Files
gstack/test/ios-qa-stateserver-hardening.test.ts
c7554824cb v1.91.38.0 fix(ios-qa): iPads work, a dropped route no longer relaunches the app, loud boot-token write (#3076)
* fix(ios-qa): allow physical iPad devices in tunnel bootstrap (#2743)

(cherry picked from commit d6d43934ef)

* fix(ios-qa): iPhone + iPad on USB names each UDID instead of picking one

With GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID unset, tied default ranks used to pick the first
device devicectl listed, so a QA session could drive the wrong device. Tied
candidates now fail with multiple_devices, list each device and UDID, and
print a ready export line. Device selection moves into selectDevice() so the
route-drop recovery can re-resolve with the same rules.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ios-qa): a dropped CoreDevice route no longer relaunches the app (#1975)

Rotation deletes the app's one-shot boot-token file, so the daemon's old
503/504 path (invalidate + full bootstrap) could only get a new token by
running devicectl launch --terminate-existing, wiping the in-app QA state at
every route blip.

A route failure now goes through recoverTunnel(): re-select the device with
the bootstrap rules, re-resolve the tunnel address for the pinned UDID, check
the unauthenticated /healthz owner, then probe /state/snapshot with the cached
bearer. Outcomes:
- bearer accepted: keep the session (new address if it moved)
- 401: full bootstrap from the fresh boot token (app was relaunched)
- app confirmed absent: bootstrap, which launches it normally once
- different device or an address devicectl cannot tie to the UDID:
  bootstrap; the old bearer is never sent there
- route still down with the app running: surface the error, keep the session

Concurrent failures on one tunnel share a single refresh. Mutations whose
response was lost are still never replayed. The CLI wiring moves into
deviceTunnelSource() so tests drive it against a simulated device.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(ios-qa): a failed boot-token write is loud instead of silent (#1837)

StateServer.start() wrote the boot-token file with try?, so a failed write
left nothing on disk and no trace anywhere, and the daemon then relaunched the
app trying to mint a token that could never be written. The write is now a
do/catch that logs the path and error (never the token), logs a NOT READY
bootstrap line, and reports boot_token_error on /healthz. bootstrapTunnel
reads that field and returns boot_token_unavailable naming the device-side
cause instead of running --terminate-existing.

Also drops the stale comments claiming the token was written to os_log.
Template and fixture stay byte-identical.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(ios-qa): type the iPad acceptance test's mDNS stub

ResolveImpl returns Promise<string[]>; resolving null tripped the test-code
typecheck ratchet. A rejected lookup exercises the same resolve_failed path.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(ios-qa): iPad support, GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID, route-drop recovery, known limits

- iPhone-only description, triggers, and prerequisites now cover iPads, and
  say how to pick one device with GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID.
- Phase 2 no longer tells you to capture a boot token from os_log (it has
  not been logged for many releases); it describes the 0600 tmp/ file and
  the NOT READY signal (#1837, #1735).
- Source-control guidance for the generated DebugBridge/ package (#1735).
- Failure table: route drops keep the session, multiple_devices, unwritable
  token file, and the one relaunch a daemon restart still costs.
- Known limits: SwiftUI DragGesture and /swipe on iOS 26 (#1975), the
  iOS 26.3.1 /elements data from PR #1755, unverified iPad Stage Manager.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs: iOS QA how-to and skill index cover iPads and route-drop recovery

The how-to still said the boot token was readable from os_log and that a
route drop re-bootstraps; both are now accurate, with iPad selection,
GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID, and three new failure rows.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* v1.91.37.0 fix(ios-qa): iPads work, a route drop no longer relaunches the app, loud boot-token write

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(ios-qa): keep issue numbers out of model-read skill text

The archaeology lint rejects issue references in generated SKILL.md text;
the Known limits entry keeps the iOS version and drops the number.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* chore: re-slot to v1.91.38.0 (v1.91.37.0 claimed by #3075)

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(ios-qa): device-change recovery test without an IPv4-mapped address

The Windows lane could not reach a fake StateServer through
::ffff:127.0.0.1, so the iPad half of the device-change test timed out. The
fake device now swaps identity on its one ::1 listener, which is also closer
to production: every StateServer answers on the same port.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: loulanyue <260355617@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-08 07:02:02 +00:00

67 lines
3.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* StateServer hardening pins (fork port wave 2, B3 + B5).
*
* B3: the boot token must never appear in an os_log statement. The daemon
* reads it from the 0600 app-container file (copyFileFromAppContainer in
* tunnel-bootstrap.ts); the old `token=\(self.bootToken, privacy: .public)`
* announce line had NO consumer and handed a live credential to anything
* reading the unified log during the launch window.
*
* B5: the IPv4 listener has no CoreDevice tunnel path, so it must bind to
* loopback at the socket level (requiredLocalEndpoint 127.0.0.1), not rely
* solely on the per-connection peer check. IPv6 keeps the wildcard bind for
* CoreDevice ULA peers by design.
*
* #1837: the boot-token file is the daemon's only way in, so writing it must
* not be a silent `try?`. A failure is logged and reported on /healthz (the
* daemon then names the device-side cause instead of relaunching the app).
*
* Pinned on BOTH the generated template and the fixture app copy so neither
* can drift back independently.
*/
import { describe, test, expect } from "bun:test";
import { readFileSync } from "fs";
import { join } from "path";
const ROOT = join(import.meta.dir, "..");
const COPIES = [
"ios-qa/templates/StateServer.swift.template",
"test/fixtures/ios-qa/FixtureApp/Sources/DebugBridgeCore/StateServer.swift",
];
describe.each(COPIES)("StateServer hardening — %s", (rel) => {
const src = readFileSync(join(ROOT, rel), "utf-8");
test("no os_log statement interpolates the boot token (B3)", () => {
const logLines = src.split("\n").filter((l) => /logger\.(notice|info|error|debug|log)/.test(l));
for (const line of logLines) {
expect(line).not.toContain("bootToken");
}
// The bootstrap announce survives (diagnostics), token-free.
expect(src).toContain('gstack-ios-qa-bootstrap port=');
expect(src).not.toContain("gstack-ios-qa-bootstrap token=");
});
test("boot-token write failures are loud, not a silent try? (#1837)", () => {
expect(src).not.toMatch(/try\?\s*bootToken\.write/);
expect(src).not.toMatch(/try\?\s*FileManager\.default\.setAttributes\(\[\.posixPermissions: 0o600\]/);
const start = src.slice(src.indexOf("public func start()"), src.indexOf("public func register("));
expect(start).toMatch(/do \{\s*try bootToken\.write\(toFile: tokenFile/);
expect(start).toMatch(/\} catch \{\s*bootTokenWriteError = error\.localizedDescription\s*logger\.error\(/);
expect(start).toContain("gstack-ios-qa-bootstrap NOT READY");
expect(src).toContain('health["boot_token_error"] = failure');
});
test("comments no longer claim os_log carries the boot token", () => {
expect(src).not.toMatch(/os_log scrape|wrote to os_log|scraping\s*\n?\/\/\s*os_log/);
});
test("IPv4 listener binds loopback at the socket level (B5)", () => {
expect(src).toContain("requiredLocalEndpoint");
expect(src).toContain('NWEndpoint.Host("127.0.0.1")');
// IPv6 wildcard + peer-check path must survive (CoreDevice tunnel peers).
expect(src).toMatch(/case \.ipv6:\s*\n\s*listener = try NWListener\(using: params, on:/);
});
});