Files
gstack/browse/test/tunnel-revoke-cli.test.ts
T
85fd9db554 v1.68.3.0 fix(pairing): re-pair to narrow revokes the old grant on the spot (#2665)
* fix(pairing): reject reserved clientId 'root' at all token writers

'root' is the sentinel checkScope/checkDomain/checkRate and the server
command gate use for the omnipotent caller, so a scoped token carrying it
bypasses every enforcement path. Add ReservedClientIdError + a shared
assertValidClientId; createToken/createSetupKey throw, restoreRegistry
skips-and-logs (a corrupt state file must not brick boot). /pair and /token
surface it as a named 400, and the CLI fast-fails --client root.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pairing): release tab ownership on revoke

tabOwnership cleared only on tab close, so after DELETE /token a same-name
re-pair inherited the revoked agent's authenticated tabs (own-only access
keys on owner === clientId). Add BrowserManager.releaseClientTabs and run it
unconditionally in DELETE /token (ownership outlives the token, so an
expired-token client can still own tabs); 404 only when both nothing was
revoked and nothing released. Response now carries tabs_released.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* v1.68.3.0 fix(pairing): re-pair to narrow revokes the old grant on the spot

POST /pair minted a new setup key but never touched the agent's live
session, so re-pairing --client X --restrict read while X was connected (or
whose 5-min key expired unexchanged) left the original full-access session,
eval included, alive up to 24h.

A reducing re-pair (fewer scopes, tighter domains, lower rate, stricter tab
policy) now revokes the live session and releases its tabs before minting
the new key (grantReducesAccess + revokeClientFully; superseded in the
response). Non-reducing re-pairs keep the session and only drop stale PENDING
setup keys, so a broaden/refresh never strands a working agent and a
narrowing re-pair issued before the agent connects can't leave the old broad
key exchangeable. Revoke happens before mint (revokeToken deletes all of a
client's tokens). CLI prints a version-skew-safe supersede notice and warns
when a re-pair-shaped call omits --client. Docs + CHANGELOG + VERSION.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pairing): harden re-pair per adversarial review

Adversarial review of the diff found four issues, now fixed:
- Validate the requested grant BEFORE the supersede revoke: a reducing
  re-pair with a bad scope/rate no longer destroys the live session and
  then fails to mint a replacement (assertValidTokenOptions runs up front).
- A re-pair with no live session releases tabs orphaned by an expired
  incarnation, closing the tab-inheritance gap /pair had (DELETE /token
  already released unconditionally).
- Test the DELETE /token revoked=0/tabs>0 path and the /pair orphaned-tab
  release at the handler level (HTTP e2e can't, headless owns no tabs).
- Test the CLI --client root fast-fail; fix its null-guard (parseFlag
  returns null when --client is absent).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Garry Tan <garry@ycombinator.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 15:32:26 -07:00

436 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Behavior tests for the `tunnel revoke` / `tunnel agents` CLI subcommands.
*
* Three harness shapes:
* 1. No/dead daemon — scratch BROWSE_STATE_FILE, no processes (the
* stop-dead-daemon.test.ts pattern): tunnel must exit 0 WITHOUT booting
* a daemon (#2254 — tokens are memory-only, a dead daemon has nothing
* to revoke).
* 2. Live daemon — real server subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1
* (the pair-agent-e2e.test.ts pattern): the full revoke + verify loop.
* 3. Stub daemon — a test-local Bun.serve behind a hand-written state file
* with an ALIVE pid (this test process). Pins the version-skew net (an
* OLD daemon with the first-match revoke bug returns 200 while /agents
* keeps listing the agent) and the unreachable-daemon branch. The pid
* decides the dead-daemon vs unreachable branch, so stubs MUST carry an
* alive pid.
*/
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import { spawn } from 'child_process';
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as net from 'net';
import * as os from 'os';
import * as path from 'path';
const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../..');
const SERVER_ENTRY = path.join(ROOT, 'browse/src/server.ts');
function runCli(args: string[], env: Record<string, string>, timeoutMs = 30_000):
Promise<{ code: number; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
const cliPath = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../src/cli.ts');
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const proc = spawn('bun', ['run', cliPath, ...args], { timeout: timeoutMs, env });
let stdout = ''; let stderr = '';
proc.stdout.on('data', (d) => stdout += d.toString());
proc.stderr.on('data', (d) => stderr += d.toString());
proc.on('close', (code) => resolve({ code: code ?? 1, stdout, stderr }));
});
}
function baseEnv(stateFile: string): Record<string, string> {
const env: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
if (v !== undefined) env[k] = v;
}
env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE = stateFile;
return env;
}
/** Grab a port that is definitely closed (bind, read, release). */
async function closedPort(): Promise<number> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const srv = net.createServer();
srv.once('error', reject);
srv.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const addr = srv.address();
if (!addr || typeof addr === 'string') { reject(new Error('bad address')); return; }
const port = addr.port;
srv.close(() => resolve(port));
});
});
}
function writeStateFile(stateFile: string, pid: number, port: number): void {
fs.writeFileSync(stateFile, JSON.stringify({
pid,
port,
token: 'fake-root-token',
startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
serverPath: '',
mode: 'launched' as const,
}, null, 2));
}
describe('tunnel subcommand parsing', () => {
test('bare tunnel / unknown sub / empty name / extra args → usage, exit 1', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-usage-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
for (const args of [
['tunnel'],
['tunnel', 'rotate'],
['tunnel', 'revoke'],
['tunnel', 'revoke', ''],
['tunnel', 'revoke', 'a', 'b'],
['tunnel', 'agents', 'extra'],
]) {
const result = await runCli(args, baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('usage: browse tunnel');
}
// Arg errors must never boot a daemon.
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 60_000);
});
// pair-agent scope-flag misuse shares this file's subprocess harness: like
// tunnel, the validation must run pre-server, so "no daemon spawned" is the
// load-bearing assertion.
describe('pair-agent scope-flag validation (pre-server)', () => {
test('bare --restrict → exit 1 usage error, NO daemon spawned (was: silent FULL grant)', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-bare-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict needs a scope list');
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('--restrict=read (equals form) → exit 1, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
// Regression: hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches, so the equals
// form sailed past validatePairAgentFlags AND handlePairAgent's parse —
// the user asked for a read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access.
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-eq-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict=read'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict takes a space-separated value');
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('--restrict swallowing the next flag → exit 1, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-flag-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict', '--client', 'bob'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict needs a scope list');
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('--restrict "read,control" → exit 1 pointing at --control, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-ctl-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict', 'read,control'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Re-run with --control');
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('--client root → exit 1 reserved-name error, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
// `root` is the sentinel that bypasses every scope/domain/rate/tab check;
// the CLI must reject it pre-server (the daemon also 400s it as defense-in-depth).
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-client-root-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--client', 'root'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('reserved');
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
});
describe('tunnel against no daemon (#2254 — never boot one)', () => {
test('revoke → exit 0, "No daemon running", nothing spawned', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-dead-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'ghost'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(0);
expect(result.stdout).toContain('No daemon running');
// A spawned daemon would have written the state file.
expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('agents → exit 0; stale state (dead pid + closed port) is NOT mutated — cleanup stays stop\'s job', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-stale-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
writeStateFile(stateFile, 2147483646, await closedPort());
const before = fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8');
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(0);
expect(result.stdout).toContain('No daemon running');
expect(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8')).toBe(before);
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
});
describe('tunnel against a live daemon (HTTP only, no browser)', () => {
test('pair → connect → revoke: verified gone, token 401s; agents lists pending keys', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-live-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
const daemon = Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', SERVER_ENTRY], {
cwd: ROOT,
env: {
...process.env,
BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP: '1',
BROWSE_PORT: String(port),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: stateFile,
BROWSE_PARENT_PID: '0',
BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT: '600000',
},
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
try {
const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
let ready = false;
while (Date.now() < deadline && !ready) {
try {
const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1000) });
ready = resp.ok;
} catch { /* not ready yet */ }
if (!ready) await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
}
expect(ready).toBe(true);
const rootToken = (JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8')) as { token: string }).token;
// Pair + connect a session, plus a second pending setup key.
const pair = async () => {
const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${rootToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'cli-agent' }),
});
return (await resp.json() as { setup_key: string }).setup_key;
};
const key1 = await pair();
const connectResp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/connect`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key1 }),
});
const { token: scopedToken } = await connectResp.json() as { token: string };
await pair(); // pending key
// tunnel agents shows the session AND the pending key.
const list = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(list.code).toBe(0);
expect(list.stdout).toContain('cli-agent');
expect(list.stdout).toContain('(pending setup key)');
// Unknown name → truthful failure with the active list.
const miss = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'nobody'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(miss.code).toBe(1);
expect(miss.stderr).toContain('No paired agent named "nobody"');
expect(miss.stderr).toContain('cli-agent');
// The real revoke: counted, verified, and the token actually dies.
const revoke = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'cli-agent'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(revoke.code).toBe(0);
expect(revoke.stdout).toContain('Revoked "cli-agent" (3 tokens)');
expect(revoke.stdout).toContain('Verified: not in the active agent list.');
const post = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
});
expect(post.status).toBe(401);
const empty = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(empty.code).toBe(0);
expect(empty.stdout).toContain('No paired agents.');
// Regression: handleTunnel used to trim() the name, but clientIds are
// stored verbatim — a space-padded agent became unrevocable by the
// documented kill switch (trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant lived).
const padPair = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/pair`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${rootToken}` },
body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: ' padded' }),
});
expect(padPair.status).toBe(200);
const padRevoke = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', ' padded'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(padRevoke.code).toBe(0);
expect(padRevoke.stdout).toContain('Verified: not in the active agent list.');
} finally {
try { daemon.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch { /* already gone */ }
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 60_000);
});
describe('tunnel against a lying or unreachable daemon (stub harness)', () => {
test('old daemon 200s the DELETE but keeps listing the agent → "Revocation incomplete", exit 1', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-skew-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
// Old daemons answer {revoked} with no tokens_deleted — this also pins
// the "(count unknown)" print (never undefined/NaN).
const stub = Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
return Response.json({ revoked: 'mallory' });
}
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
return Response.json({
agents: [{ clientId: 'mallory', scopes: ['read'], expiresAt: null, commandCount: 1, createdAt: '' }],
});
}
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
},
});
try {
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stdout).toContain('count unknown');
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revocation incomplete: "mallory" is still listed');
} finally {
stub.stop(true);
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('DELETE succeeds but /agents errors → "could not verify", exit 1 (never a silent success)', async () => {
// Regression pin: a revoke whose verification read fails must NOT report
// clean success — the whole point of the re-read is proving the deletion.
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-noverify-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
const stub = Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
return Response.json({ revoked: 'mallory', tokens_deleted: 1 });
}
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
return new Response('boom', { status: 500 });
}
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
},
});
try {
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revoked, but could not verify against the agent list.');
} finally {
stub.stop(true);
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('DELETE returns 500 → "Revoke failed" with the body error, exit 1', async () => {
// Regression pin: a non-404 HTTP failure must surface the daemon's error,
// not fall through to a success print.
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-500-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
const stub = Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
return Response.json({ error: 'registry exploded' }, { status: 500 });
}
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
},
});
try {
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revoke failed: registry exploded');
} finally {
stub.stop(true);
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('tunnel agents with a broken /agents → "Could not read the agent list", exit 1', async () => {
// Regression pin: a 500 from /agents must not render as "No paired
// agents." — an unreadable list is not an empty list.
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-agents500-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
const stub = Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
fetch(req) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
return new Response('boom', { status: 500 });
}
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
},
});
try {
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Could not read the agent list');
expect(result.stdout).not.toContain('No paired agents.');
} finally {
stub.stop(true);
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
test('alive pid but unreachable port → "Could not reach daemon", exit 1 (NOT "no daemon")', async () => {
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-unreach-'));
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
try {
// Alive pid (this test process) is what routes to the fetch-failure
// branch; a dead pid + dead port would be the exit-0 "no daemon" path.
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, await closedPort());
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'anyone'], baseEnv(stateFile));
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Could not reach daemon');
} finally {
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}, 30_000);
});