/** * Server auth security tests — verify security remediation in server.ts * * Tests are source-level: they read server.ts and verify that auth checks, * CORS restrictions, and token removal are correctly in place. */ import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path from 'path'; const SERVER_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/server.ts'), 'utf-8'); const CLI_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/cli.ts'), 'utf-8'); // Helper: extract a block of source between two markers function sliceBetween(source: string, startMarker: string, endMarker: string): string { const startIdx = source.indexOf(startMarker); if (startIdx === -1) throw new Error(`Marker not found: ${startMarker}`); const endIdx = source.indexOf(endMarker, startIdx + startMarker.length); if (endIdx === -1) throw new Error(`End marker not found: ${endMarker}`); return source.slice(startIdx, endIdx); } describe('Server auth security', () => { // Test 1: /health serves token on localhost ONLY (not when tunneled) // Extension needs the token to authenticate, but it must never leak through a tunnel. test('/health serves token on localhost only, never when tunneled', () => { const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/connect'"); // Token MUST be present in the localhost (!tunnelActive) branch expect(healthBlock).toContain('healthResponse.token = AUTH_TOKEN'); // Token assignment must be inside the !tunnelActive guard const tokenIdx = healthBlock.indexOf('healthResponse.token = AUTH_TOKEN'); const guardIdx = healthBlock.indexOf('if (!tunnelActive)'); const elseIdx = healthBlock.indexOf('} else {', guardIdx); expect(tokenIdx).toBeGreaterThan(guardIdx); expect(tokenIdx).toBeLessThan(elseIdx); // Should not expose browsing activity when tunneled expect(healthBlock).toContain('not through tunnel'); }); // Test 1b: /health strips sensitive fields when tunneled test('/health strips token, currentUrl, agent, session when tunnel is active', () => { const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/connect'"); // currentUrl and agent.currentMessage must be gated on !tunnelActive expect(healthBlock).toContain('!tunnelActive'); expect(healthBlock).toContain('currentUrl'); expect(healthBlock).toContain('currentMessage'); // Token must NOT appear in the tunnel branch (the else block) const elseIdx = healthBlock.indexOf('} else {'); const tunnelBranch = healthBlock.slice(elseIdx); expect(tunnelBranch).not.toContain('AUTH_TOKEN'); // Tunnel URL must NOT be exposed in health response expect(tunnelBranch).not.toContain('url: tunnelUrl'); }); // Test 1c: newtab must check domain restrictions (CSO finding #5) // Domain check for newtab is now unified with goto in the scope check section: // (command === 'goto' || command === 'newtab') && args[0] → checkDomain test('newtab enforces domain restrictions', () => { const scopeBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "Scope check (for scoped tokens)", "Pin to a specific tab"); expect(scopeBlock).toContain("command === 'newtab'"); expect(scopeBlock).toContain('checkDomain'); expect(scopeBlock).toContain('Domain not allowed'); }); // Test 2: /refs endpoint requires auth via validateAuth test('/refs endpoint requires authentication', () => { const refsBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/refs'", "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'"); expect(refsBlock).toContain('validateAuth'); }); // Test 3: /refs has no wildcard CORS header test('/refs has no wildcard CORS header', () => { const refsBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/refs'", "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'"); expect(refsBlock).not.toContain("'*'"); }); // Test 4: /activity/history requires auth via validateAuth test('/activity/history requires authentication', () => { const historyBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/history'", 'Sidebar endpoints'); expect(historyBlock).toContain('validateAuth'); }); // Test 5: /activity/history has no wildcard CORS header test('/activity/history has no wildcard CORS header', () => { const historyBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/history'", 'Sidebar endpoints'); expect(historyBlock).not.toContain("'*'"); }); // Test 6: /activity/stream requires auth (inline Bearer or ?token= check) test('/activity/stream requires authentication with inline token check', () => { const streamBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'", "url.pathname === '/activity/history'"); expect(streamBlock).toContain('validateAuth'); expect(streamBlock).toContain('AUTH_TOKEN'); // Should not have wildcard CORS for the SSE stream expect(streamBlock).not.toContain("Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*'"); }); // Test 7: /command accepts scoped tokens (not just root) // This was the Wintermute bug — /command was BELOW the blanket validateAuth gate // which only accepts root tokens. Scoped tokens got 401'd before reaching getTokenInfo. test('/command endpoint sits ABOVE the blanket root-only auth gate', () => { const commandIdx = SERVER_SRC.indexOf("url.pathname === '/command'"); const blanketGateIdx = SERVER_SRC.indexOf("Auth-required endpoints (root token only)"); // /command must appear BEFORE the blanket gate in source order expect(commandIdx).toBeGreaterThan(0); expect(blanketGateIdx).toBeGreaterThan(0); expect(commandIdx).toBeLessThan(blanketGateIdx); }); // Test 7b: /command uses getTokenInfo (accepts scoped tokens), not validateAuth (root-only) test('/command uses getTokenInfo for auth, not validateAuth', () => { const commandBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/command'", "Auth-required endpoints"); expect(commandBlock).toContain('getTokenInfo'); expect(commandBlock).not.toContain('validateAuth'); }); // Test 8: /tunnel/start requires root token test('/tunnel/start requires root token', () => { const tunnelBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "/tunnel/start", "Refs endpoint"); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('isRootRequest'); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('Root token required'); }); // Test 8b: /tunnel/start checks ngrok native config paths test('/tunnel/start reads ngrok native config files', () => { const tunnelBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "/tunnel/start", "Refs endpoint"); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain("'ngrok.yml'"); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('authtoken'); }); // Test 8c: /tunnel/start returns already_active if tunnel is running test('/tunnel/start returns already_active when tunnel exists', () => { const tunnelBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "/tunnel/start", "Refs endpoint"); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('already_active'); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('tunnelActive'); }); // Test 9: /pair requires root token test('/pair requires root token', () => { const pairBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/pair'", "/tunnel/start"); expect(pairBlock).toContain('isRootRequest'); expect(pairBlock).toContain('Root token required'); }); // Test 9b: /pair calls createSetupKey (not createToken) test('/pair creates setup keys, not session tokens', () => { const pairBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/pair'", "/tunnel/start"); expect(pairBlock).toContain('createSetupKey'); expect(pairBlock).not.toContain('createToken'); }); // Test 10: tab ownership check happens before command dispatch test('tab ownership check runs before command dispatch for scoped tokens', () => { const handleBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "async function handleCommand", "Block mutation commands while watching"); expect(handleBlock).toContain('checkTabAccess'); expect(handleBlock).toContain('Tab not owned by your agent'); }); // Test 10b: chain command pre-validates subcommand scopes test('chain handler checks scope for each subcommand before dispatch', () => { const metaSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8'); const chainBlock = metaSrc.slice( metaSrc.indexOf("case 'chain':"), metaSrc.indexOf("case 'diff':") ); expect(chainBlock).toContain('checkScope'); expect(chainBlock).toContain('Chain rejected'); expect(chainBlock).toContain('tokenInfo'); }); // Test 10c: handleMetaCommand accepts tokenInfo parameter test('handleMetaCommand accepts tokenInfo for chain scope checking', () => { const metaSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/meta-commands.ts'), 'utf-8'); const sig = metaSrc.slice( metaSrc.indexOf('export async function handleMetaCommand'), metaSrc.indexOf('): Promise') ); expect(sig).toContain('tokenInfo'); }); // Test 10d: server passes tokenInfo to handleMetaCommand test('server passes tokenInfo to handleMetaCommand', () => { expect(SERVER_SRC).toContain('handleMetaCommand(command, args, browserManager, shutdown, tokenInfo,'); }); // Test 10e: activity attribution includes clientId test('activity events include clientId from token', () => { const commandStartBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "Activity: emit command_start", "try {"); expect(commandStartBlock).toContain('clientId: tokenInfo?.clientId'); }); // ─── Tunnel liveness verification ───────────────────────────── // Test 11a: /pair endpoint probes tunnel before returning tunnel_url test('/pair verifies tunnel is alive before returning tunnel_url', () => { const pairBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/pair'", "url.pathname === '/tunnel/start'"); // Must probe the tunnel URL expect(pairBlock).toContain('verifiedTunnelUrl'); expect(pairBlock).toContain('Tunnel probe failed'); expect(pairBlock).toContain('marking tunnel as dead'); // Must reset tunnel state on failure expect(pairBlock).toContain('tunnelActive = false'); expect(pairBlock).toContain('tunnelUrl = null'); }); // Test 11b: /pair returns null tunnel_url when tunnel is dead test('/pair returns verified tunnel URL, not raw tunnelActive flag', () => { const pairBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/pair'", "url.pathname === '/tunnel/start'"); // Should use verifiedTunnelUrl (probe result), not raw tunnelUrl expect(pairBlock).toContain('tunnel_url: verifiedTunnelUrl'); // Must NOT use raw tunnelActive check for the response expect(pairBlock).not.toContain('tunnel_url: tunnelActive ? tunnelUrl'); }); // Test 11c: /tunnel/start probes cached tunnel before returning already_active test('/tunnel/start verifies cached tunnel is alive before returning already_active', () => { const tunnelBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/tunnel/start'", "url.pathname === '/refs'"); // Must probe before returning cached URL expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('Cached tunnel is dead'); expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('tunnelActive = false'); // Must fall through to restart when dead expect(tunnelBlock).toContain('restarting'); }); // Test 11d: CLI verifies tunnel_url from server before printing instruction block test('CLI probes tunnel_url before using it in instruction block', () => { const pairSection = sliceBetween(CLI_SRC, 'Determine the URL to use', 'local HOST: write config'); // Must probe the tunnel URL expect(pairSection).toContain('cliProbe'); expect(pairSection).toContain('Tunnel unreachable from CLI'); // Must fall through to restart logic on failure expect(pairSection).toContain('attempting restart'); }); // ─── Batch endpoint security ───────────────────────────────── // Test 12a: /batch endpoint sits ABOVE the blanket root-only auth gate (same as /command) test('/batch endpoint sits ABOVE the blanket root-only auth gate', () => { const batchIdx = SERVER_SRC.indexOf("url.pathname === '/batch'"); const blanketGateIdx = SERVER_SRC.indexOf("Auth-required endpoints (root token only)"); expect(batchIdx).toBeGreaterThan(0); expect(blanketGateIdx).toBeGreaterThan(0); expect(batchIdx).toBeLessThan(blanketGateIdx); }); // Test 12b: /batch uses getTokenInfo (accepts scoped tokens), not validateAuth (root-only) test('/batch uses getTokenInfo for auth, not validateAuth', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('getTokenInfo'); expect(batchBlock).not.toContain('validateAuth'); }); // Test 12c: /batch enforces max command limit test('/batch enforces max 50 commands per batch', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('commands.length > 50'); expect(batchBlock).toContain('Max 50 commands per batch'); }); // Test 12d: /batch rejects nested batches test('/batch rejects nested batch commands', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain("cmd.command === 'batch'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('Nested batch commands are not allowed'); }); // Test 12e: /batch skips per-command rate limiting (batch counts as 1 request) test('/batch skips per-command rate limiting', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('skipRateCheck: true'); }); // Test 12f: /batch skips per-command activity events (emits batch-level events) test('/batch emits batch-level activity, not per-command', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('skipActivity: true'); // Should emit batch-level start and end events expect(batchBlock).toContain("command: 'batch'"); }); // Test 12g: /batch validates command field in each command test('/batch validates each command has a command field', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain("typeof cmd.command !== 'string'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('Missing "command" field'); }); // Test 12h: /batch passes tabId through to handleCommandInternal test('/batch passes tabId to handleCommandInternal for multi-tab support', () => { const batchBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/batch'", "url.pathname === '/command'"); expect(batchBlock).toContain('tabId: cmd.tabId'); expect(batchBlock).toContain('handleCommandInternal'); }); });