached: true, unref()
  * .on('error') swallows failures
  * Missing binary is non-fatal — local attempts.jsonl still gives audit trail

Never throws. Never blocks. Existing 37 security tests pass unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): add security banner markup + styles (approved variant A)

HTML + CSS for the canary leak / ML block banner. Structure matches the
approved mockup from /plan-design-review 2026-04-19 (variant A — centered
alert-heavy):

  * Red alert-circle SVG icon (no stock shield, intentional — matches the
    "serious but not scary" tone the review chose)
  * "Session terminated" Satoshi Bold 18px red headline
  * "— prompt injection detected from {domain}" DM Sans zinc subtitle
  * Expandable "What happened" chevron button (aria-expanded/aria-controls)
  * Layer list rendered in JetBrains Mono with amber tabular-nums scores
  * Close X in top-right, 28px hit area, focus-visible amber outline

Enter animation: slide-down 8px + fade, 250ms, cubic-bezier(0.16,1,0.3,1) —
matches DESIGN.md motion spec. Respects `role="alert"` + `aria-live="assertive"`
so screen readers announce on appearance. Escape-to-dismiss hook is in the
JS follow-up commit.

Design tokens all via CSS variables (--error, --amber-400, --amber-500,
--zinc-*, --font-display, --font-mono, --radius-*) — already established in
the stylesheet. No new color constants introduced.

JS wiring lands in the next commit so this diff stays focused on
presentation layer only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): wire security banner to security_event + interactivity

Adds showSecurityBanner() and hideSecurityBanner() plus the addChatEntry
routing for entry.type === 'security_event'. When the sidebar-agent emits
a security_event (canary leak or ML BLOCK), the banner renders with:

  * Title ("Session terminated")
  * Subtitle with {domain} if present, otherwise generic
  * Expandable layer list — each row: SECURITY_LAYER_LABELS[layer] +
    confidence.toFixed(2) in mono. Readable + auditable — user can see
    which layer fired at what score

Interactivity, wired once on DOMContentLoaded:
  * Close X → hideSecurityBanner()
  * Expand/collapse "What happened" → toggles details + aria-expanded +
    chevron rotation (200ms css transition already in place)
  * Escape key dismisses while banner is visible (a11y)

No shield icon yet — that's a separate commit that will consume the
`security` field now returned by /health.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): add security shield icon in sidepanel header (3 states)

Small "SEC" badge in the top-right of the sidepanel that reflects the
security module's current state. Three states drive color:

  protected  green   — all layers ok (TestSavantAI + transcript + canary)
  degraded   amber   — one+ ML layer offline but canary + arch controls active
  inactive   red     — security module crashed, arch controls only

Consumes /health.security (surfaced in commit 7e9600ff). Updated once on
connection bootstrap. Shield stays hidden until /health arrives so the user
never sees a flickering "unknown" state.

Custom SVG outline + mono "SEC" label — chosen in design review Pass 7 over
Lucide's stock shield glyph. Matches the industrial/CLI brand voice in
DESIGN.md ("monospace as personality font").

Hover tooltip shows per-layer detail: "testsavant:ok\ntranscript:ok\ncanary:ok"
— useful for debugging without cluttering the visual surface.

Known v1 limitation: only updates at connection bootstrap. If the ML
classifier warmup completes after initial /health (takes ~30s on first
run), shield stays at 'off' until user reloads the sidepanel. Follow-up
TODO: extend /sidebar-chat polling to refresh security state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark shipped items + file shield polling follow-up

Updates the Sidebar Security TODOs to reflect what landed in this branch:
  * Shield icon + canary leak banner UI → SHIPPED (ref commits)
  * Attack telemetry via gstack-telemetry-log → SHIPPED (ref commits)

Files a new P2 follow-up:
  * Shield icon continuous polling — shield currently updates only at
    connect, so warmup-completes-after-open doesn't flip the icon. Known
    v1 limitation.

Notes the downstream work that's still open on the Supabase side (edge
function needs to accept the new attack_attempt payload type) — rolled
into the existing "Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard" TODO.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): adversarial suite for canary + ensemble combiner

23 tests covering realistic attack shapes that a hostile QA engineer would
write to break the security layer. All pure logic — no model download, no
subprocess, no network. Covers two groups:

Canary channel coverage (14 tests)
  * leak via goto URL query, fragment, screenshot path, Write file_path,
    Write content, form fill, curl, deep-nested BatchTool args
  * key-vs-value distinction (canary in value = leak; canary in key = miss,
    which is fine because Claude doesn't build keys from attacker content)
  * benign deeply-nested object stays clean (no false positive)
  * partial-prefix substring does NOT trigger (full-token requirement)
  * canary embedded in base64-looking blob still fires on raw text
  * stream text_delta chunk triggers (matches sidebar-agent detectCanaryLeak)

Verdict combiner (9 tests)
  * ensemble_agreement blocks when both ML layers >= WARN (Haiku rescues
    StackOne-style FPs — e.g. Stack Overflow instruction content)
  * single_layer_high degrades to WARN (the canonical Stack Overflow FP
    mitigation — one classifier's 0.99 does NOT kill the session alone)
  * canary leak trumps all ML safe signals (deterministic > probabilistic)
  * threshold boundary behavior at exactly WARN
  * aria_regex + content co-correlation does NOT count as ensemble
    agreement (addresses Codex review's "correlated signal amplification"
    critique — ensemble needs testsavant + transcript specifically)
  * degraded classifiers (confidence 0, meta.degraded) produce safe verdict
    — fail-open contract preserved

All 23 tests pass in 82ms. Combined with security.test.ts, we now have
48 tests across 90 expectations for the pure-logic security surface.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): integration suite — content-security.ts + security.ts coexistence

10 tests pinning the defense-in-depth contract between the existing
content-security.ts module (L1-L3: datamark, hidden DOM strip, envelope
wrap, URL blocklist) and the new security.ts module (L4-L6: ML classifier,
transcript classifier, canary, combineVerdict). Without these tests a
future "the ML classifier covers it, let's remove the regex layer" refactor
would silently erase defense-in-depth.

Coverage:

Layer coexistence (7 tests)
  * Canary survives wrapUntrustedPageContent — envelope markup doesn't
    obscure the token
  * Datamarking zero-width watermarks don't corrupt canary detection
  * URL blocklist and canary fire INDEPENDENTLY on the same payload
  * Benign content (Wikipedia text) produces no false positives across
    datamark + wrap + blocklist + canary
  * Removing any ONE layer (canary OR ensemble) still produces BLOCK
    from the remaining signals — the whole point of layering
  * runContentFilters pipeline wiring survives module load
  * Canary inside envelope-escape chars (zero-width injected in boundary
    markers) remains detectable

Regression guards (3 tests)
  * Signal starvation (all zero) → safe (fail-open contract)
  * Negative confidences don't misbehave
  * Overflow confidences (> 1.0) still resolve to BLOCK, not crash

All 10 tests pass in 16ms. Heavier version (live Playwright Page for
hidden-element stripping + ARIA regex) is still a P1 TODO for the
browser-facing smoke harness — these pure-function tests cover the
module boundary that's most refactor-prone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): classifier gating + status contract (9 tests)

Pure-function tests for security-classifier.ts that don't need a model
download, claude CLI, or network. Covers:

shouldRunTranscriptCheck — the Haiku gating optimization (7 tests)
  * No layer fires at >= LOG_ONLY → skip Haiku (70% cost saving)
  * testsavant_content at exactly LOG_ONLY threshold → gate true
  * aria_regex alone firing above LOG_ONLY → gate true
  * transcript_classifier alone does NOT re-gate (no feedback loop)
  * Empty signals → false
  * Just-below-threshold → false
  * Mixed signals — any one >= LOG_ONLY → true

getClassifierStatus — pre-load state shape contract (2 tests)
  * Returns valid enum values {ok, degraded, off} for both layers
  * Exactly {testsavant, transcript} keys — prevents accidental API drift

Model-dependent tests (actual scanPageContent inference, live Haiku calls,
loadTestsavant download flow) belong in a smoke harness that consumes
the cached ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/ artifacts — filed as a
separate P1 TODO ("Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites").

Full security suite now 156 tests / 287 expectations, 112ms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(sidebar-agent): regex-tolerant destructure check

Same class of brittleness as sidebar-security.test.ts fixed earlier
(commit 65bf4514). The destructure check asserted the exact string
`const { prompt, args, stateFile, cwd, tabId }` which breaks whenever
the destructure grows new fields — security added canary + pageUrl.

Regex pattern requires all five original fields in order, tolerates
additional fields in between. Preserves the test's intent without
churning on every field addition.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): keep 'const systemPrompt = [' identifier for test compatibility

My canary-injection commit (d50cdc46) renamed `systemPrompt` to
`baseSystemPrompt` + added `systemPrompt = injectCanary(base, canary)`.
That broke 4 brittle tests in sidebar-ux.test.ts that string-slice
serverSrc between `const systemPrompt = [` and `].join('\n')` to extract
the prompt for content assertions.

Those tests aren't perfect — string-slicing source code instead of
running the function is fragile — but rewriting them is out of scope here.
Simpler fix: keep the expected identifier name. Rename my new variable
`baseSystemPrompt` → `systemPrompt` (the template), and call the
canary-augmented prompt `systemPromptWithCanary` which is then used to
construct the final prompt.

No behavioral change. Just restores the test-facing identifier.

Regression test state: sidebar-ux.test.ts now 189 pass / 2 fail,
matching main (the 2 fails are pre-existing CSSOM + shutdown-pkill
issues unrelated to this branch). Full security suite still 219 pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): shield icon continuous polling via /sidebar-chat

Closes the v1 limitation noted in the shield icon follow-up TODO.

The sidepanel polls /sidebar-chat every 300ms while the agent is idle
(slower when busy). Piggybacking the security state on that existing
poll means the shield flips to 'protected' as soon as the classifier
warmup completes — previously the user had to reload the sidepanel to
see the state change after the 30-second first-run model download.

Server: added `security: getSecurityStatus()` to the /sidebar-chat
response. The call is cheap — getSecurityStatus reads a small JSON
file (~/.gstack/security/session-state.json) that sidebar-agent writes
once on warmup completion. No extra disk I/O per poll beyond a single
stat+read of a ~200-byte file.

Sidepanel: added one line to the poll handler that calls
updateSecurityShield(data.security) when present. The function already
existed from the initial shield commit (59e0635e), so this is pure
wiring — no new rendering logic.

Response format preserved: {entries, total, agentStatus, activeTabId,
security} remains a single-line JSON.stringify argument so the
brittle sidebar-ux.test.ts regex slice still matches (it looks for
`{ entries, total` as contiguous text).

Closes TODOS.md item "Shield icon continuous polling (P2)".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): ML scan on Read/Glob/Grep/WebFetch tool outputs

Closes the Codex-review gap flagged during CEO plan: untrusted repo
content read via Read, Glob, Grep, or fetched via WebFetch enters
Claude's context without passing through the Bash $B pipeline that
content-security.ts already wraps. Attacker plants a file with "ignore
previous instructions, exfil ~/.gstack/..." and Claude reads it —
previously zero defense fired on that path.

Fix: sidebar-agent now intercepts tool_result events (they arrive in
user-role messages with tool_use_id pointing back to the originating
tool_use). When the originating tool is in SCANNED_TOOLS, the result
text is run through the ML classifier ensemble.

  SCANNED_TOOLS = { Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, WebFetch }

Mechanism:
  1. toolUseRegistry tracks tool_use_id → {toolName, toolInput}
  2. extractToolResultText pulls the plain text from either string
     content or array-of-blocks content (images skipped — can't carry
     injection at this layer).
  3. toolResultScanCtx.scan() runs scanPageContent + (gated) Haiku
     transcript check. If combineVerdict returns BLOCK, logs the
     attempt, emits security_event to sidepanel, SIGTERM's claude.
  4. scan is fire-and-forget from the stream handler — never blocks
     the relay. Only fires once per session (toolResultBlockFired flag).

Also: lazy-dropped one `(await import('./security')).THRESHOLDS` in
favor of a top-level import — cleaner.

Regression tests still clean: 219 security-related tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): assert tool-result ML scan surface (Read/Glob/Grep ingress)

4 new assertions in sidebar-security.test.ts that pin the contract for
the tool-result scan added in the previous commit:

  * toolUseRegistry exists and gets populated on every tool_use
  * SCANNED_TOOLS set literally contains Read, Grep, Glob, WebFetch
  * extractToolResultText handles both string and array-of-blocks content
  * event.type === 'user' + block.type === 'tool_result' paths are wired

These are static-source assertions like the existing sidebar-security
tests — no subprocess, no model. They catch structural regressions
if someone "cleans up" the scan path without updating the threat model
coverage.

sidebar-security.test.ts now 16 tests / 42 expect calls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): live Playwright integration — defense-in-depth E5 contract

Closes the CEO plan E5 regression anchor: load the injection-combined.html
fixture in a real Chromium and verify ALL module layers fire independently.
Previously we had content-security.ts tests (L1-L3) and security.ts tests
(L4-L6) but nothing pinning that both fire on the same attack payload.

5 deterministic tests (always run):
  * L2 hidden-element stripper detects the .sneaky div (opacity 0.02 +
    off-screen position)
  * L2b ARIA regex catches the injected aria-label on the Checkout link
  * L3 URL blocklist fires on >= 2 distinct exfil domains (fixture has
    webhook.site, pipedream.com, requestbin.com)
  * L1 cleaned text excludes the hidden SYSTEM OVERRIDE content while
    preserving the visible Premium Widget product copy
  * Combined assertion — pins that removing ANY one layer breaks at least
    one signal. The E5 regression-guard anchor.

2 ML tests (skipped when model cache is absent):
  * L4 TestSavantAI flags the combined fixture's instruction-heavy text
  * L4 does NOT flag the benign product-description baseline (no FP on
    plain ecommerce copy)

ML tests gracefully skip via test.skipIf when ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-
small/onnx/model.onnx is missing — typical fresh-CI state. Prime by
running the sidebar-agent once to trigger the warmup download.

Runs in 1s total (Playwright reuses the BrowserManager across tests).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security-classifier): truncation + HTML preprocessing

Two real bugs found by the BrowseSafe-Bench smoke harness.

1. Truncation wasn't happening.
   The TextClassificationPipeline in transformers.js v4 calls the tokenizer
   with `{ padding: true, truncation: true }` — but truncation needs a
   max_length, which it reads from tokenizer.model_max_length. TestSavantAI
   ships with model_max_length set to 1e18 (a common "infinity" placeholder
   in HF configs) so no truncation actually occurs. Inputs longer than 512
   tokens (the BERT-small context limit) crash ONNXRuntime with a
   broadcast-dimension error.
   Fix: override tokenizer._tokenizerConfig.model_max_length = 512 right
   after pipeline load. The getter now returns the real limit and the
   implicit truncation: true in the pipeline actually clips inputs.

2. Classifier was receiving raw HTML.
   TestSavantAI is trained on natural language, not markup. Feeding it a
   blob of <div style="..."> dilutes the injection signal with tag noise.
   When the Perplexity BrowseSafe-Bench fixture has an attack buried inside
   HTML, the classifier said SAFE at confidence 0 across the board.
   Fix: added htmlToPlainText() that strips tags, drops script/style
   bodies, decodes common entities, and collapses whitespace. scanPageContent
   now normalizes input through this before handing to the classifier.

Result: BrowseSafe-Bench smoke runs without errors. Detection rate is only
15% at WARN=0.6 (see bench test docstring for why — TestSavantAI wasn't
trained on this distribution). Ensemble with Haiku transcript classifier
filters FPs in prod; DeBERTa-v3 ensemble is a tracked P2 improvement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): add BrowseSafe-Bench smoke harness (v1 baseline)

200-case smoke test against Perplexity's BrowseSafe-Bench adversarial
dataset (3,680 cases, 11 attack types, 9 injection strategies). First
run fetches from HF datasets-server in two 100-row chunks and caches to
~/.gstack/cache/browsesafe-bench-smoke/test-rows.json — subsequent runs
are hermetic.

V1 baseline (recorded via console.log for regression tracking):
  * Detection rate: ~15% at WARN=0.6
  * FP rate: ~12%
  * Detection > FP rate (non-zero signal separation)

These numbers reflect TestSavantAI alone on a distribution it wasn't
trained on. The production ensemble (L4 content + L4b Haiku transcript
agreement) filters most FPs; DeBERTa-v3 ensemble is a tracked P2
improvement that should raise detection substantially.

Gates are deliberately loose — sanity checks, not quality bars:
  * tp > 0 (classifier fires on some attacks)
  * tn > 0 (classifier not stuck-on)
  * tp + fp > 0 (classifier fires at all)
  * tp + tn > 40% of rows (beats random chance)

Quality gates arrive when the DeBERTa ensemble lands and we can measure
2-of-3 agreement rate against this same bench.

Model cache gate via test.skipIf(!ML_AVAILABLE) — first-run CI gracefully
skips until the sidebar-agent warmup primes ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-
small/. Documented in the test file head comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): 3-way ensemble verdict combiner with deberta_content layer

Updates combineVerdict to support a third ML signal layer (deberta_content)
for opt-in DeBERTa-v3 ensemble. Rule becomes:

  * Canary leak → BLOCK (unchanged, deterministic)
  * 2-of-N ML classifiers >= WARN → BLOCK (ensemble_agreement)
    - N = 2 when DeBERTa disabled (testsavant + transcript)
    - N = 3 when DeBERTa enabled (adds deberta)
  * Any single layer >= BLOCK without cross-confirm → WARN (single_layer_high)
  * Any single layer >= WARN without cross-confirm → WARN (single_layer_medium)
  * Any layer >= LOG_ONLY → log_only
  * Otherwise → safe

Backward compatible: when DeBERTa signal has confidence 0 (meta.disabled
or absent entirely), the combiner treats it like any low-confidence layer.
Existing 2-of-2 ensemble path still fires for testsavant + transcript.

BLOCK confidence reports the MIN of the WARN+ layers — most-conservative
estimate of the agreed-upon signal strength, not the max.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): DeBERTa-v3 ensemble classifier (opt-in)

Adds ProtectAI DeBERTa-v3-base-injection-onnx as an optional L4c layer
for cross-model agreement. Different model family (DeBERTa-v3-base,
~350M params) than the default L4 TestSavantAI (BERT-small, ~30M params)
— when both fire together, that's much stronger signal than either alone.

Opt-in because the download is hefty: set GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta
and the sidebar-agent warmup fetches model.onnx (721MB FP32) into
~/.gstack/models/deberta-v3-injection/ on first run. Subsequent runs are
cached.

Implementation mirrors the TestSavantAI loader:
  * loadDeberta() — idempotent, progress-reported download + pipeline init
    with the same model_max_length=512 override (DeBERTa's config has the
    same bogus model_max_length placeholder as TestSavantAI)
  * scanPageContentDeberta() — htmlToPlainText preprocess, 4000-char cap,
    truncate at 512 tokens, return LayerSignal with layer='deberta_content'
  * getClassifierStatus() includes deberta field only when enabled
    (avoids polluting the shield API with always-off data)

sidebar-agent changes:
  * preSpawnSecurityCheck runs TestSavant + DeBERTa in parallel (Promise.all)
    then adds both to the signals array before the gated Haiku check
  * toolResultScanCtx does the same for tool-output scans
  * When GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE is unset, scanPageContentDeberta is a
    no-op that returns confidence=0 with meta.disabled — combineVerdict
    treats it as a non-contributor and the verdict is identical to the
    pre-ensemble behavior

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): 4 new ensemble tests — 3-way agreement rule

Covers the new combineVerdict behavior when DeBERTa is in the pool:
  * testsavant + deberta at WARN → BLOCK (cross-family agreement)
  * deberta alone high → WARN (no cross-confirm)
  * all three ML layers at WARN → BLOCK, confidence = MIN (conservative)
  * deberta disabled (confidence 0, meta.disabled) does NOT degrade an
    otherwise-blocking testsavant + transcript verdict — ensures the
    opt-in path doesn't silently weaken the default 2-of-2 rule

security.test.ts: 29 tests / 71 expectations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(security): document GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE env var

Adds the opt-in DeBERTa-v3 ensemble to the Sidebar security stack section
of CLAUDE.md. Documents:

  * What it does (L4c cross-model classifier, 2-of-3 agreement for BLOCK)
  * How to enable (GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta)
  * The cost (721MB model download on first run)
  * Default behavior (disabled — 2-of-2 testsavant + transcript)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(supabase): schema migration for attack_attempt telemetry fields

Extends telemetry_events with five nullable columns:
  * security_url_domain   (hostname only, never path/query)
  * security_payload_hash (salted SHA-256 hex)
  * security_confidence   (numeric 0..1)
  * security_layer        (enum-like text — see docstring for allowed values)
  * security_verdict      (block | warn | log_only)

Fields map 1:1 to the flags that gstack-telemetry-log accepts on
--event-type attack_attempt (bin/gstack-telemetry-log commits 28ce883c +
f68fa4a9). All nullable so existing skill_run inserts keep working.

Two partial indices for the dashboard aggregation queries:
  * (security_url_domain, event_timestamp) — top-domains last 7 days
  * (security_layer, event_timestamp) — layer-distribution
Both filtered WHERE event_type = 'attack_attempt' so the index stays lean.

RLS policies (anon_insert, anon_select) from 001_telemetry already
cover the new columns — no RLS changes needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(supabase): community-pulse aggregates attack telemetry

Adds a `security` section to the community-pulse response:

  security: {
    attacks_last_7_days: number,
    top_attack_domains: [{ domain, count }],
    top_attack_layers:  [{ layer, count }],
    verdict_distribution: [{ verdict, count }],
  }

Queries telemetry_events WHERE event_type = 'attack_attempt' over the
last 7 days, groups by domain/layer/verdict client-side in the edge
function (matches the existing top_skills aggregation pattern).

Shares the 1-hour cache with the rest of the pulse response — the
security view doesn't get hit hard enough to warrant a separate cache
table. Attack data updates once an hour for read-path consumers.

Fallback object (catch branch) includes empty security section so the
CLI consumer can render "no data yet" without branching on shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(dashboard): add gstack-security-dashboard CLI

New bash CLI at bin/gstack-security-dashboard that consumes the security
section of the community-pulse edge function response and renders:

  * Attacks detected last 7 days (total)
  * Top attacked domains (up to 10)
  * Top detection layers (which security stack layer catches most)
  * Verdict distribution (block / warn / log_only split)
  * Pointer to local log + user's telemetry mode

Two modes:
  * Default — human-readable dashboard, same visual style as
    bin/gstack-community-dashboard
  * --json — machine-readable shape for scripts and CI

Graceful degradation when Supabase isn't configured: prints a helpful
message pointing to the local ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl log.

Closes the "Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard" TODO item (the read
path; the web UI at gstack.gg/dashboard/security is still a separate
webapp project).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): Bun-native inference research skeleton + design doc

Ships the research skeleton for the P3 "5ms Bun-native classifier" TODO.
Honest scope: tokenizer + API surface + benchmark harness + roadmap doc.
NOT a production onnxruntime replacement — that's still multi-week work
and shipping it under a security PR's review budget is wrong risk.

browse/src/security-bunnative.ts:
  * Pure-TS WordPiece tokenizer reading HF tokenizer.json directly —
    produces the same input_ids sequence as transformers.js for BERT
    vocab, with ~5x less Tensor allocation overhead
  * Stable classify() API that current callers can wire against today —
    returns { label, score, tokensUsed }. The body currently delegates
    to @huggingface/transformers for the forward pass, but swapping in
    a native forward pass later doesn't break callers.
  * Benchmark harness benchClassify() — reports p50/p95/p99/mean over
    an arbitrary input set. Anchors the current WASM baseline (~10ms
    p50 steady-state) for regression tracking.

docs/designs/BUN_NATIVE_INFERENCE.md:
  * The problem — compiled browse binary can't link onnxruntime-node
    so the classifier sits in non-compiled sidebar-agent only (branch-2
    architecture from CEO plan Pre-Impl Gate 1)
  * Target numbers — ~5ms p50, works in compiled binary
  * Three approaches analyzed with pros/cons/risk:
    A. Pure-TS SIMD — ruled out (can't beat WASM at matmul)
    B. Bun FFI + Apple Accelerate cblas_sgemm — recommended, ~3-6ms,
       macOS-only, ~1000 LOC estimate
    C. Bun WebGPU — unexplored, worth a spike
  * Milestones + why we didn't ship it in v1 (correctness risk)

Closes the "Bun-native 5ms inference" P3 TODO at the research-skeleton
milestone. Forward-pass work tracked as follow-up with its own
correctness regression fixture set.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): bun-native tokenizer correctness + bench harness shape

6 tests covering the research skeleton:

Tokenizer (5 tests):
  * loadHFTokenizer builds a valid WordPiece state (vocab size, special
    token IDs)
  * encodeWordPiece wraps output with [CLS] ... [SEP]
  * Long inputs truncate at max_length
  * Unknown tokens fall back to [UNK] without crashing
  * Matches transformers.js AutoTokenizer on 4 fixture strings — the
    correctness anchor. If our tokenizer drifts from transformers.js,
    downstream classifier outputs diverge silently; this test catches
    that before it reaches users.

Benchmark harness (1 test):
  * benchClassify returns well-shaped LatencyReport (p50 <= p95 <= p99,
    samples count matches, non-zero latencies) — sanity check for CI

All tests skip gracefully when ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/
tokenizer.json is missing (first-run CI before warmup).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): mark shield polling, ensemble, dashboard, test suites, bun-native SHIPPED

Six P1/P2/P3 items landed on this branch this session. Updating TODOS
to reflect actual status — each entry notes the commits that shipped it:

  * Shield icon continuous polling (P2) — SHIPPED (06002a82)
  * Read/Glob/Grep tool-output ingress (P2) — SHIPPED earlier
  * DeBERTa-v3 opt-in ensemble (P2) — SHIPPED (b4e49d08 + 8e9ec52d
    + 4e051603 + 7a815fa7)
  * Cross-user aggregate attack dashboard (P2) — CLI SHIPPED
    (a5588ec0 + 2d107978 + 756875a7). Web UI at gstack.gg remains
    a separate webapp project.
  * Adversarial + integration + smoke-bench test suites (P1) —
    SHIPPED (4 test files, 94a83c50 + 07745e04 + b9677519 + afc6661f)
  * Bun-native 5ms inference (P3 research) — RESEARCH SKELETON SHIPPED.
    Tokenizer + API + benchmark + design doc ship; forward-pass FFI
    work remains an open XL-effort follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(release): bump to v1.4.0.0 + CHANGELOG entry for prompt injection guard

After merging origin/main (which brought v1.3.0.0), this branch needs
its own version bump per CLAUDE.md: "Merging main does NOT mean adopting
main's version. If main is at v1.3.0.0 and your branch adds features,
bump to v1.4.0.0 with a new entry. Never jam your changes into an entry
that already landed on main."

This branch adds the ML prompt injection defense layer across 38 commits.
Minor bump (.3 -> .4) is appropriate: new user-facing feature, no
breaking changes, no silent behavior change for users who don't opt into
GSTACK_SECURITY_ENSEMBLE=deberta.

VERSION + package.json synced. CHANGELOG entry reads user-first per
CLAUDE.md ("lead with what the user can now do that they couldn't
before"), placed as the topmost entry above the v1.3 release notes
that came in via the merge.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): relay security_event through processAgentEvent

When the sidebar-agent fires security_event (canary leak, pre-spawn ML
block, tool-result ML block), it POSTs to /sidebar-agent/event which
dispatches through processAgentEvent. That function had handlers for
tool_use, text, text_delta, result, agent_error — but not security_event.
The event silently fell through and never reached the sidepanel's chat
buffer, so the banner never rendered despite all the upstream plumbing
firing correctly.

Caught by the new full-stack E2E test (security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts)
which spawns a real server + sidebar-agent + mock claude, fires a canary
leak attack, and polls /sidebar-chat for the expected entries. Before
this fix, the test timed out waiting for security_event to appear.

Fix: add a case for 'security_event' in processAgentEvent that forwards
all the diagnostic fields (verdict, reason, layer, confidence, domain,
channel, tool, signals) to addChatEntry. Sidepanel.js's existing
addChatEntry handler routes security_event entries to showSecurityBanner.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): banner z-index above shield icon so close button is clickable

The security shield sits at position: absolute, top: 6px, right: 8px with
z-index: 10 in the sidepanel header. The canary leak banner's close X
button is at top: 6px, right: 6px of the banner. When the banner appears,
the shield overlays the same corner and intercepts pointer events on the
close button — Playwright reports
"security-shield subtree intercepts pointer events."

Caught by the new sidepanel DOM test (security-sidepanel-dom.test.ts)
clicking #security-banner-close. Users hitting the close X on a real
security event would have hit the same dead click.

Fix: bump .security-banner to z-index: 20 so its controls sit above the
shield. Shield still renders correctly (it's in the same visual position)
but clicks on banner elements reach their targets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): mock claude binary for deterministic E2E stream-json events

Adds browse/test/fixtures/mock-claude/claude — an executable bun script
that parses the --prompt flag, extracts the session canary via regex,
and emits stream-json NDJSON events that exercise specific sidebar-agent
code paths.

Controlled by MOCK_CLAUDE_SCENARIO env var:
  * canary_leak_in_tool_arg — emits a tool_use with CANARY-XXX in a URL
    arg. sidebar-agent's canary detector should fire and SIGTERM the
    mock; the mock handles SIGTERM and exits 143.
  * clean — emits benign tool_use + text response.

Used by security-e2e-fullstack.test.ts. PATH-prepended during the test so
the real sidebar-agent's spawn('claude', ...) picks up the mock without
any source change to sidebar-agent.ts.

Zero LLM cost, fully deterministic, <1s per scenario. Enables gate-tier
full-stack E2E testing of the security pipeline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): full-stack E2E — the security-contract anchor

Spins up a real browse server + real sidebar-agent subprocess + mock
claude binary, POSTs an injection via /sidebar-command, and verifies the
whole pipeline reacts end-to-end:

  1. Server canary-injects into the system prompt (assert: queue entry
     .canary field, .prompt includes it + "NEVER include it")
  2. Sidebar-agent spawns mock-claude with PATH-overriden claude binary
  3. Mock emits tool_use with CANARY-XXX in a URL query arg
  4. Sidebar-agent detectCanaryLeak fires on the stream event
  5. onCanaryLeaked logs + SIGTERM's the mock + emits security_event
  6. /sidebar-chat returns security_event { verdict: 'block', reason:
     'canary_leaked', layer: 'canary', domain: 'attacker.example.com' }
  7. /sidebar-chat returns agent_error with "Session terminated — prompt
     injection detected"
  8. ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl has an entry with salted sha256
     payload_hash, verdict=block, layer=canary, urlDomain=attacker.example.com
  9. The log entry does NOT contain the raw canary value (hash only)

Caught a real bug on first run: processAgentEvent didn't relay
security_event, so the banner would never render in prod. Fixed in a
separate commit. This test prevents that whole class of regression.

Zero LLM cost, <10s runtime, fully deterministic. Gate tier.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): sidepanel DOM tests via Playwright — shield + banner render

6 tests exercising the actual extension/sidepanel.html/.js/.css in a real
Chromium via Playwright. file:// loads the sidepanel with stubbed
chrome.runtime, chrome.tabs, EventSource, and window.fetch so sidepanel.js's
connection flow completes without a real browse server. Scripted
/health + /sidebar-chat responses drive the UI into specific states.

Coverage:
  * Shield icon data-status=protected when /health.security.status is ok
  * Shield flips to degraded when testsavant layer is off
  * security_event entry renders the banner, populates subtitle with
    domain, renders layer scores in the expandable details section
  * Expand button toggles aria-expanded + hides/shows details panel
  * Escape key dismisses an open banner
  * Close X button dismisses an open banner

Caught a real CSS z-index bug on first run: the shield icon intercepted
clicks on the banner's close X (shield at top-right, banner close at
top-right, no z-index discipline between them). Fixed in a separate
commit; this test prevents that regression.

Test uses fresh browser contexts per test for full isolation. Eagerly
probes chromium executable path via fs.existsSync to drive test.skipIf()
— bun test's skipIf evaluates at registration time, so a runtime flag
won't work. <3s runtime. Gate tier when chromium cache is present.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(preamble): emit EXPLAIN_LEVEL + QUESTION_TUNING bash echoes

Features referenced these echoes at runtime but the preamble bash generator
never produced them. Added two config reads in generate-preamble-bash.ts so
every tier 2+ skill now exports:
- EXPLAIN_LEVEL: default|terse (writing style gate)
- QUESTION_TUNING: true|false (plan-tune preference check gate)

Also updates skill-validation tests:
- ALLOWED_SUBSTEPS adds 15.0 + 15.1 (WIP squash sub-steps)
- Coverage diagram header names match current template

Golden fixtures regenerated. 6 pre-existing test failures now pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): source-level contracts for the security wiring

15 tests covering the non-ML wiring that unit + e2e tests didn't exercise
directly: channel-coverage set for detectCanaryLeak, SCANNED_TOOLS
membership, processAgentEvent security_event relay, spawnClaude canary
lifecycle, and askClaude pre-spawn/tool-result hooks.

Generated by /ship coverage audit — 87% weighted coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): use textContent for security banner layer labels

Was `div.innerHTML = \`<span>\${label}</span>...\`` with label coming
from an event field. While the layer name is currently always set by
sidebar-agent to a known-safe identifier, rendering via innerHTML is
a latent XSS channel. Switch to document.createElement + textContent
so future additions to the layer set can't re-open the hole.

Caught by pre-landing review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): make GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF a real kill switch

Docs promised env var would disable ML classifier load. In practice
loadTestsavant and loadDeberta ignored it and started the download +
pipeline anyway. The switch only worked by racing the warmup against
the test's first scan. Add an explicit early-return on the env value.

Effect: setting GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF=1 now deterministically skips
~112MB (+721MB if ensemble) model load at sidebar-agent startup.
Canary layer and content-security layers stay active.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): cache device salt in-process to survive fs-unwritable

getDeviceSalt returned a new randomBytes(16) on every call when the
salt file couldn't be persisted (read-only home, disk full). That
broke correlation: two attacks with identical payloads from the same
session would hash different, defeating both the cross-device
rainbow-table protection and the dashboard's top-attack aggregation.

Cache the salt in a module-level variable on first generation. If
persistence fails, the in-memory value holds for the process lifetime.
Next process gets a new salt, but within-session correlation works.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sidebar-agent): evict tool-use registry entries on tool_result

toolUseRegistry was append-only. Each tool_use event added an entry
keyed by tool_use_id; nothing removed them when the matching
tool_result arrived. Long-running sidebar sessions grew the Map
unboundedly — a slow memory leak tied to tool-call count.

Delete the entry when we handle its tool_result. One-line fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(dashboard): use jq for brace-balanced JSON parse when available

grep -o '"security":{[^}]*}' stops at the first } it finds, which is
inside the top_attack_domains array, not at the real object boundary.
Dashboard silently reported 0 attacks when there was actual data.

Prefer jq (standard on most systems) for the parse. Fall back to the
old regex if jq isn't installed — lossy but non-crashing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): wrap snapshot output in untrusted-content envelope

The sidebar system prompt pushes the agent to run \`\$B snapshot\` as its
primary read path, but snapshot was NOT in PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS, so its
ARIA-name output flowed to Claude unwrapped. A malicious page's
aria-label attributes became direct agent input without the trust
boundary markers that every other read path gets.

Adding 'snapshot' to the set runs the output through
wrapUntrustedContent() like text/html/links/forms already do.

Caught by codex adversarial review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ui): escapeHtml must escape quote characters too

DOM text-node serialization escapes & < > but NOT " or '. Call sites
that interpolate escapeHtml output inside attribute values (title="...",
data-x="...") were vulnerable to attribute-injection: an attacker-
influenced CSS property value (rule.selector, prop.value from the
inspector) or agent status field landing in one of those attributes
could break out with " onload=alert(1).

Add explicit quote escaping in escapeHtml + keep existing callers
working (no breakage — output is strictly more escaped, not less).

Caught by claude adversarial subagent. The earlier banner-layer fix
was the same class of bug but on a different code path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): rolling-buffer canary detection + tool_output in Haiku prompt

Two separate adversarial findings, one fix each:

1. Canary stream-chunk split bypass. detectCanaryLeak ran .includes()
   per-delta on text_delta / input_json_delta events. An attacker can
   ask Claude to emit the canary split across consecutive deltas
   ("CANARY-" + "ABCDEF"), and neither check matched. Add a DeltaBuffer
   holding the last (canary.length-1) chars; concat tail + chunk, check,
   then trim. Reset on content_block_stop so canaries straddling
   separate tool_use blocks aren't inferred.

2. Transcript classifier tool_output context. checkTranscript only
   received user_message + tool_calls (with empty tool_input on the
   tool-result path), so for page/tool-output injections Haiku never
   saw the offending text. Only testsavant_content got a signal, and
   2-of-N degraded it to WARN. Add optional tool_output param, pass
   the scanned text from sidebar-agent's tool-result handler so Haiku
   can actually see the injection candidate and vote.

Both found by claude adversarial + codex adversarial agreeing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): tool-output context allows single-layer BLOCK

combineVerdict's 2-of-N ensemble rule was designed for user input —
the Stack Overflow FP mitigation where a dev asking about injection
shouldn't kill the session. For tool output (page content, Read/Grep
results), the content wasn't user-authored, so that FP risk doesn't
apply. Before this change: testsavant_content=0.99 on a hostile page
downgraded to WARN when the transcript classifier degraded (timeout,
Haiku unavailable) or voted differently.

Add CombineVerdictOpts.toolOutput flag. When true, a single ML
classifier >= BLOCK threshold blocks directly. User-input default
path unchanged — still requires 2-of-N to block.

Caller: sidebar-agent.ts tool-result scan now passes { toolOutput: true }.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): regression tests for 4 adversarial-review fixes

11 tests pinning the four fixes so future refactors don't silently
re-open the bypasses:

- Canary rolling-buffer detection (DeltaBuffer + slice tail)
- Tool-output single-layer BLOCK (new combineVerdict opt)
- escapeHtml quote escaping (both " and ')
- snapshot in PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS
- GSTACK_SECURITY_OFF kill switch gates both load paths
- checkTranscript.tool_output plumbing on tool-result scan

Most are source-level string contracts (not behavior) because the
alternative — real browser/subprocess wiring — would push these into
periodic-tier eval cost. The contracts catch the regression I care
about: did someone rename the flag or revert the guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: CHANGELOG hardening section + TODOS mark Read/Glob/Grep shipped

CHANGELOG v1.4.0.0 gains a "Hardening during ship" subsection covering
the 4 adversarial-review fixes landed after the initial bump (canary
split, snapshot envelope, tool-output single-layer BLOCK, Haiku
tool-output context). Test count updated 243 → 280 to reflect the
source-contracts + adversarial-fix regression suites.

TODOS: Read/Glob/Grep tool-output scan marked SHIPPED (was P2 open).
Cross-references the hardening commits so follow-up readers see the
full arc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: document sidebar prompt injection defense across user docs

README adds a user-facing paragraph on the layered defense with links to
ARCHITECTURE. ARCHITECTURE gains a "Prompt injection defense (sidebar
agent)" subsection under Security model covering the L1-L6 layers, the
Bun-compile import constraint, env knobs, and visibility affordances.
BROWSER.md expands the "Untrusted content" note into a concrete
description of the classifier stack. docs/skills.md adds a defense
sentence to the /open-gstack-browser deep dive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): k-anon suppression in community-pulse attack aggregate

Top-N attacked domains + layer distribution previously listed every
value with count>=1. With a small gstack community, that leaks
single-user attribution: if only one user is getting hit on
example.com, example.com appears in the aggregate as "1 attack,
1 domain" — easy to deanonymize when you know who's targeted.

Add K_ANON=5 threshold: a domain (or layer) must be reported by at
least 5 distinct installations before appearing in the aggregate.
Verdict distribution stays unfiltered (block/warn/log_only is
low-cardinality + population-wide, no re-id risk).

Raw rows already locked to service_role only (002_tighten_rls.sql);
this closes the aggregate-channel leak.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): decision file primitives for human-in-the-loop review

Adds writeDecision/readDecision/clearDecision around
~/.gstack/security/decisions/tab-<id>.json plus excerptForReview() for
safe UI display of tool output. Also extends Verdict with
'user_overrode' so attack-log audit trails distinguish genuine blocks
from user-acknowledged continues.

Pure primitives, no behavior change on their own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): POST /security-decision + relay reviewable banner fields

Two small server changes, one feature:

1. New POST /security-decision endpoint takes {tabId, decision} JSON
   and writes the per-tab decision file. Auth-gated like every other
   sidebar-agent control endpoint.

2. processAgentEvent relays the new reviewable/suspected_text/tabId
   fields on security_event through to the chat entry so the sidepanel
   banner can render [Allow] / [Block] buttons and the excerpt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): wait-for-decision instead of hard-kill on tool-output BLOCK

Was: tool-output BLOCK → immediate SIGTERM, session dies, user
stranded. A false positive on benign content (e.g. HN comments
discussing prompt injection) killed the session and lost the message.

Now: tool-output BLOCK → emit security_event with reviewable:true +
suspected_text + per-layer scores. Poll ~/.gstack/security/decisions/
for up to 60s. On "allow" — log the override to attempts.jsonl as
verdict=user_overrode and let the session continue. On "block" or
timeout — kill as before.

Canary leaks stay hard-stop (no review path). User-input pre-spawn
scans unchanged in this commit. Only tool-output scans gain review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(ui): reviewable security banner with suspected-text + Allow/Block

Banner previously always rendered "Session terminated" — one-way. Now
when security_event.reviewable=true:

- Title switches to "Review suspected injection"
- Subtitle explains the decision ("allow to continue, block to end")
- Expandable details auto-open so the user sees context immediately
- Suspected text excerpt rendered in a mono pre block, scrollable,
  capped at 500 chars server-side
- Per-layer confidence scores (which layer fired, how confident)
- Action row with red [Block session] + neutral [Allow and continue]
- Click posts to /security-decision, banner hides, sidebar-agent
  sees the file and resumes or kills within one poll cycle

Existing hard-block banner (terminated session, canary leaks) unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): review-flow regression tests

16 tests for the file-based handshake: round-trip, clear, permissions,
atomic write tmp-file cleanup, excerpt sanitization (truncation, ctrl
chars, whitespace collapse), and a simulated poll-loop confirming
allow/block/timeout behavior the sidebar-agent relies on.

Pins the contract so future refactors can't silently break the
allow-path recovery and ship people back into the hard-kill FP pit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): sidepanel review E2E — Playwright drives Allow/Block

5 tests, ~13s, gate tier. Loads real extension sidepanel in Playwright
Chromium with stubbed chrome.runtime + fetch, injects a reviewable
security_event, and drives the user path end-to-end:

- banner title flips to "Review suspected injection"
- suspected text excerpt renders inside the auto-expanded details
- Allow + Block buttons are visible
- click Allow → POST /security-decision with decision:"allow"
- click Block → POST /security-decision with decision:"block"
- banner auto-hides after each decision
- non-reviewable events keep the hard-stop framing (regression guard)
- XSS guard: script-tagged suspected_text doesn't execute

Complements security-review-flow.test.ts (unit-level file handshake)
and security-review-fullstack.test.ts (full pipeline with real
classifier).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): mock-claude scenario for tool-result injection path

Adds MOCK_CLAUDE_SCENARIO=tool_result_injection. Emits a Bash tool_use
followed by a user-role tool_result whose content is a classic
DAN-style prompt-injection string. The warm TestSavantAI classifier
trips at 0.9999 on this text, reliably firing the tool-output BLOCK +
review flow for the full-stack E2E.

Stays alive up to 120s so a test has time to propagate the user's
review decision via /security-decision + the on-disk decision file.
SIGTERM exits 143 on user-confirmed block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): full-stack review E2E — real classifier + mock-claude

3 tests, ~12s hot / ~30s cold (first-run model download). Skips
gracefully if ~/.gstack/models/testsavant-small/ isn't populated.

Spins up real server + real sidebar-agent + PATH-shimmed mock-claude,
HOME re-rooted so neither the chat history nor the attempts log leak
from the user's live /open-gstack-browser session. Models dir
symlinked through to the real warmed cache so the test doesn't
re-download 112MB per run.

Covers the half that hermetic tests can't:
- real classifier (not a stub) fires on real injection text
- sidebar-agent emits a reviewable security_event end-to-end
- server writes the on-disk decision file
- sidebar-agent's poll loop reads the file and acts
- attempts.jsonl gets both block + user_overrode with matching
  payloadHash (dashboard can aggregate)
- the raw payload never appears in attempts.jsonl (privacy contract)

Caught a real bug while writing: the server loads pre-existing chat
history from ~/.gstack/sidebar-sessions/, so re-rooting HOME for only
the agent leaked ghost security_events from the live session into the
test. Fix: re-root HOME for both processes. The harness is cleaner for
future full-stack tests because of it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): unbreak Haiku transcript classifier — wrong model + too-tight timeout

Two bugs that made checkTranscript return degraded on every call:

1. --model 'haiku-4-5' returns 404 from the Claude CLI. The accepted
   shorthand is 'haiku' (resolves to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001
   today, stays on the latest Haiku as models roll). Symptom: every
   call exited non-zero with api_error_status=404.

2. 2000ms timeout is below the floor. Fresh `claude -p` spawn has
   ~2-3s CLI cold-start + 5-12s inference on ~1KB prompts. With the
   wrong model gone, every successful call still timed out before it
   returned. Measured: 0% firing rate.

Fix: model alias + 15s timeout. Sanity check against DAN-style
injection now returns confidence 0.99 with reasoning ("Tool output
contains multiple injection patterns: instruction override, jailbreak
attempt (DAN), system prompt exfil request, and malicious curl
command to attacker domain") in 8.7s.

This was the silent cause of the 15.3% detection rate on
BrowseSafe-Bench — the ensemble numbers matched L4-alone because
Haiku never actually voted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(security): always run Haiku on tool outputs (drop the L4 gate)

Tool-result scan previously short-circuited when L4 (TestSavantAI)
scored below WARN, and further gated Haiku on any layer firing at >=
LOG_ONLY. On BrowseSafe-Bench that meant Haiku almost never ran,
because TestSavantAI has ~15% recall on browser-agent-specific
attacks (social engineering, indirect injection). We were gating our
best signal on our weakest.

Run all three classifiers (L4 + L4c + Haiku) in parallel. Cost:
~$0.002 + ~8s Haiku wall time per tool result, bounded by the 15s
Haiku timeout. Haiku also runs in parallel with the content scans
so it's additive only against the stream handler budget, not
against the session wall time.

User-input pre-spawn path unchanged — shouldRunTranscriptCheck still
gates there. The Stack Overflow FP mitigation that original gate was
built for still applies to direct user input; tool outputs have
different characteristics.

Source-contract test updated to pin the new parallel-three shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(changelog): measured BrowseSafe-Bench lift from Haiku unbreak

Before/after on the 200-case smoke cache:
  L4-only:  15.3% detection / 11.8% FP
  Ensemble: 67.3% detection / 44.1% FP

4.4x lift in detection from fixing the model alias + timeout + removing
the pre-Haiku gate on tool outputs. FP rate up 3.7x — Haiku is more
aggressive than L4 on edge cases. Review banner makes those recoverable;
P1 follow-up to tune Haiku WARN threshold from 0.6 to ~0.7-0.85 once
real attempts.jsonl data arrives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(todos): P0 Haiku FP tuning + P1-P3 follow-ups from bench data

BrowseSafe-Bench smoke showed 67.3% detection / 44.1% FP post-Haiku-
unbreak. Detection is good enough to ship. FP rate is too high for a
delightful default even with the review banner softening the blow.

Files four tuning items with concrete knobs + targets:

- P0 Cut Haiku FP toward 15% via (1) verdict-based counting instead
  of confidence threshold, (2) tighter classifier prompt, (3) 6-8
  few-shot exemplars, (4) bump WARN threshold 0.6 -> 0.75
- P1 Cache review decisions per (domain, payload-hash) so repeat
  scans don't re-prompt
- P2 research: fine-tune BERT-base on BrowseSafe-Bench + Qualifire +
  xxz224 — expected 15% -> 70% L4 recall
- P2 Flip DeBERTa ensemble from opt-in to default
- P3 User-feedback flywheel — Allow/Block decisions become training
  data (guardrails required)

Ordered so P0 ships next sprint and can be measured against the same
bench corpus. All items depend on v1.4.0.0 landing first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): assert block stops further tool calls, allow lets them through

Gap caught by user: the review-flow tests verified the decision path
(POST, file write, agent_error emission) but not the actual security
property — that Block stops subsequent tool calls and Allow lets them
continue.

Mock-claude tool_result_injection scenario now emits a second tool_use
~8s after the injected tool_result, targeting post-block-followup.
example.com. If block really blocks, that event never reaches the
chat feed (SIGTERM killed the subprocess before it emitted). If allow
really allows, it does.

Allow test asserts the followup tool_use DOES appear → session lives.
Block test asserts the followup tool_use does NOT appear after 12s →
kill actually stopped further work. Both tests previously proved the
control plane (decision file → agent poll → agent_error); they now
prove the data plane too.

Test timeout bumped 60s → 90s to accommodate the 12s quiet window.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 22:18:37 +08:00
Garry Tan b73f364411 feat: browser data platform for AI agents (v0.16.0.0) (#907)
* refactor: extract path-security.ts shared module

validateOutputPath, validateReadPath, and SAFE_DIRECTORIES were duplicated
across write-commands.ts, meta-commands.ts, and read-commands.ts. Extract
to a single shared module with re-exports for backward compatibility.

Also adds validateTempPath() for the upcoming GET /file endpoint (TEMP_DIR
only, not cwd, to prevent remote agents from reading project files).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: default paired agents to full access, split SCOPE_CONTROL

The trust boundary for paired agents is the pairing ceremony itself, not
the scope. An agent with write scope can already click anything and navigate
anywhere. Gating js/cookies behind --admin was security theater.

Changes:
- Default pair scopes: read+write+admin+meta (was read+write)
- New SCOPE_CONTROL for browser-wide destructive ops (stop, restart,
  disconnect, state, handoff, resume, connect)
- --admin flag now grants control scope (backward compat)
- New --restrict flag for limited access (e.g., --restrict read)
- Updated hint text: "re-pair with --control" instead of "--admin"

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add media and data commands for page content extraction

media command: discovers all img/video/audio/background-image elements
on the page. Returns JSON with URLs, dimensions, srcset, loading state,
HLS/DASH detection. Supports --images/--videos/--audio filters and
optional CSS selector scoping.

data command: extracts structured data embedded in pages (JSON-LD,
Open Graph, Twitter Cards, meta tags). One command returns product
prices, article metadata, social share info without DOM scraping.

Both are READ scope with untrusted content wrapping.
Shared media-extract.ts helper for reuse by the upcoming scrape command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add download, scrape, and archive commands

download: fetch any URL or @ref element to disk using browser session
cookies via page.request.fetch(). Supports blob: URLs via in-page
base64 conversion. --base64 flag returns inline data URI (cap 10MB).
Detects HLS/DASH and rejects with yt-dlp hint.

scrape: bulk media download composing media discovery + download loop.
Sequential with 100ms delay, URL deduplication, configurable --limit.
Writes manifest.json with per-file metadata for machine consumption.

archive: saves complete page as MHTML via CDP Page.captureSnapshot.
No silent fallback -- errors clearly if CDP unavailable.

All three are WRITE scope (write to disk, blocked in watch mode).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add GET /file endpoint for remote agent file retrieval

Remote paired agents can now retrieve downloaded files over HTTP.
TEMP_DIR only (not cwd) to prevent project file exfiltration.

- Bearer token auth (root or scoped with read scope)
- Path validation via validateTempPath() (symlink-aware)
- 200MB size cap
- Extension-based MIME detection
- Zero-copy streaming via Bun.file()

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add scroll --times N for automated repeated scrolling

Extends the scroll command with --times N flag for infinite feed
scraping. Scrolls N times with configurable --wait delay (default
1000ms) between each scroll for content loading.

Usage: scroll --times 10
       scroll --times 5 --wait 2000
       scroll --times 3 .feed-container

Composable with scrape: scroll to load content, then scrape images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add network response body capture (--capture/--export/--bodies)

The killer feature for social media scraping. Extends the existing
network command to intercept API response bodies:

  network --capture [--filter graphql]  # start capturing
  network --capture stop                # stop
  network --export /tmp/api.jsonl       # export as JSONL
  network --bodies                      # show summary

Uses page.on('response') listener with URL pattern filtering.
SizeCappedBuffer (50MB total, 5MB per-entry cap) evicts oldest
entries when full. Binary responses stored as base64, text as-is.

This lets agents tap Instagram's GraphQL API, TikTok's hydration
data, and any SPA's internal API responses instead of fragile DOM
scraping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add screenshot --base64 for inline image return

Returns data:image/png;base64,... instead of writing to disk.
Cap at 10MB. Works with all screenshot modes (element, clip, viewport).

Eliminates the two-step screenshot+file-serve dance for remote agents.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add data platform tests and media fixture

Tests for SizeCappedBuffer (eviction, export, summary), validateTempPath
(TEMP_DIR only, rejects cwd), command registration (all new commands in
correct scope sets), and MIME mapping source checks.

Rich HTML fixture with: standard images, lazy-loaded images, srcset,
video with sources + HLS, audio, CSS background-images, JSON-LD,
Open Graph, Twitter Cards, and meta tags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: regenerate SKILL.md with Extraction category

Add Extraction category to browse command table ordering. Regenerate
SKILL.md files to include media, data, download, scrape, archive
commands in the generated documentation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.0.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-08 00:41:55 -07:00
Garry Tan 8ca950f6f1 feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815)
* feat: token registry for multi-agent browser access

Per-agent scoped tokens with read/write/admin/meta command categories,
domain glob restrictions, rate limiting, expiry, and revocation. Setup
key exchange for the /pair-agent ceremony (5-min one-time key → 24h
session token). Idempotent exchange handles tunnel drops. 39 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: integrate token registry + scoped auth into browse server

Server changes for multi-agent browser access:
- /connect endpoint: setup key exchange for /pair-agent ceremony
- /token endpoint: root-only minting of scoped sub-tokens
- /token/:clientId DELETE: revoke agent tokens
- /agents endpoint: list connected agents (root-only)
- /health: strips root token when tunnel is active (P0 security fix)
- /command: scope/rate/domain checks via token registry before dispatch
- Idle timer skips shutdown when tunnel is active

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: ngrok tunnel integration + @ngrok/ngrok dependency

BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 env var starts an ngrok tunnel after Bun.serve().
Reads NGROK_AUTHTOKEN from env or ~/.gstack/ngrok.env. Reads
NGROK_DOMAIN for dedicated domain (stable URL). Updates state
file with tunnel URL. Feasibility spike confirmed: SDK works in
compiled Bun binary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: tab isolation for multi-agent browser access

Add per-tab ownership tracking to BrowserManager. Scoped agents
must create their own tab via newtab before writing. Unowned tabs
(pre-existing, user-opened) are root-only for writes. Read access
always allowed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: tab enforcement + POST /pair endpoint + activity attribution

Server-side tab ownership check blocks scoped agents from writing to
unowned tabs. Special-case newtab records ownership for scoped tokens.
POST /pair endpoint creates setup keys for the pairing ceremony.
Activity events now include clientId for attribution.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: pair-agent CLI command + instruction block generator

One command to pair a remote agent: $B pair-agent. Creates a setup
key via POST /pair, prints a copy-pasteable instruction block with
curl commands. Smart tunnel fallback (tunnel URL > auto-start >
localhost). Flags: --for HOST, --local HOST, --admin, --client NAME.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: tab isolation + instruction block generator tests

14 tests covering tab ownership lifecycle (access checks, unowned
tabs, transferTab) and instruction block generator (scopes, URLs,
admin flag, troubleshooting section). Fix server-auth test that
used fragile sliceBetween boundaries broken by new endpoints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.9.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: CSO security fixes — token leak, domain bypass, input validation

1. Remove root token from /health endpoint entirely (CSO #1 CRITICAL).
   Origin header is spoofable. Extension reads from ~/.gstack/.auth.json.
2. Add domain check for newtab URL (CSO #5). Previously only goto was
   checked, allowing domain-restricted agents to bypass via newtab.
3. Validate scope values, rateLimit, expiresSeconds in createToken()
   (CSO #4). Rejects invalid scopes and negative values.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: /pair-agent skill — syntactic sugar for browser sharing

Users remember /pair-agent, not $B pair-agent. The skill walks through
agent selection (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Cursor, generic), local vs
remote setup, tunnel configuration, and includes platform-specific
notes for each agent type. Wraps the CLI command with context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: remote browser access reference for paired agents

Full API reference, snapshot→@ref pattern, scopes, tab isolation,
error codes, ngrok setup, and same-machine shortcuts. The instruction
block points here for deeper reading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: improved instruction block with snapshot→@ref pattern

The paste-into-agent instruction block now teaches the snapshot→@ref
workflow (the most powerful browsing pattern), shows the server URL
prominently, and uses clearer formatting. Tests updated to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: smart ngrok detection + auto-tunnel in pair-agent

The pair-agent command now checks ngrok's native config (not just
~/.gstack/ngrok.env) and auto-starts the tunnel when ngrok is
available. The skill template walks users through ngrok install
and auth if not set up, instead of just printing a dead localhost
URL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: on-demand tunnel start via POST /tunnel/start

pair-agent now auto-starts the ngrok tunnel without restarting the
server. New POST /tunnel/start endpoint reads authtoken from env,
~/.gstack/ngrok.env, or ngrok's native config. CLI detects ngrok
availability and calls the endpoint automatically. Zero manual steps
when ngrok is installed and authed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pair-agent skill must output the instruction block verbatim

Added CRITICAL instruction: the agent MUST output the full instruction
block so the user can copy it. Previously the agent could summarize
over it, leaving the user with nothing to paste.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scoped tokens rejected on /command — auth gate ordering bug

The blanket validateAuth() gate (root-only) sat above the /command
endpoint, rejecting all scoped tokens with 401 before they reached
getTokenInfo(). Moved /command above the gate so both root and
scoped tokens are accepted. This was the bug Wintermute hit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: pair-agent auto-launches headed mode before pairing

When pair-agent detects headless mode, it auto-switches to headed
(visible Chromium window) so the user can watch what the remote
agent does. Use --headless to skip this. Fixed compiled binary
path resolution (process.execPath, not process.argv[1] which is
virtual /$bunfs/ in Bun compiled binaries).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: comprehensive tests for auth ordering, tunnel, ngrok, headed mode

16 new tests covering:
- /command sits above blanket auth gate (Wintermute bug)
- /command uses getTokenInfo not validateAuth
- /tunnel/start requires root, checks native ngrok config, returns already_active
- /pair creates setup keys not session tokens
- Tab ownership checked before command dispatch
- Activity events include clientId
- Instruction block teaches snapshot→@ref pattern
- pair-agent auto-headed mode, process.execPath, --headless skip
- isNgrokAvailable checks all 3 sources (gstack env, env var, native config)
- handlePairAgent calls /tunnel/start not server restart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled

1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before
   executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to
   admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without
   scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into
   the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails.

2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage,
   session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status,
   mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone
   reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: tout /pair-agent as headline feature in CHANGELOG + README

Lead with what it does for the user: type /pair-agent, paste into
your other agent, done. First time AI agents from different companies
can coordinate through a shared browser with real security boundaries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: expand /pair-agent, /design-shotgun, /design-html in README

Each skill gets a real narrative paragraph explaining the workflow,
not just a table cell. design-shotgun: visual exploration with taste
memory. design-html: production HTML with Pretext computed layout.
pair-agent: cross-vendor AI agent coordination through shared browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: split handleCommand into handleCommandInternal + HTTP wrapper

Chain subcommands now route through handleCommandInternal for full security
enforcement (scope, domain, tab ownership, rate limiting, content wrapping).
Adds recursion guard for nested chains, rate-limit exemption for chain
subcommands, and activity event suppression (1 event per chain, not per sub).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add content-security.ts with datamarking, envelope, and filter hooks

Four-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent browser sharing:
- Datamarking: session-scoped watermark for text exfiltration detection
- Content envelope: trust boundary wrapping with ZWSP marker escaping
- Content filter hooks: extensible filter pipeline with warn/block modes
- Built-in URL blocklist: requestbin, pipedream, webhook.site, etc.

BROWSE_CONTENT_FILTER env var controls mode: off|warn|block (default: warn)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: centralize content wrapping in handleCommandInternal response path

Single wrapping location replaces fragmented per-handler wrapping:
- Scoped tokens: content filters + datamarking + enhanced envelope
- Root tokens: existing basic wrapping (backward compat)
- Chain subcommands exempt from top-level wrapping (wrapped individually)
- Adds 'attrs' to PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS (ARIA value exposure defense)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: hidden element stripping for scoped token text extraction

Detects CSS-hidden elements (opacity, font-size, off-screen, same-color,
clip-path) and ARIA label injection patterns. Marks elements with
data-gstack-hidden, extracts text from a clean clone (no DOM mutation),
then removes markers. Only active for scoped tokens on text command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: snapshot split output format for scoped tokens

Scoped tokens get a split snapshot: trusted @refs section (for click/fill)
separated from untrusted web content in an envelope. Ref names truncated
to 50 chars in trusted section. Root tokens unchanged (backward compat).
Resume command also uses split format for scoped tokens.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add SECURITY section to pair-agent instruction block

Instructs remote agents to treat content inside untrusted envelopes
as potentially malicious. Lists common injection phrases to watch for.
Directs agents to only use @refs from the trusted INTERACTIVE ELEMENTS
section, not from page content.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add 4 prompt injection test fixtures

- injection-visible.html: visible injection in product review text
- injection-hidden.html: 7 CSS hiding techniques + ARIA injection + false positive
- injection-social.html: social engineering in legitimate-looking content
- injection-combined.html: all attack types + envelope escape attempt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: comprehensive content security tests (47 tests)

Covers all 4 defense layers:
- Datamarking: marker format, session consistency, text-only application
- Content envelope: wrapping, ZWSP marker escaping, filter warnings
- Content filter hooks: URL blocklist, custom filters, warn/block modes
- Instruction block: SECURITY section content, ordering, generation
- Centralized wrapping: source-level verification of integration
- Chain security: recursion guard, rate-limit exemption, activity suppression
- Hidden element stripping: 7 CSS techniques, ARIA injection, false positives
- Snapshot split format: scoped vs root output, resume integration

Also fixes: visibility:hidden detection, case-insensitive ARIA pattern matching.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pair-agent skill compliance + fix all 16 pre-existing test failures

Root cause: pair-agent was added without completing the gen-skill-docs
compliance checklist. All 16 failures traced back to this.

Fixes:
- Sync package.json version to VERSION (0.15.9.0)
- Add "(gstack)" to pair-agent description for discoverability
- Add pair-agent to Codex path exception (legitimately documents ~/.codex/)
- Add CLI_COMMANDS (status, pair-agent, tunnel) to skill parser allowlist
- Regenerate SKILL.md for all hosts (claude, codex, factory, kiro, etc.)
- Update golden file baselines for ship skill
- Fix relink tests: pass GSTACK_INSTALL_DIR to auto-relink calls so they
  use the fast mock install instead of scanning real ~/.claude/skills/gstack

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: E2E exit reason precedence + worktree prune race condition

Two fixes for E2E test reliability:

1. session-runner.ts: error_max_turns was misclassified as error_api
   because is_error flag was checked before subtype. Now known subtypes
   like error_max_turns are preserved even when is_error is set. The
   is_error override only applies when subtype=success (API failure).

2. worktree.ts: pruneStale() now skips worktrees < 1 hour old to avoid
   deleting worktrees from concurrent test runs still in progress.
   Previously any second test execution would kill the first's worktrees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restore token in /health for localhost extension auth

The CSO security fix stripped the token from /health to prevent leaking
when tunneled. But the extension needs it to authenticate on localhost.
Now returns token only when not tunneled (safe: localhost-only path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: verify /health token is localhost-only, never served through tunnel

Updated tests to match the restored token behavior:
- Test 1: token assignment exists AND is inside the !tunnelActive guard
- Test 1b: tunnel branch (else block) does not contain AUTH_TOKEN

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add security rationale for token in /health on localhost

Explains why this is an accepted risk (no escalation over file-based
token access), CORS protection, and tunnel guard. Prevents future
CSO scans from stripping it without providing an alternative auth path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: verify tunnel is alive before returning URL to pair-agent

Root cause: when ngrok dies externally (pkill, crash, timeout), the server
still reports tunnelActive=true with a dead URL. pair-agent prints an
instruction block pointing at a dead tunnel. The remote agent gets
"endpoint offline" and the user has to manually restart everything.

Three-layer fix:
- Server /pair endpoint: probes tunnel URL before returning it. If dead,
  resets tunnelActive/tunnelUrl and returns null (triggers CLI restart).
- Server /tunnel/start: probes cached tunnel before returning already_active.
  If dead, falls through to restart ngrok automatically.
- CLI pair-agent: double-checks tunnel URL from server before printing
  instruction block. Falls through to auto-start on failure.

4 regression tests verify all three probe points + CLI verification.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add POST /batch endpoint for multi-command batching

Remote agents controlling GStack Browser through a tunnel pay 2-5s of
latency per HTTP round-trip. A typical "navigate and read" takes 4
sequential commands = 10-20 seconds. The /batch endpoint collapses N
commands into a single HTTP round-trip, cutting a 20-tab crawl from
~60s to ~5s.

Sequential execution through the full security pipeline (scope, domain,
tab ownership, content wrapping). Rate limiting counts the batch as 1
request. Activity events emitted at batch level, not per-command.
Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add source-level security tests for /batch endpoint

8 tests verifying: auth gate placement, scoped token support, max
command limit, nested batch rejection, rate limiting bypass, batch-level
activity events, command field validation, and tabId passthrough.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct CHANGELOG date from 2026-04-06 to 2026-04-05

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: consolidate Hermes into generic HTTP option in pair-agent

Hermes doesn't have a host-specific config — it uses the same generic
curl instructions as any other agent. Removing the dedicated option
simplifies the menu and eliminates a misleading distinction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump VERSION to 0.15.14.0, add CHANGELOG entry for batch endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate pair-agent/SKILL.md after main merge

Vendoring deprecation section from main's template wasn't reflected
in the generated file. Fixes check-freshness CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: checkTabAccess uses options object, add own-only tab policy

Refactors checkTabAccess(tabId, clientId, isWrite) to use an options
object { isWrite?, ownOnly? }. Adds tabPolicy === 'own-only' support
in the server command dispatch — scoped tokens with this policy are
restricted to their own tabs for all commands, not just writes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add --domain flag to pair-agent CLI for domain restrictions

Allows passing --domain to pair-agent to restrict the remote agent's
navigation to specific domains (comma-separated).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert: remove batch commands CHANGELOG entry and VERSION bump

The batch endpoint work belongs on the browser-batch-multitab branch
(port-louis), not this branch. Reverting VERSION to 0.15.14.0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: adopt main's headed-mode /health token serving

Our merge kept the old !tunnelActive guard which conflicted with
main's security-audit-r2 tests that require no currentUrl/currentMessage
in /health. Adopts main's approach: serve token conditionally based on
headed mode or chrome-extension origin. Updates server-auth tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: improve snapshot flags docs completeness for LLM judge

Adds $B placeholder explanation, explicit syntax line, and detailed
flag behavior (-d depth values, -s CSS selector syntax, -D unified
diff format and baseline persistence, -a screenshot vs text output
relationship). Fixes snapshot flags reference LLM eval scoring
completeness < 4.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-06 14:41:06 -07:00
Garry Tan a94a64f821 fix: snapshot -i auto-detects dropdown/popover interactive elements (#845)
* fix: snapshot -i auto-detects dropdown/popover interactive elements

- Auto-enable cursor-interactive scan (-C) when -i flag is used
- Add floating container detection (portals, popovers, dropdowns)
  - Detects position:fixed/absolute with high z-index
  - Recognizes data-floating-ui-portal, data-radix-* attributes
  - Recognizes role=listbox, role=menu containers
- Elements inside floating containers bypass the hasRole skip
  - Catches dropdown items missed by the accessibility tree
- Role=option/menuitem elements in floating containers captured
  even without cursor:pointer/onclick
- Tag floating container items with 'popover-child' reason
- Include role name in @c ref reasons when present
- Add dropdown.html test fixture
- Add dropdown/popover detection test suite (6 tests)
- Add test: -i alone includes cursor-interactive elements

Fixes: Bookface autocomplete, Radix UI combobox, React portals,
and similar dynamic dropdown patterns where ariaSnapshot() misses
the floating content.

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update snapshot -i/-C flag descriptions to mention auto-enable behavior

* test: strengthen clickability test guard assertions

The @c ref clickability test previously used if-guards that would
silently pass when no Alice line was found in the snapshot output.
Both Claude and Codex adversarial review flagged this as a test that
could regress without CI noticing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: regenerate top-level SKILL.md with updated flag descriptions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost>
Co-authored-by: gstack <ship@gstack.dev>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 22:57:45 -07:00
root 237ae2abbe Revert "fix: snapshot -i auto-detects dropdown/popover interactive elements (#844)"
This reverts commit 542e7836d0.
2026-04-06 03:27:13 +00:00
Garry Tan 542e7836d0 fix: snapshot -i auto-detects dropdown/popover interactive elements (#844)
- Auto-enable cursor-interactive scan (-C) when -i flag is used
- Add floating container detection (portals, popovers, dropdowns)
  - Detects position:fixed/absolute with high z-index
  - Recognizes data-floating-ui-portal, data-radix-* attributes
  - Recognizes role=listbox, role=menu containers
- Elements inside floating containers bypass the hasRole skip
  - Catches dropdown items missed by the accessibility tree
- Role=option/menuitem elements in floating containers captured
  even without cursor:pointer/onclick
- Tag floating container items with 'popover-child' reason
- Include role name in @c ref reasons when present
- Add dropdown.html test fixture
- Add dropdown/popover detection test suite (6 tests)
- Add test: -i alone includes cursor-interactive elements

Fixes: Bookface autocomplete, Radix UI combobox, React portals,
and similar dynamic dropdown patterns where ariaSnapshot() misses
the floating content.

Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost>
2026-04-05 20:25:12 -07:00
Garry Tan 7665adf4fe feat: headed mode + sidebar agent + Chrome extension (v0.12.0) (#517)
* feat: CDP connect — control real Chrome/Comet via Playwright

Add `connectCDP()` to BrowserManager: connects to a running browser via
Chrome DevTools Protocol. All existing browse commands work unchanged
through Playwright's abstraction layer.

- chrome-launcher.ts: browser discovery, CDP probe, auto-relaunch with rollback
- browser-manager.ts: connectCDP(), mode guards (close/closeTab/recreateContext/handoff),
  auto-reconnect on browser restart, getRefMap() for extension API
- server.ts: CDP branch in start(), /health gains mode field, /refs endpoint,
  idle timer only resets on /command (not passive endpoints)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: browse connect/disconnect/focus CLI commands

- connect: pre-server command that discovers browser, starts server in CDP mode
- disconnect: drops CDP connection, restarts in headless mode
- focus: brings browser window to foreground via osascript (macOS)
- status: now shows Mode: cdp | launched | headed
- startServer() accepts extra env vars for CDP URL/port passthrough

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: CDP-aware skill templates — skip cookie import in real browser mode

Skills now check `$B status` for CDP mode and skip:
- /qa: cookie import prompt, user-agent override, headless workarounds
- /design-review: cookie import for authenticated pages
- /setup-browser-cookies: returns "not needed" in CDP mode

Regenerated SKILL.md files from updated templates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: activity streaming — SSE endpoint for Chrome extension Side Panel

Real-time browse command feed via Server-Sent Events:
- activity.ts: ActivityEntry type, CircularBuffer (capacity 1000), privacy
  filtering (redacts passwords, auth tokens, sensitive URL params),
  cursor-based gap detection, async subscriber notification
- server.ts: /activity/stream SSE, /activity/history REST, handleCommand
  instrumented with command_start/command_end events
- 18 unit tests for filterArgs privacy, emitActivity, subscribe lifecycle

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: Chrome extension Side Panel + Conductor API proposal

Chrome extension (Manifest V3, sideload):
- Side Panel with live activity feed, @ref overlays, dark terminal aesthetic
- Background worker: health polling, SSE relay, ref fetching
- Popup: port config, connection status, side panel launcher
- Content script: floating ref panel with @ref badges

Conductor API proposal (docs/designs/CONDUCTOR_SESSION_API.md):
- SSE endpoint for full Claude Code session mirroring in Side Panel
- Discovery via HTTP endpoint (not filesystem — extensions can't read files)

TODOS.md: add $B watch, multi-agent tabs, cross-platform CDP, Web Store publishing.
Mark CDP mode as shipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: detect Conductor runtime, skip osascript quit for sandboxed apps

macOS App Management blocks Electron apps (Conductor) from quitting
other apps via osascript. Now detects the runtime environment:
- terminal/claude-code/codex: can manage apps freely
- conductor: prints manual restart instructions + polls for 60s

detectRuntime() checks env vars and parent process. When Chrome needs
restart but we can't quit it, prints step-by-step instructions and
waits for the user to restart Chrome with --remote-debugging-port.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: detect Conductor via actual env vars (CONDUCTOR_WORKSPACE_NAME)

Previous detection checked CONDUCTOR_WORKSPACE_ID which doesn't exist.
Conductor sets CONDUCTOR_WORKSPACE_NAME, CONDUCTOR_BIN_DIR, CONDUCTOR_PORT,
and __CFBundleIdentifier=com.conductor.app. Check these FIRST because
Conductor sessions also have ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (which was matching claude-code).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: connection status pill — floating indicator when gstack controls Chrome

Small pill in bottom-right corner of every page: "● gstack · 3 refs"
Shows when connected via CDP, fades to 30% opacity after 3s, full on hover.
Disappears entirely when disconnected.

Background worker now notifies content scripts on connect/disconnect state
changes so the pill appears/disappears without polling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: Chrome requires --user-data-dir for remote debugging

Chrome refuses --remote-debugging-port without an explicit --user-data-dir.
Add userDataDir to BrowserBinary registry (macOS Application Support paths)
and pass it in both auto-launch and manual restart instructions.

Fix double-quoting in CLI manual restart instructions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: Chrome must be fully quit before launching with --remote-debugging-port

Chrome refuses to enable CDP on its default profile when another instance
is running (even with explicit --user-data-dir). The only reliable path:
fully quit Chrome first, then relaunch with the flag.

Updated instructions to emphasize this clearly with verification step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: bin/chrome-cdp — quit Chrome and relaunch with CDP in one command

Quits Chrome gracefully, waits for full exit, relaunches with
--remote-debugging-port, polls until CDP is ready. Usage: chrome-cdp [port]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use Playwright channel:chrome instead of broken connectOverCDP

Playwright's connectOverCDP hangs with Chrome 146 due to CDP protocol
version mismatch. Switch to channel:'chrome' which uses Playwright's
native pipe protocol to launch the system Chrome binary directly.

This is simpler and more reliable:
- No CDP port discovery needed
- No --remote-debugging-port or --user-data-dir hassles
- $B connect just works — launches real Chrome headed window
- All Playwright APIs (snapshot, click, fill) work unchanged

bin/chrome-cdp updated with symlinked profile approach (kept for
manual CDP use cases, but $B connect no longer needs it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: green border + gstack label on controlled Chrome window

Injects a 2px green border and small "gstack" label on every page
loaded in the controlled Chrome window via context.addInitScript().
Users can instantly tell which Chrome window Claude controls.

Also fixes close() for channel:chrome mode (uses browser.close()
not browser.disconnect() which doesn't exist).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: cleanup chrome-launcher runtime detection, remove puppeteer-core dep

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style(design): redesign controlled Chrome indicator

Replace crude green border + label with polished indicator:
- 2px shimmer gradient at top edge (green→cyan→green, 3s loop)
- Floating pill bottom-right with frosted glass bg, fades to 25%
  opacity after 4s so it doesn't compete with page content
- prefers-reduced-motion disables shimmer animation
- Much more subtle — looks like a developer tool, not broken CSS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: document real browser mode + Chrome extension in BROWSER.md and README.md

BROWSER.md: new sections for connect/disconnect/focus commands,
Chrome extension Side Panel install, CDP-aware skills, activity streaming.
Updated command reference table, key components, env vars, source map.

README.md: updated /browse description, added "Real browser mode" to
What's New section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: step-by-step Chrome extension install guide in BROWSER.md

Replace terse bullet points with numbered walkthrough covering:
developer mode toggle, load unpacked, macOS file picker tip (Cmd+Shift+G),
pin extension, configure port, open side panel. Added troubleshooting section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add Cmd+Shift+. tip for hidden folders in macOS file picker

macOS hides folders starting with . by default. Added both shortcuts:
Cmd+Shift+G (paste path directly) and Cmd+Shift+. (show hidden files).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: integrate hidden folder tips into the install flow naturally

Move Cmd+Shift+G and Cmd+Shift+. tips inline with the file picker
step instead of as a separate tip block after it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: auto-load Chrome extension when $B connect launches Chrome

Extension auto-loads via --load-extension flag — no manual chrome://extensions
install needed. findExtensionPath() checks repo root, global install, and dev
paths. Also adds bin/gstack-extension helper for manual install in regular
Chrome, and rewrites BROWSER.md install docs with auto-load as primary path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: /connect-chrome skill — one command to launch Chrome with Side Panel

New skill that runs $B connect, verifies the connection, guides the user
to open the Side Panel, and demos the live activity feed. Extension auto-loads
via --load-extension so no manual chrome://extensions install needed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use launchPersistentContext for Chrome extension loading

Playwright's chromium.launch() silently ignores --load-extension.
Switch to launchPersistentContext with ignoreDefaultArgs to remove
--disable-extensions flag. Use bundled Chromium (real Chrome blocks
unpacked extensions). Fixed port 34567 for CDP mode so the extension
auto-connects.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: sync extension to DESIGN.md — amber accent, zinc neutrals, grain texture

Import design system from gstack-website. Update all extension colors:
green (#4ade80) → amber (#F59E0B/#FBBF24), zinc gray neutrals, grain
texture overlay. Regenerate icons as amber "G" monogram on dark background.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: sidebar chat with Claude Code — icon opens side panel directly

Replace popup flyout with direct side panel open on icon click. Primary
UI is now a chat interface that sends messages to Claude Code via file
queue. Activity/Refs tabs moved behind a debug toggle in the footer.
Command bar with history, auto-poll for responses, amber design system.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: sidebar agent — Claude-powered chat backend via file queue

Add /sidebar-command, /sidebar-response, and /sidebar-chat endpoints
to the browse server. sidebar-agent.ts watches the command queue file,
spawns claude -p with browse context for each message, and streams
responses back to the sidebar chat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: remove duplicate gstack pill overlay, hide crash restore bubble

The addInitScript indicator and the extension's content script were both
injecting bottom-right pills, causing duplicates. Remove the pill from
addInitScript (extension handles it). Replace --restore-last-session with
--hide-crash-restore-bubble to suppress the "Chromium didn't shut down
correctly" dialog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: state file authority — CDP server cannot be silently replaced

Hardens the connect/disconnect lifecycle:
- ensureServer() refuses to auto-start headless when CDP server is alive
- $B connect does full cleanup: SIGTERM → 2s → SIGKILL, profile locks, state
- shutdown() cleans Chromium SingletonLock/Socket/Cookie files
- uncaughtException/unhandledRejection handlers do emergency cleanup

This prevents the bug where a headless server overwrites the CDP server's
state file, causing $B commands to hit the wrong browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: sidebar agent streaming events + session state management

Enhance sidebar-agent.ts with:
- Live streaming of claude -p events (tool_use, text, result) to sidebar
- Session state file for BROWSE_STATE_FILE propagation to claude subprocess
- Improved logging (stderr, exit codes, event types)
- stdin.end() to prevent claude waiting for input
- summarizeToolInput() with path shortening for compact sidebar display

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: sidebar chat UI — streaming events, agent status, reconnect retry

Sidebar panel improvements:
- Chat tab renders streaming agent events (tool_use, text, result)
- Thinking dots animation while agent processes
- Agent error display with styled error blocks
- tryConnect() with 2s retry loop for initial connection
- Debug tabs (Activity/Refs) hidden behind gear toggle
- Clear chat button
- Compact tool call display with path shortening

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: server-integrated sidebar agent with sessions and message queue

Move the sidebar agent from a separate bun process into server.ts:
- Agent spawns claude -p directly when messages arrive via /sidebar-command
- In-memory chat buffer backed by per-session chat.jsonl on disk
- Session manager: create, load, persist, list sessions
- Message queue (cap 5) with agent status tracking (idle/processing/hung)
- Stop/kill endpoints with queue dismiss support
- /health now returns agent status + session info
- All sidebar endpoints require Bearer auth
- Agent killed on server shutdown
- 120s timeout detects hung claude processes

Eliminates: file-queue polling, separate sidebar-agent.ts process,
stale auth tokens, state file conflicts between processes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: extension auth + token flow for server-integrated agent

Update Chrome extension to use Bearer auth on all sidebar endpoints:
- background.js captures auth token from /health, exposes via getToken msg
- background.js sets openPanelOnActionClick for direct side panel access
- sidepanel.js gets token from background, sends in all fetch headers
- Health broadcasts include token so sidebar auto-authenticates
- Removes popup from manifest — icon click opens side panel directly

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: self-healing sidebar — reconnect banner, state machine, copy button

Sidebar UI now handles disconnection gracefully:
- Connection state machine: connected → reconnecting → dead
- Amber pulsing banner during reconnect (2s retry, 30 attempts)
- Red "Server offline" banner with Reconnect + Copy /connect-chrome buttons
- Green "Reconnected" toast that fades after 3s on successful reconnect
- Copy button lets user paste /connect-chrome into any Claude Code session

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: crash handling — save session, kill agent, distinct exit codes

Hardened shutdown/crash behavior:
- Browser disconnect exits with code 2 (distinct from crash code 1)
- emergencyCleanup kills agent subprocess and saves session state
- Clean shutdown saves session before exit (chat history persists)
- Clear user message on browser disconnect: "Run $B connect to reconnect"

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: worktree-per-session isolation for sidebar agent

Each sidebar session gets an isolated git worktree so the agent's file
operations don't conflict with the user's working directory:
- createWorktree() creates detached HEAD worktree in ~/.gstack/worktrees/
- Falls back to main cwd for non-git repos or on creation failure
- Handles collision cleanup from prior crashes
- removeWorktree() cleans up on session switch and shutdown
- worktreePath persisted in session.json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(qa): ISSUE-001 — disconnect blocked by CDP guard in ensureServer

$B disconnect was routed through ensureServer() which refused to start a
headless server when a CDP state file existed. Disconnect is now handled
before ensureServer() (like connect), with force-kill + cleanup fallback
when the CDP server is unresponsive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve claude binary path for daemon-spawned agent

The browse server runs as a daemon and may not inherit the user's shell
PATH. Add findClaudeBin() that checks ~/.local/bin/claude (standard
install location), which claude, and common system paths. Shows a clear
error in the sidebar chat if claude CLI is not found.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve claude symlinks + check Conductor bundled binary

posix_spawn fails on symlinks in compiled bun binaries. Now:
- Checks Conductor app's bundled binary first (not a symlink)
- Scans ~/.local/share/claude/versions/ for direct versioned binaries
- Uses fs.realpathSync() to resolve symlinks before spawning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: compiled bun binary cannot posix_spawn — use external agent process

Compiled bun binaries fail posix_spawn on ALL executables (even /bin/bash).
The server now writes to an agent queue file, and a separate non-compiled
bun process (sidebar-agent.ts) reads the queue, spawns claude, and POSTs
events back via /sidebar-agent/event.

Changes:
- server.ts: spawnClaude writes to queue file instead of spawning directly
- server.ts: new /sidebar-agent/event endpoint for agent → server relay
- server.ts: fix result event field name (event.text vs event.result)
- sidebar-agent.ts: rewritten to poll queue file, relay events via HTTP
- cli.ts: $B connect auto-starts sidebar-agent as non-compiled bun process

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: loading spinner on sidebar open while connecting to server

Shows an amber spinner with "Connecting..." when the sidebar first opens,
replacing the empty state. After the first successful /sidebar-chat poll:
- If chat history exists: renders it immediately
- If no history: shows the welcome message

Prevents the jarring empty-then-populated flash on sidebar open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: zero-friction side panel — auto-open on install, pill is clickable

Three changes to eliminate manual side panel setup:
- Auto-open side panel on extension install/update (onInstalled listener)
- gstack pill (bottom-right) is now clickable — opens the side panel
- Pill has pointer-events: auto so clicks always register (was: none)

User no longer needs to find the puzzle piece icon, pin the extension,
or know the side panel exists. It opens automatically on first launch
and can be re-opened by clicking the floating gstack pill.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: kill CDP naming, delete chrome-launcher.ts dead code

The connectCDP() method and connectionMode: 'cdp' naming was a legacy
artifact — real Chrome was tried but failed (silently blocks
--load-extension), so the implementation already used Playwright's
bundled Chromium via launchPersistentContext(). The naming was
misleading.

Changes:
- Delete chrome-launcher.ts (361 LOC) — only import was in unreachable
  attemptReconnect() method
- Delete dead attemptReconnect() and reconnecting field
- Delete preExistingTabIds (was for protecting real Chrome tabs we
  never connect to)
- Rename connectCDP() → launchHeaded()
- Rename connectionMode: 'cdp' → 'headed' across all files
- Replace BROWSE_CDP_URL/BROWSE_CDP_PORT env vars with BROWSE_HEADED=1
- Regenerate SKILL.md files for updated command descriptions
- Move BrowserManager unit tests to browser-manager-unit.test.ts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: converge handoff into connect — extension loads on handoff

Handoff now uses launchPersistentContext() with extension auto-loading,
same as the connect/launchHeaded() path. This means when the agent
gets stuck (2FA, CAPTCHA) and hands off to the user, the Chrome
extension + side panel are available automatically.

Before: handoff used chromium.launch() + newContext() — no extension
After: handoff uses chromium.launchPersistentContext() — extension loads

Also sets connectionMode to 'headed' and disables dialog auto-accept
on handoff, matching connect behavior.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: gate sidebar chat behind --chat flag

$B connect (default): headed Chromium + extension with Activity + Refs
tabs only. No separate agent spawned. Clean, no confusion.

$B connect --chat: same + Chat tab with standalone claude -p agent.
Shows experimental banner: "Standalone mode — this is a separate
agent from your workspace."

Implementation:
- cli.ts: parse --chat, set BROWSE_SIDEBAR_CHAT env, conditionally
  spawn sidebar-agent
- server.ts: gate /sidebar-* routes behind chatEnabled, return 403
  when disabled, include chatEnabled in /health response
- sidepanel.js: applyChatEnabled() hides/shows Chat tab + banner
- background.js: forward chatEnabled from health response
- sidepanel.html/css: experimental banner with amber styling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: file drop relay + $B inbox command

Sidebar agent now writes structured messages to .context/sidebar-inbox/
when processing user input. The workspace agent can read these via
$B inbox to see what the user reported from the browser.

File drop format:
  .context/sidebar-inbox/{timestamp}-observation.json
  { type, timestamp, page: {url}, userMessage, sidebarSessionId }

Atomic writes (tmp + rename) prevent partial reads. $B inbox --clear
removes messages after display.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: $B watch — passive observation mode

Claude enters read-only mode and captures periodic snapshots (every 5s)
while the user browses. Mutation commands (click, fill, etc.) are
blocked during watch. $B watch stop exits and returns a summary with
the last snapshot.

Requires headed mode ($B connect). This is the inverse of the scout
pattern — the workspace agent watches through the browser instead of
the sidebar relaying to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add coverage for sidebar-agent, file-drop, and watch mode

33 new tests covering:
- Sidebar agent queue parsing (valid/malformed/empty JSONL)
- writeToInbox file drop (directory creation, atomic writes, JSON format)
- Inbox command (display, sorting, --clear, malformed file handling)
- Watch mode state machine (start/stop cycles, snapshots, duration)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: TODOS cleanup + Chrome vs Chromium exploration doc

- Update TODOS.md: mark CDP mode, $B watch, sidebar scout as SHIPPED
- Delete dead "cross-platform CDP browser discovery" TODO
- Rename dependencies from "CDP connect" to "headed mode"
- Add docs/designs/CHROME_VS_CHROMIUM_EXPLORATION.md memorializing
  the architecture exploration and decision to use Playwright Chromium

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add Conductor Chrome sidebar integration design doc

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: sidebar-agent validates cwd before spawning claude

The queue entry may reference a worktree that was cleaned up between
sessions. Now falls back to process.cwd() if the path doesn't exist,
preventing silent spawn failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gen-skill-docs resolver merge + preamble tier gate + plan file discovery

The local RESOLVERS record in gen-skill-docs.ts was shadowing the imported
canonical resolvers, causing stale test coverage and preamble generators
to be used instead of the authoritative versions in resolvers/.

Changes:
- Merge imported RESOLVERS with local overrides (spread + override pattern)
- Fix preamble tier gate: tier 1 skills no longer get AskUserQuestion format
- Make plan file discovery host-agnostic (search multiple plan dirs)
- Add missing E2E tier entries for ship/review plan completion tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: ungate sidebar agent + raise timeout to 5 minutes (v0.12.0)

Sidebar chat is now always available in headed mode — no --chat flag needed.
Agent tasks get 5 minutes instead of 2, enabling multi-page workflows like
navigating directories and filling forms across pages.

Changes:
- cli.ts: remove --chat flag, always set BROWSE_SIDEBAR_CHAT=1, always spawn agent
- server.ts: remove chatEnabled gate (403 response), raise AGENT_TIMEOUT_MS to 300s
- sidebar-agent.ts: raise child process timeout from 120s to 300s

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: headed mode + sidebar agent documentation (v0.12.0)

- README: sidebar agent section, personal automation example (school parent
  portal), two auth paths (manual login + cookie import), DevTools MCP mention
- BROWSER.md: sidebar agent section with usage, timeout, session isolation,
  authentication, and random delay documentation
- connect-chrome template: add sidebar chat onboarding step
- CHANGELOG: v0.12.0 entry covering headed mode, sidebar agent, extension
- VERSION: bump to 0.12.0.0
- TODOS: Chrome DevTools MCP integration as P0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate SKILL.md files

Generated from updated templates + resolver merge. Key changes:
- Tier 1 skills no longer include AskUserQuestion format section
- Ship/review skills now include coverage gate with thresholds
- Connect-chrome skill includes sidebar chat onboarding step
- Plan file discovery uses host-agnostic paths

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate Codex connect-chrome skill

Updated preamble with proactive prompt and sidebar chat onboarding step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: network idle, state persistence, iframe support, chain pipe format (v0.12.1.0) (#516)

* feat: network idle detection + chain pipe format

- Upgrade click/fill/select from domcontentloaded to networkidle wait
  (2s timeout, best-effort). Catches XHR/fetch triggered by interactions.
- Add pipe-delimited format to chain as JSON fallback:
  $B chain 'goto url | click @e5 | snapshot -ic'
- Add post-loop networkidle wait in chain when last command was a write.
- Frame-aware: commands use target (getActiveFrameOrPage) for locator ops,
  page-only ops (goto/back/forward/reload) guard against frame context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: $B state save/load + $B frame — new browse commands

- state save/load: persist cookies + URLs to .gstack/browse-states/{name}.json
  File perms 0o600, name sanitized to [a-zA-Z0-9_-]. V1 skips localStorage
  (breaks on load-before-navigate). Load replaces session via closeAllPages().
- frame: switch command context to iframe via CSS selector, @ref, --name, or
  --url. 'frame main' returns to main frame. Execution target abstraction
  (getActiveFrameOrPage) across read-commands, snapshot, and write-commands.
- Frame context cleared on tab switch, navigation, resume, and handoff.
- Snapshot shows [Context: iframe src="..."] header when in frame.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add tests for network idle, chain pipe format, state, and frame

- Network idle: click on fetch button waits for XHR, static click is fast
- Chain pipe: pipe-delimited commands, quoted args, JSON still works
- State: save/load round-trip, name sanitization, missing state error
- Frame: switch to iframe + back, snapshot context header, fill in frame,
  goto-in-frame guard, usage error

New fixtures: network-idle.html (fetch + static buttons), iframe.html (srcdoc)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: review fixes — iframe ref scoping, detached frame recovery, state validation

- snapshot.ts: ref locators, cursor-interactive scan, and cursor locator
  now use target (frame-aware) instead of page — fixes @ref clicking in iframes
- browser-manager.ts: getActiveFrameOrPage auto-recovers from detached frames
  via isDetached() check
- meta-commands.ts: state load resets activeFrame, elementHandle disposed after
  contentFrame(), state file schema validation (cookies + pages arrays),
  filter empty pipe segments in chain tokenizer
- write-commands.ts: upload command uses target.locator() for frame support

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate SKILL.md files + rebuild binary

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.12.1.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 11:15:24 -06:00
Garry Tan 76803d789a feat: 3-tier eval suite with planted-bug outcome testing (EVALS=1)
Adds comprehensive eval infrastructure:
- Tier 1 (free): 13 new static tests — cross-skill path consistency, QA
  structure validation, greptile format, planted-bug fixture validation
- Tier 2 (Agent SDK E2E): /qa quick, /review with pre-built git repo,
  3 planted-bug outcome evals (static, SPA, checkout — each with 5 bugs)
- Tier 3 (LLM judge): QA workflow quality, health rubric clarity,
  cross-skill consistency, baseline score pinning

New fixtures: 3 HTML pages with 15 total planted bugs, ground truth JSON,
review-eval-vuln.rb, eval-baselines.json. Shared llm-judge.ts helper (DRY).

Unified EVALS=1 flag replaces SKILL_E2E + ANTHROPIC_API_KEY checks.
`bun run test:evals` runs everything that costs money (~$4/run).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-14 01:17:36 -05:00
Garry Tan f7b95329c1 feat: Phase 3.5 — cookie import, QA testing, team retro (v0.3.1) (#29)
* Phase 2: Enhanced browser — dialog handling, upload, state checks, snapshots

- CircularBuffer O(1) ring buffer for console/network/dialog (was O(n) array+shift)
- Async buffer flush with Bun.write() (was appendFileSync)
- Dialog auto-accept/dismiss with buffer + prompt text support
- File upload command (upload <sel> <file...>)
- Element state checks (is visible/hidden/enabled/disabled/checked/editable/focused)
- Annotated screenshots with ref labels overlaid (-a flag)
- Snapshot diffing against previous snapshot (-D flag)
- Cursor-interactive element scan for non-ARIA clickables (-C flag)
- Snapshot scoping depth limit (-d N flag)
- Health check with page.evaluate + 2s timeout
- Playwright error wrapping — actionable messages for AI agents
- Fix useragent — context recreation preserves cookies/storage/URLs
- wait --networkidle / --load / --domcontentloaded flags
- console --errors filter (error + warning only)
- cookie-import <json-file> with auto-fill domain from page URL
- 166 integration tests (was ~63)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Phase 2: Rewrite SKILL.md as QA playbook + command reference

Reorient SKILL.md files from raw command reference to QA-first playbook
with 10 workflow patterns (test user flows, verify deployments, dogfood
features, responsive layouts, file upload, forms, dialogs, compare pages).
Compact command reference tables at the bottom.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Phase 3: /qa skill — systematic QA testing with health scores

New /qa skill for systematic web app QA testing. Three modes:
- full: 5-10 documented issues with screenshots and repro steps
- quick: 30-second smoke test with health score
- regression: compare against saved baseline

Includes issue taxonomy (7 categories, 4 severity levels), structured
report template, health score rubric (weighted across 7 categories),
framework detection guidance (Next.js, Rails, WordPress, SPA).

Also adds browse/bin/find-browse (DRY binary discovery using git
rev-parse), .gstack/ to .gitignore, and updated TODO roadmap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Bump to v0.3.0 — Phase 2 + Phase 3 changelog

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: cookie-import-browser — Chromium cookie decryption module + tests

Pure logic module for reading and decrypting cookies from macOS Chromium
browsers (Comet, Chrome, Arc, Brave, Edge). Supports v10 AES-128-CBC
encryption with macOS Keychain access, PBKDF2 key derivation, and
per-browser key caching. 18 unit tests with encrypted cookie fixtures.

* feat: cookie picker web UI + route handler

Two-panel dark-theme picker served from the browse server. Left panel
shows source browser domains with search and import buttons. Right panel
shows imported domains with trash buttons. No cookie values exposed.
6 API endpoints, importedDomains Set tracking, inline clearCookies.

* feat: wire cookie-import-browser into browse server

Add cookie-picker route dispatch (no auth, localhost-only), add
cookie-import-browser to WRITE_COMMANDS and CHAIN_WRITE, add serverPort
property to BrowserManager, add write command with two modes (picker UI
vs --domain direct import), update CLI help text.

* chore: /setup-browser-cookies skill + docs (Phase 3.5)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.3.1)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security: redact sensitive values from command output (PR #21)

type no longer echoes text (reports character count), cookie redacts
value with ****, header redacts Authorization/Cookie/X-API-Key/X-Auth-Token,
storage set drops value, forms redacts password fields. Prevents secrets
from persisting in LLM transcripts. 7 new tests.

Credit: fredluz (PR #21)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security: path traversal prevention for screenshot/pdf/eval (PR #26)

Add validateOutputPath() for screenshot/pdf/responsive (restricts to
/tmp and cwd) and validateReadPath() for eval (blocks .. sequences and
absolute paths outside safe dirs). 7 new tests.

Credit: Jah-yee (PR #26)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: auto-install Playwright Chromium in setup (PR #22)

Setup now verifies Playwright can launch Chromium, and auto-installs
it via `bunx playwright install chromium` if missing. Exits non-zero
if build or Chromium launch fails.

Credit: AkbarDevop (PR #22)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* security: fix path validation bypass, CORS restriction, cookie-import path check

- startsWith('/tmp') matched '/tmpevil' — now requires trailing slash
- CORS Access-Control-Allow-Origin changed from * to http://127.0.0.1:<port>
- cookie-import now validates file paths (was missing validateReadPath)
- 3 new tests for prefix collision and cookie-import path traversal

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address review informational issues + add regression tests

- Add cookie-import to CHAIN_WRITE set for chain command routing
- Add path validation to snapshot -a -o output path
- Fix package.json version to match 0.3.1
- Use crypto.randomUUID() for temp DB paths (unpredictable filenames)
- Add regression tests for chain cookie-import and snapshot path validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add /qa, /setup-browser-cookies to README + update BROWSER.md

- Add /qa and /setup-browser-cookies to skills table, install/update/uninstall blurbs
- Add dedicated README sections for both new skills with usage examples
- Update demo workflow to show cookie import → QA → browse flow
- Update BROWSER.md: cookie import commands, new source files, test count (203)
- Update skill count from 6 to 8

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: team-aware /retro v2.0 — per-person praise and growth opportunities

- Identify current user via git config, orient narrative as "you" vs teammates
- Add per-author metrics: commits, LOC, focus areas, commit type mix, sessions
- New "Your Week" section with personal deep-dive for whoever runs the command
- New "Team Breakdown" with per-person praise and growth opportunities
- Track AI-assisted commits via Co-Authored-By trailers
- Personal + team shipping streaks
- Tone: praise like a 1:1, growth like investment advice, never compare negatively

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add Conductor parallel sessions section to README

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-13 00:31:41 -07:00
Garry Tan 3d901066cd Initial release — gstack v0.0.1
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-12 01:32:16 -07:00