gstack

CalvinBackup/gstack

Fork 0

mirror of https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git synced 2026-05-02 11:45:20 +02:00

Commit Graph

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Garry Tan	7e96fe299b	fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988 ) * fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory. A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is /tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs. Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT (file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check. Closes #921 Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS string context, enabling arbitrary code execution. Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env). Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern. Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars. Closes #858 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp Two fixes: 1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath(). 2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support. Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler). Closes #852 Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted in LLM context, leaking secrets. Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns: token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid, api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME. Closes #860 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and feedback history. Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths. Closes #859 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently. Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in the .agents/ generation block (line 237). Closes #614 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp. Closes #747 Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate Three fixes to the learnings system: 1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list, key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields. 2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear error message. 3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases. Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated) to enable the trust gate at read time. Closes #841 Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution stays within imported origins. Changes: - BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods - cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies - cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import - cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag) Closes #615 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain: 1. Agent imports cookies for github.com 2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com 3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com). When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect). about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk). Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking). Closes #616 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): add persistent command audit log Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300 chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode. All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution. Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl. Closes #617 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe (hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254 normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe. Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl. Closes #739 Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0) Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors. Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking. Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction, learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00
Garry Tan	b3d064aabb	fix: gstack-team-init detects and removes vendored copies (#848 ) * fix: gstack-team-init detects and removes vendored copies in team mode When running gstack-team-init inside a repo with a vendored .claude/skills/gstack/, the script now auto-detects and removes it: git rm --cached, add to .gitignore, rm -rf. Also adds team_mode config key to setup --team/--no-team, and makes gstack-upgrade Step 4.5 team-mode aware (remove instead of sync). Includes 5 new integration tests for the vendored copy migration. * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.14.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-06 00:26:20 -07:00
Garry Tan	dae251e066	feat: team-friendly gstack install mode (v0.15.7.0) (#809 ) * feat: add gstack-settings-hook for atomic Claude Code hook management DRY helper for adding/removing SessionStart hooks in ~/.claude/settings.json. Handles missing files, deduplication, malformed JSON, and atomic writes (.tmp + rename) to prevent corruption on crash or disk-full. Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add gstack-session-update for automatic team updates SessionStart hook target that auto-updates gstack at session start. Background fork (zero latency), throttled to once/hour, with lockfile (mkdir + PID), stale lock recovery, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0, and debug logging to ~/.gstack/analytics/session-update.log. Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add --team, --no-team, -q flags to setup --team enables auto_upgrade and registers SessionStart hook via gstack-settings-hook. --no-team reverses it. -q/--quiet suppresses all informational output (for hook-triggered setup runs). --local now prints a deprecation warning. Replaces ~20 echo calls with log() helper for quiet mode support. Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add gstack-team-init for repo-level team bootstrapping Two modes: 'optional' (gentle CLAUDE.md suggestion) and 'required' (CLAUDE.md enforcement + .claude/hooks/check-gstack.sh PreToolUse hook that blocks work without gstack installed). Atomic JSON writes, idempotent, prints git add instructions. Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: deprecate vendoring, document team mode, clean up uninstall - README: replace "Step 2: Add to your repo" vendoring instructions with team mode (./setup --team + gstack-team-init) - CLAUDE.md: rename "Vendored symlink awareness" to "Dev symlink awareness", add deprecation note - CONTRIBUTING.md: remove vendoring language from prefix section - bin/gstack-uninstall: clean up SessionStart hook on uninstall Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add vendoring deprecation detection to skill preamble Detects vendored gstack in CWD (.claude/skills/gstack/ that's not a symlink and has VERSION or .git). Outputs VENDORED_GSTACK: yes/no. Adds generateVendoringDeprecation() section that offers one-time migration to team mode via AskUserQuestion. Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: regenerate SKILL.md files with vendoring deprecation preamble Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: team mode (v0.15.7.0) — credit Jared Friedman Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add integration tests for team mode (20 tests) Covers gstack-settings-hook (add, remove, dedup, preserve existing, atomic write), gstack-session-update (guards, throttle, non-fatal), gstack-team-init (optional, required, enforcement hook, idempotent), and setup flags (-q, --local deprecation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-05 23:49:03 -07:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Garry Tan

7e96fe299b

fix: security wave 3 — 12 fixes, 7 contributors (v0.16.4.0) (#988 )

* fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks

validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory.
A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is
/tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs.

Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve
through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT
(file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check.

Closes #921

Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation

gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e
double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS
string context, enabling arbitrary code execution.

Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env).
Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern.

Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all
other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars.

Closes #858

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp

Two fixes:
1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the
   entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed
   the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path
   with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath().

2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used
   /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support.

Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in
write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler).

Closes #852

Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password

Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text
fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted
in LLM context, leaking secrets.

Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns:
token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid,
api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME.

Closes #860

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only

Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were
world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and
feedback history.

Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths.

Closes #859

Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup

bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on
every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any
dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently.

Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones
where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in
the .agents/ generation block (line 237).

Closes #614

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci

chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined
behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp.

Closes #747

Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate

Three fixes to the learnings system:

1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list,
   key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must
   be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields.

2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like
   patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear
   error message.

3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings
   from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross
   project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases.

Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated)
to enable the trust gate at read time.

Closes #841

Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports

Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains
cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution
stays within imported origins.

Changes:
- BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods
- cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies
- cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import
- cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import
  (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag)

Closes #615

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins

When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution
on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain:
1. Agent imports cookies for github.com
2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com
3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies

assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported
cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com).
When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect).
about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk).

Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking).

Closes #616

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): add persistent command audit log

Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike
in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is
never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated
to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300
chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode.

All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution.
Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl.

Closes #617

Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass

URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe
(hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254
normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe.

Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught
by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl.

Closes #739

Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0)

Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors.
Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking.
Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction,
learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-13 07:49:37 -10:00

Garry Tan

b3d064aabb

fix: gstack-team-init detects and removes vendored copies (#848 )

* fix: gstack-team-init detects and removes vendored copies in team mode

When running gstack-team-init inside a repo with a vendored
.claude/skills/gstack/, the script now auto-detects and removes it:
git rm --cached, add to .gitignore, rm -rf. Also adds team_mode config
key to setup --team/--no-team, and makes gstack-upgrade Step 4.5
team-mode aware (remove instead of sync).

Includes 5 new integration tests for the vendored copy migration.

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.15.14.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-06 00:26:20 -07:00

Garry Tan

dae251e066

feat: team-friendly gstack install mode (v0.15.7.0) (#809 )

* feat: add gstack-settings-hook for atomic Claude Code hook management

DRY helper for adding/removing SessionStart hooks in ~/.claude/settings.json.
Handles missing files, deduplication, malformed JSON, and atomic writes
(.tmp + rename) to prevent corruption on crash or disk-full.

Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add gstack-session-update for automatic team updates

SessionStart hook target that auto-updates gstack at session start.
Background fork (zero latency), throttled to once/hour, with lockfile
(mkdir + PID), stale lock recovery, GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0, and debug
logging to ~/.gstack/analytics/session-update.log.

Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add --team, --no-team, -q flags to setup

--team enables auto_upgrade and registers SessionStart hook via
gstack-settings-hook. --no-team reverses it. -q/--quiet suppresses
all informational output (for hook-triggered setup runs). --local
now prints a deprecation warning.

Replaces ~20 echo calls with log() helper for quiet mode support.

Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add gstack-team-init for repo-level team bootstrapping

Two modes: 'optional' (gentle CLAUDE.md suggestion) and 'required'
(CLAUDE.md enforcement + .claude/hooks/check-gstack.sh PreToolUse hook
that blocks work without gstack installed). Atomic JSON writes,
idempotent, prints git add instructions.

Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: deprecate vendoring, document team mode, clean up uninstall

- README: replace "Step 2: Add to your repo" vendoring instructions
  with team mode (./setup --team + gstack-team-init)
- CLAUDE.md: rename "Vendored symlink awareness" to "Dev symlink
  awareness", add deprecation note
- CONTRIBUTING.md: remove vendoring language from prefix section
- bin/gstack-uninstall: clean up SessionStart hook on uninstall

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add vendoring deprecation detection to skill preamble

Detects vendored gstack in CWD (.claude/skills/gstack/ that's not a
symlink and has VERSION or .git). Outputs VENDORED_GSTACK: yes/no.
Adds generateVendoringDeprecation() section that offers one-time
migration to team mode via AskUserQuestion.

Part of team-install-mode feature (credit: Jared Friedman).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate SKILL.md files with vendoring deprecation preamble

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: team mode (v0.15.7.0) — credit Jared Friedman

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add integration tests for team mode (20 tests)

Covers gstack-settings-hook (add, remove, dedup, preserve existing,
atomic write), gstack-session-update (guards, throttle, non-fatal),
gstack-team-init (optional, required, enforcement hook, idempotent),
and setup flags (-q, --local deprecation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-05 23:49:03 -07:00

3 Commits