mirror of
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* fix(browse): revokeToken deletes ALL tokens for a clientId, not the first Map hit
revokeToken deleted the first Map entry matching the clientId and returned
true. After a normal pairing, two entries share one clientId: the spent setup
key (kept by exchangeSetupKey for idempotent re-exchange) and the session
token, in that insertion order. Revoke ate the setup key, reported success,
and the live session survived: DELETE /token/<id> returned a false 200 while
/agents kept listing the agent. Worse, an unspent setup key created after the
session survived revoke, so a "revoked" agent could POST /connect and mint a
fresh session within the key's 5-minute validity window.
revokeToken now deletes every matching entry and returns the delete count
(truthy-compatible with the old boolean). The DELETE /token handler logs
"Revoked N token(s)" and returns tokens_deleted so the multi-token class
stays visible; revokeSkillToken wraps Boolean() to keep its documented
contract. Regression tests pin shapes a (spent-key shadowing), b (re-grant
hole), c (multiple pending keys), and bystander isolation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(browse): tunnel revoke/agents CLI with post-revoke verification
`$B tunnel revoke <name>` was documented in the instruction block,
pair-agent/SKILL.md, and REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md but implemented nowhere:
the CLI forwarded it to the daemon as Unknown command 'tunnel', and nothing
in the repo called DELETE /token/:clientId or GET /agents.
New pre-server short-circuit (#2254 pattern: tokens are memory-only, never
boot a daemon to revoke against it). `tunnel revoke <name>` DELETEs the
token, prints the deleted count ("(count unknown)" for old daemons that
answer {revoked} without tokens_deleted), then RE-READS GET /agents to prove
the agent is gone. The still-listed branch is the version-skew net: a new
CLI against a still-running old daemon with the first-match revoke bug exits
1 and says to re-run (each old-daemon call deletes the next match) or stop.
An alive pid with an unreachable port reports "Could not reach daemon"
(exit 1), never a false "no daemon". `tunnel agents` lists sessions plus
pending (unexchanged) setup keys, which GET /agents now exposes via
listTokens({includeSetup}) — without them the revocation view was blind to
a paired-but-never-connected agent. Setup-key tokens never leave the server.
DELETE /token/ now decodeURIComponents the clientId (400 on malformed
encoding) so CLI-encoded names round-trip.
Tests: subprocess CLI coverage (usage paths, no-daemon exit 0 without
spawning, live pair/connect/revoke loop, pending-key listing), stub-daemon
pins for the skew and unreachable branches, and e2e pins for revoke-all
semantics, percent-encoded ids, and the second-DELETE-is-404 regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): CLI always sends explicit pair scopes via shared DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES
The effective pairing default lived in two places: the CLI omitted scopes
unless --restrict was passed, and the server filled in its own literal.
handlePairAgent now always sends an explicit scopes list and both sides
reference one exported constant, DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES, so the default cannot
silently drift again (pinned by a server-auth source tripwire).
Three input traps closed in the same surface:
- Bare --restrict (or --restrict swallowing the next flag) parsed as "no
restriction" and silently granted FULL access, the opposite of the user's
intent. validatePairAgentFlags rejects it pre-server, before any consent
gate, so an arg error never boots a daemon.
- A scopes list could smuggle the control scope past the explicit flag:
--restrict "read,control" minted a control-scoped session with no
--control. /pair now 400s on control in a scopes list without the control
flag, and the CLI points the user at --control.
- Option typos validated only at exchange time: createSetupKey stored any
scope string and any rateLimit, so /pair returned 200 with a poisoned
setup key whose failure surfaced to the REMOTE agent at /connect as a
misleading "Invalid request body". Shared validation now runs in both
creators and throws typed InvalidScopeError; /pair and /token 400 with the
message, naming the bad scope or negative rateLimit. Also
`opts.rateLimit || 10` became `?? 10` so the documented "0 = unlimited"
survives the /pair path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): 403 hint stops recommending --admin; invariant names both scope defaults
The scope-denied hint told restricted agents to "re-pair with --admin for
eval/cookies/storage" — but --admin is a legacy alias for --control, so
following it over-granted browser-wide destructive commands on top of the
admin scope the default already carries. The hint now matches the CLI's
sibling wording: re-pair without --restrict for page access, --control for
browser control.
Registry invariant #2 claimed "admin scope denied by default" three releases
after b73f3644 deliberately made /pair grant admin. It now names BOTH
defaults precisely (registry API functions default read+write; the /pair
ceremony grants DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES) so the header cannot lie one layer down.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(pair-agent): document the full-access default, --restrict, and real revocation
The pairing docs still described the pre-b73f3644 model: read+write default,
--admin as the opt-in for JS/cookies/storage. Reality for three releases:
/pair grants read+write+admin+meta (the pairing ceremony is the trust
boundary) and --admin is a legacy alias for --control. A user following the
skill believed they granted a sandboxed session and actually granted JS
execution on their logged-in browser.
pair-agent/SKILL.md.tmpl (SKILL.md regenerated in this commit) now states
the real default, the tunnel-allowlist nuance (eval works remotely; the
js/cookies/storage commands are local-only), --restrict for sandboxed
sessions with an untrusted-content advisory (scope caps prompt-injection
blast radius), and --control for browser-wide ops. "Revoking access"
documents the now-real tunnel revoke (deletes session + pending setup keys,
verifies against the agent list) and tunnel agents, and replaces the
never-implemented `tunnel rotate` with `$B stop` — tokens are memory-only,
so a daemon restart already rotates everything.
REMOTE_BROWSER_ACCESS.md: /connect example shows the real default scopes,
the scope table gains the control row, the 403 hint row matches the new
server wording, and the false claim that /sidebar-chat is on the tunnel
allowlist is gone (TUNNEL_PATHS is /connect + /command; /sidebar-chat no
longer exists in server.ts at all). ARCHITECTURE.md drops the same phantom
endpoint from the allowlist prose and endpoint table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v1.68.2.0: revoke-all, real tunnel revoke, truthful pairing docs
Version slot allocated against the live remote via bin/gstack-next-version
(clean patch bump from 1.68.1.0, no collision). CHANGELOG entry covers the
revoke-all fix, the new tunnel revoke/agents CLI, the explicit-scopes wire
contract, and the pairing-docs truth pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(browse): adversarial-review hardening — 6 findings fixed, regression-pinned
Pre-push adversarial review (4 lenses, refute-style verification: 13 raw
findings, 7 refuted, 6 confirmed) caught these; each fix carries a pin:
1. --restrict=read (equals form) sailed past validatePairAgentFlags —
hasFlag/parseFlag are exact-token matches — so the user asked for a
read-only sandbox and silently got FULL access: the exact failure mode
this branch claims to close. The equals form is now a hard error before
any server work.
2. handleTunnel trimmed the agent name but clientIds are stored verbatim,
so a space-padded agent was unrevocable by the documented kill switch
(trimmed DELETE 404'd while the grant stayed live). Names now pass
through verbatim; the live-daemon test revokes ' padded'.
3. The sole pin for "CLI always sends explicit scopes" passed vacuously on
a simulated revert: toContain('DEFAULT_PAIR_SCOPES') was satisfied by a
comment. The tripwire now matches the code shape with a regex and bans
the conditional spread formatting-insensitively.
4. The rewritten 403 scope hint was unpinned — new e2e asserts it names
--restrict and --control and never --admin.
5. tunnelRevoke's verify-failure and HTTP-error branches and tunnelAgents'
unreadable-list branch had no coverage — three stub-daemon pins added
(an unreadable list must never render as "No paired agents").
6. CHANGELOG claimed "40+ new test cases"; the honest count is 35.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
89 lines
5.2 KiB
JSON
89 lines
5.2 KiB
JSON
{
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"name": "gstack",
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"version": "1.68.2",
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"description": "Garry's Stack — Claude Code skills + fast headless browser. One repo, one install, entire AI engineering workflow.",
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"license": "MIT",
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"type": "module",
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"bin": {
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"browse": "./browse/dist/browse",
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"make-pdf": "./make-pdf/dist/pdf"
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},
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"scripts": {
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"build": "bash scripts/build.sh",
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"vendor:xterm": "mkdir -p extension/lib && cp node_modules/xterm/lib/xterm.js extension/lib/xterm.js && cp node_modules/xterm/css/xterm.css extension/lib/xterm.css && cp node_modules/xterm-addon-fit/lib/xterm-addon-fit.js extension/lib/xterm-addon-fit.js",
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"dev:make-pdf": "bun run make-pdf/src/cli.ts",
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"dev:design": "bun run design/src/cli.ts",
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"build:diagram-render": "cd lib/diagram-render && bun install && bun run scripts/build.ts",
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"gen:skill-docs": "bun run scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts",
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"gen:skill-docs:user": "bun run scripts/gen-skill-docs.ts --respect-detection",
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"dev": "bun run browse/src/cli.ts",
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"server": "bun run browse/src/server.ts",
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"test": "bun run scripts/test-free-shards.ts && (bun run slop:diff 2>/dev/null || true)",
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"test:free": "bun run scripts/test-free-shards.ts",
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"test:windows": "bun run scripts/test-free-shards.ts --windows-only",
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"test:evals": "EVALS=1 bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-llm-eval.test.ts test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:evals:all": "EVALS=1 EVALS_ALL=1 bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-llm-eval.test.ts test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:e2e": "EVALS=1 bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:e2e:all": "EVALS=1 EVALS_ALL=1 bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:gate": "EVALS=1 EVALS_TIER=gate bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-llm-eval.test.ts test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:periodic": "EVALS=1 EVALS_TIER=periodic EVALS_ALL=1 bun test --retry 1 --concurrent --max-concurrency ${EVALS_CONCURRENCY:-15} test/skill-llm-eval.test.ts test/skill-e2e-*.test.ts test/skill-routing-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:gate:sharded": "bun run scripts/test-paid-shards.ts --tier gate",
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"test:periodic:sharded": "EVALS_ALL=1 bun run scripts/test-paid-shards.ts --tier periodic",
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"test:codex": "EVALS=1 bun test test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts",
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"test:codex:all": "EVALS=1 EVALS_ALL=1 bun test test/codex-e2e.test.ts test/codex-e2e-sol-scope.test.ts",
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"test:gemini": "EVALS=1 bun test test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"test:gemini:all": "EVALS=1 EVALS_ALL=1 bun test test/gemini-e2e.test.ts",
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"skill:check": "bun run scripts/skill-check.ts",
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"dev:skill": "bun run scripts/dev-skill.ts",
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"start": "bun run browse/src/server.ts",
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"eval:bg": "bin/gstack-detach --label evals --lock gstack-evals --timeout 5400 -- bun run test:evals",
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"eval:bg:all": "bin/gstack-detach --label evals-all --lock gstack-evals --timeout 7200 -- bun run test:evals:all",
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"eval:bg:gate": "bin/gstack-detach --label evals-gate --lock gstack-evals --timeout 25200 -- bun run test:gate:sharded",
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"eval:bg:periodic": "bin/gstack-detach --label evals-periodic --lock gstack-evals --timeout 32400 -- bun run test:periodic:sharded",
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"eval:list": "bun run scripts/eval-list.ts",
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"eval:compare": "bun run scripts/eval-compare.ts",
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"eval:summary": "bun run scripts/eval-summary.ts",
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"eval:watch": "bun run scripts/eval-watch.ts",
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"eval:select": "bun run scripts/eval-select.ts",
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"analytics": "bun run scripts/analytics.ts",
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"test:audit": "bun test test/audit-compliance.test.ts",
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"slop": "npx slop-scan scan . 2>/dev/null || echo 'slop-scan not available (install with: npm i -g slop-scan)'",
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"slop:diff": "bun run scripts/slop-diff.ts"
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},
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"dependencies": {
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"@huggingface/transformers": "^4.2.0",
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"@ngrok/ngrok": "^1.7.0",
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"cross-spawn": "^7.0.6",
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"diff": "^9.0.0",
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"html-to-docx": "1.8.0",
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"marked": "^18.0.9",
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"playwright": "^1.62.1",
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"socks": "^2.8.9"
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},
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"engines": {
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"bun": ">=1.0.0"
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},
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"keywords": [
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"browser",
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"automation",
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"playwright",
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"headless",
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"cli",
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"claude",
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"ai-agent",
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"devtools"
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],
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"devDependencies": {
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"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "0.2.117",
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"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.78.0",
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"xterm": "5",
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"xterm-addon-fit": "^0.8.0"
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},
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"overrides": {
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"adm-zip": "^0.6.0"
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},
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"patchedDependencies": {
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"playwright-core@1.62.1": "patches/playwright-core@1.62.1.patch"
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}
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}
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