2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Garry Tan	c15b805cd8	feat(browse): Puppeteer parity — load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// (v1.1.0.0) (#1062) ... * feat(browse): TabSession loadedHtml + command aliases + DX polish primitives Adds the foundation layer for Puppeteer-parity features: - TabSession.loadedHtml + setTabContent/getLoadedHtml/clearLoadedHtml — enables load-html content to survive context recreation (viewport --scale) via in-memory replay. ASCII lifecycle diagram in the source explains the clear-before-navigation contract. - COMMAND_ALIASES + canonicalizeCommand() helper — single source of truth for name aliases (setcontent / set-content / setContent → load-html), consumed by server dispatch and chain prevalidation. - buildUnknownCommandError() pure function — rich error messages with Levenshtein-based "Did you mean" suggestions (distance ≤ 2, input length ≥ 4 to skip 2-letter noise) and NEW_IN_VERSION upgrade hints. - load-html registered in WRITE_COMMANDS + SCOPE_WRITE so scoped write tokens can use it. - screenshot and viewport descriptions updated for upcoming flags. - New browse/test/dx-polish.test.ts (15 tests): alias canonicalization, Levenshtein threshold + alphabetical tiebreak, short-input guard, NEW_IN_VERSION upgrade hint, alias + scope integration invariants. No consumers yet — pure additive foundation. Safe to bisect on its own. * feat(browse): accept file:// in goto with smart cwd/home-relative parsing Extends validateNavigationUrl to accept file:// URLs scoped to safe dirs (cwd + TEMP_DIR) via the existing validateReadPath policy. The workhorse is a new normalizeFileUrl() helper that handles non-standard relative forms BEFORE the WHATWG URL parser sees them: file:///abs/path.html → unchanged file://./docs/page.html → file://<cwd>/docs/page.html file://~/Documents/page.html → file://<HOME>/Documents/page.html file://docs/page.html → file://<cwd>/docs/page.html file://localhost/abs/path → unchanged file://host.example.com/... → rejected (UNC/network) file:// and file:/// → rejected (would list a directory) Host heuristic rejects segments with '.', ':', '\\', '%', IPv6 brackets, or Windows drive-letter patterns — so file://docs.v1/page.html, file://127.0.0.1/x, file://[::1]/x, and file://C:/Users/x are explicit errors. Uses fileURLToPath() + pathToFileURL() from node:url (never string-concat) so URL escapes like %20 decode correctly and Node rejects encoded-slash traversal (%2F..%2F) outright. Signature change: validateNavigationUrl now returns Promise<string> (the normalized URL) instead of Promise<void>. Existing callers that ignore the return value still compile — they just don't benefit from smart-parsing until updated in follow-up commits. Callers will be migrated in the next few commits (goto, diff, newTab, restoreState). Rewrites the url-validation test file: updates existing tests for the new return type, adds 20+ new tests covering every normalizeFileUrl shape variant, URL-encoding edge cases, and path-traversal rejection. References: codex consult v3 P1 findings on URL parser semantics and fileURLToPath. * feat(browse): BrowserManager deviceScaleFactor + setContent replay + file:// plumbing Three tightly-coupled changes to BrowserManager, all in service of the Puppeteer-parity workflow: 1. deviceScaleFactor + currentViewport tracking. New private fields (default scale=1, viewport=1280x720) + setDeviceScaleFactor(scale, w, h) method. deviceScaleFactor is a context-level Playwright option — changing it requires recreateContext(). The method validates (finite number, 1-3 cap, headed-mode rejected), stores new values, calls recreateContext(), and rolls back the fields on failure so a bad call doesn't leave inconsistent state. Context options at all three sites (launch, recreate happy path, recreate fallback) now honor the stored values instead of hardcoding 1280x720. 2. BrowserState.loadedHtml + loadedHtmlWaitUntil. saveState captures per-tab loadedHtml from the session; restoreState replays it via newSession. setTabContent() — NOT bare page.setContent() — so TabSession.loadedHtml is rehydrated and survives *subsequent* scale changes. In-memory only, never persisted to disk (HTML may contain secrets or customer data). 3. newTab + restoreState now consume validateNavigationUrl's normalized return value. file://./x, file://~/x, and bare-segment forms now take effect at every navigation site, not just the top-level goto command. Together these enable: load-html → viewport --scale 2 → viewport --scale 1.5 → screenshot, with content surviving both context recreations. Codex v2 P0 flagged that bare page.setContent in restoreState would lose content on the second scale change — this commit implements the rehydration path. References: codex v2 P0 (TabSession rehydration), codex v3 P1 (4-caller return value), plan Feature 3 + Feature 4. * feat(browse): load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, alias dispatch Wires the new handlers and dispatch logic that the previous commits made possible: write-commands.ts - New 'load-html' case: validateReadPath for safe-dir scoping, stat-based actionable errors (not found, directory, oversize), extension allowlist (.html/.htm/.xhtml/.svg), magic-byte sniff with UTF-8 BOM strip accepting any <[a-zA-Z!?] markup opener (not just <!doctype — bare fragments like <div>...</div> work for setContent), 50MB cap via GSTACK_BROWSE_MAX_HTML_BYTES override, frame-context rejection. Calls session.setTabContent() so replay metadata is rehydrated. - viewport command extended: optional [<WxH>], optional [--scale <n>], scale-only variant reads current size via page.viewportSize(). Invalid scale (NaN, Infinity, empty, out of 1-3) throws with named value. Headed mode rejected explicitly. - clearLoadedHtml() called BEFORE goto/back/forward/reload navigation (not after) so a timed-out goto post-commit doesn't leave stale metadata that could resurrect on a later context recreation. Codex v2 P1 catch. - goto uses validateNavigationUrl's normalized return value. meta-commands.ts - screenshot --selector <css> flag: explicit element-screenshot form. Rejects alongside positional selector (both = error), preserves --clip conflict at line 161, composes with --base64 at lines 168-174. - chain canonicalizes each step with canonicalizeCommand — step shape is now { rawName, name, args } so prevalidation, dispatch, WRITE_COMMANDS.has, watch blocking, and result labels all use canonical names while audit labels show 'rawName→name' when aliased. Codex v3 P2 catch — prior shape only canonicalized at prevalidation and diverged everywhere else. - diff command consumes validateNavigationUrl return value for both URLs. server.ts - Command canonicalization inserted immediately after parse, before scope / watch / tab-ownership / content-wrapping checks. rawCommand preserved for future audit (not wired into audit log in this commit — follow-up). - Unknown-command handler replaced with buildUnknownCommandError() from commands.ts — produces 'Unknown command: X. Did you mean Y?' with optional upgrade hint for NEW_IN_VERSION entries. security-audit-r2.test.ts - Updated chain-loop marker from 'for (const cmd of commands)' to 'for (const c of commands)' to match the new chain step shape. Same isWatching + BLOCKED invariants still asserted. * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.1.0.0) - VERSION: 1.0.0.0 → 1.1.0.0 (MINOR bump — new user-facing commands) - package.json: matching version bump - CHANGELOG.md: new 1.1.0.0 entry describing load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, file:// support, setContent replay, and DX polish in user voice with a dedicated Security section for file:// safe-dirs policy - browse/SKILL.md.tmpl: adds pattern #12 "Render local HTML", pattern #13 "Retina screenshots", and a full Puppeteer → browse cheatsheet with side-by- side API mapping and a worked tweet-renderer migration example - browse/SKILL.md + SKILL.md: regenerated from templates via `bun run gen:skill-docs` to reflect the new command descriptions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pre-landing review fixes (9 findings from specialist + adversarial review) Adversarial review (Claude subagent + Codex) surfaced 9 bugs across CRITICAL/HIGH severity. All fixed: 1. tab-session.ts:setTabContent — state mutation moved AFTER the setContent await. Prior order left phantom HTML in replay metadata if setContent threw (timeout, browser crash), which a later viewport --scale would silently replay. Now loadedHtml is only recorded on successful load. 2. browser-manager.ts:setDeviceScaleFactor — rollback now forces a second recreateContext after restoring the old fields. The fallback path in the original recreateContext builds a blank context using whatever this.deviceScaleFactor/currentViewport hold at that moment (which were the NEW values we were trying to apply). Rolling back the fields without a second recreate left the live context at new-scale while state tracked old-scale. Now: restore fields, force re-recreate with old values, only if that ALSO fails do we return a combined error. 3. commands.ts:buildUnknownCommandError — Levenshtein tiebreak simplified to 'd <= 2 && d < bestDist' (strict less). Candidates are pre-sorted alphabetically, so first equal-distance wins by default. The prior '(d === bestDist && best !== undefined && cand < best)' clause was dead code. 4. tab-session.ts:onMainFrameNavigated — now clears loadedHtml, not just refs + frame. Without this, a user who load-html'd then clicked a link (or had a form submit / JS redirect / OAuth flow) would retain the stale replay metadata. The next viewport --scale would silently revert the tab to the ORIGINAL loaded HTML, losing whatever the post-navigation content was. Silent data corruption. Browser-emitted navigations trigger this path via wirePageEvents. 5. browser-manager.ts:saveState + restoreState — tab ownership now flows through BrowserState.owner. Without this, a scoped agent's viewport --scale would strand them: tab IDs change during recreate, ownership map held stale IDs, owner lookup failed. New IDs had no owner, so writes without tabId were denied (DoS). Worse, if the agent sent a stale tabId the server's swallowed-tab-switch-error path would let the command hit whatever tab was currently active (cross-tab authz bypass). Now: clear ownership before restore, re-add per-tab with new IDs. 6. meta-commands.ts:state load — disk-loaded state.pages is now explicit allowlist (url, isActive, storage:null) instead of object spread. Spreading accepted loadedHtml, loadedHtmlWaitUntil, and owner from a user-writable state file, letting a tampered state.json smuggle HTML past load-html's safe-dirs / extension / magic-byte / 50MB-cap validators, or forge tab ownership. Now stripped at the boundary. 7. url-validation.ts:normalizeFileUrl — preserves query string + fragment across normalization. file://./app.html?route=home#login previously resolved to a filesystem path that URL-encoded '?' as %3F and '#' as %23, or (for absolute forms) pathToFileURL dropped them entirely. SPAs and fixture URLs with query params 404'd or loaded the wrong route. Now: split on ?/# before path resolution, reattach after. 8. url-validation.ts:validateNavigationUrl — reattaches parsed.search + parsed.hash to the normalized file:// URL. Same fix at the main validator for absolute paths that go through fileURLToPath round-trip. 9. server.ts:writeAuditEntry — audit entries now include aliasOf when the user typed an alias ('setcontent' → cmd: 'load-html', aliasOf: 'setcontent'). Previously the isAliased variable was computed but dropped, losing the raw input from the forensic trail. Completes the plan's codex v3 P2 requirement. Also added bm.getCurrentViewport() and switched 'viewport --scale'- without-size to read from it (more reliable than page.viewportSize() on headed/transition contexts). Tests pass: exit 0, no failures. Build clean. * test: integration coverage for load-html, screenshot --selector, viewport --scale, replay, aliases Adds 28 Playwright-integration tests that close the coverage gap flagged by the ship-workflow coverage audit (50% → expected ~80%+). **load-html (12 tests):** - happy path loads HTML file, page text matches - bare HTML fragments (<div>...</div>) accepted, not just full documents - missing file arg throws usage - non-.html extension rejected by allowlist - /etc/passwd.html rejected by safe-dirs policy - ENOENT path rejected with actionable "not found" error - directory target rejected - binary file (PNG magic bytes) disguised as .html rejected by magic-byte check - UTF-8 BOM stripped before magic-byte check — BOM-prefixed HTML accepted - --wait-until networkidle exercises non-default branch - invalid --wait-until value rejected - unknown flag rejected **screenshot --selector (5 tests):** - --selector flag captures element, validates Screenshot saved (element) - conflicts with positional selector (both = error) - conflicts with --clip (mutually exclusive) - composes with --base64 (returns data:image/png;base64,...) - missing value throws usage **viewport --scale (5 tests):** - WxH --scale 2 produces PNG with 2x element dimensions (parses IHDR bytes 16-23) - --scale without WxH keeps current size + applies scale - non-finite value (abc) throws "not a finite number" - out-of-range (4, 0.5) throws "between 1 and 3" - missing value throws **setContent replay across context recreation (3 tests):** - load-html → viewport --scale 2: content survives (hits setTabContent replay path) - double cycle 2x → 1.5x: content still survives (proves TabSession rehydration) - goto after load-html clears replay: subsequent viewport --scale does NOT resurrect the stale HTML (validates the onMainFrameNavigated fix) **Command aliases (2 tests):** - setcontent routes to load-html via chain canonicalization - set-content (hyphenated) also routes — both end-to-end through chain dispatch Fixture paths use /tmp (SAFE_DIRECTORIES entry) instead of $TMPDIR which is /var/folders/... on macOS and outside the safe-dirs boundary. Chain result labels use rawName→name format when an alias is resolved (matches the meta-commands.ts chain refactor). Full suite: exit 0, 223/223 pass. * docs: update BROWSER.md + CHANGELOG for v1.1.0.0 BROWSER.md: - Command reference table updated: goto now lists file:// support, load-html added to Navigate row, viewport flagged with --scale option, screenshot row shows --selector + --base64 flags - Screenshot modes table adds the fifth mode (element crop via --selector flag) and notes the tag-selector-not-caught-positionally gotcha - New "Retina screenshots — viewport --scale" subsection explains deviceScaleFactor mechanics, context recreation side effects, and headed-mode rejection - New "Loading local HTML — goto file:// vs load-html" subsection explains the two paths, their tradeoffs (URL state, relative asset resolution), the safe-dirs policy, extension allowlist + magic-byte sniff, 50MB cap, setContent replay across recreateContext, and the alias routing (setcontent → load-html before scope check) CHANGELOG.md (v1.1.0.0 security section expanded, no existing content removed): - State files cannot smuggle HTML or forge tab ownership (allowlist on disk-loaded page fields) - Audit log records aliasOf when a canonical command was reached via an alias (setcontent → load-html) - load-html content clears on real navigations (clicks, form submits, JS redirects) — not just explicit goto. Also notes SPA query/fragment preservation for goto file:// Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-18 23:25:33 +08:00
Garry Tan	7e96fe299b	fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988) ... * fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory. A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is /tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs. Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT (file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check. Closes #921 Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS string context, enabling arbitrary code execution. Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env). Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern. Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars. Closes #858 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp Two fixes: 1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath(). 2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support. Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler). Closes #852 Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted in LLM context, leaking secrets. Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns: token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid, api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME. Closes #860 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and feedback history. Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths. Closes #859 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently. Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in the .agents/ generation block (line 237). Closes #614 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp. Closes #747 Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate Three fixes to the learnings system: 1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list, key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields. 2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear error message. 3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases. Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated) to enable the trust gate at read time. Closes #841 Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution stays within imported origins. Changes: - BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods - cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies - cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import - cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag) Closes #615 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain: 1. Agent imports cookies for github.com 2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com 3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com). When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect). about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk). Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking). Closes #616 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): add persistent command audit log Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300 chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode. All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution. Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl. Closes #617 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe (hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254 normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe. Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl. Closes #739 Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0) Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors. Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking. Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction, learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00