mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
synced 2026-05-03 12:15:14 +02:00
7e96fe299b
* fix(security): validateOutputPath symlink bypass — check file-level symlinks validateOutputPath() previously only resolved symlinks on the parent directory. A symlink at /tmp/evil.png → /etc/crontab passed the parent check (parent is /tmp, which is safe) but the write followed the symlink outside safe dirs. Add lstatSync() check: if the target file exists and is a symlink, resolve through it and verify the real target is within SAFE_DIRECTORIES. ENOENT (file doesn't exist yet) falls through to the existing parent-dir check. Closes #921 Co-Authored-By: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): shell injection in bin/ scripts — use env vars instead of interpolation gstack-settings-hook interpolated $SETTINGS_FILE directly into bun -e double-quoted blocks. A path containing quotes or backticks breaks the JS string context, enabling arbitrary code execution. Replace direct interpolation with environment variables (process.env). Same fix applied to gstack-team-init which had the same pattern. Systematic audit confirmed only these two scripts were vulnerable — all other bin/ scripts already use stdin piping or env vars. Closes #858 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): cookie-import path validation bypass + hardcoded /tmp Two fixes: 1. cookie-import relative path bypass (#707): path.isAbsolute() gated the entire validation, so relative paths like "sensitive-file.json" bypassed the safe-directory check entirely. Now always resolves to absolute path with realpathSync for symlink resolution, matching validateOutputPath(). 2. Hardcoded /tmp in cookie-import-browser (#708): openDbFromCopy used /tmp directly instead of os.tmpdir(), breaking Windows support. Also adds explicit imports for SAFE_DIRECTORIES and isPathWithin in write-commands.ts (previously resolved implicitly through bundler). Closes #852 Co-Authored-By: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): redact form fields with sensitive names, not just type=password Form redaction only applied to type="password" fields. Hidden and text fields named csrf_token, api_key, session_id, etc. were exposed unredacted in LLM context, leaking secrets. Extend redaction to check field name and id against sensitive patterns: token, secret, key, password, credential, auth, jwt, session, csrf, sid, api_key. Uses the same pattern style as SENSITIVE_COOKIE_NAME. Closes #860 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): restrict session file permissions to owner-only Design session files written to /tmp with default umask (0644) were world-readable on shared systems. Sessions contain design prompts and feedback history. Set mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) on both create and update paths. Closes #859 Co-Authored-By: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): enforce frozen lockfile during setup bun install without --frozen-lockfile resolves ^semver ranges from npm on every run. If an attacker publishes a compromised compatible version of any dependency, the next ./setup pulls it silently. Add --frozen-lockfile with fallback to plain install (for fresh clones where bun.lock may not exist yet). Matches the pattern already used in the .agents/ generation block (line 237). Closes #614 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: remove duplicate recursive chmod on /tmp in Dockerfile.ci chmod -R 1777 /tmp recursively sets sticky bit on files (no defined behavior), not just the directory. Deduplicate to single chmod 1777 /tmp. Closes #747 Co-Authored-By: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): learnings input validation + cross-project trust gate Three fixes to the learnings system: 1. Input validation in gstack-learnings-log: type must be from allowed list, key must be alphanumeric, confidence must be 1-10 integer, source must be from allowed list. Prevents injection via malformed fields. 2. Prompt injection defense: insight field checked against 10 instruction-like patterns (ignore previous, system:, override, etc.). Rejected with clear error message. 3. Cross-project trust gate in gstack-learnings-search: AI-generated learnings from other projects are filtered out. Only user-stated learnings cross project boundaries. Prevents silent prompt injection across codebases. Also adds trusted field (true for user-stated source, false for AI-generated) to enable the trust gate at read time. Closes #841 Co-Authored-By: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): track cookie-imported domains and scope cookie imports Foundation for origin-pinned JS execution (#616). Tracks which domains cookies were imported from so the JS/eval commands can verify execution stays within imported origins. Changes: - BrowserManager: new cookieImportedDomains Set with track/get/has methods - cookie-import: tracks imported cookie domains after addCookies - cookie-import-browser: tracks domains on --domain direct import - cookie-import-browser --all: new explicit opt-in for all-domain import (previously implicit behavior, now requires deliberate flag) Closes #615 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): pin JS/eval execution to cookie-imported origins When cookies have been imported for specific domains, block JS execution on pages whose origin doesn't match. Prevents the attack chain: 1. Agent imports cookies for github.com 2. Prompt injection navigates to attacker.com 3. Agent runs js document.cookie → exfiltrates github cookies assertJsOriginAllowed() checks the current page hostname against imported cookie domains with subdomain matching (.github.com allows api.github.com). When no cookies are imported, all origins allowed (nothing to protect). about:blank and data: URIs are allowed (no cookies at risk). Depends on #615 (cookie domain tracking). Closes #616 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(security): add persistent command audit log Append-only JSONL audit trail for all browse server commands. Unlike in-memory ring buffers, the audit log persists across restarts and is never truncated. Each entry records: timestamp, command, args (truncated to 200 chars), page origin, duration, status, error (truncated to 300 chars), hasCookies flag, connection mode. All writes are best-effort — audit failures never block command execution. Log stored at ~/.gstack/.browse/browse-audit.jsonl. Closes #617 Co-Authored-By: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(security): block hex-encoded IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata bypass URL constructor normalizes ::ffff:169.254.169.254 to ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe (hex form), which was not in the blocklist. Similarly, ::169.254.169.254 normalizes to ::a9fe:a9fe. Add both hex-encoded forms to BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS so they're caught by the direct hostname check in validateNavigationUrl. Closes #739 Co-Authored-By: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.16.4.0) Security wave 3: 12 fixes, 7 contributors. Cookie origin pinning, command audit log, domain tracking. Symlink bypass, path validation, shell injection, form redaction, learnings injection, IPv6 SSRF, session permissions, frozen lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Yunsu <Hybirdss@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Gus <garagon@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Toby Morning <urbantech@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alberto Martinez <halbert04@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Maksim Soltan <Gonzih@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ziad Al Sharif <Ziadstr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Osman Mehmood <mehmoodosman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
87 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
87 lines
3.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
|
# gstack-learnings-log — append a learning to the project learnings file
|
|
# Usage: gstack-learnings-log '{"skill":"review","type":"pitfall","key":"n-plus-one","insight":"...","confidence":8,"source":"observed"}'
|
|
#
|
|
# Append-only storage. Duplicates (same key+type) are resolved at read time
|
|
# by gstack-learnings-search ("latest winner" per key+type).
|
|
set -euo pipefail
|
|
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
|
|
eval "$("$SCRIPT_DIR/gstack-slug" 2>/dev/null)"
|
|
GSTACK_HOME="${GSTACK_HOME:-$HOME/.gstack}"
|
|
mkdir -p "$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG"
|
|
|
|
INPUT="$1"
|
|
|
|
# Validate and sanitize input
|
|
VALIDATED=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | bun -e "
|
|
const raw = await Bun.stdin.text();
|
|
let j;
|
|
try { j = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid JSON, skipping\n'); process.exit(1); }
|
|
|
|
// Field validation: type must be from allowed list
|
|
const ALLOWED_TYPES = ['pattern', 'pitfall', 'preference', 'architecture', 'tool', 'operational'];
|
|
if (!j.type || !ALLOWED_TYPES.includes(j.type)) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid type \"' + (j.type || '') + '\", must be one of: ' + ALLOWED_TYPES.join(', ') + '\n');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Field validation: key must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores (no injection surface)
|
|
if (!j.key || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(j.key)) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid key, must be alphanumeric with hyphens/underscores only\n');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Field validation: confidence must be 1-10
|
|
const conf = Number(j.confidence);
|
|
if (!Number.isInteger(conf) || conf < 1 || conf > 10) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: confidence must be integer 1-10\n');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
j.confidence = conf;
|
|
|
|
// Field validation: source must be from allowed list
|
|
const ALLOWED_SOURCES = ['observed', 'user-stated', 'inferred', 'cross-model'];
|
|
if (j.source && !ALLOWED_SOURCES.includes(j.source)) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: invalid source, must be one of: ' + ALLOWED_SOURCES.join(', ') + '\n');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Content sanitization: strip instruction-like patterns from insight field
|
|
// These patterns could be used for prompt injection when learnings are loaded into agent context
|
|
if (j.insight) {
|
|
const INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
|
|
/ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+(instructions|context|rules)/i,
|
|
/you\s+are\s+now\s+/i,
|
|
/always\s+output\s+no\s+findings/i,
|
|
/skip\s+(all\s+)?(security|review|checks)/i,
|
|
/override[:\s]/i,
|
|
/\bsystem\s*:/i,
|
|
/\bassistant\s*:/i,
|
|
/\buser\s*:/i,
|
|
/do\s+not\s+(report|flag|mention)/i,
|
|
/approve\s+(all|every|this)/i,
|
|
];
|
|
for (const pat of INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
|
|
if (pat.test(j.insight)) {
|
|
process.stderr.write('gstack-learnings-log: insight contains suspicious instruction-like content, rejected\n');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Inject timestamp if not present
|
|
if (!j.ts) j.ts = new Date().toISOString();
|
|
|
|
// Mark trust level based on source
|
|
// user-stated = user explicitly told the agent this. All others are AI-generated.
|
|
j.trusted = j.source === 'user-stated';
|
|
|
|
console.log(JSON.stringify(j));
|
|
" 2>/dev/null)
|
|
|
|
if [ $? -ne 0 ] || [ -z "$VALIDATED" ]; then
|
|
exit 1
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
echo "$VALIDATED" >> "$GSTACK_HOME/projects/$SLUG/learnings.jsonl"
|