Files
gstack/bin/gstack-redact-prepush
T
Garry Tan b9706f3635 v1.88.1.0 fix: harden credential boundaries and owned state (#2942)
* fix(settings): preserve symlinked settings targets

Resolve the selected target for locking, mutation, backup, and rollback; refuse target changes and preserve private modes. Addresses #2830.

* fix(redact): bind masking to original detected spans

Inspired by #2929's anchored-span diagnosis; independently implemented using normalization offsets. Addresses #2930 and the relocation portion of #2912 without changing detection sensitivity.

* fix(evals): exclude operator credentials from prefix admission

Adapts the credential-suffix screen proposed in #2636, with real launched-child regression coverage and deliberate provider-auth exceptions.

* fix(artifacts): retain custom allowlist rules on reinitialization

Preserve the exact user-owned suffix and publish only a successfully assembled replacement. Independently implements the repair reported in #2907.

* test(cso): verify exact masked reads and unmaskable payload refusal

* fix(cso): preserve exact filesystem identities through lease recovery

Preserve 64-bit device/inode identity and nanosecond race checks. Add native NTFS lifecycle coverage for #2927; retain ambiguous legacy-state refusal without claiming Windows PID-reuse recovery is resolved.

* fix(redact): bind pre-push scans to destination and preserve seam context

Uses #2935 (bd07318) as source evidence for push-target range and slice-overlap defects. Independently implemented; no cherry-pick or release metadata adoption.

* test(ci): gate native agent ownership and settings links on macOS

* fix(browse): bind agent lifetimes and cleanup to owned generations

Uses #2931 by Chris Hutton / Claude Fable 5.1 as attributed design input; independently implemented without broad sweeps or copied code. Keep uncertain children and locks rather than deleting foreign state.

* test(ci): include concurrent shutdown controls in the native macOS gate

* v1.88.1.0 fix: harden credential boundaries and owned state

* fix(redact): preserve target provenance and scan boundary semantics

* test(artifacts): read managed rules from atomic allowlist assembly

* fix: preserve native exit observations and fixture prerequisites

* fix: preserve UTF-16 offsets through redaction normalization
2026-09-23 08:54:53 -04:00

550 lines
25 KiB
TypeScript
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bun
/**
* gstack-redact-prepush — git pre-push hook that scans the diff being pushed for
* HIGH-severity credentials and blocks the push on a hit.
*
* THIS IS A GUARDRAIL, NOT ENFORCEMENT. `git push --no-verify` bypasses it, as
* does `GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip`. It catches accidental credential pushes,
* the most common real-world leak. It does NOT scan history, binary/LFS/submodule
* files, or non-added lines. History scanning is /cso's job.
*
* Git pre-push interface: refs are read from STDIN, one per line:
* <local ref> <local sha> <remote ref> <remote sha>
* We scan the ADDED lines of <remote sha>..<local sha> per ref (what's being
* pushed). Special cases:
* - remote sha all-zeroes → new branch: diff against merge-base with the
* remote's default branch (fallback: scan all commits unique to local ref).
* - local sha all-zeroes → branch delete: nothing to scan, skip.
* - force-push → remote..local still gives the net new content.
*
* Behavior:
* - HIGH finding in added lines → print + exit 1 (block), for public AND private.
* - MEDIUM → warn (non-blocking). LOW/WARN → silent.
* - GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip → log + exit 0 (escape valve).
*
* Installed/uninstalled via `gstack-redact install-prepush-hook` (see the
* gstack-redact CLI), which chains any pre-existing hook.
*/
import { spawnSync } from "child_process";
import * as fs from "fs";
import * as os from "os";
import * as path from "path";
import { normalizeWithMap, scan, type Finding } from "../lib/redact-engine";
import { mkdirpSync } from "../lib/fs-utils";
const ZERO = /^0+$/;
let emptyTree: string | undefined;
function emptyTreeOid(): string {
if (emptyTree) return emptyTree;
const oid = gitStrict(["hash-object", "-w", "-t", "tree", "--stdin"]).trim();
if (!/^(?:[0-9a-f]{40}|[0-9a-f]{64})$/.test(oid)) throw new Error("git could not resolve the empty tree");
emptyTree = oid;
return oid;
}
/**
* Permissive git for legitimately-fallible PROBES (symbolic-ref, rev-parse,
* merge-base) where a non-zero exit is normal control flow. The DIFF call
* must NOT use this — see gitStrict (#1946 fail-closed).
*/
function git(args: string[]): string {
const r = spawnSync("git", args, { encoding: "utf8", maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 * 1024 });
return r.status === 0 ? (r.stdout ?? "") : "";
}
/**
* Fail-closed git for the diff that decides whether the push is scanned
* (#1946). status !== 0 covers repo errors; status === null covers a killed
* process AND maxBuffer overflow — the oversized-diff case is exactly where
* a large secret-bearing blob is most likely, so "couldn't read the diff"
* must block, not silently allow.
*/
function gitStrict(args: string[]): string {
const r = spawnSync("git", args, { encoding: "utf8", maxBuffer: 64 * 1024 * 1024 });
// status !== 0 covers BOTH a non-zero exit AND null (process killed by a
// signal or maxBuffer overflow — null !== 0 is true).
if (r.status !== 0) {
throw new Error(
`git ${args[0]} failed (status=${r.status ?? "killed/overflow"}): ${(r.stderr ?? "").slice(0, 300)}`,
);
}
return r.stdout ?? "";
}
/** True when the object exists in the local odb (cat-file -e signals via exit code). */
function objectExists(sha: string): boolean {
const r = spawnSync("git", ["cat-file", "-e", sha], { encoding: "utf8" });
return r.status === 0;
}
/**
* The remote-tracking exclusion used when narrowing to "commits new to the
* remote" (#2592 catch-up merges, #2573 rebased force-pushes).
*
* Narrowed to the PUSH TARGET's namespace (S1): a bare `--remotes` excludes
* commits reachable from ANY remote-tracking ref, so a secret that had only
* ever been fetched from (or pushed to) a private/local-path remote was never
* scanned when later pushed to a PUBLIC remote — "already left this machine"
* is not "already reached THIS remote". Git hands pre-push the push remote's
* name as $1 (and its URL as $2); the installed hook wrapper forwards "$@".
* A URL push has no tracking namespace, even if origin happens to contain
* the same commits. Direct invocations without Git's argv keep the historical
* all-remotes behavior for compatibility.
*/
type PushTarget = { kind: "remote"; name: string } | { kind: "url" } | { kind: "unknown" };
let cachedPushTarget: PushTarget | undefined;
function pushTarget(): PushTarget {
if (cachedPushTarget) return cachedPushTarget;
const name = process.argv[2];
const url = process.argv[3];
if (!name && !url) return cachedPushTarget = { kind: "unknown" };
if (!name || !url) return cachedPushTarget = { kind: "url" };
const remotes = git(["remote"]).split("\n");
if (!remotes.includes(name)) return cachedPushTarget = { kind: "url" };
const pushUrls = git(["remote", "get-url", "--push", "--all", name]).trim().split("\n");
const fetchUrls = git(["remote", "get-url", "--all", name]).trim().split("\n");
return cachedPushTarget = pushUrls.includes(url) && fetchUrls[0] === url
? { kind: "remote", name }
: { kind: "url" };
}
function remotesExclusionArgs(): string[] {
const target = pushTarget();
if (target.kind === "remote") return [`--remotes=${target.name}/*`];
return target.kind === "unknown" ? ["--remotes"] : [];
}
function defaultRemoteBranch(): string | null {
const target = pushTarget();
if (target.kind === "url") return null;
const remote = target.kind === "remote" ? target.name : "origin";
const sym = git(["symbolic-ref", `refs/remotes/${remote}/HEAD`]).trim();
if (sym.startsWith(`refs/remotes/${remote}/`) && git(["rev-parse", "--verify", `${sym}^{commit}`]).trim()) return sym;
for (const b of [`${remote}/main`, `${remote}/master`]) {
const qualified = `refs/remotes/${b}`;
if (git(["rev-parse", "--verify", `${qualified}^{commit}`]).trim()) return qualified;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Base commit for a new remote ref, ordered from most precise to most
* conservative. Returns null when nothing can anchor the range.
*/
function unknownRemoteTipBase(localSha: string): string | null {
// 1. The common case: a merge-base with the remote's default branch.
const defaultBranch = defaultRemoteBranch();
const base = defaultBranch ? git(["merge-base", localSha, defaultBranch]).trim() : "";
if (base) return base;
// 2. No merge-base. The target's default branch may be unavailable
// (named trunk/develop, remote/HEAD unset), or history may be disjoint.
// Anything reachable from localSha but from NO remote-tracking
// branch is what this push actually adds; the parent of its oldest commit
// is the real base.
//
// Without this we drop straight to EMPTY_TREE and re-scan content that is
// already on the remote. That is not merely wasteful, it is wrong in two
// ways: a secret pushed long ago gets re-reported as if THIS push
// introduced it (telling the operator to rotate a key over someone else's
// old commit), and on any real repository the input overshoots the
// engine's byte cap, so `engine.input_too_large` blocks having scanned
// NOTHING — "scans more, never less" inverted into "scans nothing".
//
// The exclusion is scoped to the PUSH TARGET's tracking refs (see
// remotesExclusionArgs): content on some OTHER remote has left this machine,
// but it has not reached the remote being pushed to — a secret that only
// ever hit a private remote must still be scanned on its way to a public
// one (S1).
const exclusions = remotesExclusionArgs();
const newCommits = git(["rev-list", "--reverse", localSha, ...(exclusions.length ? ["--not", ...exclusions] : [])]).trim();
if (newCommits) {
const oldest = newCommits.split("\n")[0];
const parent = git(["rev-parse", "--verify", `${oldest}^`]).trim();
if (parent) return parent;
// Oldest new commit is a root commit: there is no parent to anchor on.
}
// 3. Nothing to anchor on — a genuinely fresh repository with no remote refs.
// Every commit IS new content, so scanning it all is the correct answer.
return null;
}
/**
* The commits this push actually adds — reachable from localSha and from NO
* remote-tracking ref.
*
* ⚠ WHY THIS EXISTS RATHER THAN A TWO-DOT RANGE.
*
* `remoteSha..localSha` is "everything new on this branch", which is NOT the
* same as "everything new to the remote". Merge origin/main into a feature
* branch and every commit main gained since the branch's last push becomes an
* added line — content that is already published, already scanned, and not
* this push's doing.
*
* Two things follow, and both were observed:
*
* · FALSE HIGH FINDINGS. A placeholder connection string in a test fixture,
* already merged to main by someone else, blocked an unrelated push as
* `db.url_with_password` — telling the operator to rotate a credential
* over a fixture they had never touched. A
* guard that cries wolf on catch-up merges is a guard people learn to
* bypass reflexively — which is exactly how a real secret gets through.
* · OVERSIZED SCANS. The comment on SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES below records a
* 1,146,782-byte diff from "a feature branch catching up to a busy main"
* blowing the engine's 1 MiB cap. Same root cause, treated there as a size
* problem and solved by slicing. Narrowing the range fixes the size too.
*
* A two-dot range cannot express this: after merging main, neither the remote
* tip nor the merge-base with main is an ancestor of the other, so no single
* base excludes both. `rev-list --not --remotes=<push-remote>/*` is the
* operation that does, and this file already reasons that way in
* `unknownRemoteTipBase` step 2. The exclusion is scoped to the push target's
* tracking namespace (see remotesExclusionArgs): the upstream commits a catch-up
* merge brings in came from the SAME remote being pushed to, so scoping keeps
* the #2592 fix intact while a secret known only to some OTHER (private)
* remote is still scanned on its way to this one (S1).
*
* Each commit is diffed alone. `--cc` on a merge shows only the conflict
* RESOLUTION — content that exists in no parent — so a secret introduced while
* resolving a merge is still caught, while an ordinary merge contributes
* nothing. Returns null when the notion does not apply, so callers fall back.
*/
function addedLinesFromNewCommits(localSha: string, remoteSha: string): string | null {
// remoteSha is what git TELLS us the remote has, and it is authoritative in a
// way `--remotes` is not: remote-tracking refs can be absent (a fresh clone
// that never fetched, a push to a remote with no tracking ref) or stale. Drop
// it and a repo with no tracking refs excludes NOTHING — every commit ever
// made reads as "new", which re-introduces the false positives from the other
// direction. So it stays the base; `--remotes` only ADDS exclusions on top.
if (ZERO.test(remoteSha) || !objectExists(remoteSha)) return null;
const narrowed = git(["rev-list", localSha, "--not", remoteSha, ...remotesExclusionArgs()]).trim();
if (!narrowed) return null;
// If excluding remote-tracking refs changes nothing, this push has no
// catch-up commits and the plain range already describes it exactly. Defer to
// it. That is not just an optimization: it keeps every push that ISN'T a
// catch-up merge on the original gitStrict diff path, so the fail-closed
// guarantee (#1946) and its regression test keep exercising the code they
// were written for. A narrowing that silently retired that test would be a
// worse trade than the false positives it set out to fix.
const plain = git(["rev-list", `${remoteSha}..${localSha}`]).trim();
const asSet = (s: string) => s.split("\n").filter(Boolean).sort().join("\n");
if (asSet(narrowed) === asSet(plain)) return null;
const shas = narrowed.split("\n").filter(Boolean);
// A rewrite of long history should fall back rather than shell out per commit.
if (shas.length > 500) return null;
const out: string[] = [];
for (const sha of shas) {
// gitStrict: a failed diff must never read as "nothing added" (#1946).
out.push(gitStrict([
"show", "--unified=0", "--no-color", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv",
"--cc", "--format=", sha,
]));
}
return out.join("\n");
}
/** Return the added-line text for a ref update being pushed. */
function addedLinesFor(localSha: string, remoteSha: string): string {
// Preferred ONLY when this push carries catch-up commits: scanning them again
// is the bug. Every other shape falls through to the range logic below.
const fromNew = addedLinesFromNewCommits(localSha, remoteSha);
if (fromNew !== null) return collectAddedLines(fromNew);
let range: string;
if (ZERO.test(remoteSha) || !objectExists(remoteSha)) {
const base = ZERO.test(remoteSha) ? unknownRemoteTipBase(localSha) : null;
range = base ? `${base}..${localSha}` : `${emptyTreeOid()}..${localSha}`;
} else {
// Existing branch (incl. force-push): net new content remote..local.
range = `${remoteSha}..${localSha}`;
}
// -U0: only changed lines; we keep lines starting with '+' (added), drop the
// +++ file header. Unified diff added lines start with a single '+'.
// Strict (#1946): a failed diff used to return "" and the push sailed
// through unscanned — fail open on the exact path the guard exists for.
//
// --no-ext-diff: a user's `diff.external` driver replaces the entire diff
// with its own output — with one set, `git diff` emits zero '+' lines, so an
// unhardened scanner reads an empty diff and exits 0 on a push full of
// secrets. Reachable from ordinary user config, not hypothetical. (#2498)
// --no-textconv: a .gitattributes textconv driver can likewise rewrite
// content before we ever see it. (#2498)
const diff = gitStrict([
"diff", "--unified=0", "--no-color", "--no-ext-diff", "--no-textconv",
range,
]);
return collectAddedLines(diff);
}
/**
* Added-line text from a unified diff. Shared by both range strategies so the
* hunk-aware header handling below cannot drift between them.
*/
function collectAddedLines(diff: string): string {
const added: string[] = [];
// Hunk-aware header skip (#2498): `+++ ` is only a FILE HEADER outside a
// hunk. Inside a hunk, an added content line whose text begins with "++"
// renders as "+++<content>" — the old blanket startsWith("+++") skip
// silently dropped exactly those lines from the scan.
let inHunk = false;
for (const line of diff.split("\n")) {
// `diff --` rather than `diff --git`: a merge scanned with --cc emits
// `diff --cc <path>`, so a --git-only reset left inHunk true across file
// boundaries and read the next file's `+++ b/...` header as content. Only
// noise (it over-scans, never under-scans), but the boundary is real.
if (line.startsWith("diff --")) { inHunk = false; continue; }
if (line.startsWith("@@")) { inHunk = true; continue; }
if (!inHunk && (line.startsWith("+++") || line.startsWith("---"))) continue;
if (line.startsWith("+")) added.push(line.slice(1));
}
return added.join("\n");
}
/**
* Byte budget per scan() call. Kept comfortably under redact-engine's
* DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES (1 MiB) so a slice never trips its oversize guard.
*/
const SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES = 768 * 1024;
const SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS = 16 * 1024;
const MAX_SCAN_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
/**
* Scan complete-line core slices with bounded left and right context. Admit
* only findings whose original captured start lies inside that core.
*
* Why: the engine refuses input over its byte cap and fails closed, which is
* right for one scan() call but wrong as a push policy — a feature branch
* catching up to a busy main legitimately produces more added lines than the
* cap (1,146,782 bytes against the 1 MiB default in the push that prompted
* this, and only ~7% of that was the lockfile). The push then blocked on
* `engine.input_too_large` — a size error naming no credential — which trains
* people to reach for --no-verify, defeating the guardrail far more thoroughly
* than a large diff does.
*
* A match may need context on either adjacent line (`nearWindow` reaches 300
* normalized characters). The full core lines keep opaque spans intact; the
* engine's normalization map selects context in normalized units without
* changing the raw input. A partial context may create an artificial boundary,
* but its findings are never admitted as core findings.
*
* Fail-closed is preserved: a SINGLE line over the budget is still passed to
* the engine intact, so a genuinely unscannable blob (minified bundle,
* embedded base64) trips input_too_large and blocks exactly as before.
*
* Findings' line/col are slice-relative, which is fine here — this hook only
* reads severity, id and preview. Do not lift this into the engine, where
* callers rely on absolute line numbers.
*/
function scanAddedLines(added: string, opts: Parameters<typeof scan>[1]): Finding[] {
const findings: Finding[] = [];
const cores: Array<{ start: number; end: number }> = [];
const lines = added.split("\n");
let start = 0;
let end = 0;
let bytes = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
const line = lines[i];
const newline = i < lines.length - 1 ? 1 : 0;
const lineBytes = Buffer.byteLength(line, "utf8") + newline;
if (bytes && bytes + lineBytes > SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES) {
cores.push({ start, end });
start = end;
bytes = 0;
}
end += line.length + newline;
bytes += lineBytes;
if (lineBytes > SCAN_CHUNK_BYTES) {
cores.push({ start, end });
start = end;
bytes = 0;
}
}
if (bytes) cores.push({ start, end });
const contextStart = (boundary: number): number => {
if (!boundary) return 0;
let length = Math.min(boundary, SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS * 2);
while (true) {
const from = boundary - length;
const raw = added.slice(from, boundary);
if (Buffer.byteLength(raw, "utf8") > MAX_SCAN_BYTES) return from;
const { normalized, map } = normalizeWithMap(raw);
if (!from || normalized.length > SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS) {
return from + (map[Math.max(0, normalized.length - SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS - 1)] ?? 0);
}
length = Math.min(boundary, length * 2);
}
};
const contextEnd = (boundary: number): number => {
if (boundary === added.length) return boundary;
let length = Math.min(added.length - boundary, SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS * 2);
while (true) {
const to = boundary + length;
const raw = added.slice(boundary, to);
if (Buffer.byteLength(raw, "utf8") > MAX_SCAN_BYTES) return to;
const { normalized, map } = normalizeWithMap(raw);
if (to === added.length || normalized.length > SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS) {
return boundary + (map[Math.min(normalized.length, SCAN_OVERLAP_CHARS + 1)] ?? length);
}
length = Math.min(added.length - boundary, length * 2);
}
};
for (const core of cores) {
const left = contextStart(core.start);
const text = added.slice(left, contextEnd(core.end));
const result = scan(text, opts);
if (result.oversize) {
findings.push(...result.findings);
return findings;
}
const starts = [0];
for (let i = 0; i < text.length; i++) if (text[i] === "\n") starts.push(i + 1);
for (const finding of result.findings) {
const offset = starts[finding.line - 1] + finding.col - 1 + left;
if (offset >= core.start && offset < core.end) findings.push(finding);
}
}
return findings;
}
function logSkip(reason: string): void {
try {
const home = process.env.GSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), ".gstack");
const dir = path.join(home, "security");
// mkdirpSync, not bare mkdirSync: bun-on-Windows EEXIST (#2635). This site
// is try-wrapped by the caller, so the old failure was a silent skip-log
// loss rather than a crash — the fix makes the log survive, not un-crash.
mkdirpSync(dir);
fs.appendFileSync(
path.join(dir, "prepush-skip.jsonl"),
JSON.stringify({ ts: new Date().toISOString(), reason }) + "\n",
);
} catch {
// best-effort; never block a push because logging failed
}
}
function main() {
if ((process.env.GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH || "").toLowerCase() === "skip") {
logSkip(process.env.GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH_REASON || "env-skip");
process.stderr.write("gstack-redact-prepush: skipped via GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip\n");
process.exit(0);
}
const stdin = fs.readFileSync(0, "utf8");
const refs = stdin
.split("\n")
.map((l) => l.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
.map((l) => l.split(/\s+/));
const allHigh: Finding[] = [];
let mediumCount = 0;
for (const fields of refs) {
// Fail CLOSED on a ref line we cannot parse (#2498): git hands pre-push
// exactly "<local ref> <local sha> <remote ref> <remote sha>" — anything
// else means we cannot tell WHAT is being pushed, and silently skipping
// it would leave that ref unscanned.
const [, localSha, , remoteSha] = fields;
const shaShaped = (s: string | undefined) => !!s && /^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/i.test(s);
if (fields.length !== 4 || !shaShaped(localSha) || !shaShaped(remoteSha)) {
process.stderr.write(
"\n⛔ gstack-redact-prepush BLOCKED the push — could not parse a pre-push ref line, " +
"so its content cannot be scanned.\n" +
` line: ${JSON.stringify(fields.join(" "))}\n` +
"Bypass if you're sure: GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip git push (or git push --no-verify)\n",
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (ZERO.test(localSha!)) continue; // branch delete → nothing pushed
let added: string;
try {
added = addedLinesFor(localSha, remoteSha || "0");
} catch (err) {
// Fail CLOSED (#1946): if we can't compute the pushed diff we can't
// scan it, and unscanned-but-allowed is the failure mode this hook
// exists to prevent.
process.stderr.write(
"\n⛔ gstack-redact-prepush BLOCKED the push — could not compute the pushed diff, " +
"so it cannot be scanned for credentials.\n" +
` (${err instanceof Error ? err.message.split("\n")[0] : String(err)})\n` +
"Bypass if you're sure: GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip git push (or git push --no-verify)\n",
);
process.exit(1);
}
if (!added.trim()) continue;
// Visibility doesn't change HIGH behavior; pass private so nothing is treated
// as public-strict (HIGH blocks regardless either way).
// Sliced (see scanAddedLines) so a large-but-legitimate diff is actually
// scanned rather than blocked unscanned on the engine's size cap.
for (const f of scanAddedLines(added, { repoVisibility: "private" })) {
if (f.severity === "HIGH") allHigh.push(f);
else if (f.severity === "MEDIUM") mediumCount++;
}
}
if (mediumCount > 0) {
process.stderr.write(
`gstack-redact-prepush: ${mediumCount} MEDIUM finding(s) in pushed diff (PII/internal). ` +
"Not blocking. Review before this becomes public.\n",
);
}
if (allHigh.length > 0) {
// A scan that could not RUN is not a scan that FOUND something. Reporting
// "credential(s) in the pushed diff — rotate the credential" for an
// `engine.*` finding tells the operator to rotate a secret that was never
// detected, on a diff that was never read. Blocking is still right (fail
// closed), but the reason must be the true one: a guardrail that cries wolf
// is a guardrail that gets bypassed by reflex, which is worse than none.
// The computed range can be much larger than the visible tip diff, and a
// single over-cap line is deliberately withheld rather than partly scanned.
const unscanned = allHigh.filter((f) => f.id.startsWith("engine."));
const secrets = allHigh.filter((f) => !f.id.startsWith("engine."));
if (secrets.length > 0) {
process.stderr.write(
"\n⛔ gstack-redact-prepush BLOCKED the push — credential(s) in the pushed diff:\n\n",
);
for (const f of secrets) {
process.stderr.write(` HIGH ${f.id} ${f.preview}\n`);
}
process.stderr.write(
"\nRotate the credential (a pushed secret is compromised) and remove it from the diff.\n",
);
}
if (unscanned.length > 0) {
process.stderr.write(
"\n⛔ gstack-redact-prepush BLOCKED the push — the diff could NOT be scanned.\n" +
" No credential was found; none was looked for. Blocking fail-closed.\n\n",
);
for (const f of unscanned) {
process.stderr.write(` ${f.id}: ${f.description}\n`);
}
process.stderr.write(
"\nA long line, large first push, or unavailable remote tip may exceed the\n" +
"per-slice safety cap. Check the destination and range; scan the diff yourself\n" +
"before bypassing: `git diff <base>..HEAD | grep -inE \'password|secret|token|api.?key\'`.\n",
);
}
process.stderr.write(
"This is a guardrail: `git push --no-verify` or `GSTACK_REDACT_PREPUSH=skip git push` bypass it.\n",
);
process.exit(1);
}
process.exit(0);
}
main();