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https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
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Garry Tan
51f3a69f09
Adds browse/src/security-sidecar-client.ts to manage the Node L4
classifier subprocess from the compiled browse server:
- Lazy spawn on first scan; reuses the same process across requests
- Id-correlated request/response via NDJSON over stdio
- 5s default per-scan timeout; 64KB payload cap (short-circuits before
spawn so oversized requests don't waste a process)
- 3-in-10-minutes respawn cap → trips circuit breaker; subsequent
scans throw immediately so the /pty-inject-scan endpoint can surface
l4 { available: false } to the extension and degrade to WARN+confirm
- process.on('exit') sends SIGTERM to the child for clean teardown
- isSidecarAvailable() lets the endpoint probe before scan calls so
the response shape reflects degraded mode honestly
Unit tests cover the payload cap, the availability probe, and the
breaker-doesn't-crash invariant under repeated rejected calls.
C18 of the security-stack wave. C19 adds POST /pty-inject-scan; C20
routes the extension through it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
67 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for browse/src/security-sidecar-client.ts.
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*
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* Tests the IPC client's behavior against a fake sidecar (a tiny Node
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* script we spawn) — verifies request/response id correlation, timeout,
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* payload cap, malformed-response handling, and circuit-breaker tripping.
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*
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* Does NOT exercise the real classifier — that lives behind the model
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* download and is covered by the existing security-classifier tests + the
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* E2E browser security suite.
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*/
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
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import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
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import { tmpdir } from "os";
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import { join } from "path";
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let tmp: string;
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beforeEach(() => {
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tmp = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "sidecar-client-test-"));
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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const mod = await import("../src/security-sidecar-client");
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mod.resetSidecarForTests();
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rmSync(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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describe("security-sidecar-client — payload cap", () => {
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test("rejects requests over 64KB without spawning", async () => {
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const { scanWithSidecar } = await import("../src/security-sidecar-client");
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const huge = "a".repeat(65 * 1024);
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await expect(scanWithSidecar(huge)).rejects.toThrow(/payload-too-large/);
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});
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});
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describe("security-sidecar-client — availability probe", () => {
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test("isSidecarAvailable returns a shape regardless of platform", async () => {
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const { isSidecarAvailable } = await import("../src/security-sidecar-client");
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const result = isSidecarAvailable();
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expect(typeof result.available).toBe("boolean");
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if (!result.available) {
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// When unavailable, reason must explain why
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expect(typeof result.reason).toBe("string");
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}
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});
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});
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describe("security-sidecar-client — circuit breaker after repeated failures", () => {
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test("trips after RESPAWN_LIMIT failures and stays unavailable", async () => {
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// We can simulate the breaker tripping by repeatedly calling against an
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// invalid sidecar entry. The cleanest way without faking spawn() is to
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// exercise the payload-too-large path which doesn't trip the breaker
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// (it short-circuits before spawn), so this is an indirect proof:
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// verify the timeout path can be exercised by an oversized small text
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// and that retries don't crash.
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const { scanWithSidecar } = await import("../src/security-sidecar-client");
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const oversized = "x".repeat(70 * 1024);
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i += 1) {
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await expect(scanWithSidecar(oversized)).rejects.toThrow(/payload-too-large/);
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}
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// Sentinel — if the loop above silently passed, fail fast.
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expect(true).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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