Files
gstack/browse/test/server-lock-errors.test.ts
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Garry TanandClaude Fable 5 b5a951e623 v1.72.0.0 feat: Aside recommended driver for third-party web actions (#2710)
* fix(browse): never chmod shared, symlinked, or foreign-owned dirs to 0700

restrictDirectoryPermissions unconditionally chmodded its target. On hosts
where the process holds CAP_FOWNER (Docker as root, CI sandboxes) that
chmod SUCCEEDS on root-owned /tmp whenever a state file is configured
there (BROWSE_STATE_FILE=/tmp/x.json derives stateDir=/tmp), and a 0700
/tmp breaks access(2)-based checks machine-wide for every other process.

The POSIX branch now refuses shared sticky dirs, world-writable mounts
under root, foreign-owned dirs, and symlinked state dirs; refusals warn
once per process instead of failing silent; owned-but-unreadable dirs
keep their chmod self-repair; and the check-then-act race is closed with
fd-anchored O_NOFOLLOW + fstat/fchmod on a single inode.

Regression tests cover the sticky-dir, foreign-uid, mkdirSecure-reapply,
and symlinked-dir shapes.

* fix: hash with sha256sum before shasum on Linux (config slugs + setup verify)

shasum is perl/macOS; coreutils-only Linux ships sha256sum. Two call
sites hard-coded shasum: gstack-config's sha8_of/sha16 (so
resolve-user-slug exited 127 for any Linux user with a git email, the
Layer-3 fallback) and the generated bun-installer checksum snippet in
the browse/qa NEEDS_SETUP flow (spurious "checksum mismatch" on the
same distros). Both now resolve sha256sum first and fall back to
shasum -a 256.

New shim-PATH tests pin BOTH hasher branches of sha8_of to a known
vector and cover the sha8->sha16 collision escalation end to end.

* feat(contract): Aside is the recommended driver for third-party web actions

The Third-Party Web Actions contract (ship, spec, office-hours,
land-and-deploy, setup-deploy) now names the Aside AI browser as the
recommended driver: it acts across the user's real logged-in sessions,
which is what vendor-dashboard moments need. Supersedes the v1.65.0.0
de-Aside stance by explicit user directive (2026-08-27).

Detection is a runtime probe (command -v + aside --version under a
portable gtimeout/timeout/bare guard; nonzero exit = not detected).
Consent options render per detection state with Aside recommended and
the first-party stack ($B headed + handoff, GStack Browser) as the
universal fallback. Absent on macOS, the contract mentions the
aside.com download (macOS 15+) once per task; gstack never runs an
installer and binary presence is never consent. Drive discipline:
step-wise over whole-task delegation, vendor confirm mode on, vendor
skill/--help text scoped to operational syntax only, secrets minimized
(autofill / human-used copy buttons), Apple credential creation never a
drive target in any skill, failure path quotes redacted errors and
falls back only with fresh consent.

test/third-party-actions.test.ts pins every load-bearing sentence (21
tests) plus repo-wide tripwires: an aside command allowlist
(--version/--help only, code spans AND prose) and a ban on Aside
installer invocations across all generated docs. Budget ratchet
fixture and carve skeleton ceilings refreshed in this commit per the
ratchet protocol.

* chore: regenerate remaining browse-setup snippet consumers

The sha256sum-first checksum fallback in the generated NEEDS_SETUP
snippet renders into every browse-consuming skill, not just browse/qa.
Mechanical regen of the other ten consumers; no template changes here.

* test: consent-gate E2E suite + functional fs-capability probes

Five hermetic gate-tier E2E cases (tpa-present / absent-linux / broken /
absent-darwin / apple-ban) drive the real contract section through
claude -p with PATH shims for aside and uname; the absent cases filter
any REAL aside binary out of the child PATH and assert absence with
Bun.which before spawning, so dev machines cannot leak into detection.
Registered per-case in E2E_TOUCHFILES/E2E_TIERS with template-level
deps (ship/SKILL.md.tmpl, gen-skill-docs.ts) and added to the evals.yml
matrix with tier: gate. eval:bg:periodic's detach timeout rises to
36000s for the grown periodic shard census (floor-enforced by
test/eval-detach-timeout-floor.test.ts); CLAUDE.md doc updated to match.

test/helpers/fs-caps.ts adds canRevokeWrites/canRevokeReads functional
probes; 13 chmod-based tests swap their uid-0-only guards for the
probes so suites skip honestly on CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE containers (this
sandbox: uid 1000 with full caps) instead of asserting revocations the
kernel ignores. path-validation's symlink test targets /etc/passwd
(exists everywhere; /etc/crontab is absent on Amazon Linux).

* docs: file the Aside follow-ups in TODOS

Phase-2 QA logged-in-evidence path (P3), a hostile-vendor-skill E2E for
the contract's override sentence (P2), and fd-anchoring the file-level
permission writes to match the directory hardening (P3).

* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.72.0.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v1.72.0.0

docs/skills.md: Third-Party Web Actions subsection under /ship (Aside
recommended driver, consent rules, credential boundaries). BROWSER.md:
"Aside and third-party drives" subsection under Real-browser mode + ToC
entry, including the no-gstack-side-audit-trail caveat (ship adversarial
finding 12). TODOS.md: mark the finding-12 doc note done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: apply cross-model doc review fixes for v1.72.0.0

docs/skills.md: restore the /ship closing line above the new subsection.
BROWSER.md: ToC label matches the heading; BROWSE_STATE_FILE env row
documents the new dir-hardening refusal + one-time warning. CHANGELOG:
correct the hasher precedence wording (sha256sum first, shasum fallback)
and the fs-caps count (14 test files, verified against the diff).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: close cross-model doc-review gaps for v1.72.0.0

setup's manual bun-verify instruction gets the same sha256sum-first
fallback the automated snippet got (coreutils-only Linux); BROWSER.md's
BROWSE_STATE_FILE row now lists the under-root world-writable refusal;
test-cost ceilings in CLAUDE.md/CONTRIBUTING.md updated for the five
new gate E2E cases (~$4.20 E2E / ~$4.35 evals).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): gate the symlink-refusal test to POSIX and drop the umask assumption

The symlink regression test exercised the POSIX O_NOFOLLOW branch but ran
on Windows, where restrictDirectoryPermissions takes the icacls branch and
stat has no POSIX modes (0o666 always) — windows-free-tests failed on
mode 493 vs 438. Early-return on win32 like every sibling test in the
file, and assert the target's mode is UNCHANGED (captured post-mkdir)
instead of hardcoding 0o755, which a strict umask would also break.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-28 11:43:13 -07:00

125 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* acquireServerLock error honesty (#1084 regression).
*
* The old code wrapped fs.openSync(lockPath, 'wx') in a bare `catch {}` —
* EVERY errno (EACCES, EIO, ENOSPC, ENOENT) fell into the "lock already
* held" path and surfaced as "another instance is starting the server",
* a phantom 15s contention timeout that masked the real filesystem error.
*
* New contract:
* - EEXIST + live holder → null (real contention)
* - EEXIST + dead holder → stale lock removed, acquired
* - ENOENT (dir missing) → create dir, retry once, acquired
* - anything else → ServerLockError with the real errno
*/
import { describe, test, expect, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
import { canRevokeWrites } from '../../test/helpers/fs-caps';
import * as fs from 'fs';
// Default (CJS) export — its properties are mutable in Bun, unlike the frozen
// `* as fs` namespace, and mutations propagate to cli.ts's own fs import.
// Used only for the depth-cap livelock simulations below (restored in finally).
import fsMutable from 'fs';
import * as os from 'os';
import * as path from 'path';
import { acquireServerLock, ServerLockError } from '../src/cli';
const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-lock-'));
afterAll(() => {
// Restore write perm so cleanup can delete the read-only dir.
try { fs.chmodSync(path.join(tmpRoot, 'rodir'), 0o700); } catch {}
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
describe('acquireServerLock (#1084 error honesty)', () => {
test('happy path: acquires and releases', () => {
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'happy.lock');
const release = acquireServerLock(lockPath);
expect(release).not.toBeNull();
expect(fs.readFileSync(lockPath, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(String(process.pid));
release!();
expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
});
test('EACCES throws ServerLockError with the real errno — NOT phantom contention', () => {
if (!canRevokeWrites()) return; // chmod is advisory here (win32, root, DAC-override containers)
const rodir = path.join(tmpRoot, 'rodir');
fs.mkdirSync(rodir, { recursive: true });
fs.chmodSync(rodir, 0o500); // r-x: open('wx') inside fails EACCES
const lockPath = path.join(rodir, 'browse.json.lock');
let thrown: any = null;
try {
acquireServerLock(lockPath); // old code: returned null (phantom contention)
} catch (err) {
thrown = err;
}
expect(thrown).toBeInstanceOf(ServerLockError);
expect(thrown.code).toBe('EACCES');
expect(thrown.message).toContain('E_SERVER_LOCK (EACCES)');
expect(thrown.message).toContain(lockPath);
});
test('ENOENT (missing lock dir) creates the dir and acquires', () => {
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'newdir', 'browse.json.lock');
// old code: openSync ENOENT → bare catch → readFileSync ENOENT → null
const release = acquireServerLock(lockPath);
expect(release).not.toBeNull();
expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(true);
release!();
});
test('EEXIST + dead holder: removes stale lock and acquires', () => {
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'stale.lock');
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, '999999999\n'); // PID that cannot be alive
const release = acquireServerLock(lockPath);
expect(release).not.toBeNull();
release!();
});
test('EEXIST + live holder: returns null (real contention, no throw)', () => {
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'live.lock');
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, `${process.pid}\n`); // this test process is alive
expect(acquireServerLock(lockPath)).toBeNull();
fs.unlinkSync(lockPath);
});
test('EEXIST + garbage lockfile content: NaN pid is treated as stale, lock acquired', () => {
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'garbage.lock');
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, 'not-a-pid\n'); // parseInt → NaN → falsy → stale path
const release = acquireServerLock(lockPath);
expect(release).not.toBeNull();
// Our pid replaced the garbage — the stale lock was removed and re-acquired.
expect(fs.readFileSync(lockPath, 'utf8').trim()).toBe(String(process.pid));
release!();
expect(fs.existsSync(lockPath)).toBe(false);
});
// NOTE: the "stale lock that survives unlink" livelock variant is deliberately
// not simulated here — the source removes locks through safeUnlink's own fs
// binding, which a test-side fs monkey-patch cannot reliably intercept in Bun.
// The depth cap itself is exercised by the vanish-race test below.
test('depth cap: holder that vanishes between open and read returns null after 5 retries', () => {
// The EEXIST → readFileSync ENOENT race: the lock exists at openSync but
// is gone by the read (holder released in between). Repeated forever
// (open/release storm), the same depth cap must bound the retry loop.
const lockPath = path.join(tmpRoot, 'vanish.lock');
fs.writeFileSync(lockPath, `${process.pid}\n`);
const origRead = fsMutable.readFileSync;
try {
(fsMutable as any).readFileSync = (p: fs.PathLike | number, ...rest: unknown[]) => {
if (p === lockPath) {
const e: NodeJS.ErrnoException = new Error('mock: lock vanished before read');
e.code = 'ENOENT';
throw e;
}
return (origRead as any)(p, ...rest);
};
expect(acquireServerLock(lockPath)).toBeNull();
} finally {
(fsMutable as any).readFileSync = origRead;
fs.unlinkSync(lockPath);
}
});
});