mirror of
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* fix(browse): revokeToken deletes ALL tokens for a clientId, not the first Map hit
revokeToken deleted the first Map entry matching the clientId and returned
true. After a normal pairing, two entries share one clientId: the spent setup
key (kept by exchangeSetupKey for idempotent re-exchange) and the session
token, in that insertion order. Revoke ate the setup key, reported success,
and the live session survived: DELETE /token/<id> returned a false 200 while
/agents kept listing the agent. Worse, an unspent setup key created after the
session survived revoke, so a "revoked" agent could POST /connect and mint a
fresh session within the key's 5-minute validity window.
revokeToken now deletes every matching entry and returns the delete count
(truthy-compatible with the old boolean). The DELETE /token handler logs
"Revoked N token(s)" and returns tokens_deleted so the multi-token class
stays visible; revokeSkillToken wraps Boolean() to keep its documented
contract. Regression tests pin shapes a (spent-key shadowing), b (re-grant
hole), c (multiple pending keys), and bystander isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(browse): tunnel revoke/agents CLI with post-revoke verification
`$B tunnel revoke <name>` was documented in the instruction block,
pair-agent/SKILL.md, and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md but implemented nowhere:
the CLI forwarded it to the daemon as Unknown command 'tunnel', and nothing
in the repo called DELETE /token/:clientId or GET /agents.
New pre-server short-circuit (#2254 pattern: tokens are memory-only, never
boot a daemon to revoke against it). `tunnel revoke <name>` DELETEs the
token, prints the deleted count ("(count unknown)" for old daemons that
answer {revoked} without tokens_deleted), then RE-READS GET /agents to prove
the agent is gone. The still-listed branch is the version-skew net: a new
CLI against a still-running old daemon with the first-match revoke bug exits
1 and says to re-run (each old-daemon call deletes the next match) or stop.
An alive pid with an unreachable port reports "Could not reach daemon"
(exit 1), never a false "no daemon". `tunnel agents` lists sessions plus
pending (unexchanged) setup keys, which GET /agents now exposes via
listTokens({includeSetup}) — without them the revocation view was blind to
a paired-but-never-connected agent. Setup-key tokens never leave the server.
DELETE /token/ now decodeURIComponents the clientId (400 on malformed
encoding) so CLI-encoded names round-trip.
Tests: subprocess CLI coverage (usage paths, no-daemon exit 0 without
spawning, live pair/connect/revoke loop, pending-key listing), stub-daemon
pins for the skew and unreachable branches, and e2e pins for revoke-all
semantics, percent-encoded ids, and the second-DELETE-is-404 regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): CLI always sends explicit pair scopes via shared DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES
The effective pairing default lived in two places: the CLI omitted scopes
unless --restrict was passed, and the server filled in its own literal.
handlePairAgent now always sends an explicit scopes list and both sides
reference one exported constant, DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, so the default cannot
silently drift again (pinned by a server-auth source tripwire).
Three input traps closed in the same surface:
- Bare --restrict (or --restrict swallowing the next flag) parsed as "no
restriction" and silently granted FULL access, the opposite of the user's
intent. validatePairAgentFlags rejects it pre-server, before any consent
gate, so an arg error never boots a daemon.
- A scopes list could smuggle the control scope past the explicit flag:
--restrict "read,control" minted a control-scoped session with no
--control. /pair now 400s on control in a scopes list without the control
flag, and the CLI points the user at --control.
- Option typos validated only at exchange time: createSetupKey stored any
scope string and any rateLimit, so /pair returned 200 with a poisoned
setup key whose failure surfaced to the REMOTE agent at /connect as a
misleading "Invalid request body". Shared validation now runs in both
creators and throws typed InvalidScopeError; /pair and /token 400 with the
message, naming the bad scope or negative rateLimit. Also
`opts.rateLimit || 10` became `?? 10` so the documented "0 = unlimited"
survives the /pair path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): 403 hint stops recommending --admin; invariant names both scope defaults
The scope-denied hint told restricted agents to "re-pair with --admin for
eval/cookies/storage" — but --admin is a legacy alias for --control, so
following it over-granted browser-wide destructive commands on top of the
admin scope the default already carries. The hint now matches the CLI's
sibling wording: re-pair without --restrict for page access, --control for
browser control.
Registry invariant #2 claimed "admin scope denied by default" three releases
after b73f3644 deliberately made /pair grant admin. It now names BOTH
defaults precisely (registry API functions default read+write; the /pair
ceremony grants DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES) so the header cannot lie one layer down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(pair-agent): document the full-access default, --restrict, and real revocation
The pairing docs still described the pre-b73f3644 model: read+write default,
--admin as the opt-in for JS/cookies/storage. Reality for three releases:
/pair grants read+write+admin+meta (the pairing ceremony is the trust
boundary) and --admin is a legacy alias for --control. A user following the
skill believed they granted a sandboxed session and actually granted JS
execution on their logged-in browser.
pair-agent/SKILL.md.tmpl (SKILL.md regenerated in this commit) now states
the real default, the tunnel-allowlist nuance (eval works remotely; the
js/cookies/storage commands are local-only), --restrict for sandboxed
sessions with an untrusted-content advisory (scope caps prompt-injection
blast radius), and --control for browser-wide ops. "Revoking access"
documents the now-real tunnel revoke (deletes session + pending setup keys,
verifies against the agent list) and tunnel agents, and replaces the
never-implemented `tunnel rotate` with `$B stop` — tokens are memory-only,
so a daemon restart already rotates everything.
REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: /connect example shows the real default scopes,
the scope table gains the control row, the 403 hint row matches the new
server wording, and the false claim that /sidebar-chat is on the tunnel
allowlist is gone (TUNNEL_PATHS is /connect + /command; /sidebar-chat no
longer exists in server.ts at all). ARCHITECTURE.md drops the same phantom
endpoint from the allowlist prose and endpoint table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v1.68.2.0: revoke-all, real tunnel revoke, truthful pairing docs
Version slot allocated against the live remote via bin/gstack-next-version
(clean patch bump from 1.68.1.0, no collision). CHANGELOG entry covers the
revoke-all fix, the new tunnel revoke/agents CLI, the explicit-scopes wire
contract, and the pairing-docs truth pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): adversarial-review hardening — 6 findings fixed, regression-pinned
Pre-push adversarial review (4 lenses, refute-style verification: 13 raw
findings, 7 refuted, 6 confirmed) caught these; each fix carries a pin:
1. --restrict=read (equals form) sailed past validatePairAgentFlags —
hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches — so the user asked for a
read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access: the exact failure mode
this branch claims to close. The equals form is now a hard error before
any server work.
2. handleTunnel trimmed the agent name but clientIds are stored verbatim,
so a space-padded agent was unrevocable by the documented kill switch
(trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant stayed live). Names now pass
through verbatim; the live-daemon test revokes ' padded'.
3. The sole pin for "CLI always sends explicit scopes" passed vacuously on
a simulated revert: toContain('DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES') was satisfied by a
comment. The tripwire now matches the code shape with a regex and bans
the conditional spread formatting-insensitively.
4. The rewritten 403 scope hint was unpinned — new e2e asserts it names
--restrict and --control and never --admin.
5. tunnelRevoke's verify-failure and HTTP-error branches and tunnelAgents'
unreadable-list branch had no coverage — three stub-daemon pins added
(an unreadable list must never render as "No paired agents").
6. CHANGELOG claimed "40+ new test cases"; the honest count is 35.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
421 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
421 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Behavior tests for the `tunnel revoke` / `tunnel agents` CLI subcommands.
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*
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* Three harness shapes:
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* 1. No/dead daemon — scratch BROWSE_STATE_FILE, no processes (the
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* stop-dead-daemon.test.ts pattern): tunnel must exit 0 WITHOUT booting
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* a daemon (#2254 — tokens are memory-only, a dead daemon has nothing
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* to revoke).
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* 2. Live daemon — real server subprocess with BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP=1
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* (the pair-agent-e2e.test.ts pattern): the full revoke + verify loop.
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* 3. Stub daemon — a test-local Bun.serve behind a hand-written state file
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* with an ALIVE pid (this test process). Pins the version-skew net (an
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* OLD daemon with the first-match revoke bug returns 200 while /agents
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* keeps listing the agent) and the unreachable-daemon branch. The pid
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* decides the dead-daemon vs unreachable branch, so stubs MUST carry an
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* alive pid.
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
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import { spawn } from 'child_process';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as net from 'net';
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import * as os from 'os';
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import * as path from 'path';
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const ROOT = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../..');
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const SERVER_ENTRY = path.join(ROOT, 'browse/src/server.ts');
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function runCli(args: string[], env: Record<string, string>, timeoutMs = 30_000):
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Promise<{ code: number; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
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const cliPath = path.resolve(import.meta.dir, '../src/cli.ts');
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return new Promise((resolve) => {
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const proc = spawn('bun', ['run', cliPath, ...args], { timeout: timeoutMs, env });
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let stdout = ''; let stderr = '';
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proc.stdout.on('data', (d) => stdout += d.toString());
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proc.stderr.on('data', (d) => stderr += d.toString());
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proc.on('close', (code) => resolve({ code: code ?? 1, stdout, stderr }));
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});
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}
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function baseEnv(stateFile: string): Record<string, string> {
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const env: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
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if (v !== undefined) env[k] = v;
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}
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env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE = stateFile;
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return env;
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}
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/** Grab a port that is definitely closed (bind, read, release). */
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async function closedPort(): Promise<number> {
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return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
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const srv = net.createServer();
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srv.once('error', reject);
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srv.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
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const addr = srv.address();
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if (!addr || typeof addr === 'string') { reject(new Error('bad address')); return; }
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const port = addr.port;
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srv.close(() => resolve(port));
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});
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});
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}
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function writeStateFile(stateFile: string, pid: number, port: number): void {
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fs.writeFileSync(stateFile, JSON.stringify({
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pid,
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port,
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token: 'fake-root-token',
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startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
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serverPath: '',
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mode: 'launched' as const,
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}, null, 2));
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}
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describe('tunnel subcommand parsing', () => {
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test('bare tunnel / unknown sub / empty name / extra args → usage, exit 1', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-usage-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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for (const args of [
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['tunnel'],
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['tunnel', 'rotate'],
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['tunnel', 'revoke'],
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['tunnel', 'revoke', ''],
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['tunnel', 'revoke', 'a', 'b'],
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['tunnel', 'agents', 'extra'],
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]) {
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const result = await runCli(args, baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(1);
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('usage: browse tunnel');
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}
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// Arg errors must never boot a daemon.
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 60_000);
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});
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// pair-agent scope-flag misuse shares this file's subprocess harness: like
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// tunnel, the validation must run pre-server, so "no daemon spawned" is the
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// load-bearing assertion.
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describe('pair-agent scope-flag validation (pre-server)', () => {
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test('bare --restrict → exit 1 usage error, NO daemon spawned (was: silent FULL grant)', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-bare-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(1);
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict needs a scope list');
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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test('--restrict=read (equals form) → exit 1, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
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// Regression: hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches, so the equals
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// form sailed past validatePairAgentFlags AND handlePairAgent's parse —
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// the user asked for a read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access.
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-eq-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict=read'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(1);
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict takes a space-separated value');
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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test('--restrict swallowing the next flag → exit 1, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-flag-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict', '--client', 'bob'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(1);
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('--restrict needs a scope list');
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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test('--restrict "read,control" → exit 1 pointing at --control, NO daemon spawned', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-restrict-ctl-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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const result = await runCli(['pair-agent', '--restrict', 'read,control'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(1);
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expect(result.stderr).toContain('Re-run with --control');
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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});
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describe('tunnel against no daemon (#2254 — never boot one)', () => {
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test('revoke → exit 0, "No daemon running", nothing spawned', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-dead-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'ghost'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(0);
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('No daemon running');
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// A spawned daemon would have written the state file.
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expect(fs.existsSync(stateFile)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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test('agents → exit 0; stale state (dead pid + closed port) is NOT mutated — cleanup stays stop\'s job', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-stale-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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try {
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writeStateFile(stateFile, 2147483646, await closedPort());
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const before = fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8');
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const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(result.code).toBe(0);
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expect(result.stdout).toContain('No daemon running');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8')).toBe(before);
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} finally {
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 30_000);
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});
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describe('tunnel against a live daemon (HTTP only, no browser)', () => {
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test('pair → connect → revoke: verified gone, token 401s; agents lists pending keys', async () => {
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const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-live-'));
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const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
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const port = 20000 + Math.floor(Math.random() * 20000);
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const daemon = Bun.spawn(['bun', 'run', SERVER_ENTRY], {
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cwd: ROOT,
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env: {
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...process.env,
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BROWSE_HEADLESS_SKIP: '1',
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BROWSE_PORT: String(port),
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BROWSE_STATE_FILE: stateFile,
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BROWSE_PARENT_PID: '0',
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BROWSE_IDLE_TIMEOUT: '600000',
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},
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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});
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const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
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try {
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const deadline = Date.now() + 15_000;
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let ready = false;
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while (Date.now() < deadline && !ready) {
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try {
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const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1000) });
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ready = resp.ok;
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} catch { /* not ready yet */ }
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if (!ready) await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 200));
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}
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expect(ready).toBe(true);
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const rootToken = (JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(stateFile, 'utf-8')) as { token: string }).token;
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// Pair + connect a session, plus a second pending setup key.
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const pair = async () => {
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const resp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/pair`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${rootToken}` },
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body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: 'cli-agent' }),
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});
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return (await resp.json() as { setup_key: string }).setup_key;
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};
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const key1 = await pair();
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const connectResp = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/connect`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ setup_key: key1 }),
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});
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const { token: scopedToken } = await connectResp.json() as { token: string };
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await pair(); // pending key
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// tunnel agents shows the session AND the pending key.
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const list = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(list.code).toBe(0);
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expect(list.stdout).toContain('cli-agent');
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expect(list.stdout).toContain('(pending setup key)');
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// Unknown name → truthful failure with the active list.
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const miss = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'nobody'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(miss.code).toBe(1);
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expect(miss.stderr).toContain('No paired agent named "nobody"');
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expect(miss.stderr).toContain('cli-agent');
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// The real revoke: counted, verified, and the token actually dies.
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const revoke = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'cli-agent'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(revoke.code).toBe(0);
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expect(revoke.stdout).toContain('Revoked "cli-agent" (3 tokens)');
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expect(revoke.stdout).toContain('Verified: not in the active agent list.');
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const post = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/command`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${scopedToken}` },
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body: JSON.stringify({ command: 'status', args: [] }),
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});
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expect(post.status).toBe(401);
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const empty = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(empty.code).toBe(0);
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expect(empty.stdout).toContain('No paired agents.');
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// Regression: handleTunnel used to trim() the name, but clientIds are
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// stored verbatim — a space-padded agent became unrevocable by the
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// documented kill switch (trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant lived).
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const padPair = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/pair`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Authorization: `Bearer ${rootToken}` },
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body: JSON.stringify({ clientId: ' padded' }),
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});
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expect(padPair.status).toBe(200);
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const padRevoke = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', ' padded'], baseEnv(stateFile));
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expect(padRevoke.code).toBe(0);
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expect(padRevoke.stdout).toContain('Verified: not in the active agent list.');
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} finally {
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try { daemon.kill('SIGKILL'); } catch { /* already gone */ }
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fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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}
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}, 60_000);
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});
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describe('tunnel against a lying or unreachable daemon (stub harness)', () => {
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test('old daemon 200s the DELETE but keeps listing the agent → "Revocation incomplete", exit 1', async () => {
|
|
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-skew-'));
|
|
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
|
|
// Old daemons answer {revoked} with no tokens_deleted — this also pins
|
|
// the "(count unknown)" print (never undefined/NaN).
|
|
const stub = Bun.serve({
|
|
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
|
|
port: 0,
|
|
fetch(req) {
|
|
const url = new URL(req.url);
|
|
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
|
|
return Response.json({ revoked: 'mallory' });
|
|
}
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
|
|
return Response.json({
|
|
agents: [{ clientId: 'mallory', scopes: ['read'], expiresAt: null, commandCount: 1, createdAt: '' }],
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
|
|
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
|
|
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(result.stdout).toContain('count unknown');
|
|
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revocation incomplete: "mallory" is still listed');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
stub.stop(true);
|
|
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}, 30_000);
|
|
|
|
test('DELETE succeeds but /agents errors → "could not verify", exit 1 (never a silent success)', async () => {
|
|
// Regression pin: a revoke whose verification read fails must NOT report
|
|
// clean success — the whole point of the re-read is proving the deletion.
|
|
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-noverify-'));
|
|
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
|
|
const stub = Bun.serve({
|
|
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
|
|
port: 0,
|
|
fetch(req) {
|
|
const url = new URL(req.url);
|
|
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
|
|
return Response.json({ revoked: 'mallory', tokens_deleted: 1 });
|
|
}
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
|
|
return new Response('boom', { status: 500 });
|
|
}
|
|
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
|
|
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
|
|
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revoked, but could not verify against the agent list.');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
stub.stop(true);
|
|
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}, 30_000);
|
|
|
|
test('DELETE returns 500 → "Revoke failed" with the body error, exit 1', async () => {
|
|
// Regression pin: a non-404 HTTP failure must surface the daemon's error,
|
|
// not fall through to a success print.
|
|
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-500-'));
|
|
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
|
|
const stub = Bun.serve({
|
|
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
|
|
port: 0,
|
|
fetch(req) {
|
|
const url = new URL(req.url);
|
|
if (req.method === 'DELETE' && url.pathname.startsWith('/token/')) {
|
|
return Response.json({ error: 'registry exploded' }, { status: 500 });
|
|
}
|
|
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
|
|
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'mallory'], baseEnv(stateFile));
|
|
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Revoke failed: registry exploded');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
stub.stop(true);
|
|
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}, 30_000);
|
|
|
|
test('tunnel agents with a broken /agents → "Could not read the agent list", exit 1', async () => {
|
|
// Regression pin: a 500 from /agents must not render as "No paired
|
|
// agents." — an unreadable list is not an empty list.
|
|
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-agents500-'));
|
|
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
|
|
const stub = Bun.serve({
|
|
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
|
|
port: 0,
|
|
fetch(req) {
|
|
const url = new URL(req.url);
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/agents') {
|
|
return new Response('boom', { status: 500 });
|
|
}
|
|
return Response.json({ status: 'healthy' });
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
try {
|
|
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, stub.port);
|
|
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'agents'], baseEnv(stateFile));
|
|
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Could not read the agent list');
|
|
expect(result.stdout).not.toContain('No paired agents.');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
stub.stop(true);
|
|
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}, 30_000);
|
|
|
|
test('alive pid but unreachable port → "Could not reach daemon", exit 1 (NOT "no daemon")', async () => {
|
|
const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'browse-tunnel-unreach-'));
|
|
const stateFile = path.join(tmpDir, 'browse.json');
|
|
try {
|
|
// Alive pid (this test process) is what routes to the fetch-failure
|
|
// branch; a dead pid + dead port would be the exit-0 "no daemon" path.
|
|
writeStateFile(stateFile, process.pid, await closedPort());
|
|
const result = await runCli(['tunnel', 'revoke', 'anyone'], baseEnv(stateFile));
|
|
expect(result.code).toBe(1);
|
|
expect(result.stderr).toContain('Could not reach daemon');
|
|
} finally {
|
|
fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}, 30_000);
|
|
});
|