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Commits
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b5a951e623 |
v1.72.0.0 feat: Aside recommended driver for third-party web actions (#2710)
* fix(browse): never chmod shared, symlinked, or foreign-owned dirs to 0700 restrictDirectoryPermissions unconditionally chmodded its target. On hosts where the process holds CAP_FOWNER (Docker as root, CI sandboxes) that chmod SUCCEEDS on root-owned /tmp whenever a state file is configured there (BROWSE_STATE_FILE=/tmp/x.json derives stateDir=/tmp), and a 0700 /tmp breaks access(2)-based checks machine-wide for every other process. The POSIX branch now refuses shared sticky dirs, world-writable mounts under root, foreign-owned dirs, and symlinked state dirs; refusals warn once per process instead of failing silent; owned-but-unreadable dirs keep their chmod self-repair; and the check-then-act race is closed with fd-anchored O_NOFOLLOW + fstat/fchmod on a single inode. Regression tests cover the sticky-dir, foreign-uid, mkdirSecure-reapply, and symlinked-dir shapes. * fix: hash with sha256sum before shasum on Linux (config slugs + setup verify) shasum is perl/macOS; coreutils-only Linux ships sha256sum. Two call sites hard-coded shasum: gstack-config's sha8_of/sha16 (so resolve-user-slug exited 127 for any Linux user with a git email, the Layer-3 fallback) and the generated bun-installer checksum snippet in the browse/qa NEEDS_SETUP flow (spurious "checksum mismatch" on the same distros). Both now resolve sha256sum first and fall back to shasum -a 256. New shim-PATH tests pin BOTH hasher branches of sha8_of to a known vector and cover the sha8->sha16 collision escalation end to end. * feat(contract): Aside is the recommended driver for third-party web actions The Third-Party Web Actions contract (ship, spec, office-hours, land-and-deploy, setup-deploy) now names the Aside AI browser as the recommended driver: it acts across the user's real logged-in sessions, which is what vendor-dashboard moments need. Supersedes the v1.65.0.0 de-Aside stance by explicit user directive (2026-08-27). Detection is a runtime probe (command -v + aside --version under a portable gtimeout/timeout/bare guard; nonzero exit = not detected). Consent options render per detection state with Aside recommended and the first-party stack ($B headed + handoff, GStack Browser) as the universal fallback. Absent on macOS, the contract mentions the aside.com download (macOS 15+) once per task; gstack never runs an installer and binary presence is never consent. Drive discipline: step-wise over whole-task delegation, vendor confirm mode on, vendor skill/--help text scoped to operational syntax only, secrets minimized (autofill / human-used copy buttons), Apple credential creation never a drive target in any skill, failure path quotes redacted errors and falls back only with fresh consent. test/third-party-actions.test.ts pins every load-bearing sentence (21 tests) plus repo-wide tripwires: an aside command allowlist (--version/--help only, code spans AND prose) and a ban on Aside installer invocations across all generated docs. Budget ratchet fixture and carve skeleton ceilings refreshed in this commit per the ratchet protocol. * chore: regenerate remaining browse-setup snippet consumers The sha256sum-first checksum fallback in the generated NEEDS_SETUP snippet renders into every browse-consuming skill, not just browse/qa. Mechanical regen of the other ten consumers; no template changes here. * test: consent-gate E2E suite + functional fs-capability probes Five hermetic gate-tier E2E cases (tpa-present / absent-linux / broken / absent-darwin / apple-ban) drive the real contract section through claude -p with PATH shims for aside and uname; the absent cases filter any REAL aside binary out of the child PATH and assert absence with Bun.which before spawning, so dev machines cannot leak into detection. Registered per-case in E2E_TOUCHFILES/E2E_TIERS with template-level deps (ship/SKILL.md.tmpl, gen-skill-docs.ts) and added to the evals.yml matrix with tier: gate. eval:bg:periodic's detach timeout rises to 36000s for the grown periodic shard census (floor-enforced by test/eval-detach-timeout-floor.test.ts); CLAUDE.md doc updated to match. test/helpers/fs-caps.ts adds canRevokeWrites/canRevokeReads functional probes; 13 chmod-based tests swap their uid-0-only guards for the probes so suites skip honestly on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE containers (this sandbox: uid 1000 with full caps) instead of asserting revocations the kernel ignores. path-validation's symlink test targets /etc/passwd (exists everywhere; /etc/crontab is absent on Amazon Linux). * docs: file the Aside follow-ups in TODOS Phase-2 QA logged-in-evidence path (P3), a hostile-vendor-skill E2E for the contract's override sentence (P2), and fd-anchoring the file-level permission writes to match the directory hardening (P3). * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.72.0.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: Third-Party Web Actions subsection under /ship (Aside recommended driver, consent rules, credential boundaries). BROWSER.md: "Aside and third-party drives" subsection under Real-browser mode + ToC entry, including the no-gstack-side-audit-trail caveat (ship adversarial finding 12). TODOS.md: mark the finding-12 doc note done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: apply cross-model doc review fixes for v1.72.0.0 docs/skills.md: restore the /ship closing line above the new subsection. BROWSER.md: ToC label matches the heading; BROWSE_STATE_FILE env row documents the new dir-hardening refusal + one-time warning. CHANGELOG: correct the hasher precedence wording (sha256sum first, shasum fallback) and the fs-caps count (14 test files, verified against the diff). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: close cross-model doc-review gaps for v1.72.0.0 setup's manual bun-verify instruction gets the same sha256sum-first fallback the automated snippet got (coreutils-only Linux); BROWSER.md's BROWSE_STATE_FILE row now lists the under-root world-writable refusal; test-cost ceilings in CLAUDE.md/CONTRIBUTING.md updated for the five new gate E2E cases (~$4.20 E2E / ~$4.35 evals). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): gate the symlink-refusal test to POSIX and drop the umask assumption The symlink regression test exercised the POSIX O_NOFOLLOW branch but ran on Windows, where restrictDirectoryPermissions takes the icacls branch and stat has no POSIX modes (0o666 always) — windows-free-tests failed on mode 493 vs 438. Early-return on win32 like every sibling test in the file, and assert the target's mode is UNCHANGED (captured post-mkdir) instead of hardcoding 0o755, which a strict umask would also break. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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03973c2fab |
fix: community security wave — 8 PRs, 4 contributors (v0.15.13.0) (#847)
* fix(bin): pass search params via env vars (RCE fix) (#819) Replace shell string interpolation with process.env in gstack-learnings-search to prevent arbitrary code execution via crafted learnings entries. Also fixes the CROSS_PROJECT interpolation that the original PR missed. Adds 3 regression tests verifying no shell interpolation remains in the bun -e block. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): add path validation to upload command (#821) Add isPathWithin() and path traversal checks to the upload command, blocking file exfiltration via crafted upload paths. Uses existing SAFE_DIRECTORIES constant instead of a local copy. Adds 3 regression tests. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): symlink resolution in meta-commands validateOutputPath (#820) Add realpathSync to validateOutputPath in meta-commands.ts to catch symlink-based directory escapes in screenshot, pdf, and responsive commands. Resolves SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync to handle macOS /tmp -> /private/tmp symlinks. Existing path validation tests pass with the hardened implementation. Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add uninstall instructions to README (#812) Community PR #812 by @0531Kim. Adds two uninstall paths: the gstack-uninstall script (handles everything) and manual removal steps for when the repo isn't cloned. Includes CLAUDE.md cleanup note and Playwright cache guidance. Co-Authored-By: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): Windows launcher extraEnv + headed-mode token (#822) Community PR #822 by @pieterklue. Three fixes: 1. Windows launcher now merges extraEnv into spawned server env (was only passing BROWSE_STATE_FILE, dropping all other env vars) 2. Welcome page fallback serves inline HTML instead of about:blank redirect (avoids ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT on Windows) 3. /health returns auth token in headed mode even without Origin header (fixes Playwright Chromium extensions that don't send it) Also adds HOME/USERPROFILE fallback for cross-platform compatibility. Co-Authored-By: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): terminate orphan server when parent process exits (#808) Community PR #808 by @mmporong. Passes BROWSE_PARENT_PID to the spawned server process. The server polls every 15s with signal 0 and calls shutdown() if the parent is gone. Prevents orphaned chrome-headless-shell processes when Claude Code sessions exit abnormally. Co-Authored-By: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel, targeted token (#664) Community PR #664 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 1, new parts only). - IPv6 ULA prefix blocking (fc00::/7) in url-validation.ts with false-positive guard for hostnames like fd.example.com - Cookie value redaction for tokens, API keys, JWTs in browse cookies command - Per-tab cancel files in killAgent() replacing broken global kill-signal - design/serve.ts: realpathSync upgrade prevents symlink bypass in /api/reload - extension: targeted getToken handler replaces token-in-health-broadcast - Supabase migration 003: column-level GRANT restricts anon UPDATE scope - Telemetry sync: upsert error logging - 10 new tests for IPv6, cookie redaction, DNS rebinding, path traversal Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): CSS injection guard, timeout clamping, session validation, tests (#806) Community PR #806 by @mr-k-man (security audit round 2, new parts only). - CSS value validation (DANGEROUS_CSS) in cdp-inspector, write-commands, extension inspector - Queue file permissions (0o700/0o600) in cli, server, sidebar-agent - escapeRegExp for frame --url ReDoS fix - Responsive screenshot path validation with validateOutputPath - State load cookie filtering (reject localhost/.internal/metadata cookies) - Session ID format validation in loadSession - /health endpoint: remove currentUrl and currentMessage fields - QueueEntry interface + isValidQueueEntry validator for sidebar-agent - SIGTERM->SIGKILL escalation in timeout handler - Viewport dimension clamping (1-16384), wait timeout clamping (1s-300s) - Cookie domain validation in cookie-import and cookie-import-browser - DocumentFragment-based tab switching (XSS fix in sidepanel) - pollInProgress reentrancy guard for pollChat - toggleClass/injectCSS input validation in extension inspector - Snapshot annotated path validation with realpathSync - 714-line security-audit-r2.test.ts + 33-line learnings-injection.test.ts Co-Authored-By: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.13.0) Community security wave: 8 PRs from 4 contributors (@garagon, @mr-k-man, @mmporong, @0531Kim, @pieterklue). IPv6 ULA blocking, cookie redaction, per-tab cancel signaling, CSS injection guards, timeout clamping, session validation, DocumentFragment XSS fix, parent process watchdog, uninstall docs, Windows fixes, and 750+ lines of security regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: garagon <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: 0531Kim <0531Kim@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: pieterklue <pieterklue@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mmporong <mmporong@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mr-k-man <mr-k-man@users.noreply.github.com> |
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7450b5160b |
fix: security audit remediation — 12 fixes, 20 tests (v0.13.1.0) (#595)
* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03) - Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process) - Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap - sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var - Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast) - Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition * fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01) - Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes - GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell) - Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls - CORS preflight now allows Authorization header * fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02) - Add savedAt timestamp to state save output - Warn on load if state file older than 7 days - Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup - Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message * fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01) - content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel - sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed - Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team * fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02) - Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass) - Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check - Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent) - Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp) - Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent) * fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03) - Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS) - Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir - Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary * fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04) - gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only) - gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex) - gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines - gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe() * test: 20 security tests for audit remediation - server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/* - cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated - path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws - gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved - state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning - telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON - adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c0f3c3a91a |
fix: security hardening + issue triage (v0.8.3) (#205)
* fix: check for bun before running setup (#147) Users without bun installed got a cryptic "command not found" error. Now prints a clear message with install instructions. Closes #147 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block SSRF via URL validation in browse commands (#17) Adds validateNavigationUrl() that blocks non-HTTP(S) schemes (file://, javascript:, data:) and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal). Applied to goto, diff, and newTab commands. Localhost and private IPs remain allowed for local dev QA. Closes #17 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace eval $(gstack-slug) with source <(...) (#133) Eliminates unnecessary use of eval across all skill templates and generated files. source <(...) has identical behavior without the shell injection surface. Also hardens gstack-diff-scope usage. Closes #133 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rename /debug to /investigate to avoid Claude Code conflict (#190) Claude Code has a built-in /debug command that shadows the gstack skill. Renaming to /investigate which better reflects the systematic root-cause investigation methodology. Closes #190 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add unit tests for path validation helpers validateOutputPath() and validateReadPath() are security-critical functions with zero test coverage. Adds 14 tests covering safe paths, traversal attacks, and prefix collision edge cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.8.3) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update /debug → /investigate references in docs CLAUDE.md, README.md, and docs/skills.md still referenced the old /debug skill name after the rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: harden URL validation against hostname bypasses (Codex P1) Codex review found that metadata IPs could be reached via hex (0xA9FEA9FE), decimal (2852039166), octal, trailing dot, and IPv6 bracket forms. Now normalizes hostnames before checking the blocklist and probes numeric IP representations via URL constructor. Also moves URL validation before page allocation in newTab() to prevent zombie tabs on rejection (Codex P3). 5 new test cases for bypass variants. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |