{ "source": "dacc95ea69dc73d7d0358165355969b6e4f10f6f", "provenance": { "publicProjectionPath": ".context/sep15-ship-consolidation/dacc95ea-eng-permission/first-attempt-public-test-plan-events.json", "publicProjectionSha256": "186f5e4c2105123f138d8db24db50710a4f1087878b1ee3ada00f66140cbfbf2", "originalParentPath": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/with-skills/.claude/projects/-tmp-gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy-gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG-tmp-gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39.jsonl", "originalParentSha256AtProjection": "99b786a8d31e9ee1ca54b8d718cb91ca02b89ae040bba317909d0ce04c3abde2", "rawParentNoLongerAvailable": true, "nativeIdsRequestBodiesOrderAndAcknowledgments": "retained exact; session fields on results are linked by unique original tool-use ID in replay", "syntheticReplayScaffolding": "new disposable paths, shifted wall clock, hook envelope and parent message/request IDs (not retained in projection); no invented original result", "hiddenReasoningIncluded": false, "commandStartedAt": "synthetic replay boundary one second before first retained mutation; original exact slash-command timestamp was not retained" }, "commandStartedAt": 1789471580683, "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "file": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md", "before": "# Test Plan\nGenerated by /plan-eng-review on 2026-09-15\nBranch: main\nRepo: local-only\n\n## Affected Pages/Routes\n- Login / token exchange endpoint (per tenant) \u2014 validation now runs through `AuthBroker` with parallel IDP calls; confirm a valid token still yields a session and an expired one is denied.\n- Logout endpoint \u2014 invalidation must take effect on the very next request for that tenant; no stale session survives.\n- Any endpoint behind `legacyAuthFlow()` \u2014 behavior must match the pre-rewrite characterization suite except for the listed intentional changes.\n- Admin: tenant suspension action \u2014 all sessions for the suspended tenant denied; sibling tenants unaffected.\n\n## Key Interactions to Verify\n- Sign in with a valid token for tenant A; immediately sign in for tenant B with a different token; each sees only its own session.\n- Sign in, then log out, then replay the old token: request is denied, not served from cache.\n- Revoke a token while a sign-in for that token is still in progress: sign-in completes with a denial or the session is not stored; never a usable session after revocation.\n- Sign in while one IDP dependency is unreachable: user sees a clear \"could not validate\" error, not a hang and not a silent allow.\n- Trigger each validation error class (malformed token, IDP failure, tenant lookup failure): user sees a denial with a distinct reason; nothing is silently swallowed.\n\n## Edge Cases\n- Double-submit of the same token: one validation result, no duplicate sessions, no second IDP fan-out visible to the user.\n- Session left open past cache TTL: next request re-validates instead of silently allowing.\n- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a typed timeout error within the configured per-call bound (proposed 5s default); the user sees \"could not validate\", not a hang.\n- One of the five IDP calls returns an error: request denied immediately with an error naming the failed check; the other four results are not awaited.\n- Token whose tenant claim differs from the request's tenant context: denied.\n- Tenant suspended between cache read and session store: session not stored.\n- Policy version bumped for a tenant: previously cached entries for the old version are not served.\n\n## Critical Paths\n- Login \u2192 validate (5 parallel IDP calls) \u2192 session stored by `AuthBroker` \u2192 authenticated request served.\n- Logout \u2192 cache invalidated \u2192 next request denied.\n- Tenant suspension \u2192 all tenant entries invalidated \u2192 tenant requests denied, other tenants served.\n- `legacyAuthFlow()` characterization suite (recorded before the rewrite) passes against the rewritten code.\n\n## Pending Decisions\n- R5 / D11 \u2014 failure and timeout semantics of the parallel IDP fan-out (Promise.all + per-call timeout vs allSettled vs bare Promise.all). Timeout bound and error shape in the edge cases above depend on this answer.\n", "viewport": " 167 \n 168 ### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate\n\n\u25cf Update(~/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md)\n \u23bf \u00a0Added 2 lines, removed 1 line\n 19 ## Edge Cases\n 20 - Double-submit of the same token: one validation result, no duplicate sessions, no second IDP fan-out \n visible to the user.\n 21 - Session left open past cache TTL: next request re-validates instead of silently allowing.\n 22 -- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a timeout error within the config\n -ured bound (exact bound pending D11). \n 22 +- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a typed timeout error within the \n +configured per-call bound (proposed 5s default); the user sees \"could not validate\", not a hang. \n 23 +- One of the five IDP calls returns an error: request denied immediately with an error naming the faile\n +d check; the other four results are not awaited. \n 24 - Token whose tenant claim differs from the request's tenant context: denied.\n 25 - Tenant suspended between cache read and session store: session not stored.\n 26 - Policy version bumped for a tenant: previously cached entries for the old version are not served.\n\n\u25cf Update(~/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md)\n\n\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n Edit file\n \u2026ill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md\n\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\n 32 - `legacyAuthFlow()` characterization suite (recorded before the rewrite) passes against the rewritten code.\n 33 \n 34 ## Pending Decisions \n 35 -- R5 / D11 \u2014 failure and timeout semantics of the parallel IDP fan-out (Promise.all + per-call timeout vs allSettle\n -d vs bare Promise.all). Timeout bound and error shape in the edge cases above depend on this answer. \n 35 +- none (R1-R5 resolved: D7 injection, D8 single writer, D9 fail-closed typed errors, D10 characterization suite, D1\n +1 Promise.all + per-call timeout) \n\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\u254c\n Do you want to make this edit to vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md?\n \u276f 1. Yes\n 2. Yes, and switch to accept edits (auto-approve file edits and common file commands) for this session (shift+tab)\n 3. No\n\n Esc to cancel \u00b7 Tab to amend\n", "publicEvents": [ { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:26:21.683Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_011xY3mSSBX4JZnvSKLtDTrn", "name": "Write", "input": { "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "content": "# Plan: Multi-tenant Auth Refactor (reviewed)\n\nReviewed target: `PLAN.md` at commit `84ec453` (branch `main`), via `/plan-eng-review` on 2026-09-15.\nOriginal plan text is preserved below under \"Original proposal\"; accepted changes from the review are applied in the sections that follow it.\n\n## Context\n\nTwo new services, `AuthBroker` and `SessionMint`, take over token validation and session minting for a multi-tenant deployment. They share the existing tenant-keyed cache adapter. `legacyAuthFlow()` is rewritten as part of the work. Token validation currently makes 5 sequential IDP calls.\n\n## Original proposal (PLAN.md, verbatim)\n\n### Existing contracts retained\nThe existing cache adapter keys entries by tenant ID, issuer, audience,\nand policy version. It evicts expired tokens and invalidates entries on\nlogout, token revocation, or tenant suspension. AuthCache retains these\nunchanged validity and tenant-key rules; they do not serialize mutations.\nAuthCache is a service-facing facade over that same existing adapter,\nwith one backing cache. The adapter, its invalidation hooks, and their\nexisting tests remain in use unchanged.\nUnit and integration coverage is planned for the new components and their\nsuccess/error paths. That coverage does not exercise legacyAuthFlow() or\nassert compatibility with its prior behavior.\n\n### Architecture\nTwo new services (`AuthBroker` and `SessionMint`) share a global mutable\n`AuthCache` instance via module-level export. Both services mutate it.\n\n### Code quality\nThe `validateAndDispatch()` function is 60 lines with three nested\ntry/catch blocks; each catch swallows a different error class.\n\n### Tests\nThe existing `legacyAuthFlow()` will get rewritten as part of this work;\nno regression test for the prior behavior is planned.\n\n### Performance\nToken validation issues 5 sequential API calls to the IDP; they could be\nparallelized via Promise.all trivially (calls are independent).\n\n### Architecture (scope smell)\nThis touches 12 files and introduces 4 new classes (TokenStore,\nSessionMint, AuthCache, RequestPolicy). Worth flagging the complexity check.\n\n## Scope (accepted in review)\n\nCorrection: the original plan counts 4 new classes but names 5 (`AuthBroker` at PLAN.md:19 plus the four at PLAN.md:35).\n\n| Candidate | Original | Accepted | Answer |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `AuthBroker` | new service | **Include** | unchanged |\n| `SessionMint` | new service | **Include** | unchanged |\n| `AuthCache` facade | new class over the adapter | **Dropped**; services use the existing cache adapter directly | D6 = B |\n| `TokenStore` | new class, no stated responsibility | **Deferred** until its responsibility is written | D4 = Defer |\n| `RequestPolicy` | new class, no stated responsibility | **Deferred**; named home if policy evaluation is later extracted from `validateAndDispatch()` | D5 = Defer |\n\nResult: 2 new services instead of 5 new classes. Existing contracts retained: adapter keying (tenant ID, issuer, audience, policy version), eviction of expired tokens, invalidation on logout / revocation / tenant suspension, adapter tests unchanged.\n\n## Decision ledger\n\n### R1: How `AuthBroker` and `SessionMint` obtain the shared cache adapter\nFinding: A1, P1, confidence 9/10, PLAN.md:19-20 (\"share a global mutable `AuthCache` instance via module-level export. Both services mutate it.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: module-level exported singleton (original proposal). D6 replaced `AuthCache` with the existing adapter; the acquisition mechanism is still the original module-level export.\nRuntime evidence: none; no implementation exists in this repo (fixture contains PLAN.md only). Web research: module-level singletons are hidden global state, hard to reset in tests, and not guaranteed identical across module-cache boundaries (patterns.dev, medium.com/@moali314).\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid:\n\n| Choice | Current | A) Constructor injection | B) Keep module-level export | C) Export + injectable override for tests |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R1 acquisition | module-level export, pending | adapter passed to both constructors at composition root | module-level export | module-level default, constructor param overrides |\n| R2 write ordering | unserialized, pending | unserialized, pending | unserialized, pending | unserialized, pending |\n| Adapter contract | unchanged (approved, D6) | unchanged | unchanged | unchanged |\n\nQuestion D7:\n(see chat brief D7; options A constructor injection (recommended), B keep module-level export, C hybrid)\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### R2: Ordering guarantee for concurrent mutations by two writers\nFinding: A2, P1, confidence 7/10, PLAN.md:10 (\"they do not serialize mutations\") + PLAN.md:20 (\"Both services mutate it.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: no ordering guarantee (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none; pattern-level. Check-then-set race: `SessionMint` reads a token as valid, revocation invalidates the entry via `AuthBroker`, then `SessionMint` writes its (now stale) entry back. Stale session survives revocation until TTL eviction.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid: (to be filled before D8)\n\nQuestion D8: (to be drafted after D7)\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate\n- D4 TokenStore \u2192 Defer. Accepted scope: remove from this change; add to NOT in scope.\n- D5 RequestPolicy \u2192 Defer. Accepted scope: remove from this change; add to NOT in scope.\n- D6 Structure \u2192 B (drop `AuthCache`, services use adapter directly). Accepted scope: no `AuthCache` class; `AuthBroker` and `SessionMint` depend on the existing adapter's interface.\n" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:26:21.950Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_011xY3mSSBX4JZnvSKLtDTrn", "is_error": false, "content": "File created successfully at: /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:27:11.310Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_011AWKnfbqvvsdQy8cEyA2Er", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "old_string": "Actual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### R2: Ordering guarantee for concurrent mutations by two writers\nFinding: A2, P1, confidence 7/10, PLAN.md:10 (\"they do not serialize mutations\") + PLAN.md:20 (\"Both services mutate it.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: no ordering guarantee (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none; pattern-level. Check-then-set race: `SessionMint` reads a token as valid, revocation invalidates the entry via `AuthBroker`, then `SessionMint` writes its (now stale) entry back. Stale session survives revocation until TTL eviction.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid: (to be filled before D8)\n\nQuestion D8: (to be drafted after D7)\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none", "new_string": "Actual answer: A) Constructor injection (D7)\nAccepted scope: adapter instance is constructed once at a composition root and passed to `AuthBroker` and `SessionMint` constructors; no module-level export of the adapter or any cache wrapper; unit tests inject an in-memory fake adapter.\nHistory: none\n\n### R2: Ordering guarantee for concurrent mutations by two writers\nFinding: A2, P1, confidence 7/10, PLAN.md:10 (\"they do not serialize mutations\") + PLAN.md:20 (\"Both services mutate it.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: no ordering guarantee (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none; pattern-level. Check-then-set race: `SessionMint` reads a token as valid, revocation invalidates the entry via `AuthBroker`, then `SessionMint` writes its (now stale) entry back. Stale session survives revocation until TTL eviction.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid:\n\n| Choice | Current | A) Single writer | B) Guarded writes (tombstone / CAS) | C) Accept and document |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R2 write ordering | unserialized, pending | only `AuthBroker` calls adapter set/invalidate; `SessionMint` returns minted session, broker stores it | every set re-checks revocation marker; invalidation leaves short-TTL tombstone | unserialized; race documented, TTL bounds exposure |\n| R1 acquisition | constructor injection (D7) | constructor injection | constructor injection | constructor injection |\n| Adapter contract | unchanged (D6) | unchanged | **changed**: needs tombstone or conditional-set API (reopens D6's \"adapter unchanged\") | unchanged |\n| Stale-after-revocation window | up to TTL | none across services | none | up to TTL |\n\nQuestion D8:\nD8 \u2014 Who is allowed to write to the shared cache, and what stops a stale write after revocation? Options: A) Single writer: AuthBroker owns all mutations (recommended, Completeness 9/10); B) Guarded writes with tombstones/CAS (Completeness 10/10, changes adapter contract); C) Accept the race, document it (Completeness 3/10).\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:27:11.580Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_011AWKnfbqvvsdQy8cEyA2Er", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:27:53.856Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_01V9kXRAqn4EcDbG39db6TpU", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "old_string": "Actual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate", "new_string": "Actual answer: A) Single writer: AuthBroker owns writes (D8)\nAccepted scope: only `AuthBroker` calls the adapter's set/invalidate; `SessionMint` reads via the injected adapter and returns minted sessions to the broker, which re-checks revocation/tenant-suspension state immediately before storing. Adapter contract unchanged. Tests: single-write-path assertion with a fake adapter; interleaving test (mint in flight, revocation lands, store is refused).\nHistory: none\n\n### R3: Error handling policy for `validateAndDispatch()`\nFinding: C1, P1, confidence 9/10, PLAN.md:23-24 (\"60 lines with three nested try/catch blocks; each catch swallows a different error class.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: three nested try/catch, each swallowing one error class; no stated replacement (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none; function body not in this repo. Pattern: a swallowed error in an auth validator means the caller cannot distinguish \"invalid\" from \"validator crashed\", and the default branch decides whether a broken IDP call fails open or closed.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid:\n\n| Choice | Current | A) Fail closed, typed errors, split function | B) Keep swallow, add logging | C) Keep as is |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R3 error policy | 3 catches swallow 3 error classes, pending | no swallow: each error class maps to an explicit deny result or a typed `AuthError` rethrown; `validate()` and `dispatch()` separated, each < 25 lines | catches remain; each logs with error class + tenant before swallowing | unchanged |\n| Caller can tell \"denied\" from \"validator failed\" | no | yes | no (log only) | no |\n| R1 / R2 / adapter contract | fixed (D6, D7, D8) | fixed | fixed | fixed |\n\nQuestion D9:\nD9 \u2014 What should happen when one of the three error classes fires inside validateAndDispatch()? A) Fail closed with typed errors and split the function (recommended, Completeness 10/10); B) Keep swallowing but log each (Completeness 6/10); C) Leave unchanged (Completeness 2/10).\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:27:55.227Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01V9kXRAqn4EcDbG39db6TpU", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:28:39.849Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_01LeD3A5DnYiBme7JG6CyUBV", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "old_string": "Actual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate", "new_string": "Actual answer: A) Fail closed, typed errors, split (D9)\nAccepted scope: `validateAndDispatch()` split into `validate()` and `dispatch()` (each < 25 lines, no nested try/catch); each of the three error classes maps to an explicit deny result or a typed `AuthError` that is rethrown; no catch swallows. Callers updated to handle typed errors. Tests: one test per error class asserting the deny/typed-error outcome, plus the happy path.\nHistory: none\n\n### R4: Regression contract for the `legacyAuthFlow()` rewrite\nFinding: T1, P1 (CRITICAL, Iron Rule), confidence 9/10, PLAN.md:27-28 (\"will get rewritten as part of this work; no regression test for the prior behavior is planned.\") and PLAN.md:15-16 (\"does not exercise legacyAuthFlow() or assert compatibility with its prior behavior.\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: no regression coverage (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none; `legacyAuthFlow()` source not in this repo. Callers and current branches unknown; must be enumerated at implementation start.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid:\n\n| Choice | Current | A) Characterization suite before rewrite | B) Flow-level E2E only |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| R4 regression contract | none, pending | record current `legacyAuthFlow()` outputs for every reachable branch before any edit; rewrite must pass; intentional differences listed and asserted separately | integration tests for login \u2192 validate \u2192 logout per tenant; per-branch behavior unasserted |\n| Behavior to preserve | unstated | all observable outputs per branch except listed intentional changes | end-to-end outcomes only |\n| Intentional changes | unstated | explicit list in plan (from D8, D9, R5) | explicit list in plan |\n| R1-R3 | fixed | fixed | fixed |\n\nQuestion D10:\nD10 \u2014 How do we prove the legacyAuthFlow() rewrite preserves prior behavior? A) Characterization suite captured before the rewrite (recommended, Completeness 10/10); B) Flow-level E2E tests only (Completeness 7/10).\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:28:40.905Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01LeD3A5DnYiBme7JG6CyUBV", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:29:37.631Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_01RJ7Y5p2MfjFNYR6KYqvWDJ", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "old_string": "Actual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate", "new_string": "Actual answer: A) Characterization suite before rewrite (D10)\nAccepted scope: before editing `legacyAuthFlow()`, enumerate its callers and reachable branches (at minimum: valid token, expired token, revoked token, suspended tenant, unknown tenant, malformed token, IDP failure) and record input \u2192 output for each as a characterization test suite. The rewrite must pass the suite. Intentional differences (D8 store ownership, D9 typed errors, R5 parallel IDP behavior) are listed in the plan and asserted as separate new tests, not as edits to the recorded expectations.\nHistory: none\n\n### R5: Failure semantics of the parallel IDP fan-out\nFinding: P1, P2, confidence 8/10, PLAN.md:31-32 (\"5 sequential API calls to the IDP; they could be parallelized via Promise.all trivially (calls are independent).\"), reviewer: native\nPlan baseline: sequential; proposed `Promise.all` with no stated failure or timeout behavior (original proposal)\nRuntime evidence: none. `Promise.all` rejects on the first rejection and leaves the other four in flight; there is no timeout unless the IDP client supplies one. \"Trivially\" understates the semantic change: sequential code stopped at the first failure; parallel code must decide what a partial failure means.\nState: pending\n\nComparison grid:\n\n| Choice | Current | A) `Promise.all` + per-call timeout + typed error | B) `Promise.allSettled` + aggregate error | C) Bare `Promise.all` |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R5 fan-out failure | sequential, stop at first failure, pending | fail closed on first rejection; every call wrapped in a bounded timeout; rejection surfaces as typed `AuthError` (D9) with which call failed | wait for all five; deny with an aggregate listing every failed call | fail closed on first rejection; no timeout; raw error |\n| Worst-case latency | 5 \u00d7 call | max(call, timeout) | max(call) with no bound unless timeout added | unbounded on a hung call |\n| Caller learns which call failed | first only | yes (one) | yes (all) | raw error, maybe |\n| R1-R4 | fixed | fixed | fixed | fixed |\n\nQuestion D11:\nD11 \u2014 When one of the five parallel IDP calls fails or hangs, what should token validation do? A) Promise.all with a per-call timeout and typed AuthError (recommended, Completeness 9/10); B) Promise.allSettled with an aggregate error (Completeness 10/10); C) Bare Promise.all as written (Completeness 4/10).\n\nActual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:29:38.647Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01RJ7Y5p2MfjFNYR6KYqvWDJ", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:00.889Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_018W4rUhA8Kk2XQav8vEHMJn", "name": "Write", "input": { "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md", "content": "# Test Plan\nGenerated by /plan-eng-review on 2026-09-15\nBranch: main\nRepo: local-only\n\n## Affected Pages/Routes\n- Login / token exchange endpoint (per tenant) \u2014 validation now runs through `AuthBroker` with parallel IDP calls; confirm a valid token still yields a session and an expired one is denied.\n- Logout endpoint \u2014 invalidation must take effect on the very next request for that tenant; no stale session survives.\n- Any endpoint behind `legacyAuthFlow()` \u2014 behavior must match the pre-rewrite characterization suite except for the listed intentional changes.\n- Admin: tenant suspension action \u2014 all sessions for the suspended tenant denied; sibling tenants unaffected.\n\n## Key Interactions to Verify\n- Sign in with a valid token for tenant A; immediately sign in for tenant B with a different token; each sees only its own session.\n- Sign in, then log out, then replay the old token: request is denied, not served from cache.\n- Revoke a token while a sign-in for that token is still in progress: sign-in completes with a denial or the session is not stored; never a usable session after revocation.\n- Sign in while one IDP dependency is unreachable: user sees a clear \"could not validate\" error, not a hang and not a silent allow.\n- Trigger each validation error class (malformed token, IDP failure, tenant lookup failure): user sees a denial with a distinct reason; nothing is silently swallowed.\n\n## Edge Cases\n- Double-submit of the same token: one validation result, no duplicate sessions, no second IDP fan-out visible to the user.\n- Session left open past cache TTL: next request re-validates instead of silently allowing.\n- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a timeout error within the configured bound (exact bound pending D11).\n- Token whose tenant claim differs from the request's tenant context: denied.\n- Tenant suspended between cache read and session store: session not stored.\n- Policy version bumped for a tenant: previously cached entries for the old version are not served.\n\n## Critical Paths\n- Login \u2192 validate (5 parallel IDP calls) \u2192 session stored by `AuthBroker` \u2192 authenticated request served.\n- Logout \u2192 cache invalidated \u2192 next request denied.\n- Tenant suspension \u2192 all tenant entries invalidated \u2192 tenant requests denied, other tenants served.\n- `legacyAuthFlow()` characterization suite (recorded before the rewrite) passes against the rewritten code.\n\n## Pending Decisions\n- R5 / D11 \u2014 failure and timeout semantics of the parallel IDP fan-out (Promise.all + per-call timeout vs allSettled vs bare Promise.all). Timeout bound and error shape in the edge cases above depend on this answer.\n" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:02.283Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_018W4rUhA8Kk2XQav8vEHMJn", "is_error": false, "content": "File created successfully at: /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:44.919Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_01P6V2jxzhfm8KxJNumqQTnm", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md", "old_string": "Actual answer: unanswered\nAccepted scope: none\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate", "new_string": "Actual answer: A) Promise.all + per-call timeout + typed error (D11)\nAccepted scope: the five independent IDP calls run via `Promise.all`; each call is wrapped in a bounded timeout (value configured alongside the IDP client; default proposed 5s, tune to IDP p99); first rejection or timeout denies validation with a typed `AuthError` naming the failed call (D9 policy). Tests: happy path (all five resolve), one call rejects, one call times out, assert deny + error identity and that latency \u2264 timeout bound.\nHistory: none\n\n### Scope answers imported from the complexity gate" } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:45.957Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_01P6V2jxzhfm8KxJNumqQTnm", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-eng-UK2zYc/gstack-test-plan-eng.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:53.561Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_013spKdwXHmSuPejHow7F5Q5", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md", "old_string": "- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a timeout error within the configured bound (exact bound pending D11).", "new_string": "- IDP responds after 10s on one of the five calls: request fails with a typed timeout error within the configured per-call bound (proposed 5s default); the user sees \"could not validate\", not a hang.\n- One of the five IDP calls returns an error: request denied immediately with an error naming the failed check; the other four results are not awaited." } }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:30:55.484Z", "type": "tool_result", "tool_use_id": "toolu_013spKdwXHmSuPejHow7F5Q5", "is_error": false, "content": "The file /tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md has been updated successfully. (file state is current in your context \u2014 no need to Read it back)" }, { "timestamp": "2026-09-15T11:31:02.256Z", "sessionId": "09df762a-1bd1-4416-bc68-72cbf6b45f39", "cwd": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7", "type": "tool_use", "id": "toolu_01SEAYuQ8CwCLoncZH84P8Xe", "name": "Edit", "input": { "replace_all": false, "file_path": "/tmp/gstack-owned-display-y9q732vy/gstack-paid-shard-xDZMlG/tmp/gstack-hermetic-1157928-qcaiDS/skill-home-gI493f/.gstack/projects/gstack-plan-count-vktOi7/vercel-sandbox-main-eng-review-test-plan-20260915-112945.md", "old_string": "## Pending Decisions\n- R5 / D11 \u2014 failure and timeout semantics of the parallel IDP fan-out (Promise.all + per-call timeout vs allSettled vs bare Promise.all). Timeout bound and error shape in the edge cases above depend on this answer.", "new_string": "## Pending Decisions\n- none (R1-R5 resolved: D7 injection, D8 single writer, D9 fail-closed typed errors, D10 characterization suite, D11 Promise.all + per-call timeout)" } } ], "originalOutcome": { "outcome": "timeout", "elapsedMs": 1495003, "reviewCount": 8, "step0Count": 3 } }