Files
gstack/lib/sealed-guard.ts
Garry Tanandcapy-ai[bot] 0eb9c0d88b v1.92.72.0 fix(sealed): refuse published records that put a label next to an identifier (GST-620) (#3747)
* feat(sealed): refuse published records that put a label next to an identifier (GST-620)

sealed.label_keys turns on sealed.label_join: a published JSON, JSONL, CSV, TSV or Markdown-table record that holds a label field and an identifier (an identifier_keys glob or a hex value) is refused when its fingerprint is new against every parent. Unreadable supported files are sealed.label_join_unchecked. Without label_keys the guard reads no blobs and its output matches main byte for byte (golden in test/fixtures/sealed-guard-off-golden.json).

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: pre-landing review fixes

sealed.label_join: a hex object key is an identifier of the object it holds; label_keys and identifier_keys refuse dotted names; register the off golden as a free fixture.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: adversarial review fixes (GST-620)

A field may count as both a label and an identifier (a pushed label_keys can no longer hide a join); TSV cells may be quoted; a file that never names a label key is skipped before parsing; blobs are parsed as they are read; label_join refusals no longer suggest allow_paths.

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sealed): strip quotes before the label-key prefilter so a quoted header fragment still joins

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(sealed): the label-key prefilter ignores double quotes

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* docs(sealed): hex lists count as identifiers; a \u escape always parses (Step 14.5 audit)

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-11-02 11:36:03 +00:00

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/**
* sealed-guard — the sealed-output guard (field wave CD4), shared by the
* managed pre-push hook (bin/gstack-redact-prepush) and the standalone
* preflight `gstack-pregate sealed [--range <a..b>]`.
*
* A repo opts in with a `sealed` key in `.gstack/pregate.json`:
* paths globs that may never be published (held-out sets, cells)
* transcripts globs of per-cell transcripts
* answer_markers regexes for a quoted sealed answer in added text
* seed_patterns regexes for a sampling seed in added text
* local_paths true: a local home path (/home/<u>/, /Users/<u>/) in added text
* allow_paths globs exempt from the path rules (read from the base branch only; never folds case)
* case_insensitive true: `paths` and `transcripts` match regardless of case
* label_keys field names whose records may not also carry an identifier (lib/sealed-join.ts; off when empty)
* identifier_keys field-name globs that count as identifiers (default DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_KEYS)
* visibility "public" | "private": the destination override (reviewed on the base branch)
*
* The publication boundary is every commit the push publishes: the local sha
* minus everything the destination remote already has (`git rev-list <local>
* --not --remotes=<remote> ^<remote sha>`); a destination with no refs means
* everything reachable. Path rules see every path a commit adds, renames or
* copies, independent of content (binary, empty, add-then-delete); text rules
* see each commit's added lines. The effective policy is the union of the
* destination base branch's `sealed` and the pushed one (a push can tighten,
* never relax); `allow_paths` exceptions come only from the base branch's
* policy and remove path findings before waivers, which come only from the
* base branch's `.gstack/sealed-allow.tsv` and must name the full commit sha. A malformed or unreadable policy refuses (fail
* closed). Visibility: the base override, else a cache under the state root
* (a `public` answer for 24 h, a `private` one for 1 h before it may
* downgrade a refusal), else `gh repo view` (5 s); unknown counts as public.
* Findings name file, line, rule and commit, never the matched text.
*/
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import { containedRelative, globToRegExp } from './ship-policy';
import { DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_KEYS, identifierKeyError, joinFindings, labelKeyError } from './sealed-join';
import { resolveStateRoot } from './state-root';
export const SEALED_CONFIG_PATH = '.gstack/pregate.json';
export const SEALED_ALLOW_PATH = '.gstack/sealed-allow.tsv';
export const VISIBILITY_OVERRIDE_KEY = 'sealed.visibility';
export type SealedRule = 'sealed.path' | 'sealed.transcript' | 'sealed.answer' | 'sealed.seed' | 'sealed.local_path' | 'sealed.label_join' | 'sealed.label_join_unchecked';
export interface SealedPolicy { paths: string[]; transcripts: string[]; answer_markers: string[]; seed_patterns: string[]; local_paths: boolean; allow_paths: string[]; case_insensitive: boolean; label_keys: string[]; identifier_keys: string[]; visibility?: 'public' | 'private' }
export interface SealedFinding { rule: SealedRule; file: string; line?: number; commit: string; keys?: string[] }
export type ExemptFinding = SealedFinding & { glob: string };
export interface AllowEntry { rule: string; path: string; sha: string; reason: string }
export type Visibility = 'public' | 'private' | 'unknown';
const KEYS = ['paths', 'transcripts', 'answer_markers', 'seed_patterns', 'local_paths', 'allow_paths', 'case_insensitive', 'label_keys', 'identifier_keys', 'visibility'];
const MAX_ENTRIES = 64;
const MAX_REGEX = 256;
const LOCAL_PATH_RE = /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_.~-]|\$\{!?(?:[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*(?:\[[^\]\s]{0,64}\])?|[0-9]+|[@*#?$!-]):?-)(?:\/home\/[^/\s'"`]+\/|\/Users\/[^/\s'"`]+\/|[A-Za-z]:\\+Users\\+[^\\\s'"`]+\\)/;
const PUBLIC_TTL_MS = 24 * 3600_000;
const PRIVATE_TTL_MS = 3600_000;
/** `<key>: <message>` errors for a `sealed` value; empty when valid. Shared with lib/pregate/config.ts. */
export function sealedErrors(raw: unknown): Array<{ path: string; message: string }> {
const errors: Array<{ path: string; message: string }> = [];
if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return [{ path: 'sealed', message: `must be an object { ${KEYS.join(', ')} }` }];
const o = raw as Record<string, unknown>;
for (const k of Object.keys(o)) if (!KEYS.includes(k)) errors.push({ path: `sealed.${k}`, message: `unknown key; valid keys: ${KEYS.join(', ')} (if the key comes from a newer gstack, upgrade gstack on this machine)` });
const list = (key: string, check: (s: string) => string | null) => {
if (!(key in o)) return;
const v = o[key];
if (!Array.isArray(v) || v.some(s => typeof s !== 'string')) { errors.push({ path: `sealed.${key}`, message: 'must be an array of strings' }); return; }
if (v.length > MAX_ENTRIES) errors.push({ path: `sealed.${key}`, message: `more than ${MAX_ENTRIES} entries` });
(v as string[]).forEach((s, i) => { const why = check(s); if (why) errors.push({ path: `sealed.${key}[${i}]`, message: `${JSON.stringify(s)} ${why}` }); });
};
const glob = (g: string) => { const why = containedRelative(g); if (why) return why; try { globToRegExp(g); return null; } catch (e: any) { return e.message; } };
const regex = (r: string) => { if (!r || r.length > MAX_REGEX) return `must be 1-${MAX_REGEX} characters`; try { new RegExp(r); return null; } catch (e: any) { return `is not a valid regex (${e.message})`; } };
const exception = (g: string) => { const name = g.split('/').pop()!; return glob(g) ?? (name.includes('**') || /^[*?]+(\.|$)/.test(name) ? 'has a wildcard file name, which would exempt whole directories or file types; name the file (e.g. **/sealed/*/MANIFEST.json)' : null); };
list('paths', glob); list('transcripts', glob); list('answer_markers', regex); list('seed_patterns', regex); list('allow_paths', exception);
list('label_keys', labelKeyError); list('identifier_keys', identifierKeyError);
for (const k of ['local_paths', 'case_insensitive']) if (k in o && typeof o[k] !== 'boolean') errors.push({ path: `sealed.${k}`, message: 'must be true or false' });
if ('visibility' in o && o.visibility !== 'public' && o.visibility !== 'private') errors.push({ path: 'sealed.visibility', message: 'must be "public" or "private"' });
return errors;
}
function git(repoRoot: string, args: string[], input?: string): { ok: boolean; out: string; err: string } {
const r = spawnSync('git', args, { cwd: repoRoot, encoding: 'utf8', input, timeout: 120_000, maxBuffer: 256 * 1024 * 1024 });
return { ok: r.status === 0, out: r.stdout ?? '', err: (r.stderr ?? '').trim() };
}
export type PolicyRead = { policy: SealedPolicy | null; label: string } | { error: string; label: string };
/** The `sealed` key of `.gstack/pregate.json` at a commit; null when absent; an error when present but unreadable. */
export function sealedPolicyAt(repoRoot: string, treeish: string, label: string): PolicyRead {
const spec = `${treeish}:${SEALED_CONFIG_PATH}`;
if (!git(repoRoot, ['cat-file', '-e', spec]).ok) return { policy: null, label };
const show = git(repoRoot, ['cat-file', 'blob', spec]);
if (!show.ok) return { error: `cannot read ${SEALED_CONFIG_PATH} (${show.err})`, label };
let raw: any;
try { raw = JSON.parse(show.out); }
catch (e: any) { return /"sealed"/.test(show.out) ? { error: `${SEALED_CONFIG_PATH} is not valid JSON (${e.message})`, label } : { policy: null, label }; }
if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || !('sealed' in raw)) return { policy: null, label };
const errors = sealedErrors(raw.sealed);
if (errors.length) return { error: errors.map(e => `${e.path}: ${e.message}`).join('; '), label };
const s = raw.sealed;
return { policy: { paths: s.paths ?? [], transcripts: s.transcripts ?? [], answer_markers: s.answer_markers ?? [], seed_patterns: s.seed_patterns ?? [], local_paths: s.local_paths === true, allow_paths: s.allow_paths ?? [], case_insensitive: s.case_insensitive === true, label_keys: s.label_keys ?? [], identifier_keys: s.identifier_keys ?? DEFAULT_IDENTIFIER_KEYS, visibility: s.visibility }, label };
}
/** Base ∪ pushed: deny lists, `label_keys` and `identifier_keys` (each resolved to its default per policy first) concatenate, `local_paths` and `case_insensitive` OR (both only tighten); `allow_paths` relax, so they come from the base alone; visibility stays private only when the base says so and the push does not say public. */
export function unionPolicies(base: SealedPolicy | null, pushed: SealedPolicy | null): SealedPolicy | null {
if (!base && !pushed) return null;
const u = (k: 'paths' | 'transcripts' | 'answer_markers' | 'seed_patterns' | 'label_keys' | 'identifier_keys') => [...new Set([...(base?.[k] ?? []), ...(pushed?.[k] ?? [])])];
const visibility = pushed?.visibility === 'public' || base?.visibility === 'public' ? 'public' : base?.visibility === 'private' ? 'private' : undefined;
return { paths: u('paths'), transcripts: u('transcripts'), answer_markers: u('answer_markers'), seed_patterns: u('seed_patterns'), local_paths: !!(base?.local_paths || pushed?.local_paths), allow_paths: base?.allow_paths ?? [], case_insensitive: !!(base?.case_insensitive || pushed?.case_insensitive), label_keys: u('label_keys'), identifier_keys: u('identifier_keys'), visibility };
}
/** Reviewed waivers: `rule<TAB>path<TAB>sha<TAB>reason` lines in the base branch's allow file; a waiver counts only when its sha equals the finding's full commit sha. */
export function allowEntriesAt(repoRoot: string, treeish: string | null): AllowEntry[] {
if (!treeish) return [];
const show = git(repoRoot, ['cat-file', 'blob', `${treeish}:${SEALED_ALLOW_PATH}`]);
if (!show.ok) return [];
return show.out.split('\n').filter(l => l.trim() && !l.startsWith('#')).map(l => l.split('\t')).filter(f => f.length >= 4 && f[2]!.trim() && f[3]!.trim())
.map(f => ({ rule: f[0]!.trim(), path: f[1]!.trim(), sha: f[2]!.trim(), reason: f.slice(3).join('\t').trim() }));
}
/** Commits a push publishes: local minus the remote's refs (and its tip for this ref); null remote and no tip → everything reachable. */
export function publishedCommits(repoRoot: string, o: { localSha: string; remoteSha?: string | null; remoteName?: string | null }): { commits: string[] } | { error: string } {
const not: string[] = [];
if (o.remoteName) not.push(`--remotes=${o.remoteName}/*`);
if (o.remoteSha && !/^0+$/.test(o.remoteSha) && git(repoRoot, ['cat-file', '-e', `${o.remoteSha}^{commit}`]).ok) not.push(o.remoteSha);
const r = git(repoRoot, ['rev-list', o.localSha, ...(not.length ? ['--not', ...not] : [])]);
if (!r.ok) return { error: `git rev-list failed: ${r.err.slice(0, 200)}` };
return { commits: r.out.split('\n').filter(Boolean) };
}
export function rangeCommits(repoRoot: string, range: string): { commits: string[] } | { error: string } {
const r = git(repoRoot, ['rev-list', range]);
if (!r.ok) return { error: `git rev-list ${range} failed: ${r.err.slice(0, 200)}` };
return { commits: r.out.split('\n').filter(Boolean) };
}
const HEX = /^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/;
/** The first glob matching a repo-relative path, compiled once per list (`matchesAny` normalization); null when none does. */
function globMatcher(globs: string[], ignoreCase: boolean): (file: string) => string | null {
const compiled = globs.map(g => { const re = globToRegExp(g); return { g, re: ignoreCase ? new RegExp(re.source, 'i') : re }; });
return file => { const norm = file.replace(/\\/g, '/').replace(/^\.\//, ''); return compiled.find(c => c.re.test(norm))?.g ?? null; };
}
/** Path rules over every added, renamed or copied path, per commit (merges: paths new against every parent). */
function pathFindings(repoRoot: string, commits: string[], p: SealedPolicy): SealedFinding[] {
if (!p.paths.length && !p.transcripts.length) return [];
const r = git(repoRoot, ['-c', 'core.quotePath=false', 'diff-tree', '--stdin', '-r', '--root', '-M', '-C', '--cc', '--name-status', '-z'], commits.join('\n') + '\n');
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`git diff-tree failed: ${r.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
const out: SealedFinding[] = [];
const transcript = globMatcher(p.transcripts, p.case_insensitive);
const sealedPath = globMatcher(p.paths, p.case_insensitive);
const tokens = r.out.split('\0');
let commit = '';
for (let i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
const t = tokens[i]!;
if (!t) continue;
if (HEX.test(t)) { commit = t; continue; }
const renamed = /^[RC]\d*$/.test(t);
const file = renamed ? tokens[i += 2]! : tokens[++i]!;
if (!renamed && !t.includes('A')) continue;
if (transcript(file)) out.push({ rule: 'sealed.transcript', file, commit });
else if (sealedPath(file)) out.push({ rule: 'sealed.path', file, commit });
}
return out;
}
/** Text rules over each commit's added lines (`--cc` for merges: only the resolution's own lines). */
function textFindings(repoRoot: string, commits: string[], p: SealedPolicy): SealedFinding[] {
const rules: Array<[SealedRule, RegExp]> = [
...p.answer_markers.map(r => ['sealed.answer', new RegExp(r)] as [SealedRule, RegExp]),
...p.seed_patterns.map(r => ['sealed.seed', new RegExp(r)] as [SealedRule, RegExp]),
...(p.local_paths ? [['sealed.local_path', LOCAL_PATH_RE] as [SealedRule, RegExp]] : []),
];
if (!rules.length) return [];
const r = git(repoRoot, ['-c', 'core.quotePath=false', 'diff-tree', '--stdin', '-r', '--root', '-M', '-C', '--cc', '-p', '--unified=0', '--no-color', '--no-ext-diff', '--no-textconv'], commits.join('\n') + '\n');
if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`git diff-tree -p failed: ${r.err.slice(0, 200)}`);
const out: SealedFinding[] = [];
let commit = ''; let file = ''; let inHunk = false; let parents = 1; let next = 0;
for (const line of r.out.split('\n')) {
if (HEX.test(line)) { commit = line; inHunk = false; continue; }
if (line.startsWith('diff --')) { inHunk = false; file = ''; continue; }
if (line.startsWith('@@')) { inHunk = true; parents = (/^@+/.exec(line)?.[0].length ?? 2) - 1; next = Number(/ \+(\d+)(?:,\d+)? @+/.exec(line)?.[1] ?? 0); continue; }
if (!inHunk) { if (line.startsWith('+++ ')) file = line.startsWith('+++ b/') ? line.slice(6) : ''; continue; }
const prefix = line.slice(0, parents);
if (line.startsWith('\\') || prefix.includes('-')) continue;
const n = next++;
if (!prefix.includes('+')) continue;
const text = line.slice(parents);
for (const [rule, re] of rules) if (re.test(text)) out.push({ rule, file, line: n, commit });
}
return out;
}
export function scanCommits(repoRoot: string, commits: string[], policy: SealedPolicy): SealedFinding[] {
if (!commits.length) return [];
const seen = new Set<string>();
return [...pathFindings(repoRoot, commits, policy), ...textFindings(repoRoot, commits, policy), ...joinFindings(repoRoot, commits, policy)].filter(f => {
const key = `${f.rule}\0${f.file}\0${f.line ?? ''}\0${f.commit}`;
if (seen.has(key)) return false;
seen.add(key);
return true;
});
}
/** `owner/repo` for a GitHub remote URL; null for anything else (a local path, another host). */
export function githubSlug(url: string | null | undefined): string | null {
const m = /^(?:https?:\/\/(?:[^@/]+@)?github\.com\/|ssh:\/\/git@github\.com\/|git@github\.com:)([A-Za-z0-9-]+)\/([A-Za-z0-9._-]+?)(?:\.git)?\/?$/.exec((url ?? '').trim());
return m ? `${m[1]}/${m[2]}` : null;
}
export interface VisibilityOptions { env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; gh?: (args: string[]) => { ok: boolean; out: string }; now?: number }
/** Destination visibility: cache (public 24 h, private 1 h), else `gh repo view` (5 s); unknown on any failure or a non-GitHub remote. */
export function resolveVisibility(url: string | null, o: VisibilityOptions = {}): { visibility: Visibility; source: string } {
const slug = githubSlug(url);
if (!slug) return { visibility: 'unknown', source: 'not a GitHub remote' };
const now = o.now ?? Date.now();
const file = path.join(resolveStateRoot(o.env ?? process.env), 'sealed-visibility.json');
let cache: Record<string, { visibility: Visibility; checked_at: number }> = {};
try { cache = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8')).entries ?? {}; } catch { cache = {}; }
const hit = cache[slug];
if (hit && ((hit.visibility === 'public' && now - hit.checked_at < PUBLIC_TTL_MS) || (hit.visibility === 'private' && now - hit.checked_at < PRIVATE_TTL_MS))) return { visibility: hit.visibility, source: `cache ${new Date(hit.checked_at).toISOString()}` };
const gh = o.gh ?? ((args: string[]) => { const r = spawnSync('gh', args, { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 5_000, env: o.env ?? process.env }); return { ok: r.status === 0, out: r.stdout ?? '' }; });
const r = gh(['repo', 'view', slug, '--json', 'visibility']);
let v: string | undefined;
try { v = r.ok ? String(JSON.parse(r.out).visibility ?? '').toLowerCase() : undefined; } catch { v = undefined; }
if (v !== 'public' && v !== 'private' && v !== 'internal') return { visibility: 'unknown', source: `gh repo view ${slug} failed (a new or unreadable repository counts as public)` };
const visibility: Visibility = v === 'public' ? 'public' : 'private';
cache[slug] = { visibility, checked_at: now };
try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(file, JSON.stringify({ entries: cache }, null, 2) + '\n'); } catch { /* an unwritable cache only costs a lookup */ }
return { visibility, source: `gh repo view ${slug}` };
}
export interface SealedReport {
status: 'no-policy' | 'clear' | 'refused' | 'warned' | 'error';
policyLabels: string[]; commits: number; findings: SealedFinding[]; exempt: ExemptFinding[]; waived: Array<SealedFinding & { reason: string }>; ignoredWaivers: Array<{ rule: string; path: string; sha: string; commit: string }>;
visibility: Visibility; visibilitySource: string; target: string; error?: string;
}
export interface EvaluateOptions {
repoRoot: string; targets: Array<{ commits: string[]; pushedSha: string }>; baseRef: string | null; baseLabel?: string; remoteUrl: string | null; target: string;
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; gh?: VisibilityOptions['gh'];
}
/** A report for a failure before any policy is read (an unlisted range, an unreadable push); renders as a fail-closed refusal. */
export function sealedErrorReport(error: string, target: string): SealedReport {
return { status: 'error', error, policyLabels: [], commits: 0, findings: [], exempt: [], waived: [], ignoredWaivers: [], visibility: 'unknown', visibilitySource: '', target };
}
/** The whole guard for one push (or range): policies, commits, findings, waivers, visibility, verdict. */
export function evaluateSealed(o: EvaluateOptions): SealedReport {
const blank = { ...sealedErrorReport('', o.target), error: undefined };
const base = o.baseRef ? sealedPolicyAt(o.repoRoot, o.baseRef, o.baseLabel ?? o.baseRef) : { policy: null, label: '(no destination base branch)' };
if ('error' in base) return { ...blank, status: 'error', error: `the sealed policy on ${base.label} is unreadable: ${base.error}` };
let policy: SealedPolicy | null = base.policy;
const labels = base.policy ? [base.label] : [];
for (const t of o.targets) {
const pushed = sealedPolicyAt(o.repoRoot, t.pushedSha, `commit ${t.pushedSha.slice(0, 12)}`);
if ('error' in pushed) return { ...blank, status: 'error', error: `the sealed policy in ${pushed.label} is unreadable: ${pushed.error}` };
if (pushed.policy) labels.push(pushed.label);
policy = unionPolicies(policy, pushed.policy);
}
if (!policy) return { ...blank, status: 'no-policy' };
const commits = [...new Set(o.targets.flatMap(t => t.commits))];
let found: SealedFinding[];
try { found = scanCommits(o.repoRoot, commits, policy); }
catch (e: any) { return { ...blank, policyLabels: labels, commits: commits.length, status: 'error', error: `could not read the published commits: ${e.message}` }; }
const exception = globMatcher(policy.allow_paths, false);
const exempt: ExemptFinding[] = [];
found = found.filter(f => {
const glob = f.rule === 'sealed.path' || f.rule === 'sealed.transcript' ? exception(f.file) : null;
if (glob) exempt.push({ ...f, glob });
return !glob;
});
const allow = allowEntriesAt(o.repoRoot, o.baseRef);
const waived: SealedReport['waived'] = [];
const findings = found.filter(f => {
const entry = allow.find(a => a.rule === f.rule && a.path === f.file && a.sha === f.commit);
if (entry) waived.push({ ...f, reason: entry.reason });
return !entry;
});
const applied = new Set(waived.map(w => `${w.rule}\t${w.file}\t${w.commit}`));
const ignored = new Map<string, SealedReport['ignoredWaivers'][number]>();
for (const f of findings) for (const a of allow) {
if (a.rule !== f.rule || a.path !== f.file || applied.has(`${a.rule}\t${a.path}\t${a.sha}`)) continue;
ignored.set(`${a.rule}\t${a.path}\t${a.sha}\t${f.commit}`, { rule: a.rule, path: a.path, sha: a.sha, commit: f.commit });
}
const ignoredWaivers = [...ignored.values()];
const vis = policy.visibility ? { visibility: policy.visibility as Visibility, source: `${VISIBILITY_OVERRIDE_KEY} override` } : resolveVisibility(o.remoteUrl, { env: o.env, gh: o.gh });
const status = findings.length === 0 ? 'clear' : vis.visibility === 'private' ? 'warned' : 'refused';
return { status, policyLabels: labels, commits: commits.length, findings, exempt, waived, ignoredWaivers, visibility: vis.visibility, visibilitySource: vis.source, target: o.target };
}
const where = (f: SealedFinding) => `${f.file || '(unknown file)'}${f.line ? `:${f.line}` : ''}`;
/** stderr text for a report: findings one per line (`<rule> <file[:line]> commit <sha12>`), never the matched text. */
export function renderSealed(r: SealedReport, context: string): string {
const lines: string[] = [];
for (const e of r.exempt) lines.push(`${context}: exempt ${e.rule} ${where(e)} commit ${e.commit.slice(0, 12)} (sealed.allow_paths ${e.glob})`);
for (const w of r.waived) lines.push(`${context}: waived ${w.rule} ${where(w)} commit ${w.commit.slice(0, 12)} (${SEALED_ALLOW_PATH}: ${w.reason})`);
for (const i of r.ignoredWaivers) {
const why = i.commit.startsWith(i.sha.toLowerCase()) ? `${SEALED_ALLOW_PATH} must name the full lowercase commit sha` : 'it names another commit';
lines.push(`${context}: ignored waiver ${i.rule} ${i.path} sha ${i.sha} (${why}; this finding is in commit ${i.commit}, review it before waiving)`);
}
const vis = `visibility: ${r.visibility}${r.visibility === 'unknown' ? ', counted public' : ''}; ${r.visibilitySource}`;
const body = r.findings.map(f => ` ${f.rule} ${where(f)} commit ${f.commit.slice(0, 12)}${f.keys ? ` keys=${f.keys.join(',')}` : ''}`);
const join = r.findings.some(f => f.rule.startsWith('sealed.label_join')) ? [`sealed.label_join: a record puts a sealed.label_keys field next to an identifier (keys= lists the label fields, then the identifier fields); drop one side from the published file or keep the file out of the public repository. sealed.label_join_unchecked: a supported file the guard could not read (over 4 MiB, unparseable, or nested deeper than 64); allow_paths never exempt either rule`] : [];
if (r.status === 'error') {
lines.push(`\n⛔ ${context} BLOCKED the publication of ${r.target} — ${r.error}.`);
lines.push(`Fix the sealed policy (gstack-pregate validate), then retry; an unreadable policy never passes (SEALED_OUTPUT_REFUSED)`);
} else if (r.status === 'refused') {
lines.push(`\n⛔ ${context} BLOCKED the publication of ${r.target} (${vis}) — sealed or eval output in ${r.commits} published commit(s):`, ...body, ...join);
const exemptable = r.findings.some(f => !f.rule.startsWith('sealed.label_join')) ? ` exempt a publishable path with a sealed.allow_paths glob in the base branch's ${SEALED_CONFIG_PATH},` : '';
lines.push(`Remove it from every published commit before this branch reaches a public repository,${exemptable} or waive one reviewed finding with a \`rule<TAB>path<TAB>full-commit-sha<TAB>reason\` line in the base branch's ${SEALED_ALLOW_PATH}. A private destination: set ${VISIBILITY_OVERRIDE_KEY} "private" in the base branch's ${SEALED_CONFIG_PATH} (SEALED_OUTPUT_REFUSED)`);
} else if (r.status === 'warned') {
lines.push(`${context}: warning — sealed or eval output in a push to a private destination (${vis}); it would be refused for a public one:`, ...body, ...join);
}
return lines.length ? lines.join('\n') + '\n' : '';
}