mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
synced 2026-05-01 19:25:10 +02:00
main
8 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Garry Tan
|
e8893a18b1 |
v1.20.0.0 feat: browser-skills runtime + gbrain-support carryover (#1233)
* feat(gbrain-sync): queue primitives + writer shims
Adds bin/gstack-brain-enqueue (atomic append to sync queue) and
bin/gstack-jsonl-merge (git merge driver, ts-sort with SHA-256 fallback).
Wires one backgrounded enqueue call into learnings-log, timeline-log,
review-log, and developer-profile --migrate. question-log and
question-preferences stay local per Codex v2 decision.
gstack-config gains gbrain_sync_mode (off/artifacts-only/full) and
gbrain_sync_mode_prompted keys, plus GSTACK_HOME env alignment so
tests don't leak into real ~/.gstack/config.yaml.
* feat(gbrain-sync): --once drain + secret scan + push
bin/gstack-brain-sync is the core sync binary. Subcommands: --once
(drain queue, allowlist-filter, privacy-class-filter, secret-scan
staged diff, commit with template, push with fetch+merge retry),
--status, --skip-file <path>, --drop-queue --yes, --discover-new
(cursor-based detection of artifact writes that skip the shim).
Secret regex families: AWS keys, GitHub tokens (ghp_/gho_/ghu_/ghs_/
ghr_/github_pat_), OpenAI sk-, PEM blocks, JWTs, bearer-token-in-JSON.
On hit: unstage, preserve queue, print remediation hint (--skip-file
or edit), exit clean. No daemon — invoked by preamble at skill
boundaries.
* feat(gbrain-sync): init, restore, uninstall, consumer registry
bin/gstack-brain-init: idempotent first-run. git init ~/.gstack/,
.gitignore=*, canonical .brain-allowlist + .brain-privacy-map.json,
pre-commit secret-scan hook (defense-in-depth), merge driver registration
via git config, gh repo create --private OR arbitrary --remote <url>,
initial push, ~/.gstack-brain-remote.txt for new-machine discovery,
GBrain consumer registration via HTTP POST.
bin/gstack-brain-restore: safe new-machine bootstrap. Refuses clobber
of existing allowlisted files, clones to staging, rsync-copies tracked
files, re-registers merge drivers (required — not cloned from remote),
rehydrates consumers.json, prompts for per-consumer tokens.
bin/gstack-brain-uninstall: clean off-ramp. Removes .git + .brain-*
files + consumers.json + config keys. Preserves user data (learnings,
plans, retros, profile). Optional --delete-remote for GitHub repos.
bin/gstack-brain-consumer + bin/gstack-brain-reader (symlink alias):
registry management. Internal 'consumer' term; user-facing 'reader'
per DX review decision.
* feat(gbrain-sync): preamble block — privacy gate + boundary sync
scripts/resolvers/preamble/generate-brain-sync-block.ts emits bash that
runs at every skill invocation:
- Detects ~/.gstack-brain-remote.txt on machines without local .git
and surfaces a restore-available hint (does NOT auto-run restore).
- Runs gstack-brain-sync --once at skill start to drain any pending
writes (and at skill end via prose instruction).
- Once-per-day auto-pull (cached via .brain-last-pull) for append-only
JSONL files.
- Emits BRAIN_SYNC: status line every skill run.
Also emits prose for the host LLM to fire the one-time privacy
stop-gate (full / artifacts-only / off) when gbrain is detected and
gbrain_sync_mode_prompted is false. Wired into preamble.ts composition.
* test(gbrain-sync): 27-test consolidated suite
test/brain-sync.test.ts covers:
- Config: validation, defaults, GSTACK_HOME env isolation
- Enqueue: no-op gates, skip list, concurrent atomicity, JSON escape
- JSONL merge driver: 3-way + ts-sort + SHA-256 fallback
- Init + sync: canonical file creation, merge driver registration,
push-reject + fetch+merge retry path
- Init refuses different remote (idempotency)
- Cross-machine restore round-trip (machine A write → machine B sees)
- Secret scan across all 6 regex families (AWS, GH, OpenAI, PEM, JWT,
bearer-JSON). --skip-file unblock remediation
- Uninstall removes sync config, preserves user data
- --discover-new idempotence via mtime+size cursor
Behaviors verified via integration smokes during implementation. Known
follow-up: bun-test 5s default timeout needs 30s wrapper for
spawnSync-heavy tests.
* docs(gbrain-sync): user guide + error lookup + README section
docs/gbrain-sync.md: setup walkthrough, privacy modes, cross-machine
workflow, secret protection, two-machine conflict handling, uninstall,
troubleshooting reference.
docs/gbrain-sync-errors.md: problem/cause/fix index for every
user-visible error. Patterned on Rust's error docs + Stripe's API
error reference.
README.md: 'Cross-machine memory with GBrain sync' section near the
top (discovery moment), plus docs-table entry.
* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.7.0.0)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate SKILL.md files for gbrain-sync preamble block
Re-runs bun run gen:skill-docs after adding generateBrainSyncBlock
to scripts/resolvers/preamble.ts in
|
||
|
Garry Tan
|
54d4cde773 |
security: tunnel dual-listener + SSRF + envelope + path wave (v1.6.0.0) (#1137)
* refactor(security): loosen /connect rate limit from 3/min to 300/min
Setup keys are 24 random bytes (unbruteforceable), so a tight rate limit
does not meaningfully prevent key guessing. It exists only to cap
bandwidth, CPU, and log-flood damage from someone who discovered the
ngrok URL. A legitimate pair-agent session hits /connect once; 300/min
is 60x that pattern and never hit accidentally.
3/min caused pairing to fail on any retry flow (network blip, second
paired client) with no upside. Per-IP tracking was considered and
rejected — adds a bounded Map + LRU for defense already adequate at the
global layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): add tunnel-denial-log module for attack visibility
Append-only log of tunnel-surface auth denials to
~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl. Gives operators visibility into who
is probing tunneled daemons so the next security wave can be driven by
real attack data instead of speculation.
Design notes:
- Async via fs.promises.appendFile. Never appendFileSync — blocking the
event loop on every denial during a flood is what an attacker wants
(prior learning: sync-audit-log-io, 10/10 confidence).
- In-process rate cap at 60 writes/minute globally. Excess denials are
counted in memory but not written to disk — prevents disk DoS.
- Writes to the same ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl used by the
prompt-injection attempt log. File rotation is handled by the existing
security pipeline (10MB, 5 generations).
No consumers in this commit; wired up in the dual-listener refactor that
follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(security): dual-listener tunnel architecture
The /health endpoint leaked AUTH_TOKEN to any caller that hit the ngrok
URL (spoofing chrome-extension:// origin, or catching headed mode).
Surfaced by @garagon in PR #1026; the original fix was header-inference
on the single port. Codex's outside-voice review during /plan-ceo-review
called that approach brittle (ngrok header behavior could change, local
proxies would false-positive), and pushed for the structural fix.
This is that fix. Stop making /health a root-token bootstrap endpoint on
any surface the tunnel can reach. The server now binds two HTTP
listeners when a tunnel is active. The local listener (extension, CLI,
sidebar) stays on 127.0.0.1 and is never exposed to ngrok. ngrok
forwards only to the tunnel listener, which serves only /connect
(unauth, rate-limited) and /command with a locked allowlist of
browser-driving commands. Security property comes from physical port
separation, not from header inference — a tunnel caller cannot reach
/health or /cookie-picker or /inspector because they live on a
different TCP socket.
What this commit adds to browse/src/server.ts:
* Surface type ('local' | 'tunnel') and TUNNEL_PATHS +
TUNNEL_COMMANDS allowlists near the top of the file.
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory replacing the single fetch arrow;
closure-captures the surface so the filter that runs before route
dispatch knows which socket accepted the request.
* Tunnel filter at dispatch entry: 404s anything not on TUNNEL_PATHS,
403s root-token bearers with a clear pairing hint, 401s non-/connect
requests that lack a scoped token. Every denial is logged via
logTunnelDenial (from tunnel-denial-log).
* GET /connect alive probe (unauth on both surfaces) so /pair and
/tunnel/start can detect dead ngrok tunnels without reaching
/health — /health is no longer tunnel-reachable.
* Lazy tunnel listener lifecycle. /tunnel/start binds a dedicated
Bun.serve on an ephemeral port, points ngrok.forward at THAT port
(not the local port), hard-fails on bind error (no local fallback),
tears down cleanly on ngrok failure. BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses
the same pattern.
* closeTunnel() helper — single teardown path for both the ngrok
listener and the tunnel Bun.serve listener.
* resolveNgrokAuthtoken() helper — shared authtoken lookup across
/tunnel/start and BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup (was duplicated).
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS check in /command dispatch: on the tunnel surface,
commands outside the allowlist return 403 with a list of allowed
commands as a hint.
* Probe paths in /pair and /tunnel/start migrated from /health to
GET /connect — the only unauth path reachable on the tunnel surface
under the new architecture.
Test updates in browse/test/server-auth.test.ts:
* /pair liveness-verify test: assert via closeTunnel() helper instead
of the inline `tunnelActive = false; tunnelUrl = null` lines that
the helper subsumes.
* /tunnel/start cached-tunnel test: same closeTunnel() adaptation.
Credit
Derived from PR #1026 by @garagon — thanks for flagging the critical
bug that drove the architectural rewrite. The per-request
isTunneledRequest approach from #1026 is superseded by physical port
separation here; the underlying report remains the root cause for the
entire v1.6.0.0 wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(security): add source-level guards for dual-listener architecture
23 source-level assertions that keep future contributors from silently
widening the tunnel surface during a routine refactor. Covers:
* Surface type + tunnelServer state variable shape
* TUNNEL_PATHS is a closed set of /connect, /command, /sidebar-chat
(and NOT /health, /welcome, /cookie-picker, /inspector/*, /pair,
/token, /refs, /activity/stream, /tunnel/{start,stop})
* TUNNEL_COMMANDS includes browser-driving ops only (and NOT
launch-browser, tunnel-start, token-mint, cookie-import, etc.)
* makeFetchHandler(surface) factory exists and is wired to both
listeners with the correct surface parameter
* Tunnel filter runs BEFORE any route dispatch, with 404/403/401
responses and logged denials for each reason
* GET /connect returns {alive: true} unauth
* /command dispatch enforces TUNNEL_COMMANDS on tunnel surface
* closeTunnel() helper tears down ngrok + Bun.serve listener
* /tunnel/start binds on ephemeral port, points ngrok at TUNNEL_PORT
(not local port), hard-fails on bind error (no fallback), probes
cached tunnel via GET /connect (not /health), tears down on
ngrok.forward failure
* BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup uses the dual-listener pattern
* logTunnelDenial wired for all three denial reasons
* /connect rate limit is 300/min, not 3/min
All 23 tests pass. Behavioral integration tests (spawn subprocess, real
network) live in the E2E suite that lands later in this wave.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security: gate download + scrape through validateNavigationUrl (SSRF)
The `goto` command was correctly wired through validateNavigationUrl,
but `download` and `scrape` called page.request.fetch(url, ...) directly.
A caller with the default write scope could hit the /command endpoint
and ask the daemon to fetch http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
(AWS IMDSv1) or the GCP/Azure/internal equivalents. The response body
comes back as base64 or lands on disk where GET /file serves it.
Fix: call validateNavigationUrl(url) immediately before each
page.request.fetch() call site in download and in the scrape loop.
Same blocklist that already protects `goto`: file://, javascript:,
data:, chrome://, cloud metadata (IPv4 all encodings, IPv6 ULA,
metadata.*.internal).
Tests: extend browse/test/url-validation.test.ts with a source-level
guard that walks every `await page.request.fetch(` call site and
asserts a validateNavigationUrl call precedes it within the same
branch. Regression trips before code review if a future refactor
drops the gate.
* security: route splitForScoped through envelope sentinel escape
The scoped-token snapshot path in snapshot.ts built its untrusted
block by pushing the raw accessibility-tree lines between the literal
`═══ BEGIN UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══` / `═══ END UNTRUSTED WEB CONTENT ═══`
sentinels. The full-page wrap path in content-security.ts already
applied a zero-width-space escape on those exact strings to prevent
sentinel injection, but the scoped path skipped it.
Net effect: a page whose rendered text contains the literal sentinel
can close the envelope early from inside untrusted content and forge
a fake "trusted" block for the LLM. That includes fabricating
interactive `@eN` references the agent will act on.
Fix:
* Extract the zero-width-space escape into a named, exported helper
`escapeEnvelopeSentinels(content)` in content-security.ts.
* Have `wrapUntrustedPageContent` call it (behavior unchanged on
that path — same bytes out).
* Import the helper in snapshot.ts and map it over `untrustedLines`
in the `splitForScoped` branch before pushing the BEGIN sentinel.
Tests: add a describe block in content-security.test.ts that covers
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` defuses BEGIN and END markers;
* `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` leaves normal text untouched;
* `wrapUntrustedPageContent` still emits exactly one real envelope
pair when hostile content contains forged sentinels;
* snapshot.ts imports the helper;
* the scoped-snapshot branch calls `escapeEnvelopeSentinels` before
pushing the BEGIN sentinel (source-level regression — if a future
refactor reorders this, the test trips).
* security: extend hidden-element detection to all DOM-reading channels
The Confusion Protocol envelope wrap (`wrapUntrustedPageContent`)
covers every scoped PAGE_CONTENT_COMMAND, but the hidden-element
ARIA-injection detection layer only ran for `text`. Other DOM-reading
channels (html, links, forms, accessibility, attrs, data, media,
ux-audit) returned their output through the envelope with no hidden-
content filter, so a page serving a display:none div that instructs
the agent to disregard prior system messages, or an aria-label that
claims to put the LLM in admin mode, leaked the injection payload on
any non-text channel. The envelope alone does not mitigate this, and
the page itself never rendered the hostile content to the human
operator.
Fix:
* New export `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` in commands.ts — the subset of
PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS that derives its output from the live DOM.
Console and dialog stay out; they read separate runtime state.
* server.ts runs `markHiddenElements` + `cleanupHiddenMarkers` for
every scoped command in this set. `text` keeps its existing
`getCleanTextWithStripping` path (hidden elements physically
stripped before the read). All other channels keep their output
format but emit flagged elements as CONTENT WARNINGS on the
envelope, so the LLM sees what it would otherwise have consumed
silently.
* Hidden-element descriptions merge into `combinedWarnings`
alongside content-filter warnings before the wrap call.
Tests: new describe block in content-security.test.ts covering
* `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS` export shape and channel membership;
* dispatch gates on `DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS.has(command)`, not the
literal `text` string;
* hiddenContentWarnings plumbs into `combinedWarnings` and reaches
wrapUntrustedPageContent;
* DOM_CONTENT_COMMANDS is a strict subset of PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS.
Existing datamarking, envelope wrap, centralized-wrapping, and chain
security suites stay green (52 pass, 0 fail).
* security: validate --from-file payload paths for parity with direct paths
The direct `load-html <file>` path runs every caller-supplied file path
through validateReadPath() so reads stay confined to SAFE_DIRECTORIES
(cwd, TEMP_DIR). The `load-html --from-file <payload.json>` shortcut
and its sibling `pdf --from-file <payload.json>` skipped that check and
went straight to fs.readFileSync(). An MCP caller that picks the
payload path (or any caller whose payload argument is reachable from
attacker-influenced text) could use --from-file as a read-anywhere
escape hatch for the safe-dirs policy.
Fix: call validateReadPath(path.resolve(payloadPath)) before readFileSync
at both sites. Error surface mirrors the direct-path branch so ops and
agent errors stay consistent.
Test coverage in browse/test/from-file-path-validation.test.ts:
- source-level: validateReadPath precedes readFileSync in the load-html
--from-file branch (write-commands.ts) and the pdf --from-file parser
(meta-commands.ts)
- error-message parity: both sites reference SAFE_DIRECTORIES
Related security audit pattern: R3 F002 (validateNavigationUrl gap on
download/scrape) and R3 F008 (markHiddenElements gap on 10 DOM commands)
were the same shape — a defense that existed on the primary code path
but not its shortcut sibling. This PR closes the same class of gap on
the --from-file shortcuts.
* fix(design): escape url.origin when injecting into served HTML
serve.ts injected url.origin into a single-quoted JS string in
the response body. A local request with a crafted Host header
(e.g. Host: "evil'-alert(1)-'x") would break out of the string
and execute JS in the 127.0.0.1:<port> origin opened by the
design board. Low severity — bound to localhost, requires a
local attacker — but no reason not to escape.
Fix: JSON.stringify(url.origin) produces a properly quoted,
escaped JS string literal in one call.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security change is the one line
in the HTML injection; everything else is whitespace/style.
* fix(scripts): drop shell:true from slop-diff npx invocations
spawnSync('npx', [...], { shell: true }) invokes /bin/sh -c
with the args concatenated, subjecting them to shell parsing
(word splitting, glob expansion, metacharacter interpretation).
No user input reaches these calls today, so not exploitable —
but the posture is wrong: npx + shell args should be direct.
Fix: scope shell:true to process.platform === 'win32' where
npx is actually a .cmd requiring the shell. POSIX runs the
npx binary directly with array-form args.
Also includes Prettier reformatting (single→double quotes,
trailing commas, line wrapping) applied by the repo's
PostToolUse formatter hook. Security-relevant change is just
the two shell:true -> shell: process.platform === 'win32'
lines; everything else is whitespace/style.
* security(E3): gate GSTACK_SLUG on /welcome path traversal
The /welcome handler interpolates GSTACK_SLUG directly into the filesystem
path used to locate the project-local welcome page. Without validation, a
slug like "../../etc/passwd" would resolve to
~/.gstack/projects/../../etc/passwd/designs/welcome-page-20260331/finalized.html
— classic path traversal.
Not exploitable today: GSTACK_SLUG is set by the gstack CLI at daemon launch,
and an attacker would already need local env-var access to poison it. But
the gate is one regex (^[a-z0-9_-]+$), and a defense-in-depth pass costs us
nothing when the cost of being wrong is arbitrary file read via /welcome.
Fall back to the safe 'unknown' literal when the slug fails validation —
same fallback the code already uses when GSTACK_SLUG is unset. No behavior
change for legitimate slugs (they all match the regex).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N1): replace ?token= SSE auth with HttpOnly session cookie
Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root
AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization
headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs,
crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the
/plan-ceo-review outside voice pass.
New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token
and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min
TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser
sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is
GONE — no more URL-borne secrets.
Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10
confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and
/inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token,
or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot
execute browser commands.
Components
* browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/
build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning,
no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module
boundary).
* browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires
Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer
OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param.
* extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call,
EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints.
Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing
flow that lands later in the wave.
* browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering
mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie
parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract
guard (module must not import token-registry).
* browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth
test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence
of the ?token= query param.
Cookie flag choices:
* HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS
exfiltration).
* SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1
directly.
* Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin.
* Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on
reconnect when daemon restarts.
* Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding
Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back.
Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* security(N2): document Windows v20 ABE elevation path on CDP port
The existing comment around the cookie-import-browser --remote-debugging-port
launch claimed "threat model: no worse than baseline." That's wrong on
Windows with App-Bound Encryption v20. A same-user local process that
opens the cookie SQLite DB directly CANNOT decrypt v20 values (DPAPI
context is bound to the browser process). The CDP port lets them bypass
that: connect to the debug port, call Network.getAllCookies inside Chrome,
walk away with decrypted v20 cookies.
The correct fix is to switch from TCP --remote-debugging-port to
--remote-debugging-pipe so the CDP transport is a stdio pipe, not a
socket. That requires restructuring the CDP WebSocket client in this
module and Playwright doesn't expose the pipe transport out of the box.
Non-trivial, deferred from the v1.6.0.0 wave.
This commit updates the comment to correctly describe the threat and
points at the tracking issue. No code change to the launch itself.
Follow-up: #1136.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(E2): document dual-listener tunnel architecture in ARCHITECTURE.md
Adds an explicit per-endpoint disposition table to the Security model
section, covering the v1.6.0.0 dual-listener refactor. Every HTTP
endpoint now has a documented local-vs-tunnel answer. Future audits
(and future contributors wondering "is it safe to add X to the tunnel
surface?") can read this instead of reverse-engineering server.ts.
Also documents:
* Why physical port separation beats per-request header inference
(ngrok behavior drift, local proxies can forge headers, etc.)
* Tunnel surface denial logging → ~/.gstack/security/attempts.jsonl
* SSE session cookie model (gstack_sse, 30-min TTL, stream-scope only,
module-boundary-enforced scope isolation)
* N2 non-goal for Windows v20 ABE via CDP port (tracking #1136)
No code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(E1): end-to-end pair-agent flow against a spawned daemon
Spawns the browse daemon as a subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1 so
the HTTP layer runs without a real browser. Exercises:
* GET /health — token delivery for chrome-extension origin, withheld
otherwise (the F1 + PR #1026 invariant)
* GET /connect — alive probe returns {alive:true} unauth
* POST /pair — root Bearer required (403 without), returns setup_key
* POST /connect — setup_key exchange mints a distinct scoped token
* POST /command — 401 without auth
* POST /sse-session — Bearer required, Set-Cookie has HttpOnly +
SameSite=Strict (the N1 invariant)
* GET /activity/stream — 401 without auth
* GET /activity/stream?token= — 401 (the old ?token= query param is
REJECTED, which is the whole point of N1)
* GET /welcome — serves HTML, does not leak /etc/passwd content under
the default 'unknown' slug (E3 regex gate)
12 behavioral tests, ~220ms end-to-end, no network dependencies, no
ngrok, no real browser. This is the receipt for the wave's central
'pair-agent still works + the security boundary holds' claim.
Tunnel-port binding (/tunnel/start) is deliberately NOT exercised here
— it requires an ngrok authtoken and live network. The dual-listener
route allowlist is covered by source-level guards in
dual-listener.test.ts; behavioral tunnel testing belongs in a separate
paid-evals harness.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* release(v1.6.0.0): bump VERSION + CHANGELOG for security wave
Architectural bump, not patch: dual-listener HTTP refactor changes the
daemon's tunnel-exposure model. See CHANGELOG for the full release
summary (~950 words) covering the five root causes this wave closes:
1. /health token leak over ngrok (F1 + E3 + test infra)
2. /cookie-picker + /inspector exposed over the tunnel (F1)
3. ?token=<ROOT> in SSE URLs leaking to logs/referer/history (N1)
4. /welcome GSTACK_SLUG path traversal (E3)
5. Windows v20 ABE elevation via CDP port (N2 — documented non-goal,
tracked as #1136)
Plus the base PRs: SSRF gate (#1029), envelope sentinel escape (#1031),
DOM-channel hidden-element coverage (#1032), --from-file path validation
(#1103), and 2 commits from #1073 (@theqazi).
VERSION + package.json bumped to 1.6.0.0. CHANGELOG entry covers
credits (@garagon, @Hybirdss, @HMAKT99, @theqazi), review lineage (CEO
→ Codex outside voice → Eng), and the non-goal tracking issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: pre-landing review findings (4 auto-fixes)
Addresses 4 findings from the Claude adversarial subagent on the
v1.6.0.0 security wave diff. No user-visible behavior change; all
are defense-in-depth hardening of newly-introduced code.
1. GET /connect rate-limited (was POST-only) [HIGH conf 8/10]
Attacker discovering the ngrok URL could probe unlimited GETs for
daemon enumeration. Now shares the global /connect counter.
2. ngrok listener leak on tunnel startup failure [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
If ngrok.forward() resolved but tunnelListener.url() or the
state-file write threw, the Bun listener was torn down but the
ngrok session was leaked. Fixed in BOTH /tunnel/start and
BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 startup paths.
3. GSTACK_SKILL_ROOT path-traversal gate [MEDIUM conf 8/10]
Symmetric with E3's GSTACK_SLUG regex gate — reject values
containing '..' before interpolating into the welcome-page path.
4. SSE session registry pruning [LOW conf 7/10]
pruneExpired() only checked 10 entries per mint call. Now runs
on every validate too, checks 20 entries, with a hard 10k cap as
backstop. Prevents registry growth under sustained extension
reconnect pressure.
Tests remain green (56/56 in sse-session-cookie + dual-listener +
pair-agent-e2e suites).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v1.6.0.0
Reflect the dual-listener tunnel architecture, SSE session cookies,
SSRF guards, and Windows v20 ABE non-goal across the three docs
users actually read for remote-agent and browser auth context:
- docs/REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: rewrote Architecture diagram for
dual listeners, fixed /connect rate limit (3/min → 300/min),
removed stale "/health requires no auth" (now 404 on tunnel),
added SSE cookie auth, expanded Security Model with tunnel
allowlist, SSRF guards, /welcome path traversal defense, and
the Windows v20 ABE tracking note.
- BROWSER.md: added dual-listener paragraph to Authentication and
linked to ARCHITECTURE.md endpoint table. Replaced the stale
?token= SSE auth note with the HttpOnly gstack_sse cookie flow.
- CLAUDE.md: added Transport-layer security section above the
sidebar prompt-injection stack so contributors editing server.ts,
sse-session-cookie.ts, or tunnel-denial-log.ts see the load-bearing
module boundaries before touching them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(make-pdf): write --from-file payload to /tmp, not os.tmpdir()
make-pdf's browseClient wrote its --from-file payload to os.tmpdir(),
which is /var/folders/... on macOS. v1.6.0.0's PR #1103 cherry-pick
tightened browse load-html --from-file to validate against the
safe-dirs allowlist ([TEMP_DIR, cwd] where TEMP_DIR is '/tmp' on
macOS/Linux, os.tmpdir() on Windows). This closed a CLI/API parity
gap but broke make-pdf on macOS because /var/folders/... is outside
the allowlist.
Fix: mirror browse's TEMP_DIR convention — use '/tmp' on non-Windows,
os.tmpdir() on Windows. The make-pdf-gate CI failure on macOS-latest
(run 72440797490) is caused by exactly this: the payload file was
rejected by validateReadPath.
Verified locally: the combined-gate e2e test now passes after
rebuilding make-pdf/dist/pdf.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sidebar): killAgent resets per-tab state; align tests with current agent event format
Two pre-existing bugs surfaced while running the full e2e suite on the
sec-wave branch. Both pre-date v1.6.0.0 (same failures on main at
|
||
|
Garry Tan
|
a7593d70ef |
fix: cookie picker auth token leak (v0.15.17.0) (#904)
* fix: cookie picker auth token leak (CVE — CVSS 7.8) GET /cookie-picker served HTML that inlined the master bearer token without authentication. Any local process could extract it and use it to call /command, executing arbitrary JS in the browser context. Fix: Jupyter-style one-time code exchange. The picker URL now includes a one-time code that is consumed via 302 redirect, setting an HttpOnly session cookie. The master AUTH_TOKEN never appears in HTML. The session cookie is isolated from the scoped token system (not valid for /command). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.17.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: browse-snapshot E2E turn budget too tight (7 → 9) The agent consistently uses 8 turns for 5 snapshot commands because it reads the saved annotated PNG to verify it was created. All 3 CI attempts hit error_max_turns at exactly 8. Bumping to 9 gives headroom. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Garry Tan
|
6cc094cd41 |
fix: pair-agent tunnel drops after 15s (v0.15.15.1) (#868)
* fix: remove stray `domains` reference crashing connect command The connect command's status fetch had an undefined `domains` variable in the JSON body, causing "Connect failed: domains is not defined" and preventing headed mode from initializing properly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent server dies 15s after CLI exits The server monitors BROWSE_PARENT_PID and self-terminates when the parent exits. For pair-agent, the connect subprocess is the parent, so the server dies 15s after connect finishes. Disable parent-PID monitoring for pair-agent sessions so the server outlives the CLI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.15.1) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: newtab blocked by tab ownership check for scoped tokens The tab ownership check ran before the newtab handler, checking the active tab (owned by root) against the scoped token. Since the scoped token doesn't own the root tab, newtab returned 403. Skip the ownership check for newtab since it creates a new tab. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: regression tests for pair-agent tunnel fixes Three source-level tests covering the bugs fixed on this branch: - connect status fetch has no undefined variable references (domains) - pair-agent disables parent PID monitoring (BROWSE_PARENT_PID=0) - newtab excluded from tab ownership check for scoped tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Garry Tan
|
8ca950f6f1 |
feat: content security — 4-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent (#815)
* feat: token registry for multi-agent browser access Per-agent scoped tokens with read/write/admin/meta command categories, domain glob restrictions, rate limiting, expiry, and revocation. Setup key exchange for the /pair-agent ceremony (5-min one-time key → 24h session token). Idempotent exchange handles tunnel drops. 39 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: integrate token registry + scoped auth into browse server Server changes for multi-agent browser access: - /connect endpoint: setup key exchange for /pair-agent ceremony - /token endpoint: root-only minting of scoped sub-tokens - /token/:clientId DELETE: revoke agent tokens - /agents endpoint: list connected agents (root-only) - /health: strips root token when tunnel is active (P0 security fix) - /command: scope/rate/domain checks via token registry before dispatch - Idle timer skips shutdown when tunnel is active Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: ngrok tunnel integration + @ngrok/ngrok dependency BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 env var starts an ngrok tunnel after Bun.serve(). Reads NGROK_AUTHTOKEN from env or ~/.gstack/ngrok.env. Reads NGROK_DOMAIN for dedicated domain (stable URL). Updates state file with tunnel URL. Feasibility spike confirmed: SDK works in compiled Bun binary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab isolation for multi-agent browser access Add per-tab ownership tracking to BrowserManager. Scoped agents must create their own tab via newtab before writing. Unowned tabs (pre-existing, user-opened) are root-only for writes. Read access always allowed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: tab enforcement + POST /pair endpoint + activity attribution Server-side tab ownership check blocks scoped agents from writing to unowned tabs. Special-case newtab records ownership for scoped tokens. POST /pair endpoint creates setup keys for the pairing ceremony. Activity events now include clientId for attribution. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent CLI command + instruction block generator One command to pair a remote agent: $B pair-agent. Creates a setup key via POST /pair, prints a copy-pasteable instruction block with curl commands. Smart tunnel fallback (tunnel URL > auto-start > localhost). Flags: --for HOST, --local HOST, --admin, --client NAME. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: tab isolation + instruction block generator tests 14 tests covering tab ownership lifecycle (access checks, unowned tabs, transferTab) and instruction block generator (scopes, URLs, admin flag, troubleshooting section). Fix server-auth test that used fragile sliceBetween boundaries broken by new endpoints. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.9.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: CSO security fixes — token leak, domain bypass, input validation 1. Remove root token from /health endpoint entirely (CSO #1 CRITICAL). Origin header is spoofable. Extension reads from ~/.gstack/.auth.json. 2. Add domain check for newtab URL (CSO #5). Previously only goto was checked, allowing domain-restricted agents to bypass via newtab. 3. Validate scope values, rateLimit, expiresSeconds in createToken() (CSO #4). Rejects invalid scopes and negative values. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: /pair-agent skill — syntactic sugar for browser sharing Users remember /pair-agent, not $B pair-agent. The skill walks through agent selection (OpenClaw, Hermes, Codex, Cursor, generic), local vs remote setup, tunnel configuration, and includes platform-specific notes for each agent type. Wraps the CLI command with context. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: remote browser access reference for paired agents Full API reference, snapshot→@ref pattern, scopes, tab isolation, error codes, ngrok setup, and same-machine shortcuts. The instruction block points here for deeper reading. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: improved instruction block with snapshot→@ref pattern The paste-into-agent instruction block now teaches the snapshot→@ref workflow (the most powerful browsing pattern), shows the server URL prominently, and uses clearer formatting. Tests updated to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: smart ngrok detection + auto-tunnel in pair-agent The pair-agent command now checks ngrok's native config (not just ~/.gstack/ngrok.env) and auto-starts the tunnel when ngrok is available. The skill template walks users through ngrok install and auth if not set up, instead of just printing a dead localhost URL. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: on-demand tunnel start via POST /tunnel/start pair-agent now auto-starts the ngrok tunnel without restarting the server. New POST /tunnel/start endpoint reads authtoken from env, ~/.gstack/ngrok.env, or ngrok's native config. CLI detects ngrok availability and calls the endpoint automatically. Zero manual steps when ngrok is installed and authed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill must output the instruction block verbatim Added CRITICAL instruction: the agent MUST output the full instruction block so the user can copy it. Previously the agent could summarize over it, leaving the user with nothing to paste. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scoped tokens rejected on /command — auth gate ordering bug The blanket validateAuth() gate (root-only) sat above the /command endpoint, rejecting all scoped tokens with 401 before they reached getTokenInfo(). Moved /command above the gate so both root and scoped tokens are accepted. This was the bug Wintermute hit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pair-agent auto-launches headed mode before pairing When pair-agent detects headless mode, it auto-switches to headed (visible Chromium window) so the user can watch what the remote agent does. Use --headless to skip this. Fixed compiled binary path resolution (process.execPath, not process.argv[1] which is virtual /$bunfs/ in Bun compiled binaries). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive tests for auth ordering, tunnel, ngrok, headed mode 16 new tests covering: - /command sits above blanket auth gate (Wintermute bug) - /command uses getTokenInfo not validateAuth - /tunnel/start requires root, checks native ngrok config, returns already_active - /pair creates setup keys not session tokens - Tab ownership checked before command dispatch - Activity events include clientId - Instruction block teaches snapshot→@ref pattern - pair-agent auto-headed mode, process.execPath, --headless skip - isNgrokAvailable checks all 3 sources (gstack env, env var, native config) - handlePairAgent calls /tunnel/start not server restart Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: chain scope bypass + /health info leak when tunneled 1. Chain command now pre-validates ALL subcommand scopes before executing any. A read+meta token can no longer escalate to admin via chain (eval, js, cookies were dispatched without scope checks). tokenInfo flows through handleMetaCommand into the chain handler. Rejects entire chain if any subcommand fails. 2. /health strips sensitive fields (currentUrl, agent.currentMessage, session) when tunnel is active. Only operational metadata (status, mode, uptime, tabs) exposed to the internet. Previously anyone reaching the ngrok URL could surveil browsing activity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tout /pair-agent as headline feature in CHANGELOG + README Lead with what it does for the user: type /pair-agent, paste into your other agent, done. First time AI agents from different companies can coordinate through a shared browser with real security boundaries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: expand /pair-agent, /design-shotgun, /design-html in README Each skill gets a real narrative paragraph explaining the workflow, not just a table cell. design-shotgun: visual exploration with taste memory. design-html: production HTML with Pretext computed layout. pair-agent: cross-vendor AI agent coordination through shared browser. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split handleCommand into handleCommandInternal + HTTP wrapper Chain subcommands now route through handleCommandInternal for full security enforcement (scope, domain, tab ownership, rate limiting, content wrapping). Adds recursion guard for nested chains, rate-limit exemption for chain subcommands, and activity event suppression (1 event per chain, not per sub). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add content-security.ts with datamarking, envelope, and filter hooks Four-layer prompt injection defense for pair-agent browser sharing: - Datamarking: session-scoped watermark for text exfiltration detection - Content envelope: trust boundary wrapping with ZWSP marker escaping - Content filter hooks: extensible filter pipeline with warn/block modes - Built-in URL blocklist: requestbin, pipedream, webhook.site, etc. BROWSE_CONTENT_FILTER env var controls mode: off|warn|block (default: warn) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: centralize content wrapping in handleCommandInternal response path Single wrapping location replaces fragmented per-handler wrapping: - Scoped tokens: content filters + datamarking + enhanced envelope - Root tokens: existing basic wrapping (backward compat) - Chain subcommands exempt from top-level wrapping (wrapped individually) - Adds 'attrs' to PAGE_CONTENT_COMMANDS (ARIA value exposure defense) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: hidden element stripping for scoped token text extraction Detects CSS-hidden elements (opacity, font-size, off-screen, same-color, clip-path) and ARIA label injection patterns. Marks elements with data-gstack-hidden, extracts text from a clean clone (no DOM mutation), then removes markers. Only active for scoped tokens on text command. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: snapshot split output format for scoped tokens Scoped tokens get a split snapshot: trusted @refs section (for click/fill) separated from untrusted web content in an envelope. Ref names truncated to 50 chars in trusted section. Root tokens unchanged (backward compat). Resume command also uses split format for scoped tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add SECURITY section to pair-agent instruction block Instructs remote agents to treat content inside untrusted envelopes as potentially malicious. Lists common injection phrases to watch for. Directs agents to only use @refs from the trusted INTERACTIVE ELEMENTS section, not from page content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add 4 prompt injection test fixtures - injection-visible.html: visible injection in product review text - injection-hidden.html: 7 CSS hiding techniques + ARIA injection + false positive - injection-social.html: social engineering in legitimate-looking content - injection-combined.html: all attack types + envelope escape attempt Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: comprehensive content security tests (47 tests) Covers all 4 defense layers: - Datamarking: marker format, session consistency, text-only application - Content envelope: wrapping, ZWSP marker escaping, filter warnings - Content filter hooks: URL blocklist, custom filters, warn/block modes - Instruction block: SECURITY section content, ordering, generation - Centralized wrapping: source-level verification of integration - Chain security: recursion guard, rate-limit exemption, activity suppression - Hidden element stripping: 7 CSS techniques, ARIA injection, false positives - Snapshot split format: scoped vs root output, resume integration Also fixes: visibility:hidden detection, case-insensitive ARIA pattern matching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pair-agent skill compliance + fix all 16 pre-existing test failures Root cause: pair-agent was added without completing the gen-skill-docs compliance checklist. All 16 failures traced back to this. Fixes: - Sync package.json version to VERSION (0.15.9.0) - Add "(gstack)" to pair-agent description for discoverability - Add pair-agent to Codex path exception (legitimately documents ~/.codex/) - Add CLI_COMMANDS (status, pair-agent, tunnel) to skill parser allowlist - Regenerate SKILL.md for all hosts (claude, codex, factory, kiro, etc.) - Update golden file baselines for ship skill - Fix relink tests: pass GSTACK_INSTALL_DIR to auto-relink calls so they use the fast mock install instead of scanning real ~/.claude/skills/gstack Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.12.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: E2E exit reason precedence + worktree prune race condition Two fixes for E2E test reliability: 1. session-runner.ts: error_max_turns was misclassified as error_api because is_error flag was checked before subtype. Now known subtypes like error_max_turns are preserved even when is_error is set. The is_error override only applies when subtype=success (API failure). 2. worktree.ts: pruneStale() now skips worktrees < 1 hour old to avoid deleting worktrees from concurrent test runs still in progress. Previously any second test execution would kill the first's worktrees. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore token in /health for localhost extension auth The CSO security fix stripped the token from /health to prevent leaking when tunneled. But the extension needs it to authenticate on localhost. Now returns token only when not tunneled (safe: localhost-only path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: verify /health token is localhost-only, never served through tunnel Updated tests to match the restored token behavior: - Test 1: token assignment exists AND is inside the !tunnelActive guard - Test 1b: tunnel branch (else block) does not contain AUTH_TOKEN Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add security rationale for token in /health on localhost Explains why this is an accepted risk (no escalation over file-based token access), CORS protection, and tunnel guard. Prevents future CSO scans from stripping it without providing an alternative auth path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: verify tunnel is alive before returning URL to pair-agent Root cause: when ngrok dies externally (pkill, crash, timeout), the server still reports tunnelActive=true with a dead URL. pair-agent prints an instruction block pointing at a dead tunnel. The remote agent gets "endpoint offline" and the user has to manually restart everything. Three-layer fix: - Server /pair endpoint: probes tunnel URL before returning it. If dead, resets tunnelActive/tunnelUrl and returns null (triggers CLI restart). - Server /tunnel/start: probes cached tunnel before returning already_active. If dead, falls through to restart ngrok automatically. - CLI pair-agent: double-checks tunnel URL from server before printing instruction block. Falls through to auto-start on failure. 4 regression tests verify all three probe points + CLI verification. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add POST /batch endpoint for multi-command batching Remote agents controlling GStack Browser through a tunnel pay 2-5s of latency per HTTP round-trip. A typical "navigate and read" takes 4 sequential commands = 10-20 seconds. The /batch endpoint collapses N commands into a single HTTP round-trip, cutting a 20-tab crawl from ~60s to ~5s. Sequential execution through the full security pipeline (scope, domain, tab ownership, content wrapping). Rate limiting counts the batch as 1 request. Activity events emitted at batch level, not per-command. Max 50 commands per batch. Nested batches rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add source-level security tests for /batch endpoint 8 tests verifying: auth gate placement, scoped token support, max command limit, nested batch rejection, rate limiting bypass, batch-level activity events, command field validation, and tabId passthrough. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct CHANGELOG date from 2026-04-06 to 2026-04-05 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: consolidate Hermes into generic HTTP option in pair-agent Hermes doesn't have a host-specific config — it uses the same generic curl instructions as any other agent. Removing the dedicated option simplifies the menu and eliminates a misleading distinction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump VERSION to 0.15.14.0, add CHANGELOG entry for batch endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate pair-agent/SKILL.md after main merge Vendoring deprecation section from main's template wasn't reflected in the generated file. Fixes check-freshness CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: checkTabAccess uses options object, add own-only tab policy Refactors checkTabAccess(tabId, clientId, isWrite) to use an options object { isWrite?, ownOnly? }. Adds tabPolicy === 'own-only' support in the server command dispatch — scoped tokens with this policy are restricted to their own tabs for all commands, not just writes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add --domain flag to pair-agent CLI for domain restrictions Allows passing --domain to pair-agent to restrict the remote agent's navigation to specific domains (comma-separated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert: remove batch commands CHANGELOG entry and VERSION bump The batch endpoint work belongs on the browser-batch-multitab branch (port-louis), not this branch. Reverting VERSION to 0.15.14.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: adopt main's headed-mode /health token serving Our merge kept the old !tunnelActive guard which conflicted with main's security-audit-r2 tests that require no currentUrl/currentMessage in /health. Adopts main's approach: serve token conditionally based on headed mode or chrome-extension origin. Updates server-auth tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: improve snapshot flags docs completeness for LLM judge Adds $B placeholder explanation, explicit syntax line, and detailed flag behavior (-d depth values, -s CSS selector syntax, -D unified diff format and baseline persistence, -a screenshot vs text output relationship). Fixes snapshot flags reference LLM eval scoring completeness < 4. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Garry Tan
|
115d81d792 |
fix: security wave 1 — 14 fixes for audit #783 (v0.15.7.0) (#810)
* fix: DNS rebinding protection checks AAAA (IPv6) records too Cherry-pick PR #744 by @Gonzih. Closes the IPv6-only DNS rebinding gap by checking both A and AAAA records independently. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: validateOutputPath symlink bypass — resolve real path before safe-dir check Cherry-pick PR #745 by @Gonzih. Adds a second pass using fs.realpathSync() to resolve symlinks after lexical path validation. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: validate saved URLs before navigation in restoreState Cherry-pick PR #751 by @Gonzih. Prevents navigation to cloud metadata endpoints or file:// URIs embedded in user-writable state files. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: telemetry-ingest uses anon key instead of service role key Cherry-pick PR #750 by @Gonzih. The service role key bypasses RLS and grants unrestricted database access — anon key + RLS is the right model for a public telemetry endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: killAgent() actually kills the sidebar claude subprocess Cherry-pick PR #743 by @Gonzih. Implements cross-process kill signaling via kill-file + polling pattern, tracks active processes per-tab. Co-Authored-By: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(design): bind server to localhost and validate reload paths Cherry-pick PR #803 by @garagon. Adds hostname: '127.0.0.1' to Bun.serve() and validates /api/reload paths are within cwd() or tmpdir(). Closes C1+C2 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add auth gate to /inspector/events SSE endpoint (C3) The /inspector/events endpoint had no authentication, unlike /activity/stream which validates tokens. Now requires the same Bearer header or ?token= query param check. Closes C3 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sanitize design feedback with trust boundary markers (C4+H5) Wrap user feedback in <user-feedback> XML markers with tag escaping to prevent prompt injection via malicious feedback text. Cap accumulated feedback to last 5 iterations to limit incremental poisoning. Closes C4 and H5 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: harden file/directory permissions to owner-only (C5+H9+M9+M10) Add mode 0o700 to all mkdirSync calls for state/session directories. Add mode 0o600 to all writeFileSync calls for session.json, chat.jsonl, and log files. Add umask 077 to setup script. Prevents auth tokens, chat history, and browser logs from being world-readable on multi-user systems. Closes C5, H9, M9, M10 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: TOCTOU race in setup symlink creation (C6) Remove the existence check before mkdir -p (it's idempotent) and validate the target isn't already a symlink before creating the link. Prevents a local attacker from racing between the check and mkdir to redirect SKILL.md writes. Closes C6 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove CORS wildcard, restrict to localhost (H1) Replace Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * with http://127.0.0.1 on sidebar tab/chat endpoints. The Chrome extension uses manifest host_permissions to bypass CORS entirely, so this only blocks malicious websites from making cross-origin requests. Closes H1 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make cookie picker auth mandatory (H2) Remove the conditional if(authToken) guard that skipped auth when authToken was undefined. Now all cookie picker data/action routes reject unauthenticated requests. Closes H2 from security audit #783. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate /health token on chrome-extension Origin header Only return the auth token in /health response when the request Origin starts with chrome-extension://. The Chrome extension always sends this origin via manifest host_permissions. Regular HTTP requests (including tunneled ones from ngrok/SSH) won't get the token. The extension also has a fallback path through background.js that reads the token from the state file directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: update server-auth test for chrome-extension Origin gating The test previously checked for 'localhost-only' comment. Now checks for 'chrome-extension://' since the token is gated on Origin header. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.7.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Gonzih <gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Garry Tan
|
3f080de1b7 |
feat: GStack Browser — double-click AI browser with anti-bot stealth (#695)
* feat: CDP inspector module — persistent sessions, CSS cascade, style modification New browse/src/cdp-inspector.ts with full CDP inspection engine: - inspectElement() via CSS.getMatchedStylesForNode + DOM.getBoxModel - modifyStyle() via CSS.setStyleTexts with headless page.evaluate fallback - Persistent CDP session lifecycle (create, reuse, detach on nav, re-create) - Specificity sorting, overridden property detection, UA rule filtering - Modification history with undo support - formatInspectorResult() for CLI output Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: browse server inspector endpoints + inspect/style/cleanup/prettyscreenshot CLI Server endpoints: POST /inspector/pick, GET /inspector, POST /inspector/apply, POST /inspector/reset, GET /inspector/history, GET /inspector/events (SSE). CLI commands: inspect (CDP cascade), style (live CSS mod), cleanup (page clutter removal), prettyscreenshot (clean screenshot pipeline). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: sidebar CSS inspector — element picker, box model, rule cascade, quick edit Extension changes for the visual CSS inspector: - inspector.js: element picker with hover highlight, CSS selector generation, basic mode fallback (getComputedStyle + CSSOM), page alteration handlers - inspector.css: picker overlay styles (blue highlight + tooltip) - background.js: inspector message routing (picker <-> server <-> sidepanel) - sidepanel: Inspector tab with box model viz (gstack palette), matched rules with specificity badges, computed styles, click-to-edit quick edit, Send to Agent/Code button, empty/loading/error states Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: document inspect, style, cleanup, prettyscreenshot browse commands Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: auto-track user-created tabs and handle tab close browser-manager.ts changes: - context.on('page') listener: automatically tracks tabs opened by the user (Cmd+T, right-click open in new tab, window.open). Previously only programmatic newTab() was tracked, so user tabs were invisible. - page.on('close') handler in wirePageEvents: removes closed tabs from the pages map and switches activeTabId to the last remaining tab. - syncActiveTabByUrl: match Chrome extension's active tab URL to the correct Playwright page for accurate tab identity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: per-tab agent isolation via BROWSE_TAB environment variable Prevents parallel sidebar agents from interfering with each other's tab context. Three-layer fix: - sidebar-agent.ts: passes BROWSE_TAB=<tabId> env var to each claude process, per-tab processing set allows concurrent agents across tabs - cli.ts: reads process.env.BROWSE_TAB and includes tabId in command request body - server.ts: handleCommand() temporarily switches activeTabId when tabId is present, restores after command completes (safe: Bun event loop is single-threaded) Also: per-tab agent state (TabAgentState map), per-tab message queuing, per-tab chat buffers, verbose streaming narration, stop button endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: sidebar per-tab chat context, tab bar sync, stop button, UX polish Extension changes: - sidepanel.js: per-tab chat history (tabChatHistories map), switchChatTab() swaps entire chat view, browserTabActivated handler for instant tab sync, stop button wired to /sidebar-agent/stop, pollTabs renders tab bar - sidepanel.html: updated banner text ("Browser co-pilot"), stop button markup, input placeholder "Ask about this page..." - sidepanel.css: tab bar styles, stop button styles, loading state fixes - background.js: chrome.tabs.onActivated sends browserTabActivated to sidepanel with tab URL for instant tab switch detection Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: per-tab isolation, BROWSE_TAB pinning, tab tracking, sidebar UX sidebar-agent.test.ts (new tests): - BROWSE_TAB env var passed to claude process - CLI reads BROWSE_TAB and sends tabId in body - handleCommand accepts tabId, saves/restores activeTabId - Tab pinning only activates when tabId provided - Per-tab agent state, queue, concurrency - processingTabs set for parallel agents sidebar-ux.test.ts (new tests): - context.on('page') tracks user-created tabs - page.on('close') removes tabs from pages map - Tab isolation uses BROWSE_TAB not system prompt hack - Per-tab chat context in sidepanel - Tab bar rendering, stop button, banner text Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve merge conflicts — keep security defenses + per-tab isolation Merged main's security improvements (XML escaping, prompt injection defense, allowed commands whitelist, --model opus, Write tool, stderr capture) with our branch's per-tab isolation (BROWSE_TAB env var, processingTabs set, no --resume). Updated test expectations for expanded system prompt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.9.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add inspector message types to background.js allowlist Pre-existing bug found by Codex: ALLOWED_TYPES in background.js was missing all inspector message types (startInspector, stopInspector, elementPicked, pickerCancelled, applyStyle, toggleClass, injectCSS, resetAll, inspectResult). Messages were silently rejected, making the inspector broken on ALL pages. Also: separate executeScript and insertCSS into individual try blocks in injectInspector(), store inspectorMode for routing, and add content.js fallback when script injection fails (CSP, chrome:// pages). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: basic element picker in content.js for CSP-restricted pages When inspector.js can't be injected (CSP, chrome:// pages), content.js provides a basic picker using getComputedStyle + CSSOM: - startBasicPicker/stopBasicPicker message handlers - captureBasicData() with ~30 key CSS properties, box model, matched rules - Hover highlight with outline save/restore (never leaves artifacts) - Click uses e.target directly (no re-querying by selector) - Sends inspectResult with mode:'basic' for sidebar rendering - Escape key cancels picker and restores outlines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: cleanup + screenshot buttons in sidebar inspector toolbar Two action buttons in the inspector toolbar: - Cleanup (🧹): POSTs cleanup --all to server, shows spinner, chat notification on success, resets inspector state (element may be removed) - Screenshot (📸): POSTs screenshot to server, shows spinner, chat notification with saved file path Shared infrastructure: - .inspector-action-btn CSS with loading spinner via ::after pseudo-element - chat-notification type in addChatEntry() for system messages - package.json version bump to 0.13.9.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: inspector allowlist, CSP fallback, cleanup/screenshot buttons 16 new tests in sidebar-ux.test.ts: - Inspector message allowlist includes all inspector types - content.js basic picker (startBasicPicker, captureBasicData, CSSOM, outline save/restore, inspectResult with mode basic, Escape cleanup) - background.js CSP fallback (separate try blocks, inspectorMode, fallback) - Cleanup button (POST /command, inspector reset after success) - Screenshot button (POST /command, notification rendering) - Chat notification type and CSS styles Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v0.13.9.0 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: cleanup + screenshot buttons in chat toolbar (not just inspector) Quick actions toolbar (🧹 Cleanup, 📸 Screenshot) now appears above the chat input, always visible. Both inspector and chat buttons share runCleanup() and runScreenshot() helper functions. Clicking either set shows loading state on both simultaneously. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: chat toolbar buttons, shared helpers, quick-action-btn styles Tests that chat toolbar exists (chat-cleanup-btn, chat-screenshot-btn, quick-actions container), CSS styles (.quick-action-btn, .quick-action-btn.loading), shared runCleanup/runScreenshot helper functions, and cleanup inspector reset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: aggressive cleanup heuristics — overlays, scroll unlock, blur removal Massively expanded CLEANUP_SELECTORS with patterns from uBlock Origin and Readability.js research: - ads: 30+ selectors (Google, Amazon, Outbrain, Taboola, Criteo, etc.) - cookies: OneTrust, Cookiebot, TrustArc, Quantcast + generic patterns - overlays (NEW): paywalls, newsletter popups, interstitials, push prompts, app download banners, survey modals - social: follow prompts, share tools - Cleanup now defaults to --all when no args (sidebar button fix) - Uses !important on all display:none (overrides inline styles) - Unlocks body/html scroll (overflow:hidden from modal lockout) - Removes blur/filter effects (paywall content blur) - Removes max-height truncation (article teaser truncation) - Collapses empty ad placeholder whitespace (empty divs after ad removal) - Skips gstack-ctrl indicator in sticky removal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: disable action buttons when disconnected, no error spam - setActionButtonsEnabled() toggles .disabled class on all cleanup/screenshot buttons (both chat toolbar and inspector toolbar) - Called with false in updateConnection when server URL is null - Called with true when connection established - runCleanup/runScreenshot silently return when disconnected instead of showing 'Not connected' error notifications - CSS .disabled style: pointer-events:none, opacity:0.3, cursor:not-allowed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: cleanup heuristics, button disabled state, overlay selectors 17 new tests: - cleanup defaults to --all on empty args - CLEANUP_SELECTORS overlays category (paywall, newsletter, interstitial) - Major ad networks in selectors (doubleclick, taboola, criteo, etc.) - Major consent frameworks (OneTrust, Cookiebot, TrustArc, Quantcast) - !important override for inline styles - Scroll unlock (body overflow:hidden) - Blur removal (paywall content blur) - Article truncation removal (max-height) - Empty placeholder collapse - gstack-ctrl indicator skip in sticky cleanup - setActionButtonsEnabled function - Buttons disabled when disconnected - No error spam from cleanup/screenshot when disconnected - CSS disabled styles for action buttons Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: LLM-based page cleanup — agent analyzes page semantically Instead of brittle CSS selectors, the cleanup button now sends a prompt to the sidebar agent (which IS an LLM). The agent: 1. Runs deterministic $B cleanup --all as a quick first pass 2. Takes a snapshot to see what's left 3. Analyzes the page semantically to identify remaining clutter 4. Removes elements intelligently, preserving site branding This means cleanup works correctly on any site without site-specific selectors. The LLM understands that "Your Daily Puzzles" is clutter, "ADVERTISEMENT" is junk, but the SF Chronicle masthead should stay. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: aggressive cleanup heuristics + preserve top nav bar Deterministic cleanup improvements (used as first pass before LLM analysis): - New 'clutter' category: audio players, podcast widgets, sidebar puzzles/games, recirculation widgets (taboola, outbrain, nativo), cross-promotion banners - Text-content detection: removes "ADVERTISEMENT", "Article continues below", "Sponsored", "Paid content" labels and their parent wrappers - Sticky fix: preserves the topmost full-width element near viewport top (site nav bar) instead of hiding all sticky/fixed elements. Sorts by vertical position, preserves the first one that spans >80% viewport width. Tests: clutter category, ad label removal, nav bar preservation logic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: LLM-based cleanup architecture, deterministic heuristics, sticky nav 22 new tests covering: - Cleanup button uses /sidebar-command (agent) not /command (deterministic) - Cleanup prompt includes deterministic first pass + agent snapshot analysis - Cleanup prompt lists specific clutter categories for agent guidance - Cleanup prompt preserves site identity (masthead, headline, body, byline) - Cleanup prompt instructs scroll unlock and $B eval removal - Loading state management (async agent, setTimeout) - Deterministic clutter: audio/podcast, games/puzzles, recirculation - Ad label text patterns (ADVERTISEMENT, Sponsored, Article continues) - Ad label parent wrapper hiding for small containers - Sticky nav preservation (sort by position, first full-width near top) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: GStack Browser stealth + branding — anti-bot patches, custom UA, rebrand - Add GSTACK_CHROMIUM_PATH env var for custom Chromium binary - Add BROWSE_EXTENSIONS_DIR env var for extension path override - Move auth token to /health endpoint (fixes read-only .app bundles) - Anti-bot stealth: disable navigator.webdriver, fake plugins, languages - Custom user agent: Chrome/<version> GStackBrowser (auto-detects version) - Rebrand Chromium plist to "GStack Browser" at launch time - Update security test to match new token-via-health approach * feat: GStack Browser .app bundle — launcher script + build system - scripts/app/gstack-browser: dual-mode launcher (dev + .app bundle) - scripts/build-app.sh: compiles binary, bundles Chromium + extension, creates DMG - Rebrands Chromium plist during build for "GStack Browser" in menu bar - 389MB .app, 189MB compressed DMG, launches in ~5s * docs: GStack Browser V0 master plan — AI-native development browser vision 5-phase roadmap from .app wrapper through Chromium fork, 9 capability visions, competitive landscape, architecture diagrams, design system. * fix: restore package.json and sync version to 0.14.3.0 * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.14.4.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: gitignore top-level dist/ (GStack Browser build output) * feat: GStack Browser icon — custom .icns replaces Chromium's Dock icon - Generated 1024px icon: dark terminal window with amber prompt cursor - Converted to .icns with all macOS sizes (16-1024px, 1x and 2x) - build-app.sh copies icon into both the outer .app and bundled Chromium's Resources (Chromium's process owns the Dock icon, not the launcher) - browser-manager.ts patches Chromium's icon at runtime for dev mode too - Both the Dock and Cmd+Tab now show the GStack icon * feat: rename /connect-chrome → /open-gstack-browser - Rename skill directory + update frontmatter name and description - Update SKILL.md.tmpl to reference GStack Browser branding/stealth - Create connect-chrome symlink for backwards compatibility - Setup script creates /connect-chrome alias in .claude/skills/ - Fix package.json version sync (0.14.5.0 → 0.14.6.0) * feat: rename /connect-chrome → /open-gstack-browser across all references Update README skill lists, docs/skills.md deep dive, extension sidepanel banner copy button, and reconnect clipboard text. * feat: left-align sidebar UI + extension-ready event for welcome page - Left-align all sidebar text (chat welcome, loading, empty states, notifications, inspector empty, session placeholder) - Dispatch 'gstack-extension-ready' CustomEvent from content.js so the welcome page can detect when the sidebar is active * chore: add GStack Browser TODOs — CDP stealth patches + Chromium fork P1: rebrowser-style postinstall patcher for Playwright 1.58.2 (suppress Runtime.enable, addBinding context discovery, 6 files, ~200 lines). P2: long-term Chromium fork for permanent stealth + native sidebar. * chore: regenerate open-gstack-browser/SKILL.md from template Fix timeline skill name (connect-chrome → open-gstack-browser) and preamble formatting from merge with main's updated template. * feat: welcome page served from browse server on headed launch - Add /welcome endpoint to server.ts, serves welcome.html - Navigate to /welcome after server starts (not during launchHeaded, which runs before the server is listening) - welcome.html bundled in browse/src/ for portability * feat: auto-open sidebar on every browser launch, not just first install - Add top-level setTimeout in background.js that fires on every service worker startup (onInstalled only fires on install/update) - Remove misaligned arrow from welcome page, replace with text fallback that hides when extension content script fires gstack-extension-ready * fix: sidebar auto-open retry with backoff + welcome page tests - Replace single-attempt sidePanel.open() with autoOpenSidePanel() that retries up to 5 times with 500ms-5000ms backoff - Fire on both onInstalled AND every service worker startup - Remove misaligned arrow from welcome page, replace with text fallback - Add 12 tests: welcome page structure, /welcome endpoint, headed launch navigation timing, sidebar auto-open retry logic, extension-ready event * feat: reload button in sidebar footer Adds a "reload" button next to "debug" and "clear" in the sidebar footer. Calls location.reload() to fully refresh the side panel, re-run connection logic, and clear stale state. * feat: right-pointing arrow hint for sidebar on welcome page Replace invisible text fallback with visible amber bubble + animated right arrow (→) pointing toward where the sidebar opens. Always correct regardless of window size (unlike the old up arrow at toolbar chrome). * fix: sidebar auth race — pass token in getPort response The sidebar called tryConnect() → getPort → got {port, connected} but NO token. All subsequent requests (SSE, chat poll) failed with 401. The token only arrived later via the health broadcast, but by then the SSE connection was already broken. Fix: include authToken in the getPort response so the sidebar has the token from its very first connection attempt. * feat: sidebar debug visibility + auth race tests - Show attempt count in loading screen ("Connecting... attempt 3") - After 5 failed attempts, show debug details (port, connected, token) so stuck users can see exactly what's failing - Add 4 tests: getPort includes token, tryConnect uses token, dead state exists with MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS, reconnectAttempts visible * fix: startup health check retries every 1s instead of 10s Root cause: extension service worker starts before Bun.serve() is listening. First checkHealth() fails, next attempt is 10 seconds later. User stares at "Connecting..." for 10 seconds. Fix: retry every 1s for up to 15 attempts on startup, then switch to 10s polling once connected (or after 15s gives up). Sidebar should connect within 1-2 seconds of server becoming available. 3 new tests verify the fast-retry → slow-poll transition. * feat: detailed step-by-step status in sidebar loading screen Replace useless "Connecting..." with real-time debug info: - "Looking for browse server... (attempt N)" - Shows port, server responding status, token status - Shows chrome.runtime errors if extension messaging fails - Tells user to run /open-gstack-browser if server not found * fix: sidebar connects directly to /health instead of waiting for background Root cause: sidepanel asked background "are you connected?" but background's health check hadn't succeeded yet (1-10s gap). Sidepanel waited forever. Fix: when background says not connected, sidepanel hits /health directly with fetch(). Gets the token from the response. Bypasses background entirely for initial connection. Shows step-by-step debug info: "Checking server directly... port: 34567 / Trying GET /health..." * fix: suppress fake "session ended" and timeout errors in sidebar Two issues making the sidebar look broken when it's actually working: 1. "Timed out after 300s" error displayed after agent_done — this is a cleanup timer, not a real error. Now suppressed when no active session. 2. "(session ended)" text appended on every idle poll — removed entirely. The thinking spinner is cleaned up silently instead. * fix: sidebar agent passes BROWSE_PORT to child claude Ensures the child claude process connects to the existing headed browse server (port 34567) instead of spawning a new headless one. Without this, sidebar chat commands run in an invisible browser. * feat: BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents sidebar from spawning headless browser When set, the browse CLI refuses to start a new server and exits with a clear error: "Server not available, run /open-gstack-browser to restart." The sidebar agent sets this so users never get an invisible headless browser when the headed one is closed. * test: BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART guard in CLI + sidebar-agent env vars 5 tests: CLI checks env var before starting server, shows actionable error, sidebar-agent sets the flag + BROWSE_PORT, guard runs before lock acquisition to prevent stale lock files. * fix: stale auth token causes Unauthorized + invisible error text background.js checkHealth() never refreshed authToken from /health responses, so when the browse server restarted with a new token, all sidebar-command requests got 401 Unauthorized forever. Also: error placeholder text was #3f3f46 on #0C0C0C (nearly invisible). Now shows in red to match the error border. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace 40+ silent catch blocks with debug logging Every empty catch {} in sidepanel.js, sidebar-agent.ts now logs with [gstack sidebar] or [sidebar-agent] prefix. Chat poll 401s, stop agent, tab poll, clear chat, SSE parse, refs fetch, stream JSON parse, queue read/parse, process kill — all now visible in console. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: noisy debug logging + auto model routing in browse server Server-side silent catch blocks (22 instances) now log with [browse] prefix: chat persistence, session save/load, agent kill, tab pin/restore, welcome page, buffer flush, worktree cleanup, lock files, SSE streams. Also adds pickSidebarModel() — routes sidebar messages to sonnet for navigation/interaction (click, goto, fill, screenshot) and opus for analysis/comprehension (summarize, describe, find bugs). Sonnet is ~4x faster for action commands with zero quality difference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: update sidebar tests for model router + longer stopAgent slice - stopAgent slice 800→1000 to accommodate added error logging lines - Replace hardcoded opus assertion with model router assertions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sidebar arrow hint stays visible until sidebar actually opens Previously the welcome page arrow hid immediately when the extension's content script loaded — but extension loaded ≠ sidebar open. Now the signal flow is: sidepanel connects → tells background.js → relays to content script → dispatches gstack-extension-ready → arrow hides. Adds welcome-page.test.ts: 14 tests verifying arrow, branding, feature cards, dark theme, and auto-hide behavior via real HTTP server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: arrow hide signal chain (4-step) + stale session-ended assertion 8 new tests verify the sidebarOpened → background → content → welcome signal chain. Updates stale "(session ended)" test that checked for text removed in a prior commit. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: preserve optimistic UI during tab switch on first message When the user sends a message and the server assigns it to a new tab (because Chrome's active tab changed), switchChatTab() was blowing away the optimistic user bubble and thinking dots with a welcome screen. Now preserves the current DOM if we're mid-send with a thinking indicator. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: sidebar message flow architecture doc + CLAUDE.md pointer SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md documents the full init timeline, message flow (user types → claude responds), auth token chain, arrow hint signal chain, model routing, tab concurrency, and known failure modes. CLAUDE.md now tells you to read it before touching sidebar files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sidebar chat resets idle timer + shutdown kills sidebar-agent Two fixes for the "browser died while chatting" problem: 1. /sidebar-command now calls resetIdleTimer(). Previously only CLI commands reset it, so the server would shut down after 30 min even while the user was actively chatting in the sidebar. 2. shutdown() now pkills the sidebar-agent daemon. Previously the agent survived server shutdown, kept polling a dead server, and spawned confused claude processes that auto-started headless browsers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: disable idle timeout in headed mode — browser lives until closed The 30-minute idle timeout only applies to headless mode now. In headed mode the user is looking at the Chrome window, so auto-shutdown is wrong. The browser stays alive until explicit disconnect or window close. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: cookies button in sidebar footer opens cookie picker One-click cookie import from the sidebar. Navigates the headed browser to /cookie-picker where you can select which domains to import from your real Chrome profile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for GStack Browser improvements README.md: updated Real browser mode and sidebar agent sections with model routing, cookie import button, no idle timeout in headed mode. Updated skill table entries for /browse and /open-gstack-browser. docs/skills.md: updated /open-gstack-browser deep dive with model routing and cookie import details. GSTACK_BROWSER_V0.md: added 6 new SHIPPED items to implementation status table (model routing, debug logging, idle timeout, cookie button, arrow hint, architecture doc). TODOS.md: marked "Sidebar agent Write tool + error visibility" as SHIPPED. Added new P2 TODO for direct API calls to eliminate claude -p startup tax. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add Claude Code terminal example to welcome page TRY IT NOW Fifth example shows the parent agent workflow: navigate, extract CSS, write to file. The other four are all sidebar-only. This one shows co-presence — the Claude Code session that launched the browser can also control it directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hide internal tool-result file reads from sidebar activity Claude reads its own ~/.claude/projects/.../tool-results/ files as internal plumbing. These showed up as long unreadable paths in the sidebar. Now: describeToolCall returns empty for tool-result reads, and the sidebar skips rendering tool_use entries with no description. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: collapse tool calls into "See reasoning" disclosure on completion While the agent is working, tool calls stream live so you can watch progress. When the agent finishes, all tool calls collapse into a "See reasoning (N steps)" disclosure. Click to expand and see what the agent did. The final text answer stays visible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: 17 new tests for recent sidebar fixes Covers: tool-result file filtering, empty tool_use skip, reasoning disclosure collapse, idle timeout headed mode bypass, sidebar-command idle reset, shutdown sidebar-agent kill, cookie button, and model routing analysis-before-action priority. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: move cookies button to quick actions toolbar Cookies now sits next to Cleanup and Screenshot as a primary action button (🍪 Cookies) instead of buried in the footer. Same behavior, more discoverable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add instructional text to cookie picker page "Select the domains of cookies you want to import to GStack Browser. You'll be able to browse those sites with the same login as your other browser." Also fixes stale test that expected hardcoded '--model', 'opus'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: 6-card welcome page with cookie import + dual-agent cards 3x2 grid layout (was 2x2). New cards: "Import your cookies" (click 🍪 Cookies to import login sessions from Chrome/Arc/Brave) and "Or use your main agent" (your Claude Code terminal also controls this browser). Responsive: 3 cols > 2 cols > 1 col. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: move sidebar arrow hint to top-right instead of vertically centered The arrow was centered vertically which put it behind the feature cards. Now positioned at top: 80px where there's open space and it's more visible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
Garry Tan
|
7450b5160b |
fix: security audit remediation — 12 fixes, 20 tests (v0.13.1.0) (#595)
* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03) - Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process) - Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap - sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var - Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast) - Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition * fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01) - Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes - GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell) - Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls - CORS preflight now allows Authorization header * fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02) - Add savedAt timestamp to state save output - Warn on load if state file older than 7 days - Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup - Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message * fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01) - content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel - sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed - Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team * fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02) - Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass) - Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check - Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent) - Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp) - Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent) * fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03) - Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS) - Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir - Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary * fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04) - gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only) - gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex) - gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines - gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe() * test: 20 security tests for audit remediation - server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/* - cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated - path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws - gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved - state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning - telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON - adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |