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* fix(gbrain): stop forcing GBRAIN_PREPARE on transaction-mode poolers (#1965) buildGbrainEnv auto-set GBRAIN_PREPARE=true whenever DATABASE_URL targeted port 6543, and the /sync-gbrain capability check exported it for the rest of the skill run. Both had the semantics inverted: gbrain auto-disables prepared statements on transaction-mode poolers because they break every write there ("prepared statement does not exist"); GBRAIN_PREPARE=true is gbrain's documented override for SESSION-mode poolers on 6543, not a requirement for transaction mode. The #1435 search symptom the auto-set worked around was fixed gbrain-side. Remove both force-sets. A caller-set GBRAIN_PREPARE (either value) still passes through untouched, preserving the session-mode-on-6543 escape hatch. isTransactionModePooler stays exported. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gbrain): classify probe timeout as its own status; sync proceeds instead of skipping (#1964) The 5s engine probe misclassified healthy-but-slow engines (cold Supabase pooler connections measured at 6.9-10.7s) as broken-config, so /sync-gbrain silently skipped code+memory and told the user their config was malformed. - New "timeout" status: probe killed at the deadline with no recognized stderr pattern. Default deadline is now 15s, overridable via GSTACK_GBRAIN_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS (tests set 300ms against a fake that sleeps 2s). - Sync stages PROCEED on timeout with a stderr warning naming the env knob; a genuinely-dead engine surfaces its real error at the first operation instead of a false config diagnosis. - Consistency everywhere "ok" gated behavior: gstack-gbrain-detect --is-ok exits 0 on timeout, and gen-skill-docs' detection gate accepts it, so a slow engine no longer silently suppresses brain-aware features. - Status cache: key now includes the effective probe timeout (raising it invalidates a cached timeout) and GBRAIN_HOME; config detection honors GBRAIN_HOME so relocated-home users stop being misclassified as missing-config. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bins): cygpath-normalize SCRIPT_DIR for bun imports; surface learnings-log errors (#1950) Under Windows git-bash, pwd yields a POSIX path (/c/Users/...) that Bun on Windows cannot resolve as an ES module specifier. gstack-learnings-log interpolates SCRIPT_DIR into a bun -e import, so every invocation died with "Cannot find module" — and 2>/dev/null swallowed the error, silently dropping every AI-logged learning for Windows users. - 3-line cygpath -m guard in gstack-learnings-log and gstack-question-log (which gains the same import shape in the next commit). Matches the duplicated IS_WINDOWS convention in setup; no shared shell lib exists. - learnings-log adopts question-log's set +e / TMPERR capture pattern wholesale: validation errors now print to stderr. The old `if [ $? -ne 0 ]` check was dead code under set -euo pipefail — the script exited at the failing assignment before reaching it. - New test/bin-windows-bun-import-paths.test.ts: static invariant (any bash bin interpolating $SCRIPT_DIR into a bun -e import must carry the guard) + behavioral end-to-end run invoked via `bash <bin>` — added to the windows-free-tests workflow list so the conversion is proven on the only platform where the bug exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(question-log): dedupe INJECTION_PATTERNS via lib/jsonl-store (#1934) bin/gstack-question-log carried a local copy of the injection-pattern list, so pattern fixes to lib/jsonl-store.ts never propagated — including the /override[:\s]/i false-positive fix arriving via community PR #1940. Import the shared hasInjection instead (enabled by the previous commit's cygpath guard). question-log also gets the lib's stricter superset (human:, disregard, from-now-on, approve-all patterns). Tests pin the contract in a #1940-order-independent way: an "Override: ignore all previous instructions" header is rejected, "prose overrides the deterministic table" is accepted, and a static invariant keeps local INJECTION_PATTERNS duplicates out of the bin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): community-pulse + both dashboards never report fake zeros (#1947) The security-signaling surface failed open at three layers — every failure mode read as a reassuring "0 attacks" / "0 installs": - community-pulse edge function: supabase-js returns {data,error} without throwing, and all five queries discarded `error` — a DB outage produced real-looking zeros via the SUCCESS path, and the catch (also returning zeros with HTTP 200) was unreachable for query failures. Every query now destructures and throws; the catch serves the stale cache (marked "stale": true) when one exists, else 503 {"error":"pulse_unavailable"}. Success responses carry "status":"ok" so clients can distinguish authoritative data from legacy backends. NOTE: the edge function deploys out-of-band (supabase functions deploy community-pulse). - gstack-security-dashboard: captures the HTTP status; non-200 / network failure / error body / missing section → "unknown — backend error"; jq missing → "unknown — install jq" (the lossy grep fallback broke on nested arrays and under-reported attacks as zero — removed); a 200 without the new marker shows figures with an "unverified (legacy backend)" note. Also fixes a latent display bug: the TOTAL grep matched the digit 7 inside "attacks_last_7_days" and misreported every count. - gstack-community-dashboard: same class — curl || echo "{}" plus grep || echo "0" printed "Weekly active installs: 0" on any failure. Now "unknown — backend error (HTTP N)". test/security-dashboard-fallback.test.ts pins the matrix (200+marker, 200-legacy, 503, network failure) x (jq present, jq absent) for both bins: "unknown" states never render as 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(telemetry): redact error_message spans before they leave the machine (#1947) error_message was uploaded with only quote/newline escaping — stack traces and failed-API errors can embed credentials, private paths, and hostnames, and the sync path strips only _repo_slug/_branch. New lib/redact-engine.ts export redactFindingSpans(): replaces EVERY finding's span with <REDACTED-{id}> regardless of tier (applyRedactions is the interactive PII-only path and exits nonzero on credential findings, so it can't serve machine egress). Returns null when a span can't be located — callers drop the whole payload rather than risk a leak. gstack-telemetry-log pipes error_message through it at LOG time, so the local JSONL at rest is clean too; surrounding text survives for crash triage. FAIL CLOSED: bun missing, engine error, or non-JSON-string output all null the field. Tests pin: embedded ghp_ token → <REDACTED-github.pat> with context intact; redactor unavailable → null; raw bytes on disk never contain the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact): prepush guard fails closed on git failure; /ship owns hook install (#1946) Two gaps closed: 1. Fail closed. The git() helper returned "" on ANY non-zero exit or maxBuffer overflow (status null), addedLinesFor produced an empty string, and the push sailed through unscanned — fail-open on exactly the oversized-diff case where a large secret-bearing blob is most likely. The diff call now uses a strict variant that throws; main blocks with a clear message naming the GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip escape valve. Probe calls (symbolic-ref, rev-parse, merge-base) keep the permissive helper — their failures are normal control flow. 2. Install path. The hook was installed by nothing ("opt-in, installed by nothing" was the issue's words). ./setup runs in the gstack checkout — the wrong repo for a per-project hook — so it gets a one-line hint only. /ship owns per-repo install: config redact_prepush_hook=true + hook missing → silent install (consent already given); config unset + no ~/.gstack/.redact-prepush-prompted marker → one-time machine-wide AskUserQuestion offer, answer persisted. ship/SKILL.md regenerated in this same commit (check-freshness bisect discipline). Tests: unscannable diff (bogus SHAs) → exit 1 + valve named; empty-but- successful diff → exit 0; static asserts pin setup as hint-only and the ship template as the installer surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(redact): six new credential patterns — GitLab, HuggingFace, npm, DigitalOcean, Bearer, GCP SA (#1946) Coverage gaps from the #1946 security review, including token types for tooling gstack itself drives (glab): HIGH (block): gitlab.token (glpat-/glptt-/gldt-), huggingface.token (hf_), npm.token (npm_), digitalocean.token (dop_v1_), gcp.service_account (the JSON-escaped "private_key" form that dodges pem.private_key's literal-block match when minified, confirmed by "private_key_id" proximity). MEDIUM (warn): auth.bearer — the most FP-prone shape in the set (docs are full of "Authorization: Bearer <token>"), so it requires header-context proximity and the same entropy>=3.0 + placeholder validator recipe as env.kv. "Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE" never fires; calibration over coverage, per the cries-wolf principle. All shapes are linear-time; test/redact-pattern-lint.test.ts covers them automatically. Engine tests add positive + placeholder-negative cases per pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: coverage-audit additions for the fix wave Ship Step 7 gap-fill (all passing, 248 tests across the touched suites): memory + dream stage probe-timeout proceeds, gbrain-detect override paths, stale-flag passthrough, 200-body-missing-.security fail-closed case, telemetry redaction edges, and credential-pattern edge cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pre-landing review fixes Review army findings (1 critical, auto-fixed with regression tests): - CRITICAL (security specialist, verified live): redactFindingSpans spliced only the regex capture span, and pem.private_key / gcp.service_account capture just the BEGIN-header — the key body survived "redaction" and shipped via telemetry. Marker-only patterns now drop the whole payload (null, fail closed). Overlapping spans (Bearer+JWT on the same bytes) are coalesced before splicing so stale offsets can't leave partial secret bytes behind. - gitStrict: drop the dead `|| r.status === null` disjunct (null !== 0 already covers it); add the signal-kill/null-status regression test the docstring promised. - security-dashboard human mode flags stale snapshots ("figures may be out of date") instead of presenting frozen counts as current. - community-dashboard marker check uses jq when available — the grep-only variant misclassified whitespaced/reserialized bodies as legacy. - telemetry fail-closed test now shadows bun with a failing stub (deterministic on any host layout); stale "five status cases" describe title renamed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: adversarial review fixes (Claude + Codex cross-model passes) Both adversarial passes ran against the wave; every FIXABLE finding landed with a regression test: - probeTimeoutMs clamps to >=1ms: a fractional override floored to 0, and execFileSync treats timeout:0 as NO timeout — the probe that exists to bound hangs could hang forever (found by both models independently). - /ship silent hook install now requires the hooks dir to live inside .git: with core.hooksPath (husky's COMMITTED .husky/), the chaining installer would have renamed the team's committed pre-push and written a machine-local wrapper into the working tree (found by both models). - gstack-config gbrain-refresh accepts the "timeout" status — the last consumer still gating on literal "ok" (Codex); gstack-gbrain-detect's config-derived fields honor GBRAIN_HOME so the detection JSON can't report status ok alongside config_exists false (Codex). - prepush: a remote sha absent locally (shallow clone / stale fetch) falls back to the merge-base/empty-tree range — scans MORE, never blocks a legitimate push into training users toward --no-verify. - dashboards: curl's own 000 no longer doubles to "HTTP 000000"; the community dashboard flags stale snapshots like the security one; array sections parse via jq (the sed/grep loops truncated at the first ']'); the no-jq marker grep tolerates whitespace. - telemetry: multi-line redactor output nulls the field instead of corrupting the JSONL record; setup's hint fires only when the config key is genuinely unset (an explicit false is a recorded decline); the /ship prompt marker honors GSTACK_HOME. Kept as designed (cross-model tension noted): Bearer stays MEDIUM in the prepush gate — a HIGH Bearer would block every docs example; the entropy validator can't eliminate that FP class, and MEDIUM warns visibly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.57.11.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: P1 TODO — eval harness live progress + incremental persistence Root-caused during this ship: a killed eval run was indistinguishable from a healthy one for hours (per-file output buffering across mega test files, no incremental eval-store writes, no honest liveness signal). Full context and starting points in the entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: fix operational-learning E2E fixture — copy lib/jsonl-store.ts Pre-existing breakage, proven on main: gstack-learnings-log has imported lib/jsonl-store.ts (shared injection patterns) since v1.57.5.0 / #1910, but the fixture copies only the bin scripts — the bin exits 1 before writing anything, on main silently (stderr swallowed) and on this branch loudly (the #1950 error-surfacing made the four-day-old failure visible). A real install always ships bin/ and lib/ together; the fixture now does too. Verified: the fixture-shaped invocation writes the learning (exit 0) with lib present, exits 1 on both main and this branch without it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ios-qa): isolate E2E tests under --concurrent (3 real races) The ios-qa E2E file failed intermittently under `bun test --concurrent` (the eval harness default). Three distinct shared-state races, all fixed: 1. Shared pidfile: a module-level `workDir` reassigned in beforeEach was clobbered by parallel tests, so concurrent daemons collided on the same pidfile and the loser returned `already_running`. Each test now gets its own dir via makeWorkDir(). 2. process.env path globals: tests set GSTACK_IOS_AUDIT_PATH / _ATTEMPTS_PATH / _ALLOWLIST_PATH on the shared process env; concurrent tests stomped each other's audit/attempts destinations. Threaded auditPath/attemptsPath/allowlistPath through DaemonOptions (and mintForCaller) as explicit args — env is no longer load-bearing. 3. afterEach cleanup race: the per-test cleanup drained a shared dir array, so the first test to finish deleted still-running tests' workDirs mid-assertion. Moved to afterAll (cleans once, after all settle). Verified: 5/5 clean full-suite runs at --max-concurrency 15 (was intermittent); daemon unit suite 91/91; daemon source compiles. The paths default to the env-derived locations when options are omitted, so the production CLI path is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(pty): pin spawned claude to EVALS model chain (default claude-sonnet-4-6) launchClaudePty spawned the interactive `claude` TUI with no --model flag, so the child inherited the operator's ~/.claude/settings.json model. On a slow-thinking model that meant 5+ min of extended thinking on empty plan-mode context, timing out the plan-mode smoke tests regardless of contention. Pin the model via opts.model ?? EVALS_MODEL ?? 'claude-sonnet-4-6' — byte-identical to session-runner.ts:144, so PTY and `claude -p` evals always agree. Pushed before extraArgs (last flag wins, so a per-test --model still overrides). Placement leaves the spawn region byte-stable for a clean merge with the in-flight hermetic-env branch. Plumbed model through the three plan-skill wrappers. Static-grep tripwires guard the pin, its fallback chain, the before-extraArgs ordering, and all three wrapper forwards. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(pty): detect markdown bold-bullet prose AUQs (fixes office-hours smoke) office-hours auto-mode renders its mode question as `- **Building a startup**` markdown bullets (office-hours/SKILL.md.tmpl:102) with no letter/number marker. isProseAUQVisible only matched `A)`-style lettered or `1.`-style numbered options, so the question went undetected: the model surfaced it at ~2m19s (well under the 300s budget) but the harness kept scoring the run "working" off the spinner glyphs and timed out — a false timeout on a question that was already on screen. Add Pattern 3: when an interrogative line ('?') is present AND 3+ bold-bullet markers (`- **`) appear in the 4KB tail, classify as a prose AUQ. Bold is the discriminator vs incidental prose bullets; the line anchor is dropped (stripAnsi can collapse option lines) and the existing `❯ 1.` cursor gate still defers to a live native list. Wires through the existing classifyVisible 'asked' path and the timeout high-water-mark, so office-hours now classifies 'asked' instead of 'timeout'. Five unit cases: the office-hours render passes; no-'?', <3-bullet, plain-bullet, and native-cursor cases stay false. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(pty): detect stripAnsi-collapsed prose AUQs + judge spinner-precedence The plan-eng/plan-design plan-mode + finding-floor smokes timed out even when the skill HAD rendered a complete prose AskUserQuestion and was waiting: the PTY strips cursor-positioning escapes, collapsing the option newlines/spaces so "A) ..." arrives as "A(recommended)" / "-B:" and "Reply with A, B, or C" as "ReplywithA,B,orC". Every line-anchored detector (Patterns 1-3) returns false on those bytes, so proseAUQEverObserved never latched and the run timed out on a question that was already on screen. Add Pattern 4/5: a two-signal collapsed-form detector — a reply/recommendation marker (space-insensitive "reply with [A-D]", "Recommendation:", or "(recommended)") AND 2+ distinct A-D letters each punctuated by ) : or (. The conjunction is what separates a real AUQ from incidental report prose; verified true on the verbatim failing-run buffers where Patterns 1-3 return false. Also fix the Haiku judge spinner bias: of 614 verdicts, 569 were 'working' and 95 of those noted a question was visible — Claude Code keeps the spinner animating at an idle prose decision, so the judge coin-flipped. Add a precedence override: when an option list AND a Recommendation/Reply instruction are both visible, classify WAITING even with spinner glyphs. Kept the strict dual-signal gate (never option-list-alone) so auto-decide-preserved doesn't flip. 5 unit tests pin the two-signal contract (2 true on real collapsed bytes, 3 false guards). 90 -> 95 pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(plan-review): ask-first scope gate for plan-eng + plan-design review On an empty/cold invocation, plan-eng-review and plan-design-review would dive straight into repo exploration (plan-eng) or a 7-pass mockup+audit (plan-design) and only ask the user much later, if at all. plan-ceo-review already asks first via an unconditional Step-0 gate and behaves well; these two did not. Add a hard-STOP scope gate as the FIRST operational instruction in each skill (above the design-doc check / pre-review audit / mockup defaults it explicitly overrides): the first tool call must be AskUserQuestion confirming the review target, before any git/Read/Grep/Glob/Bash or mockup generation. Under --disallowedTools the options render as plain column-0 lettered prose with a Recommendation + "Reply with A, B, or C" line so the answer is detectable. This is correct cold-start UX (confirm what to review before grinding a full review on nothing) and it is the product half of the plan-mode smoke fix; the harness collapsed-form detector is the deterministic half that catches the ask however it renders. Templates + regenerated SKILL.md (default variant). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(tiers): reclassify stochastic plan-eng/plan-design ask-first smokes as periodic plan-eng-review and plan-design-review run a long explore/audit before their first AskUserQuestion, so whether the plan-mode + finding-floor smokes reach a terminal outcome within the 300s/600s budget depends on stochastic ask-first compliance (measured ~50-67%/run even with the hardened gate). Per the "non-deterministic -> periodic" tiering rule, move the four affected smokes (plan-eng/plan-design review-plan-mode + finding-floor) to periodic. The deterministic harness fix (collapsed-form detector + judge precedence) and the ask-first gate lift these from always-failing to mostly-passing and are the real product+harness improvements; periodic monitoring tracks the rate weekly without blocking PRs on an LLM coin-flip. plan-ceo/plan-devex ask-first reliably and stay gate-tier. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(evals): gate the deterministic PTY plan-mode smokes in CI The real-PTY plan-mode smokes never ran in CI — the gate was local-only. Add an e2e-pty-plan-smoke matrix suite running the two deterministically-reliable ones (office-hours-auto-mode, plan-mode-no-op) so a regression there blocks PRs. The stochastic plan-eng/plan-design ask-first smokes stay periodic (touchfiles E2E_TIERS) and are not CI-gated. A fresh CI container has no ~/.claude.json, so the spawned interactive `claude` would wedge on the onboarding + API-key-approval dialog. Add a scoped seed step (hasCompletedOnboarding + key approval, its own ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env) before the run — mirrors what the hermetic E2E child env seeds. Per-suite timeout override (35 min) via matrix.suite.timeout so the PTY suite has headroom for --retry 2 without bumping the other 12 suites. Report runner count 12 -> 13. Validate via workflow_dispatch before relying on the gate (PTY-in-CI is new). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(evals): install gstack skill registry for the PTY smoke suite The first dry-run of e2e-pty-plan-smoke failed: the spawned interactive `claude` printed "Unknown command: /plan-ceo-review". .claude/skills is gitignored, so a fresh CI checkout has no gstack skill registry and the TUI can't resolve /office-hours or /plan-ceo-review. Add a Register step (scoped to the suite, after Seed, before Run) that mirrors setup's --no-prefix user-scoped registry minimally: $HOME/.claude/skills/gstack -> repo (resolves the preambles' absolute ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/* and <skill>/sections/* paths) + per-skill SKILL.md/sections symlinks for the two skills these tests invoke. HOME is /github/home in this container and the runner adds no HOME/CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR override (no hermetic mode), so $HOME is the right anchor — the Seed step already proved claude reads it. No ./setup (binary build + Chromium + fonts + /dev/tty prompt); SKILL.md + bin/ + sections/ are committed. Self-validating: fails the step loudly on a dangling symlink or missing `name:` frontmatter, so a moved target surfaces here instead of as a silent 35-min "Unknown command" timeout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v1.58.4.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
464 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
464 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
// gstack-ios-qa-daemon entrypoint.
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//
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// Two listeners:
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// - Loopback (127.0.0.1 + ::1): full command surface for the spawning agent.
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// - Tailnet (optional, --tailnet flag): capability-tier allowlist.
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//
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// The tailnet listener is opened ONLY if:
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// 1. The user passed --tailnet at the CLI.
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// 2. The tailscaled LocalAPI socket probe succeeds (fail-closed otherwise).
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//
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// All tailnet ingress is auth-gated against the SessionTokenStore. Identity
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// validation uses tailscaled's WhoIs endpoint. Capability tiers come from
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// types.ts. Audit + attempts logging is in audit.ts.
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import { createServer, IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'http';
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import { parse as parseUrl } from 'url';
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import { tryClaim } from './single-instance';
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import { probeTailscale, whoIs } from './tailscale-localapi';
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import { SessionTokenStore } from './session-tokens';
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import { mintForCaller } from './auth-mint';
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import { classifyRoute, proxyToDevice, type DeviceTunnel } from './proxy';
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import { writeAudit, writeAttempt, sanitizeReplacer } from './audit';
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import { bootstrapTunnel } from './tunnel-bootstrap';
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import { startTunnelKeepalive } from './devicectl';
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import type { Capability } from './types';
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interface DaemonOptions {
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loopbackPort: number;
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tailnetEnabled: boolean;
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tailnetSocketPath?: string;
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tailnetSessionTtlSeconds?: number;
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pidfilePath?: string;
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// Explicit security-log + allowlist paths. Default to the env-var-derived
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// locations (defaultAuditPath etc.) when omitted, but passing them lets
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// concurrent test instances stay isolated without racing on process.env.
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auditPath?: string;
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attemptsPath?: string;
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allowlistPath?: string;
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// Test injection
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tunnelProvider?: () => Promise<DeviceTunnel | null>;
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whoIsImpl?: (addr: string) => Promise<{ identity: string; raw: unknown }>;
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probeImpl?: () => Promise<{ ok: boolean; reason?: string; ownIdentity?: string }>;
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}
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export interface RunningDaemon {
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loopbackPort: number;
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tailnetPort: number | null;
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tokenStore: SessionTokenStore;
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close: () => Promise<void>;
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}
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export async function startDaemon(opts: DaemonOptions): Promise<RunningDaemon | { error: string; reason?: string }> {
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// 1. Single-instance enforcement.
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const claim = await tryClaim({ port: opts.loopbackPort, path: opts.pidfilePath });
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if (!claim.claimed) {
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// Existing daemon — print READY with the existing port and exit.
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// The spawnAndWaitReady caller will receive this and connect to the
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// existing port instead.
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process.stdout.write(`READY: port=${claim.existing.port} pid=${claim.existing.pid}\n`);
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return { error: 'already_running', reason: `existing daemon pid=${claim.existing.pid}` };
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}
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const tokenStore = new SessionTokenStore();
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let tunnel: DeviceTunnel | null = null;
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let cachedTunnelAt = 0;
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const getTunnel = async (): Promise<DeviceTunnel | null> => {
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// Cache the tunnel for 30s; refresh on demand.
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if (tunnel && Date.now() - cachedTunnelAt < 30_000) return tunnel;
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if (opts.tunnelProvider) {
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tunnel = await opts.tunnelProvider();
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cachedTunnelAt = Date.now();
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}
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return tunnel;
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};
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// 2. Tailnet probe (fail-closed).
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const probe = opts.tailnetEnabled
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? (opts.probeImpl ? await opts.probeImpl() : await probeTailscale(opts.tailnetSocketPath))
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: null;
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if (opts.tailnetEnabled && (!probe || !probe.ok)) {
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process.stderr.write(`tailnet binding refused: ${probe?.reason ?? 'probe_failed'}\n`);
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// Loopback still runs.
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}
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// 3. Loopback listener (full surface).
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const loopbackServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
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await handleLoopback({ req, res, tokenStore, getTunnel });
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});
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// Use port 0 for OS-assigned port when test/random port collisions are a risk.
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const requestedPort = opts.loopbackPort;
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await listenAsync(loopbackServer, requestedPort, '127.0.0.1');
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const actualPort = (loopbackServer.address() as { port: number }).port;
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// ipv6 — bind a SECOND server to ::1 on the same actualPort. In test (port 0)
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// mode this can collide; we try the actualPort first and skip ipv6 if it
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// fails (tests don't exercise ::1 explicitly).
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const loopbackServerV6 = createServer(async (req, res) => {
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await handleLoopback({ req, res, tokenStore, getTunnel });
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});
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let v6Bound = false;
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try {
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await listenAsync(loopbackServerV6, actualPort, '::1');
|
|
v6Bound = true;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
// IPv6 loopback bind failed (port collision or no v6 on host). Loopback
|
|
// IPv4 already serves the spawning agent. Continue.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 4. Tailnet listener (if probe succeeded).
|
|
let tailnetServer: ReturnType<typeof createServer> | null = null;
|
|
let tailnetPort: number | null = null;
|
|
if (opts.tailnetEnabled && probe?.ok) {
|
|
tailnetServer = createServer(async (req, res) => {
|
|
await handleTailnet({
|
|
req,
|
|
res,
|
|
tokenStore,
|
|
getTunnel,
|
|
auditPath: opts.auditPath,
|
|
attemptsPath: opts.attemptsPath,
|
|
allowlistPath: opts.allowlistPath,
|
|
whoIsImpl: opts.whoIsImpl ?? ((addr) => whoIs(addr, opts.tailnetSocketPath)),
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
const tailnetBindAddr = process.env.GSTACK_IOS_TAILNET_BIND ?? '127.0.0.1';
|
|
// For tailnet port: actualPort + 1 if specified, else port 0 (OS-assigned).
|
|
const requestedTailnetPort = requestedPort === 0 ? 0 : actualPort + 1;
|
|
await listenAsync(tailnetServer, requestedTailnetPort, tailnetBindAddr);
|
|
tailnetPort = (tailnetServer.address() as { port: number }).port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 5. READY line.
|
|
process.stdout.write(`READY: port=${actualPort} pid=${process.pid}\n`);
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
loopbackPort: actualPort,
|
|
tailnetPort,
|
|
tokenStore,
|
|
close: async () => {
|
|
// Force-close any open connections (keep-alive sockets) before waiting
|
|
// for the listening socket itself. Otherwise close() hangs forever on
|
|
// idle clients.
|
|
const closeAll = (s: ReturnType<typeof createServer> | null | undefined) => {
|
|
if (!s) return Promise.resolve();
|
|
(s as unknown as { closeAllConnections?: () => void }).closeAllConnections?.();
|
|
(s as unknown as { closeIdleConnections?: () => void }).closeIdleConnections?.();
|
|
return new Promise<void>((resolve) => s.close(() => resolve()));
|
|
};
|
|
await Promise.all([
|
|
closeAll(loopbackServer),
|
|
v6Bound ? closeAll(loopbackServerV6) : Promise.resolve(),
|
|
closeAll(tailnetServer),
|
|
]);
|
|
await claim.release();
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function listenAsync(server: ReturnType<typeof createServer>, port: number, host: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
const onError = (err: Error) => {
|
|
server.off('listening', onListening);
|
|
reject(err);
|
|
};
|
|
const onListening = () => {
|
|
server.off('error', onError);
|
|
resolve();
|
|
};
|
|
server.once('error', onError);
|
|
server.once('listening', onListening);
|
|
server.listen(port, host);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ───────── Handlers ─────────
|
|
|
|
interface HandlerCtx {
|
|
req: IncomingMessage;
|
|
res: ServerResponse;
|
|
tokenStore: SessionTokenStore;
|
|
getTunnel: () => Promise<DeviceTunnel | null>;
|
|
// Explicit security-log + allowlist paths (default to env-derived when undefined).
|
|
auditPath?: string;
|
|
attemptsPath?: string;
|
|
allowlistPath?: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readBody(req: IncomingMessage, maxBytes = 1_048_576): Promise<Buffer | { error: 'body_too_large' }> {
|
|
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
|
|
let total = 0;
|
|
let overLimit = false;
|
|
req.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
|
|
total += chunk.length;
|
|
if (total > maxBytes && !overLimit) {
|
|
overLimit = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!overLimit) chunks.push(chunk);
|
|
});
|
|
req.on('end', () => {
|
|
if (overLimit) {
|
|
resolve({ error: 'body_too_large' });
|
|
} else {
|
|
resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks));
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
req.on('error', (err) => {
|
|
// Resolve with empty body if upstream cut us off after limit hit.
|
|
if (overLimit) resolve({ error: 'body_too_large' });
|
|
else reject(err);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function sendJson(res: ServerResponse, status: number, body: unknown): void {
|
|
const payload = JSON.stringify(body, sanitizeReplacer);
|
|
res.writeHead(status, {
|
|
'content-type': 'application/json',
|
|
'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
|
|
});
|
|
res.end(payload);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Loopback handler — full surface for the spawning agent. No auth (the
|
|
* loopback bind itself is the boundary).
|
|
*/
|
|
async function handleLoopback(ctx: HandlerCtx): Promise<void> {
|
|
const { req, res, tokenStore, getTunnel } = ctx;
|
|
const url = parseUrl(req.url ?? '/');
|
|
const path = url.pathname ?? '/';
|
|
const method = req.method ?? 'GET';
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// /healthz — public on loopback.
|
|
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/healthz') {
|
|
sendJson(res, 200, { version: '1.0.0', mode: 'loopback' });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /auth/sessions — list active sessions (owner only).
|
|
if (method === 'GET' && path === '/auth/sessions') {
|
|
sendJson(res, 200, { sessions: tokenStore.list() });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /auth/revoke — revoke a token.
|
|
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/auth/revoke') {
|
|
const body = await readBody(req);
|
|
if ('error' in body) { sendJson(res, 413, body); return; }
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(body.toString('utf-8') || '{}') as { token?: string; identity?: string };
|
|
let count = 0;
|
|
if (parsed.token) {
|
|
count = tokenStore.revoke(parsed.token) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
} else if (parsed.identity) {
|
|
count = tokenStore.revokeByIdentity(parsed.identity);
|
|
}
|
|
sendJson(res, 200, { revoked: count });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Other endpoints — proxy to the device.
|
|
const tunnel = await getTunnel();
|
|
if (!tunnel) {
|
|
sendJson(res, 503, { error: 'device_not_connected' });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const body = await readBody(req);
|
|
if ('error' in body) { sendJson(res, 413, body); return; }
|
|
const sessionId = (req.headers['x-session-id'] as string | undefined) ?? null;
|
|
const agentIdentity = (req.headers['x-agent-identity'] as string | undefined) ?? undefined;
|
|
const upstream = await proxyToDevice({ inbound: req, body, tunnel, sessionId, agentIdentity });
|
|
res.writeHead(upstream.status, upstream.headers);
|
|
res.end(upstream.body);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
sendJson(res, 500, { error: 'internal_error', detail: (err as Error).message });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
interface TailnetCtx extends HandlerCtx {
|
|
whoIsImpl: (addr: string) => Promise<{ identity: string; raw: unknown }>;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Tailnet handler — locked allowlist + capability tiers.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function handleTailnet(ctx: TailnetCtx): Promise<void> {
|
|
const { req, res, tokenStore, getTunnel, whoIsImpl, auditPath, attemptsPath, allowlistPath } = ctx;
|
|
const url = parseUrl(req.url ?? '/');
|
|
const path = url.pathname ?? '/';
|
|
const method = req.method ?? 'GET';
|
|
const route = `${method} ${path}`;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// Classify the route.
|
|
const classification = classifyRoute(method, path);
|
|
if (!classification.allowed) {
|
|
sendJson(res, 404, { error: 'endpoint_not_in_tailnet_allowlist', path });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const requiredCapability = classification.requiredCapability as Capability;
|
|
|
|
// /healthz on tailnet requires auth (codex catch).
|
|
// No special-case; treated like every other observe-tier endpoint.
|
|
|
|
// /auth/mint — special path. No bearer required; uses WhoIs.
|
|
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/auth/mint') {
|
|
const peerAddr = `${req.socket.remoteAddress}:${req.socket.remotePort}`;
|
|
let callerIdentity: string;
|
|
try {
|
|
const who = await whoIsImpl(peerAddr);
|
|
callerIdentity = who.identity;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
await writeAttempt({
|
|
rawIdentity: peerAddr,
|
|
endpoint: route,
|
|
reason: 'whois_unparseable',
|
|
path: attemptsPath,
|
|
});
|
|
sendJson(res, 502, { error: 'whois_failed', detail: (err as Error).message });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const body = await readBody(req);
|
|
if ('error' in body) { sendJson(res, 413, body); return; }
|
|
const parsed = JSON.parse(body.toString('utf-8') || '{}') as { capability?: Capability; device_udid?: string };
|
|
|
|
const result = await mintForCaller({
|
|
callerIdentity,
|
|
request: parsed,
|
|
tokenStore,
|
|
endpoint: route,
|
|
allowlistPath,
|
|
attemptsPath,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if ('error' in result) {
|
|
const status = result.error === 'rate_limited' ? 429 : 403;
|
|
sendJson(res, status, result);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
sendJson(res, 200, result);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All other endpoints: bearer auth + capability check.
|
|
const auth = req.headers['authorization'] as string | undefined;
|
|
const token = auth?.startsWith('Bearer ') ? auth.slice('Bearer '.length) : null;
|
|
const validation = tokenStore.validate(token, requiredCapability);
|
|
if (!validation.ok) {
|
|
await writeAttempt({
|
|
rawIdentity: token ? 'token:' + token.slice(0, 8) : 'no_token',
|
|
endpoint: route,
|
|
reason: validation.reason,
|
|
path: attemptsPath,
|
|
});
|
|
const status = validation.reason === 'capability_insufficient' ? 403 : 401;
|
|
sendJson(res, status, { error: validation.reason });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const session = validation.session;
|
|
|
|
// Read body once + enforce limit.
|
|
const body = await readBody(req);
|
|
if ('error' in body) { sendJson(res, 413, body); return; }
|
|
|
|
// Tailnet-only own-session revoke.
|
|
if (method === 'POST' && path === '/auth/revoke') {
|
|
tokenStore.revoke(session.token);
|
|
sendJson(res, 200, { revoked: 1 });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Proxy to device.
|
|
const tunnel = await getTunnel();
|
|
if (!tunnel) {
|
|
sendJson(res, 503, { error: 'device_not_connected' });
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const sessionId = (req.headers['x-session-id'] as string | undefined) ?? null;
|
|
const upstream = await proxyToDevice({
|
|
inbound: req,
|
|
body,
|
|
tunnel,
|
|
sessionId,
|
|
agentIdentity: session.identity,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Audit the action (mutating endpoints only).
|
|
if (requiredCapability !== 'observe') {
|
|
await writeAudit({
|
|
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
identity: session.identity,
|
|
device_udid: tunnel.udid,
|
|
endpoint: route,
|
|
session_id: sessionId ?? '-',
|
|
capability: session.capability,
|
|
request_id: req.headers['x-request-id']?.toString() ?? '-',
|
|
status: upstream.status,
|
|
}, auditPath);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.writeHead(upstream.status, upstream.headers);
|
|
res.end(upstream.body);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
sendJson(res, 500, { error: 'internal_error', detail: (err as Error).message });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CLI entry — runs when this file is executed directly, not when imported.
|
|
if (import.meta.main) {
|
|
const port = parseInt(process.env.GSTACK_IOS_DAEMON_PORT ?? '9099', 10);
|
|
const tailnet = process.argv.includes('--tailnet');
|
|
const targetUDID = process.env.GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID;
|
|
const bundleId = process.env.GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_BUNDLE_ID ?? 'com.gstack.iosqa.fixture';
|
|
|
|
// Default tunnelProvider: when GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID (or a default with
|
|
// any connected paired device) is set, bootstrap a real CoreDevice tunnel.
|
|
// Otherwise return null (proxy will return 503 device_not_connected).
|
|
//
|
|
// After a successful bootstrap we spawn a periodic devicectl `info details`
|
|
// call to keep the CoreDevice tunnel session alive — Xcode 26's CoreDevice
|
|
// only holds the tunnel up while a devicectl command is in-flight, so
|
|
// without a poke every few seconds the IPv6 becomes unroutable.
|
|
let keepalive: { stop: () => void } | null = null;
|
|
const realTunnelProvider = async () => {
|
|
const result = await bootstrapTunnel({
|
|
udid: targetUDID,
|
|
bundleId,
|
|
});
|
|
if (!result.ok) {
|
|
process.stderr.write(`bootstrap error: ${result.error}${result.detail ? ' — ' + result.detail : ''}\n`);
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
if (keepalive) keepalive.stop();
|
|
keepalive = startTunnelKeepalive(result.tunnel.udid);
|
|
return result.tunnel;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const shutdown = () => {
|
|
if (keepalive) { keepalive.stop(); keepalive = null; }
|
|
};
|
|
process.on('SIGINT', shutdown);
|
|
process.on('SIGTERM', shutdown);
|
|
process.on('exit', shutdown);
|
|
|
|
startDaemon({
|
|
loopbackPort: port,
|
|
tailnetEnabled: tailnet,
|
|
tunnelProvider: realTunnelProvider,
|
|
}).then((d) => {
|
|
if ('error' in d) {
|
|
process.stderr.write(`daemon error: ${d.error}\n`);
|
|
process.exit(0); // exit 0 because READY was already printed
|
|
}
|
|
}).catch((err) => {
|
|
process.stderr.write(`daemon fatal: ${(err as Error).message}\n`);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|