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icacls '/inheritance:r /grant:r' can partially fail on localized or domain accounts: inheritance strips but the user grant doesn't resolve, leaving a machine-SID-only DACL the owner can't even list — the sidebar/PTY failure chain in #1605, caused by the very hardening call meant to protect the dir. mkdirSecure now verifies listability after hardening (a real readdir — fs.accessSync doesn't consult NTFS ACLs) and repairs via icacls /reset, re-hardens, and if hardening breaks access again leaves inherited ACLs: functional-but-unhardened beats hardened-but-unusable. The icacls calls carry windowsHide (#1835's last two sites) and the fork's static spawn-hide tripwire lands here, pinning every covered site. file-permissions.test.ts is already in the windows-free-tests curated shard, so the DACL contract executes on windows-latest. Ported from time-attack/gstack (GStack 2). Co-authored-by: Sina Matian <sina@time-attack.dev> Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
181 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
181 lines
6.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for browse/src/file-permissions.ts
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*
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* Strategy:
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* - POSIX assertions check fs.statSync.mode bits directly (cheap, reliable,
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* runs on every CI config).
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* - Windows assertions don't check ACLs (that'd require parsing icacls
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* output, which is brittle across Windows versions / locales). Instead
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* we verify the helper doesn't throw and the file ends up accessible
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* to the current user — the "doesn't crash, file still usable"
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* contract the callers rely on.
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*/
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as os from 'os';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import {
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restrictFilePermissions,
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restrictDirectoryPermissions,
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writeSecureFile,
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appendSecureFile,
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mkdirSecure,
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repairBrokenDacl,
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__resetWarnedForTests,
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} from '../src/file-permissions';
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let tmpDir: string;
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beforeEach(() => {
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tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'file-perms-'));
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__resetWarnedForTests();
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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try { fs.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch { /* best-effort */ }
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});
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describe('restrictFilePermissions', () => {
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test('on POSIX, sets file mode to 0o600', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'secret');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'token');
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fs.chmodSync(p, 0o644); // start world-readable to prove the call mutates it
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restrictFilePermissions(p);
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw on an existing file', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'secret');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'token');
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expect(() => restrictFilePermissions(p)).not.toThrow();
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// File remains readable by the caller — core contract.
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('token');
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw when icacls fails (bad path)', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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// icacls emits an error for a nonexistent path; helper must swallow.
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expect(() => restrictFilePermissions(path.join(tmpDir, 'nonexistent'))).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('restrictDirectoryPermissions', () => {
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test('on POSIX, sets directory mode to 0o700', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'subdir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d, { mode: 0o755 });
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restrictDirectoryPermissions(d);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw on an existing directory', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'subdir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d);
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expect(() => restrictDirectoryPermissions(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('writeSecureFile', () => {
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test('writes the payload and restricts permissions atomically', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'data');
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writeSecureFile(p, 'hello');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('hello');
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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}
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});
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test('accepts Buffer payloads', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'buffer');
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writeSecureFile(p, Buffer.from([0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef]));
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const out = fs.readFileSync(p);
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expect(out.length).toBe(4);
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expect(out[0]).toBe(0xde);
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});
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test('overwrites existing file', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'existing');
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fs.writeFileSync(p, 'old', { mode: 0o644 });
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writeSecureFile(p, 'new');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('new');
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});
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});
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describe('appendSecureFile', () => {
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test('appends to a new file and sets owner-only permissions', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'log');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line1\n');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('line1\n');
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
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expect(fs.statSync(p).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o600);
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}
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});
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test('appends without re-applying ACL on subsequent writes', () => {
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const p = path.join(tmpDir, 'log');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line1\n');
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appendSecureFile(p, 'line2\n');
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expect(fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')).toBe('line1\nline2\n');
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});
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});
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describe('mkdirSecure', () => {
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test('creates directory with owner-only mode (POSIX)', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'nested', 'deep');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).isDirectory()).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.statSync(d).mode & 0o777).toBe(0o700);
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});
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test('is idempotent — safe to call on existing directory', () => {
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'dir');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(() => mkdirSecure(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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test('recursive behavior: creates intermediate directories', () => {
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'a', 'b', 'c');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'a'))).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpDir, 'a', 'b'))).toBe(true);
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expect(fs.existsSync(d)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('created directory is listable by the creating process', () => {
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// #1605 contract: whatever ACL hardening happens, the client must be
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// able to read its own state dir immediately after creation.
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'state');
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mkdirSecure(d);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(d, 'browse.json'), '{}');
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expect(fs.readdirSync(d)).toContain('browse.json');
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});
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});
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describe('repairBrokenDacl', () => {
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test('is a no-op on non-Windows platforms', () => {
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if (process.platform === 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'dir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d);
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expect(() => repairBrokenDacl(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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test('on Windows, does not throw and directory stays listable', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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const d = path.join(tmpDir, 'dir');
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fs.mkdirSync(d);
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expect(() => repairBrokenDacl(d)).not.toThrow();
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expect(() => fs.readdirSync(d)).not.toThrow();
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});
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test('on Windows, swallows icacls failure on a nonexistent path', () => {
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if (process.platform !== 'win32') return;
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expect(() => repairBrokenDacl(path.join(tmpDir, 'nonexistent'))).not.toThrow();
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});
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});
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