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* security: isolate every gstack Bun entry point from the audited checkout's .env and bunfig.toml Bun auto-loads .env, .env.local and .env.<NODE_ENV> from its cwd and runs a cwd bunfig.toml preload before the program starts. gstack runs inside the repo it audits, so a committed .env could steer state roots, the claude binary or spend caps, and a bunfig preload ran arbitrary code in every bin and hook. Every bun shebang, shell and skill caller, TypeScript spawn and compiled build now disables both (--no-env-file --config=/dev/null, bunIsolationArgs(), --no-compile-autoload-dotenv/bunfig), with a ratchet and hostile-fixture regressions. Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: name the directly executed scripts in the isolation ratchet Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: follow the isolation flags in touchfiles, copy lists, recipe assertions and the harness pin Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep browse/src/bun-child-config.ts unchanged so the native cookie qualification still binds Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(windows): the empty bunfig outlives its process so the timeline hook's detached repair child can read it Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * v1.91.159.0 security: gstack's Bun entry points ignore the audited repo's .env and bunfig.toml (S1) Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: plan-mode render pattern accepts the isolation flags Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
17 lines
844 B
TypeScript
Executable File
17 lines
844 B
TypeScript
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env -S bun --no-env-file --config=/dev/null
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// Claude-only outside-review runner. Prompts arrive on stdin, never argv.
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// codex_reviews gates the send (lib/outside-consent.ts); --user-invoked marks
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// a review the user asked for by name (/claude-code) and runs regardless.
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import { claudeCodeMain } from '../lib/claude-code';
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import { outsideConsent } from '../lib/outside-consent';
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const argv = process.argv.slice(2);
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const userInvoked = argv.includes('--user-invoked');
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const consent = outsideConsent({ userInvoked });
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if (!consent.allowed) {
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process.stderr.write(consent.lines.join('\n') + '\n');
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process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ status: 'not_run', reason: 'consent_missing', stderr: consent.lines.join('\n') }) + '\n');
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process.exit(3);
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}
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process.exit(await claudeCodeMain(argv.filter(a => a !== '--user-invoked')));
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