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Garry Tan 7450b5160b fix: security audit remediation — 12 fixes, 20 tests (v0.13.1.0) (#595)
* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03)

- Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process)
- Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap
- sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var
- Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast)
- Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition

* fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01)

- Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes
- GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell)
- Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls
- CORS preflight now allows Authorization header

* fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02)

- Add savedAt timestamp to state save output
- Warn on load if state file older than 7 days
- Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup
- Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message

* fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01)

- content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel
- sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed
- Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team

* fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02)

- Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass)
- Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check
- Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent)
- Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp)
- Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent)

* fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03)

- Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS)
- Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir
- Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary

* fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04)

- gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only)
- gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex)
- gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines
- gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe()

* test: 20 security tests for audit remediation

- server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/*
- cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated
- path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws
- gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved
- state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning
- telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON
- adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 08:35:24 -06:00

80 lines
2.6 KiB
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Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check-freeze.sh — PreToolUse hook for /freeze skill
# Reads JSON from stdin, checks if file_path is within the freeze boundary.
# Returns {"permissionDecision":"deny","message":"..."} to block, or {} to allow.
set -euo pipefail
# Read stdin
INPUT=$(cat)
# Locate the freeze directory state file
STATE_DIR="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA:-$HOME/.gstack}"
FREEZE_FILE="$STATE_DIR/freeze-dir.txt"
# If no freeze file exists, allow everything (not yet configured)
if [ ! -f "$FREEZE_FILE" ]; then
echo '{}'
exit 0
fi
FREEZE_DIR=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < "$FREEZE_FILE")
# If freeze dir is empty, allow
if [ -z "$FREEZE_DIR" ]; then
echo '{}'
exit 0
fi
# Extract file_path from tool_input JSON
# Try grep/sed first, fall back to Python for escaped quotes
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | grep -o '"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/.*:[[:space:]]*"//;s/"$//' || true)
# Python fallback if grep returned empty
if [ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]; then
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.loads(sys.stdin.read()).get("tool_input",{}).get("file_path",""))' 2>/dev/null || true)
fi
# If we couldn't extract a file path, allow (don't block on parse failure)
if [ -z "$FILE_PATH" ]; then
echo '{}'
exit 0
fi
# Resolve file_path to absolute if it isn't already
case "$FILE_PATH" in
/*) ;; # already absolute
*)
FILE_PATH="$(pwd)/$FILE_PATH"
;;
esac
# Normalize: remove double slashes and trailing slash
FILE_PATH=$(printf '%s' "$FILE_PATH" | sed 's|/\+|/|g;s|/$||')
# Resolve symlinks and .. sequences (POSIX-portable, works on macOS)
_resolve_path() {
local _dir _base
_dir="$(dirname "$1")"
_base="$(basename "$1")"
_dir="$(cd "$_dir" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P || printf '%s' "$_dir")"
printf '%s/%s' "$_dir" "$_base"
}
FILE_PATH=$(_resolve_path "$FILE_PATH")
FREEZE_DIR=$(_resolve_path "$FREEZE_DIR")
# Check: does the file path start with the freeze directory?
case "$FILE_PATH" in
"${FREEZE_DIR}/"*|"${FREEZE_DIR}")
# Inside freeze boundary — allow
echo '{}'
;;
*)
# Outside freeze boundary — deny
# Log hook fire event
mkdir -p ~/.gstack/analytics 2>/dev/null || true
echo '{"event":"hook_fire","skill":"freeze","pattern":"boundary_deny","ts":"'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'","repo":"'$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")'"}' >> ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true
printf '{"permissionDecision":"deny","message":"[freeze] Blocked: %s is outside the freeze boundary (%s). Only edits within the frozen directory are allowed."}\n' "$FILE_PATH" "$FREEZE_DIR"
;;
esac