mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
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006dbe19f1
The chat queue path is gone. The Chrome side panel is now just an
interactive claude PTY in xterm.js. Activity / Refs / Inspector still
exist behind the `debug` toggle in the footer.
Three threads of change, all from dogfood iteration on top of
cc-pty-import:
1. fix(server): cross-port WS auth via Sec-WebSocket-Protocol
- Browsers can't set Authorization on a WebSocket upgrade. We had
been minting an HttpOnly gstack_pty cookie via /pty-session, but
SameSite=Strict cookies don't survive the cross-port jump from
server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port from a chrome-extension
origin. The WS opened then immediately closed → "Session ended."
- /pty-session now also returns ptySessionToken in the JSON body.
- Extension calls `new WebSocket(url, [`gstack-pty.<token>`])`.
Browser sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol on the upgrade.
- Agent reads the protocol header, validates against validTokens,
and MUST echo the protocol back (Chromium closes the connection
immediately if a server doesn't pick one of the offered protocols).
- Cookie path is kept as a fallback for non-browser callers (curl,
integration tests).
- New integration test exercises the full protocol-auth round-trip
via raw fetch+Upgrade so a future regression of this exact class
fails in CI.
2. fix(extension): UX polish on the Terminal pane
- Eager auto-connect when the sidebar opens — no "Press any key to
start" friction every reload.
- Always-visible ↻ Restart button in the terminal toolbar (not
gated on the ENDED state) so the user can force a fresh claude
mid-session.
- MutationObserver on #tab-terminal's class attribute drives a
fitAddon.fit() + term.refresh() when the pane becomes visible
again — xterm doesn't auto-redraw after display:none → display:flex.
3. feat(extension): rip the chat tab + sidebar-agent.ts
- Sidebar is Terminal-only. No more Terminal | Chat primary nav.
- sidebar-agent.ts deleted. /sidebar-command, /sidebar-chat,
/sidebar-agent/event, /sidebar-tabs* and friends all deleted.
- The pickSidebarModel router (sonnet vs opus) is gone — the live
PTY uses whatever model the user's `claude` CLI is configured with.
- Quick-actions (🧹 Cleanup / 📸 Screenshot / 🍪 Cookies) survive
in the Terminal toolbar. Cleanup now injects its prompt into the
live PTY via window.gstackInjectToTerminal — no more
/sidebar-command POST. The Inspector "Send to Code" action uses
the same injection path.
- clear-chat button removed from the footer.
- sidepanel.js shed ~900 lines of chat polling, optimistic UI,
stop-agent, etc.
Net diff: -3.4k lines across 16 files. CLAUDE.md, TODOS.md, and
docs/designs/SIDEBAR_MESSAGE_FLOW.md rewritten to match. The sidebar
regression test (browse/test/sidebar-tabs.test.ts) is rewritten as 27
structural assertions locking the new layout — Terminal sole pane,
no chat input, quick-actions in toolbar, eager-connect, MutationObserver
repaint, restart helper.
192 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
192 lines
8.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for the Terminal-tab PTY agent and its server-side glue.
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*
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* Coverage:
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* - pty-session-cookie module: mint / validate / revoke / TTL pruning.
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* - source-level guard: /pty-session and /terminal/* are NOT in TUNNEL_PATHS.
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* - source-level guard: /health does not surface ptyToken.
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* - source-level guard: terminal-agent binds 127.0.0.1 only.
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* - source-level guard: terminal-agent enforces Origin AND cookie on /ws.
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*
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* These are read-only checks against source — they prevent silent surface
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* widening during a routine refactor (matches the dual-listener.test.ts
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* pattern). End-to-end behavior (real /bin/bash PTY round-trip,
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* tunnel-surface 404 + denial-log) lives in
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* `browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts`.
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect, beforeEach } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import {
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mintPtySessionToken, validatePtySessionToken, revokePtySessionToken,
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extractPtyCookie, buildPtySetCookie, buildPtyClearCookie,
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PTY_COOKIE_NAME, __resetPtySessions,
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} from '../src/pty-session-cookie';
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const SERVER_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/server.ts'), 'utf-8');
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const AGENT_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/terminal-agent.ts'), 'utf-8');
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describe('pty-session-cookie: mint/validate/revoke', () => {
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beforeEach(() => __resetPtySessions());
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test('a freshly minted token validates', () => {
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const { token } = mintPtySessionToken();
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expect(validatePtySessionToken(token)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('null and unknown tokens fail validation', () => {
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expect(validatePtySessionToken(null)).toBe(false);
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expect(validatePtySessionToken(undefined)).toBe(false);
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expect(validatePtySessionToken('')).toBe(false);
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expect(validatePtySessionToken('not-a-real-token')).toBe(false);
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});
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test('revoke makes a token invalid', () => {
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const { token } = mintPtySessionToken();
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expect(validatePtySessionToken(token)).toBe(true);
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revokePtySessionToken(token);
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expect(validatePtySessionToken(token)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('Set-Cookie has HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict + Path=/ + Max-Age', () => {
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const { token } = mintPtySessionToken();
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const cookie = buildPtySetCookie(token);
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expect(cookie).toContain(`${PTY_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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expect(cookie).toContain('HttpOnly');
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expect(cookie).toContain('SameSite=Strict');
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expect(cookie).toContain('Path=/');
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expect(cookie).toMatch(/Max-Age=\d+/);
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// Secure is intentionally omitted — daemon binds 127.0.0.1 over HTTP.
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expect(cookie).not.toContain('Secure');
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});
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test('clear-cookie has Max-Age=0', () => {
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expect(buildPtyClearCookie()).toContain('Max-Age=0');
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});
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test('extractPtyCookie reads gstack_pty from a Cookie header', () => {
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const { token } = mintPtySessionToken();
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const req = new Request('http://127.0.0.1/ws', {
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headers: { 'cookie': `othercookie=foo; gstack_pty=${token}; baz=qux` },
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});
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expect(extractPtyCookie(req)).toBe(token);
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});
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test('extractPtyCookie returns null when the cookie is missing', () => {
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const req = new Request('http://127.0.0.1/ws', {
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headers: { 'cookie': 'unrelated=value' },
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});
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expect(extractPtyCookie(req)).toBe(null);
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});
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});
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describe('Source-level guard: /pty-session is not on the tunnel surface', () => {
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test('TUNNEL_PATHS does not include /pty-session or /terminal/*', () => {
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const start = SERVER_SRC.indexOf('const TUNNEL_PATHS = new Set<string>([');
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expect(start).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
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const end = SERVER_SRC.indexOf(']);', start);
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const body = SERVER_SRC.slice(start, end);
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expect(body).not.toContain('/pty-session');
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expect(body).not.toContain('/terminal/');
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expect(body).not.toContain('/terminal-');
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});
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});
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describe('Source-level guard: /health does NOT surface ptyToken', () => {
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test('/health response body does not include ptyToken', () => {
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const healthIdx = SERVER_SRC.indexOf("url.pathname === '/health'");
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expect(healthIdx).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
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// Slice from /health through the response close-bracket.
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const slice = SERVER_SRC.slice(healthIdx, healthIdx + 2000);
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// The /health JSON.stringify body must not mention the cookie token.
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// It's allowed to include `terminalPort` (a port number, not auth).
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expect(slice).not.toContain('ptyToken');
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expect(slice).not.toContain('gstack_pty');
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expect(slice).toContain('terminalPort');
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});
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});
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describe('Source-level guard: terminal-agent', () => {
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test('binds 127.0.0.1 only, never 0.0.0.0', () => {
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expect(AGENT_SRC).toContain("hostname: '127.0.0.1'");
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expect(AGENT_SRC).not.toContain("hostname: '0.0.0.0'");
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});
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test('rejects /ws upgrades without chrome-extension:// Origin', () => {
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// The Origin check must run BEFORE the cookie check — otherwise a
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// missing-origin attempt would surface the 401 cookie message and
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// signal to attackers that they need to forge a cookie.
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const wsHandler = AGENT_SRC.slice(AGENT_SRC.indexOf("if (url.pathname === '/ws')"));
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('chrome-extension://');
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('forbidden origin');
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});
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test('validates the session token against an in-memory token set', () => {
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const wsHandler = AGENT_SRC.slice(AGENT_SRC.indexOf("if (url.pathname === '/ws')"));
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// Two transports: Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (preferred for browsers) and
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// Cookie gstack_pty (fallback). Both verify against validTokens.
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('sec-websocket-protocol');
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('gstack_pty');
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('validTokens.has');
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});
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test('Sec-WebSocket-Protocol auth: strips gstack-pty. prefix and echoes back', () => {
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const wsHandler = AGENT_SRC.slice(AGENT_SRC.indexOf("if (url.pathname === '/ws')"));
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// Browsers send `Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: gstack-pty.<token>`. The agent
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// must strip the prefix before checking validTokens, AND echo the
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// protocol back in the upgrade response — without the echo, the
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// browser closes the connection immediately.
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expect(wsHandler).toContain("'gstack-pty.'");
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('Sec-WebSocket-Protocol');
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expect(wsHandler).toContain('acceptedProtocol');
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});
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test('lazy spawn: claude PTY is spawned in message handler, not on upgrade', () => {
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// The whole point of lazy-spawn (codex finding #8) is that the WS
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// upgrade itself does NOT call spawnClaude. Spawn happens on first
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// message frame.
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const upgradeBlock = AGENT_SRC.slice(
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AGENT_SRC.indexOf("if (url.pathname === '/ws')"),
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AGENT_SRC.indexOf("websocket: {"),
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);
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expect(upgradeBlock).not.toContain('spawnClaude(');
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// Spawn must be invoked from the message handler (lazy on first byte).
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const messageHandler = AGENT_SRC.slice(AGENT_SRC.indexOf('message(ws, raw)'));
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expect(messageHandler).toContain('spawnClaude(');
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expect(messageHandler).toContain('!session.spawned');
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});
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test('process.on uncaughtException + unhandledRejection handlers exist', () => {
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expect(AGENT_SRC).toContain("process.on('uncaughtException'");
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expect(AGENT_SRC).toContain("process.on('unhandledRejection'");
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});
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test('cleanup escalates SIGINT to SIGKILL after 3s on close', () => {
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// disposeSession must be idempotent and use a SIGINT-then-SIGKILL pattern.
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const dispose = AGENT_SRC.slice(AGENT_SRC.indexOf('function disposeSession'));
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expect(dispose).toContain("'SIGINT'");
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expect(dispose).toContain("'SIGKILL'");
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expect(dispose).toContain('3000');
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});
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});
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describe('Source-level guard: server.ts /pty-session route', () => {
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test('validates AUTH_TOKEN, grants over loopback, returns token + Set-Cookie', () => {
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const route = SERVER_SRC.slice(SERVER_SRC.indexOf("url.pathname === '/pty-session'"));
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// Must check auth before minting.
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const beforeMint = route.slice(0, route.indexOf('mintPtySessionToken'));
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expect(beforeMint).toContain('validateAuth');
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// Must call the loopback grant before responding (otherwise the
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// agent's validTokens Set never sees the token and /ws would 401).
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expect(route).toContain('grantPtyToken');
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// Must return the token in the JSON body for the
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// Sec-WebSocket-Protocol auth path (cross-port cookies don't survive
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// SameSite=Strict from a chrome-extension origin).
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expect(route).toContain('ptySessionToken');
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// Set-Cookie is kept as a fallback for non-browser callers.
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expect(route).toContain('Set-Cookie');
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expect(route).toContain('buildPtySetCookie');
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});
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});
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