mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
synced 2026-11-02 23:14:33 +01:00
* fix(ios-qa): allow physical iPad devices in tunnel bootstrap (#2743)
(cherry picked from commit d6d43934ef)
* fix(ios-qa): iPhone + iPad on USB names each UDID instead of picking one
With GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID unset, tied default ranks used to pick the first
device devicectl listed, so a QA session could drive the wrong device. Tied
candidates now fail with multiple_devices, list each device and UDID, and
print a ready export line. Device selection moves into selectDevice() so the
route-drop recovery can re-resolve with the same rules.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ios-qa): a dropped CoreDevice route no longer relaunches the app (#1975)
Rotation deletes the app's one-shot boot-token file, so the daemon's old
503/504 path (invalidate + full bootstrap) could only get a new token by
running devicectl launch --terminate-existing, wiping the in-app QA state at
every route blip.
A route failure now goes through recoverTunnel(): re-select the device with
the bootstrap rules, re-resolve the tunnel address for the pinned UDID, check
the unauthenticated /healthz owner, then probe /state/snapshot with the cached
bearer. Outcomes:
- bearer accepted: keep the session (new address if it moved)
- 401: full bootstrap from the fresh boot token (app was relaunched)
- app confirmed absent: bootstrap, which launches it normally once
- different device or an address devicectl cannot tie to the UDID:
bootstrap; the old bearer is never sent there
- route still down with the app running: surface the error, keep the session
Concurrent failures on one tunnel share a single refresh. Mutations whose
response was lost are still never replayed. The CLI wiring moves into
deviceTunnelSource() so tests drive it against a simulated device.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ios-qa): a failed boot-token write is loud instead of silent (#1837)
StateServer.start() wrote the boot-token file with try?, so a failed write
left nothing on disk and no trace anywhere, and the daemon then relaunched the
app trying to mint a token that could never be written. The write is now a
do/catch that logs the path and error (never the token), logs a NOT READY
bootstrap line, and reports boot_token_error on /healthz. bootstrapTunnel
reads that field and returns boot_token_unavailable naming the device-side
cause instead of running --terminate-existing.
Also drops the stale comments claiming the token was written to os_log.
Template and fixture stay byte-identical.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ios-qa): type the iPad acceptance test's mDNS stub
ResolveImpl returns Promise<string[]>; resolving null tripped the test-code
typecheck ratchet. A rejected lookup exercises the same resolve_failed path.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(ios-qa): iPad support, GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID, route-drop recovery, known limits
- iPhone-only description, triggers, and prerequisites now cover iPads, and
say how to pick one device with GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID.
- Phase 2 no longer tells you to capture a boot token from os_log (it has
not been logged for many releases); it describes the 0600 tmp/ file and
the NOT READY signal (#1837, #1735).
- Source-control guidance for the generated DebugBridge/ package (#1735).
- Failure table: route drops keep the session, multiple_devices, unwritable
token file, and the one relaunch a daemon restart still costs.
- Known limits: SwiftUI DragGesture and /swipe on iOS 26 (#1975), the
iOS 26.3.1 /elements data from PR #1755, unverified iPad Stage Manager.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: iOS QA how-to and skill index cover iPads and route-drop recovery
The how-to still said the boot token was readable from os_log and that a
route drop re-bootstraps; both are now accurate, with iPad selection,
GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID, and three new failure rows.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* v1.91.37.0 fix(ios-qa): iPads work, a route drop no longer relaunches the app, loud boot-token write
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(ios-qa): keep issue numbers out of model-read skill text
The archaeology lint rejects issue references in generated SKILL.md text;
the Known limits entry keeps the iOS version and drops the number.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: re-slot to v1.91.38.0 (v1.91.37.0 claimed by #3075)
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ios-qa): device-change recovery test without an IPv4-mapped address
The Windows lane could not reach a fake StateServer through
::ffff:127.0.0.1, so the iPad half of the device-change test timed out. The
fake device now swaps identity on its one ::1 listener, which is also closer
to production: every StateServer answers on the same port.
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: loulanyue <260355617@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
626 lines
27 KiB
Plaintext
626 lines
27 KiB
Plaintext
// AUTO-GENERATED from gstack/ios-qa/templates/StateServer.swift.template
|
|
// Regenerate with: /ios-sync
|
|
//
|
|
// StateServer — HTTP server embedded in the iOS app under test. Loopback-only.
|
|
// All tailnet ingress is the responsibility of the Mac-side daemon.
|
|
//
|
|
// Threat model: this surface is reachable from the local Mac via the CoreDevice
|
|
// IPv6 tunnel. It MUST refuse any caller without a current bearer token. The
|
|
// boot token is rotated within ~5 seconds of daemon spawn, and rotation deletes
|
|
// its file, so a copy taken past that window is a dead credential.
|
|
|
|
import Foundation
|
|
import Network
|
|
import os.log
|
|
|
|
#if DEBUG
|
|
|
|
public typealias JSONDict = [String: Any]
|
|
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
public final class StateServer {
|
|
// MARK: Public surface
|
|
|
|
public static let shared = StateServer()
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Configuration
|
|
|
|
private let logger = Logger(subsystem: "gstack.ios-qa", category: "StateServer")
|
|
private let port: UInt16
|
|
private let bootTokenPath: String
|
|
|
|
// Two listeners for dual-stack loopback. The fork's single-listener IPv6-only
|
|
// binding was caught in eng + outside-voice review as incomplete.
|
|
private var ipv6Listener: NWListener?
|
|
private var ipv4Listener: NWListener?
|
|
|
|
// Auth state. The boot token is written to a 0600 file in tmp/ on launch
|
|
// (never to os_log). It exists ONLY long enough for the daemon to call
|
|
// /auth/rotate. A failed write is kept here and reported on /healthz.
|
|
private var bootToken: String
|
|
private var bootTokenWriteError: String?
|
|
private var rotatedToken: String? // set after first /auth/rotate
|
|
private var bootTokenValid: Bool = true
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Session lock (per-device, sliding window on mutations only)
|
|
|
|
private struct Session {
|
|
let id: String
|
|
var lastMutationAt: Date
|
|
}
|
|
private var activeSession: Session?
|
|
private let sessionTtlSeconds: TimeInterval = 300 // 5 min orphan timeout
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Accessor registry (populated by codegen)
|
|
|
|
public typealias ReadHandler = () -> Any?
|
|
public typealias WriteHandler = (Any) -> Bool
|
|
public typealias TypeName = String
|
|
|
|
private var readHandlers: [String: ReadHandler] = [:]
|
|
private var writeHandlers: [String: WriteHandler] = [:]
|
|
private var typeNames: [String: TypeName] = [:]
|
|
|
|
// Validated-restore hooks. Every generated model registers one two-phase
|
|
// handler. The server validates all models before it lets any model mutate,
|
|
// so invalid input can never cause a cross-model partial restore.
|
|
// Valid restores apply properties on MainActor; observers may receive one
|
|
// change notification per property because arbitrary @Observable models do
|
|
// not expose a general single-assignment transaction API.
|
|
public typealias AtomicRestoreFn = (JSONDict, Bool) -> RestoreResult
|
|
public enum RestoreResult {
|
|
case ok
|
|
case missingKey(String)
|
|
case typeMismatch(String)
|
|
case schemaMismatch(expected: String, got: String)
|
|
}
|
|
private var atomicRestores: [AtomicRestoreFn] = []
|
|
|
|
// Snapshot schema hash — written by codegen, stable across builds with
|
|
// identical accessor signatures.
|
|
private var accessorHash: String = "uninitialized"
|
|
private var appBuildId: String = "uninitialized"
|
|
|
|
// Agent identity for the DebugOverlay attribution chip. Display-only,
|
|
// never used for auth.
|
|
public private(set) var lastAgentIdentity: String = "Claude Code (local)"
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Lifecycle
|
|
|
|
private init(port: UInt16 = 9999) {
|
|
self.port = port
|
|
self.bootToken = UUID().uuidString
|
|
self.bootTokenPath = NSTemporaryDirectory() + "gstack-ios-qa.token"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public func start() {
|
|
// 1. Persist the boot token to a 0600 file. This is the ONLY way the
|
|
// daemon can authenticate (devicectl copies it out of tmp/), so a
|
|
// failed write is an error, not a silent skip.
|
|
let tokenFile = bootTokenPath
|
|
do {
|
|
try bootToken.write(toFile: tokenFile, atomically: true, encoding: .utf8)
|
|
try FileManager.default.setAttributes([.posixPermissions: 0o600], ofItemAtPath: tokenFile)
|
|
} catch {
|
|
bootTokenWriteError = error.localizedDescription
|
|
logger.error("Boot token file write failed at \(tokenFile, privacy: .public): \(error.localizedDescription, privacy: .public). No daemon can authenticate until the app relaunches with a writable tmp/.")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. Announce bootstrap WITHOUT the token. The daemon reads the boot
|
|
// token from the 0600 file above (copyFileFromAppContainer); the
|
|
// os_log line that used to carry it had no consumer and handed a
|
|
// live credential to anything reading the unified log during the
|
|
// launch window. Port/build stay for diagnostics.
|
|
if let failure = bootTokenWriteError {
|
|
logger.error("gstack-ios-qa-bootstrap NOT READY port=\(self.port, privacy: .public): boot token file unwritable (\(failure, privacy: .public))")
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.notice("gstack-ios-qa-bootstrap port=\(self.port, privacy: .public) build=\(self.appBuildId, privacy: .public)")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. Bind both IPv6 and IPv4 loopback. CoreDevice tunnel uses IPv6;
|
|
// local tooling may use IPv4. Never bind 0.0.0.0 or ::.
|
|
startListener(family: .ipv6)
|
|
startListener(family: .ipv4)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public func register(buildId: String, accessorHash: String, atomicRestore: @escaping AtomicRestoreFn) {
|
|
self.appBuildId = buildId
|
|
self.accessorHash = accessorHash
|
|
self.atomicRestores.append(atomicRestore)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public func registerAccessor(key: String, type: String, read: @escaping ReadHandler, write: @escaping WriteHandler) {
|
|
readHandlers[key] = read
|
|
writeHandlers[key] = write
|
|
typeNames[key] = type
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Listener setup
|
|
|
|
private enum AddressFamily {
|
|
case ipv4
|
|
case ipv6
|
|
|
|
var host: NWEndpoint.Host {
|
|
switch self {
|
|
case .ipv4: return NWEndpoint.Host("127.0.0.1")
|
|
case .ipv6: return NWEndpoint.Host("::1")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func startListener(family: AddressFamily) {
|
|
do {
|
|
// Binding strategy: accept connections from the device's loopback
|
|
// AND from the CoreDevice tunnel (the USB-mounted tunnel the Mac
|
|
// daemon uses to reach this app — appears as a non-loopback
|
|
// utun-style interface on the device with the peer's source
|
|
// address in the fd*/fc* ULA range). We can't use
|
|
// params.acceptLocalOnly — Network.framework's definition of
|
|
// "local" is strictly loopback and silently drops CoreDevice
|
|
// tunnel peers. Instead we accept on the wildcard interface and
|
|
// do a per-connection peer-address check below: loopback OR
|
|
// RFC 4193 ULA (fc00::/7) → accept, everything else → cancel.
|
|
let params = NWParameters.tcp
|
|
params.allowLocalEndpointReuse = true
|
|
|
|
// IPv4 has no CoreDevice tunnel path, so it binds strictly to
|
|
// loopback at the socket level; IPv6 keeps the wildcard bind and
|
|
// relies on the per-connection peer check below for tunnel peers.
|
|
let listener: NWListener
|
|
switch family {
|
|
case .ipv4:
|
|
params.requiredLocalEndpoint = NWEndpoint.hostPort(
|
|
host: NWEndpoint.Host("127.0.0.1"),
|
|
port: NWEndpoint.Port(rawValue: port)!)
|
|
listener = try NWListener(using: params)
|
|
case .ipv6:
|
|
listener = try NWListener(using: params, on: NWEndpoint.Port(rawValue: port)!)
|
|
}
|
|
listener.stateUpdateHandler = { [weak self] state in
|
|
Task { @MainActor in
|
|
if case .ready = state {
|
|
self?.logger.notice("StateServer listening on \(String(describing: family))")
|
|
} else if case .failed(let err) = state {
|
|
self?.logger.error("StateServer listener failed: \(err.localizedDescription, privacy: .public)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
listener.newConnectionHandler = { [weak self] connection in
|
|
Task { @MainActor in
|
|
// Defense-in-depth: even with .loopback interface gate, double-check
|
|
// the peer is loopback. Reject otherwise.
|
|
if let self, self.isLoopbackPeer(connection) {
|
|
self.handle(connection)
|
|
} else {
|
|
connection.cancel()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
listener.start(queue: .global(qos: .userInitiated))
|
|
|
|
switch family {
|
|
case .ipv6: ipv6Listener = listener
|
|
case .ipv4: ipv4Listener = listener
|
|
}
|
|
} catch {
|
|
logger.error("Listener bind failed (\(String(describing: family))): \(error.localizedDescription, privacy: .public)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func isLoopbackPeer(_ connection: NWConnection) -> Bool {
|
|
switch connection.endpoint {
|
|
case .hostPort(let host, _):
|
|
switch host {
|
|
case .ipv4(let addr):
|
|
return addr == .loopback
|
|
case .ipv6(let addr):
|
|
// Loopback (::1) — local same-device traffic
|
|
if addr.isLoopback { return true }
|
|
// CoreDevice ULA range (fd00::/8 unique-local addresses) —
|
|
// the USB tunnel that the Mac daemon uses to reach this app.
|
|
// Apple's CoreDevice tunnel uses fd-prefixed ULAs like
|
|
// fd72:8347:2ead::1 (Mac-facing) and fd72:8347:2ead::2
|
|
// (device-facing). We accept the entire ULA range since
|
|
// the prefix is regenerated per session.
|
|
let bytes = addr.rawValue
|
|
if bytes.count >= 1 && (bytes[0] & 0xFE) == 0xFC {
|
|
// RFC 4193 ULA range (fc00::/7) — fc* or fd* prefix.
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
case .name(let name, _):
|
|
return name == "localhost"
|
|
@unknown default: return false
|
|
}
|
|
default: return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Request handling
|
|
|
|
private func handle(_ connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
connection.start(queue: .global(qos: .userInitiated))
|
|
receive(connection: connection, buffer: Data())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private static let maxBodyBytes = 1_048_576 // 1MB hard cap
|
|
|
|
private func receive(connection: NWConnection, buffer: Data) {
|
|
connection.receive(minimumIncompleteLength: 1, maximumLength: 65_536) { [weak self] data, _, isComplete, error in
|
|
guard let self else { return }
|
|
Task { @MainActor in
|
|
var current = buffer
|
|
if let data = data { current.append(data) }
|
|
if current.count > Self.maxBodyBytes {
|
|
self.send(connection: connection, status: 413, body: ["error": "body_too_large"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if let req = self.tryParseRequest(current) {
|
|
self.route(connection: connection, request: req)
|
|
} else if isComplete || error != nil {
|
|
self.send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "bad_request"])
|
|
} else {
|
|
self.receive(connection: connection, buffer: current)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct ParsedRequest {
|
|
let method: String
|
|
let path: String
|
|
let headers: [String: String]
|
|
let body: Data
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func tryParseRequest(_ data: Data) -> ParsedRequest? {
|
|
guard let headerEnd = data.range(of: Data("\r\n\r\n".utf8)) else { return nil }
|
|
let headerData = data.subdata(in: 0..<headerEnd.lowerBound)
|
|
let body = data.subdata(in: headerEnd.upperBound..<data.count)
|
|
guard let headerStr = String(data: headerData, encoding: .utf8) else { return nil }
|
|
let lines = headerStr.components(separatedBy: "\r\n")
|
|
guard let requestLine = lines.first else { return nil }
|
|
let parts = requestLine.components(separatedBy: " ")
|
|
guard parts.count >= 2 else { return nil }
|
|
|
|
var headers: [String: String] = [:]
|
|
for line in lines.dropFirst() {
|
|
guard let colon = line.firstIndex(of: ":") else { continue }
|
|
let key = String(line[..<colon]).lowercased()
|
|
let value = line[line.index(after: colon)...].trimmingCharacters(in: .whitespaces)
|
|
headers[key] = value
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let lenStr = headers["content-length"], let len = Int(lenStr), body.count < len {
|
|
return nil // need more bytes
|
|
}
|
|
return ParsedRequest(method: parts[0], path: parts[1], headers: headers, body: body)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func route(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest) {
|
|
// Update display attribution from header (display only — never trusted
|
|
// for auth).
|
|
if let agent = request.headers["x-agent-identity"], !agent.isEmpty, agent.count < 200 {
|
|
lastAgentIdentity = agent
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let path = request.path
|
|
|
|
// 1. Public on loopback: /healthz.
|
|
if request.method == "GET" && path == "/healthz" {
|
|
var health: JSONDict = [
|
|
"version": "1.0.0",
|
|
"build": appBuildId,
|
|
"accessor_hash": accessorHash,
|
|
"bundle_id": Bundle.main.bundleIdentifier ?? "unknown",
|
|
]
|
|
if let failure = bootTokenWriteError { health["boot_token_error"] = failure }
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: health)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 2. Auth bootstrap: /auth/rotate is the ONLY endpoint that accepts the
|
|
// boot token. Everything else requires the rotated token.
|
|
if request.method == "POST" && path == "/auth/rotate" {
|
|
handleAuthRotate(connection: connection, request: request)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 3. All other endpoints require Bearer auth with the rotated token.
|
|
guard authorize(request: request) else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 401, body: ["error": "unauthorized"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (request.method, path) {
|
|
case ("POST", "/session/acquire"): handleSessionAcquire(connection: connection)
|
|
case ("POST", "/session/release"): handleSessionRelease(connection: connection)
|
|
case ("POST", "/session/heartbeat"): handleSessionHeartbeat(connection: connection, request: request)
|
|
case ("GET", "/state/snapshot"): handleSnapshotGet(connection: connection)
|
|
case ("POST", "/state/restore"): handleSnapshotRestore(connection: connection, request: request)
|
|
case ("GET", "/elements"): handleElements(connection: connection)
|
|
case ("GET", "/screenshot"): handleScreenshot(connection: connection)
|
|
case ("POST", "/tap"): handleMutation(connection: connection, request: request, op: "tap")
|
|
case ("POST", "/swipe"): handleMutation(connection: connection, request: request, op: "swipe")
|
|
case ("POST", "/type"): handleMutation(connection: connection, request: request, op: "type")
|
|
case ("GET", let p) where p.hasPrefix("/state/"):
|
|
let key = String(p.dropFirst("/state/".count))
|
|
handleStateGet(connection: connection, key: key)
|
|
case ("POST", let p) where p.hasPrefix("/state/"):
|
|
let key = String(p.dropFirst("/state/".count))
|
|
handleStateWrite(connection: connection, request: request, key: key)
|
|
default:
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 404, body: ["error": "not_found", "path": path])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Auth
|
|
|
|
private func authorize(request: ParsedRequest) -> Bool {
|
|
guard let auth = request.headers["authorization"], auth.hasPrefix("Bearer ") else { return false }
|
|
let token = String(auth.dropFirst("Bearer ".count))
|
|
return token == rotatedToken
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleAuthRotate(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest) {
|
|
// Validate boot token (still alive AND used only once).
|
|
guard bootTokenValid,
|
|
let auth = request.headers["authorization"],
|
|
auth.hasPrefix("Bearer "),
|
|
String(auth.dropFirst("Bearer ".count)) == bootToken else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 401, body: ["error": "boot_token_invalid"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
guard let dict = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: request.body) as? JSONDict,
|
|
let newToken = dict["new_token"] as? String,
|
|
newToken.count >= 16 else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "invalid_rotate_payload"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rotatedToken = newToken
|
|
bootTokenValid = false
|
|
// Best-effort scrub of on-disk boot token file.
|
|
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(atPath: bootTokenPath)
|
|
|
|
logger.notice("Boot token rotated; original now invalid")
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["ok": true])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Session lock
|
|
|
|
private static let mutatingPaths: Set<String> = ["/tap", "/swipe", "/type", "/state/restore"]
|
|
|
|
private func mutatingPathRequiresSession(_ path: String, method: String) -> Bool {
|
|
if method != "POST" { return false }
|
|
if path.hasPrefix("/state/") && path != "/state/restore" { return true } // /state/<key> writes
|
|
return Self.mutatingPaths.contains(path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func requireSession(in request: ParsedRequest, connection: NWConnection) -> Bool {
|
|
guard let id = request.headers["x-session-id"] else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 409, body: ["error": "session_required"])
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
guard let current = activeSession, current.id == id else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 409, body: ["error": "session_invalid_or_expired"])
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
// Mutation slides the lock; reads do not.
|
|
activeSession?.lastMutationAt = Date()
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleSessionAcquire(connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
// Reap orphaned session.
|
|
if let s = activeSession, Date().timeIntervalSince(s.lastMutationAt) > sessionTtlSeconds {
|
|
activeSession = nil
|
|
}
|
|
if activeSession != nil {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 423, body: ["error": "device_locked"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
let id = UUID().uuidString
|
|
activeSession = Session(id: id, lastMutationAt: Date())
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: [
|
|
"session_id": id,
|
|
"ttl_seconds": Int(sessionTtlSeconds),
|
|
])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleSessionRelease(connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
activeSession = nil
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["ok": true])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleSessionHeartbeat(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest) {
|
|
guard let id = request.headers["x-session-id"],
|
|
activeSession?.id == id else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 409, body: ["error": "session_invalid_or_expired"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
activeSession?.lastMutationAt = Date()
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["ok": true, "ttl_seconds": Int(sessionTtlSeconds)])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: State handlers
|
|
|
|
private func handleStateGet(connection: NWConnection, key: String) {
|
|
guard let handler = readHandlers[key] else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 404, body: ["error": "unknown_key", "key": key])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
let value = handler() ?? NSNull()
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["key": key, "value": value])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleStateWrite(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest, key: String) {
|
|
guard requireSession(in: request, connection: connection) else { return }
|
|
guard let handler = writeHandlers[key] else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 404, body: ["error": "unknown_key", "key": key])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guard let payload = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: request.body) as? JSONDict,
|
|
let value = payload["value"] else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "missing_value"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
let ok = handler(value)
|
|
if ok {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["ok": true])
|
|
} else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "type_mismatch", "expected": typeNames[key] ?? "?"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleSnapshotGet(connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
var keys: JSONDict = [:]
|
|
for (k, read) in readHandlers {
|
|
keys[k] = read() ?? NSNull()
|
|
}
|
|
let envelope: JSONDict = [
|
|
"_schema_version": 1,
|
|
"_app_build_id": appBuildId,
|
|
"_accessor_hash": accessorHash,
|
|
"keys": keys,
|
|
]
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: envelope)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleSnapshotRestore(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest) {
|
|
guard requireSession(in: request, connection: connection) else { return }
|
|
guard let envelope = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: request.body) as? JSONDict else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "invalid_json"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Schema gate.
|
|
if let hash = envelope["_accessor_hash"] as? String, hash != accessorHash {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 409, body: [
|
|
"error": "schema_mismatch",
|
|
"expected_hash": accessorHash,
|
|
"got_hash": hash,
|
|
])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guard let keys = envelope["keys"] as? JSONDict else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "missing_keys"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
guard !atomicRestores.isEmpty else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 503, body: ["error": "atomic_restore_not_registered"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Phase one validates every registered model without assignment.
|
|
for restore in atomicRestores {
|
|
switch restore(keys, false) {
|
|
case .ok:
|
|
continue
|
|
case .missingKey(let k):
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "validation_failed", "key": k, "reason": "missing"])
|
|
return
|
|
case .typeMismatch(let k):
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "validation_failed", "key": k, "reason": "type-mismatch"])
|
|
return
|
|
case .schemaMismatch(let expected, let got):
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 409, body: ["error": "schema_mismatch", "expected_hash": expected, "got_hash": got])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Phase two applies only after every model accepted the immutable input.
|
|
// A valid multi-field restore may notify once per property.
|
|
for restore in atomicRestores {
|
|
guard case .ok = restore(keys, true) else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 500, body: ["error": "restore_apply_failed"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["ok": true])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Stubs (real impls live in DebugBridgeManager + UIKit)
|
|
|
|
private func handleElements(connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
let tree = ElementsBridge.snapshot()
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["elements": tree])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleScreenshot(connection: NWConnection) {
|
|
if let png = ScreenshotBridge.capturePNG() {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 200, body: ["png_base64": png.base64EncodedString()])
|
|
} else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 500, body: ["error": "screenshot_unavailable"])
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private func handleMutation(connection: NWConnection, request: ParsedRequest, op: String) {
|
|
guard requireSession(in: request, connection: connection) else { return }
|
|
guard let payload = try? JSONSerialization.jsonObject(with: request.body) as? JSONDict else {
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: 400, body: ["error": "invalid_json"])
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
let ok = MutationBridge.dispatch(op: op, payload: payload)
|
|
send(connection: connection, status: ok ? 200 : 400, body: ["op": op, "ok": ok])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: Response
|
|
|
|
private func send(connection: NWConnection, status: Int, body: JSONDict) {
|
|
let responseStatus: Int
|
|
let json: Data
|
|
if JSONSerialization.isValidJSONObject(body),
|
|
let encoded = try? JSONSerialization.data(withJSONObject: body) {
|
|
responseStatus = status
|
|
json = encoded
|
|
} else {
|
|
logger.error("Refusing to send a non-JSON response body")
|
|
responseStatus = 500
|
|
json = Data("{\"error\":\"response_not_json_serializable\"}".utf8)
|
|
}
|
|
let statusText: String
|
|
switch responseStatus {
|
|
case 200: statusText = "OK"
|
|
case 400: statusText = "Bad Request"
|
|
case 401: statusText = "Unauthorized"
|
|
case 404: statusText = "Not Found"
|
|
case 409: statusText = "Conflict"
|
|
case 413: statusText = "Payload Too Large"
|
|
case 423: statusText = "Locked"
|
|
case 429: statusText = "Too Many Requests"
|
|
case 500: statusText = "Internal Server Error"
|
|
case 503: statusText = "Service Unavailable"
|
|
default: statusText = "Status"
|
|
}
|
|
let header = "HTTP/1.1 \(responseStatus) \(statusText)\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: \(json.count)\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"
|
|
var packet = Data(header.utf8)
|
|
packet.append(json)
|
|
connection.send(content: packet, completion: .contentProcessed { _ in
|
|
connection.cancel()
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MARK: - Bridges (implementation provided by DebugBridgeManager)
|
|
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
public enum ElementsBridge {
|
|
public static var resolver: () -> [JSONDict] = { [] }
|
|
static func snapshot() -> [JSONDict] { resolver() }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
public enum ScreenshotBridge {
|
|
public static var resolver: () -> Data? = { nil }
|
|
static func capturePNG() -> Data? { resolver() }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
@MainActor
|
|
public enum MutationBridge {
|
|
public static var resolver: (String, JSONDict) -> Bool = { _, _ in false }
|
|
static func dispatch(op: String, payload: JSONDict) -> Bool { resolver(op, payload) }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif // DEBUG
|