Garry Tan 10a7ab8a62 fix(security): k-anon suppression in community-pulse attack aggregate ...

Top-N attacked domains + layer distribution previously listed every
value with count>=1. With a small gstack community, that leaks
single-user attribution: if only one user is getting hit on
example.com, example.com appears in the aggregate as "1 attack,
1 domain" — easy to deanonymize when you know who's targeted.

Add K_ANON=5 threshold: a domain (or layer) must be reported by at
least 5 distinct installations before appearing in the aggregate.
Verdict distribution stays unfiltered (block/warn/log_only is
low-cardinality + population-wide, no re-id risk).

Raw rows already locked to service_role only (002_tighten_rls.sql);
this closes the aggregate-channel leak.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-20 19:39:42 +08:00

..

community-pulse

fix(security): k-anon suppression in community-pulse attack aggregate

2026-04-20 19:39:42 +08:00

telemetry-ingest

fix: security wave 1 — 14 fixes for audit #783 (v0.15.7.0) (#810)

2026-04-04 22:12:04 -07:00

update-check

feat: opt-in usage telemetry + community intelligence platform (v0.8.6) (#210)

2026-03-19 17:21:05 -07:00