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Garry Tan
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* fix(ship): adversarial subagent no longer trips usage-policy denial on own security fixtures (#1899) The Claude adversarial subagent in /review and /ship was told to "think like an attacker" over the full diff. When the diff includes the repo's own security regression fixtures (real attack payloads, by design), reasoning adversarially over that material triggered Anthropic's real-time usage-policy safeguards and the subagent call was denied — blocking the review. Fix at the prompt's source of truth (scripts/resolvers/review.ts {{ADVERSARIAL_STEP}}): - Authorized-defensive-testing framing: declares this is the maintainer's own repo and that attack-pattern strings inside test/fixture paths are the project's own regression corpus to analyze, not material to expand on. - Fixture summary-mode diff: full content for non-fixture source, --stat/--name-status for test/fixture files, so raw exploit bytes aren't fed into adversarial reasoning. The subagent must state fixtures were reviewed in summary mode (no silent coverage cut). Reported by @bmajewski. Regenerated review/SKILL.md + ship/sections/adversarial.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact): detect modern sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-admin- OpenAI keys (#1868) openai.key (HIGH/block) used /\b(sk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9]{32,})\b/, which stops at the first - or _ in the body. Modern OpenAI project/service-account/admin keys use base64url bodies containing - and _, so they never reached the 32-char run and produced ZERO findings — a HIGH credential failing open through /spec, /ship, /cso, and /document-*. Replace with explicit alternation, bare vs prefixed (not a globally-optional prefix, which would match malformed sk--... or separator-less sk-projabc...): sk-{proj,svcacct,admin}- + [A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,} | sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{32,} (legacy) Tests: the three previously-missed shapes now block; FP guards pin that hyphenated prose and malformed sk- strings do NOT match (HIGH tier blocks, so calibration matters). Reported by @jbetala7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redact): reject malformed --max-bytes instead of silently disabling the size guard (#1824) The oversize check is designed to fail CLOSED, but a malformed --max-bytes turned it fail-OPEN. bin/gstack-redact did parseInt(maxBytes,10) and passed it straight through; parseInt("foo") is NaN. The engine guarded with `opts.maxBytes ?? DEFAULT`, and ?? does not catch NaN, so `byteLen > NaN` was always false and the fail-closed block never fired. A negative value made `byteLen > -5` always true, blocking everything. Two layers: - bin/gstack-redact validates the RAW string (parseInt accepts "123abc"->123, "1.5"->1): require /^\d+$/ and > 0, else exit 1 with a clear message. - lib/redact-engine.ts hardens the fallback to Number.isFinite && > 0 else the default cap — a guardrail so the engine never silently runs uncapped even if a bad value reaches it directly. Tests: NaN and negative both fall back to the default cap (oversize still blocks); CLI rejects garbage/negative with exit 1. Reported by @jbetala7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(learnings): cross-project trust gate is an allowlist, not a denylist (#1745) gstack-learnings-search --cross-project is documented as an allowlist — foreign learnings load only when user-stated/trusted, to stop one project's AI-generated learnings from injecting into another project's reviews. It was implemented as a denylist: `if (isCrossProject && e.trusted === false) continue`. Any row where `trusted` is missing/undefined (legacy rows from before the field existed, hand-edited rows, rows from other tools) passed `undefined === false` → false → admitted. Those rows leaked across projects. Flip to `e.trusted !== true`. Test: a foreign row with no `trusted` field is now excluded (true still included, false still excluded). Reported by @jbetala7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(safety): one-way-door classifier catches "rotate ... password" (#1839) scripts/one-way-doors.ts is the secondary safety net for ad-hoc AskUserQuestion ids with no registry entry; a false negative auto-approves a destructive op. The revoke and reset credential patterns both include `password`, but the rotate pattern omitted it, so the most common phrasing ("rotate the database password") classified as a reversible two-way question. Add `password` to the rotate alternation so all three verbs are parallel. New test covers rotate+password, the revoke/reset/rotate parallel, and rotate's other nouns. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(review): route .mjs/.cjs/.mts/.cts changes to the backend reviewer (#1810) gstack-diff-scope backend detection matched only *.ts|*.js. Modern Node ships backend code as ESM (.mjs) / CommonJS (.cjs) and explicit-module TS (.mts/.cts); none matched any category, so a PR touching only those files reported no backend scope and the Review Army skipped the backend reviewer. Add the four module extensions to the backend case. Test covers all four. Reported by @jbetala7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(brain-cache): loadMeta tolerates malformed _meta.json without crashing (#1879) loadMeta returned the parsed JSON verbatim. A valid JSON file that lacked the last_refresh map made three consumers (isStale, cmdInvalidate, refreshEntity) throw a TypeError dereferencing meta.last_refresh — the sibling last_attempt was already guarded, last_refresh wasn't. Fix in loadMeta: - Shape-guard: JSON.parse can return null/array/string/number; non-object → fresh meta. - Normalize ONLY the dereferenced maps (last_refresh, last_attempt). - Deliberately do NOT default schema_version/endpoint_hash. Leaving them absent makes schemaVersionMismatch()/endpointSwitched() force a rebuild (missing identity = mismatch = safe); defaulting them would suppress cache invalidation and trust a stale file of unknown provenance. Tests: missing last_refresh no longer throws; null/array/primitive treated as cold; missing schema_version forces rebuild instead of a trusted warm hit. Reported by @jbetala7. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skills): anchor guard/freeze/careful hook paths so they survive CC 2.1.162 (#1871) The PreToolUse frontmatter hooks for guard, freeze, and careful invoked `bash ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/.../check-*.sh`. Claude Code 2.1.162 no longer populates ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR} in the skill-hook execution env, so it expanded to empty and every Edit/Write/Bash ran `bash /...` and errored — breaking the safety skills entirely. Frontmatter hooks run before any skill-body bash, so no runtime-resolved variable can fix this; the command must be a path that's valid at hook time. Anchor to the installed checkout: $HOME/.claude/skills/gstack/{careful,freeze}/bin/check-*.sh, where the scripts actually live. ($HOME is expanded by the hook shell.) Reported by @omariani-howdy. Regenerated the three SKILL.md from templates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: v1.58.0.0 — fix-wave release notes, VERSION bump, #1882 TODO CHANGELOG entry for the 8-fix safety wave (#1899, #1868, #1824, #1745, #1839, #1810, #1879, #1871). VERSION + package.json to 1.58.0.0 (MINOR — coordinated multi-file safety fixes on top of main's 1.57.3.0). #1882 filed as the top TODOS.md item (scoped out of this wave per decision; host-config change touching all 52 skills, distinct from the #1871 hook fix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(learnings): strip backticks from #1745 comment inside the bun -e block The #1745 trust-gate fix added an explanatory comment containing backticks (`=== false`) and the JS block is a double-quoted `bun -e "..."` bash string, so bash command-substituted the backtick contents on every cross-project search — polluting stderr with "command not found" and leaving a latent shell-injection / source-corruption surface in a security gate. Caught by the wave's own adversarial review (#1899 framing working as intended). Reworded the comments to avoid backticks and dollar-paren entirely; the gate logic is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(golden): refresh ship golden baselines (#1899 prompt + main's PR-title line) The three ship golden fixtures were stale: main's v1.57.3.0 added the always-loaded PR-title invariant to ship/SKILL.md but did not regenerate the goldens (the golden regression test fails on main too), and the codex golden still carried an unresolved ${ctx.paths.binDir} token. Regenerated from the current generated ship skills, which also picks up this wave's #1899 adversarial-prompt framing (inlined for codex/factory). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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name, version, description, triggers, allowed-tools, hooks
| name | version | description | triggers | allowed-tools | hooks | |||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| careful | 0.1.0 | Safety guardrails for destructive commands. (gstack) |
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When to invoke this skill
Warns before rm -rf, DROP TABLE, force-push, git reset --hard, kubectl delete, and similar destructive operations. User can override each warning. Use when touching prod, debugging live systems, or working in a shared environment. Use when asked to "be careful", "safety mode", "prod mode", or "careful mode".
/careful — Destructive Command Guardrails
Safety mode is now active. Every bash command will be checked for destructive patterns before running. If a destructive command is detected, you'll be warned and can choose to proceed or cancel.
mkdir -p ~/.gstack/analytics
echo '{"skill":"careful","ts":"'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'","repo":"'$(basename "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")'"}' >> ~/.gstack/analytics/skill-usage.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true
What's protected
| Pattern | Example | Risk |
|---|---|---|
rm -rf / rm -r / rm --recursive |
rm -rf /var/data |
Recursive delete |
DROP TABLE / DROP DATABASE |
DROP TABLE users; |
Data loss |
TRUNCATE |
TRUNCATE orders; |
Data loss |
git push --force / -f |
git push -f origin main |
History rewrite |
git reset --hard |
git reset --hard HEAD~3 |
Uncommitted work loss |
git checkout . / git restore . |
git checkout . |
Uncommitted work loss |
kubectl delete |
kubectl delete pod |
Production impact |
docker rm -f / docker system prune |
docker system prune -a |
Container/image loss |
Safe exceptions
These patterns are allowed without warning:
rm -rf node_modules/.next/dist/__pycache__/.cache/build/.turbo/coverage
How it works
The hook reads the command from the tool input JSON, checks it against the
patterns above, and returns permissionDecision: "ask" with a warning message
if a match is found. You can always override the warning and proceed.
To deactivate, end the conversation or start a new one. Hooks are session-scoped.