Files
gstack/supabase/verify-rls.sh
T
RagavRida 3bba467289 fix(verify-rls): drop predictable $$-based tmp file fallback
Same shape as gstack-telemetry-sync: on mktemp failure the script fell
back to '/tmp/verify-rls-$$-$TOTAL', which is fully predictable from the
PID and a per-check counter. On a shared box another user can pre-create
or symlink the path and either capture the HTTP response body (which may
leak what the RLS tests revealed) or corrupt an unrelated file that curl
writes through.

Make mktemp strict. On failure return from the check function; the caller
tallies a FAIL and the run moves on.
2026-05-17 19:52:15 -07:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# verify-rls.sh — smoke test after deploying 002_tighten_rls.sql
#
# Verifies:
# - SELECT denied on all tables and views (security fix)
# - UPDATE denied on installations (security fix)
# - INSERT still allowed on tables (kept for old client compat)
#
# Run manually after deploying the migration:
# bash supabase/verify-rls.sh
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
. "$SCRIPT_DIR/config.sh"
URL="$GSTACK_SUPABASE_URL"
KEY="$GSTACK_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"
PASS=0
FAIL=0
TOTAL=0
# check <description> <expected> <method> <path> [data]
# expected: "deny" (want 401/403) or "allow" (want 200/201)
check() {
local desc="$1"
local expected="$2"
local method="$3"
local path="$4"
local data="${5:-}"
TOTAL=$(( TOTAL + 1 ))
local resp_file
# Use mktemp strictly. Don't fall back to a predictable $$-based path —
# that's a race/overwrite footgun on shared machines.
resp_file="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/verify-rls-XXXXXX")" || {
echo "verify-rls: mktemp failed, aborting" >&2
return 1
}
local http_code
if [ "$method" = "GET" ]; then
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
"${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
elif [ "$method" = "POST" ]; then
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
-X POST "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Prefer: return=minimal" \
-d "$data" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
elif [ "$method" = "PATCH" ]; then
http_code="$(curl -s -o "$resp_file" -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 10 \
-X PATCH "${URL}/rest/v1/${path}" \
-H "apikey: ${KEY}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${KEY}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$data" 2>/dev/null)" || http_code="000"
fi
# Trim to last 3 chars (the HTTP code) in case of concatenation
http_code="$(echo "$http_code" | grep -oE '[0-9]{3}$' || echo "000")"
if [ "$expected" = "deny" ]; then
case "$http_code" in
401|403)
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, denied)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 )) ;;
200|204)
# For GETs: 200+empty means RLS filtering (pass). 200+data means leak (fail).
# For PATCH: 204 means no rows matched — could be RLS or missing row.
if [ "$method" = "GET" ]; then
body="$(cat "$resp_file" 2>/dev/null || echo "")"
if [ "$body" = "[]" ] || [ -z "$body" ]; then
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, empty — RLS filtering)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
else
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $http_code, got data!)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 ))
fi
else
# PATCH 204 = no rows affected. RLS blocked the update or row doesn't exist.
# Either way, the attacker can't modify data.
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, no rows affected)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 ))
fi ;;
000)
echo " WARN $desc (connection failed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
*)
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $http_code — unexpected)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
esac
elif [ "$expected" = "allow" ]; then
case "$http_code" in
200|201|204|409)
# 409 = conflict (duplicate key) — INSERT policy works, row already exists
echo " PASS $desc (HTTP $http_code, allowed as expected)"
PASS=$(( PASS + 1 )) ;;
401|403)
echo " FAIL $desc (HTTP $http_code, denied — should be allowed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
000)
echo " WARN $desc (connection failed)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
*)
echo " WARN $desc (HTTP $http_code — unexpected)"
FAIL=$(( FAIL + 1 )) ;;
esac
fi
rm -f "$resp_file" 2>/dev/null || true
}
echo "RLS Verification (after 002_tighten_rls.sql)"
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo ""
echo "Read denial (should be blocked):"
check "SELECT telemetry_events" deny GET "telemetry_events?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT installations" deny GET "installations?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT update_checks" deny GET "update_checks?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT crash_clusters" deny GET "crash_clusters?select=*&limit=1"
check "SELECT skill_sequences" deny GET "skill_sequences?select=skill_a&limit=1"
echo ""
echo "Update denial (should be blocked):"
check "UPDATE installations" deny PATCH "installations?installation_id=eq.test_verify_rls" '{"gstack_version":"hacked"}'
echo ""
echo "Insert allowed (kept for old client compat):"
check "INSERT telemetry_events" allow POST "telemetry_events" '{"gstack_version":"verify_rls_test","os":"test","event_timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z","outcome":"test"}'
check "INSERT update_checks" allow POST "update_checks" '{"gstack_version":"verify_rls_test","os":"test"}'
check "INSERT installations" allow POST "installations" '{"installation_id":"verify_rls_test"}'
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo "Results: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed (of $TOTAL checks)"
if [ "$FAIL" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "VERDICT: FAIL"
exit 1
else
echo "VERDICT: PASS — reads/updates blocked, inserts allowed"
exit 0
fi