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Garry Tan
149fe74349
Three security hardening fixes from /ship adversarial review: 1. AUTH_TOKEN unicode-whitespace bypass (server.ts:67-83). Old: `process.env.AUTH_TOKEN?.trim() || randomUUID()` only stripped ASCII whitespace. A misconfigured embedder shipping AUTH_TOKEN=$'' (BOM) or $'' (zero-width space) would silently get a one-character bearer secret. New `sanitizeAuthToken()` strips all unicode whitespace via regex and requires >= 16 chars after stripping; anything shorter falls back to crypto.randomUUID(). Same sanitizer used by `resolveConfigFromEnv()` so the embedder path is hardened too. 2. security-classifier.ts checkTranscript safety net. `resolveClaudeCommand()` and `spawn()` can throw under transient conditions (PATH probe failure, posix_spawn ENOMEM). Old code let the throw propagate and rejected the Promise with a raw exception. Now wrapped in try/catch that calls finish() with a degraded signal, matching the graceful-degradation contract the layer already promises for missing-CLI / exit-nonzero / parse-error. 3. cleanSingletonLocks defensive guard tightened (config.ts). Old: basename === 'chromium-profile' OR userDataDir === $CHROMIUM_PROFILE. The second branch was env-controlled and the first was bypassable by passing a relative path that resolved to chromium-profile via CWD drift. New guard: refuses relative paths outright, resolves both sides via path.resolve(), and only accepts the env-match path when $CHROMIUM_PROFILE is itself absolute. Test updates: replace the old `.trim()` test with three new cases covering unicode-whitespace stripping, short-token rejection, and zero-width-only rejection (server-factory.test.ts). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>