gstack/test/fixtures/ceo-source-attribution-6aef.json

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  "qualification": "Literal projection of source attribution, complete decision ledger and complete native currentDecision fields. Original paid outcome remains unchanged; regression replay grants no behavioral credit.",
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      "text": "# Plan: Payment Processing Integration (CEO review, HOLD SCOPE)\n\nSource under review: `PLAN.md` (repo root, commit e4bae55). Review skill: `/plan-ceo-review`.\nMode: HOLD SCOPE (explicit user instruction). Base branch: `main`.\n"
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      "text": "## Decision ledger\n\n| ID and owner | Contract and evidence | Current | Proposed | Status | Exact approval and scope |\n|---|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R0 (plan author) | Handler class name `Webhooks::StripePaymentWebhookHandler`, app namespace (PLAN.md:100-103) | n/a (new class) | as named | approved | Settled in PLAN.md:102 (\"This naming choice is settled\"); not re-asked |\n| R1 (backend owner) | Routing: separate handler registered with `WebhookDispatcher` vs bypass vs inline (PLAN.md:10-11, 103, 105-108) | ingress -> dispatcher -> prior library-adapter handler | A register / B bypass / C inline in dispatcher | approved | D1 answered \"A) Register with dispatcher\". Scope: new class `Webhooks::StripePaymentWebhookHandler` registered for `payment_intent.succeeded` in `WebhookDispatcher`; flag selects new vs prior handler at registration; no bypass route. Decision log id a7b3cdc1 |\n| R2 (backend owner) | Lookup query construction from `request.params.userId` (PLAN.md:16-31, 110-112) | existing lookup, opaque TEXT id, no cast | raw SQL fragment | pending | review sections (Error map) |\n| R3 (backend owner) | Email-leg exception handling after payment update (PLAN.md:52-53, 60-69, 85-97, 114-116) | prior handler behavior unknown; mail client rethrows | inline, no error handling | pending | review sections (Error map) |\n| R4 (backend owner) | Automated coverage for the new handler (PLAN.md:76-80, 118-119) | manual staging replay only | none | pending | review sections (Tests) |\n| R5 (backend owner) | Order summary data loading (PLAN.md:81-84, 121-123) | per-order loop | per-order loop | pending | review sections (Performance) |\n\n"
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      "text": "## currentDecision (R2)\nCommitment comparison:\n\n```text\nCommitment | Source/approval or pending | Current | A | B | C\nLookup query construction | pending (R2), PLAN.md:110-112 | existing lookup by opaque TEXT id (PLAN.md:24-26) | bound parameter via the existing lookup (`where(id: user_id)` / `where(\"id = ?\", user_id)`) | hand-built SQL string with `connection.quote(user_id)` escaping | raw fragment with interpolated `request.params.userId` (as planned)\nAccepts every nonempty opaque TEXT id incl. punctuation/Unicode | retained PLAN.md:24-26 | yes | yes | yes if quote() is correct for the adapter | no: quotes break the statement\nInjection surface | retained PLAN.md:21-23 | none | none | none if every call site quotes; fragile | open\nNo cast / no format validation | retained PLAN.md:24-26 | none | none | none | none\nRegression test carried with the change | 0D test table | n/a | spec: ids with ' \" ; -- and Unicode resolve the user, no exception | same spec | none\nDB exception propagation | retained PLAN.md:70-73 | propagate | unchanged | unchanged | unchanged\n```\n\nQuestion: D2 — R2: How should the handler build the user lookup query from `request.params.userId`?\nProject/branch/task: gstack-plan-count-ryKYNk on main; HOLD SCOPE CEO review of the Stripe payment handler plan.\nELI10: The webhook carries a user id as plain text. The plan pastes that text straight into a SQL string. The contracts say ids can contain any punctuation and that nothing upstream escapes them (PLAN.md:21-26). So a legitimate id with an apostrophe breaks the query, and an id shaped like SQL runs as SQL. Databases have a built-in way to pass values separately from the query text; using it costs nothing.\nStakes if we pick wrong: a real customer whose id contains a quote pays, Stripe says succeeded, and our app throws on every retry until Stripe gives up: they stay unpaid and nobody sees why except a 500 in the ingress log. If ids ever come from outside the app, it is a SQL injection against the payments database.\nRecommendation: A because a bound parameter is the standard-library answer (reuse ladder rung 2), it reuses the existing lookup, and it removes the whole failure class instead of guarding one call site; this maps to \"explicit over clever\" and \"bug fixes hit root cause\".\nCompleteness: A=10/10, B=5/10, C=1/10\nNet: A and B differ in whether the fix is structural (binding) or a hand-applied guard (escaping); C keeps a known break on legitimate ids.\nHeader: Lookup query\nA) Bind parameter via existing lookup (recommended)\nPass `userId` as a bound parameter through the existing user lookup (ActiveRecord `where(id: user_id)` or `where(\"id = ?\", user_id)`); never interpolate it into SQL text. Carries its regression: a handler spec that resolves users whose ids contain `'`, `\"`, `;`, `--`, and Unicode, asserting the user is found and no exception is raised. Failure visibility: none needed, the failure class no longer exists; DB exceptions still propagate to the ingress 500 path. Effort: S (human: ~1h / CC: ~5 min). Risk: low. Reuse: existing lookup, no new code path. Maintenance: none. ✅ Removes both the availability bug (legitimate ids with quotes) and the injection surface in one structural change. ✅ Reuses the existing lookup exactly as the prior handler did, so behavior for every nonempty id matches the retained contract (PLAN.md:24-26). ❌ Requires the implementer to resist the plan's literal wording (\"raw SQL fragment\") and use the ORM/bound form instead.\nB) Escape into raw SQL string\nKeep a hand-built SQL string but wrap the value with the adapter's quoting (`connection.quote(user_id)`) before interpolation. Same regression spec as A. Effort: S (human: ~1h / CC: ~5 min). Risk: medium. Reuse: none, a second lookup path beside the existing one. Maintenance: every future edit to that string must remember to quote. ✅ Keeps the plan's raw-SQL shape if there is an unstated reason to avoid the ORM here. ✅ Correct quoting does handle punctuation and Unicode ids on mainstream adapters. ❌ A guard applied at one call site; the next person who edits the string can drop it silently, and it duplicates a lookup that already exists (DRY). ❌ Escaping correctness is adapter-specific and not verified by the plan.\nC) Keep raw fragment as planned\nInterpolate `request.params.userId` directly, as PLAN.md:110-112 states, with no test. Effort: S (zero extra work). Risk: high. Reuse: none. Maintenance: incident-driven. ✅ Zero deviation from the written plan. ✅ Works for ids that happen to contain no quote characters. ❌ Violates the retained contract that every nonempty string is a valid identifier (PLAN.md:24-26): ids with quotes throw on every delivery and that customer never becomes paid. ❌ Leaves a SQL injection surface on the payments database, contradicting PLAN.md:21-23.\n\n"
    }
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  "seed": "Please review this plan thoroughly in HOLD SCOPE mode. As you go, write your plan-mode plan to /tmp/g-cwnk0pmy/gstack-paid-shard-kd7Yyw/tmp/gstack-e2e-plan-ceo-Ui9vBI/gstack-test-plan-ceo.md (use Edit/Write to that exact path).\nProceed directly to the requested CEO review; skip the optional /office-hours prerequisite.\nFinish after this CEO review; I will handle subsequent reviews manually.\n\n# Plan: Payment Processing Integration\n\n## Existing contracts retained\nThe approved motivation is to move payment orchestration out of the prior\nlibrary-adapter handler into application-owned code while retaining the\nexisting payment and receipt product behavior. The shared dispatcher remains\navailable; the proposed bypass below is still an architectural choice to review.\nThe existing ingress middleware verifies the Stripe signature against the\nraw request body and rejects invalid signatures before invoking handlers.\nThe existing ingress forwards only `payment_intent.succeeded` events to\nthis handler; other Stripe event types are acknowledged without invoking it.\nThe existing payload adapter exposes `event.data.object.metadata.user_id`\nas `request.params.userId`. This params object is the parsed body-data map,\nnot URL query/path parameters; all users share one webhook URL.\nThe adapter acknowledges missing, nil, or empty user_id metadata with\nHTTP 200 and an event-correlated warning before invoking this handler.\nFor every nonempty external string it performs no SQL-format validation.\nThe adapter forwards that external string unchanged. It does not cast,\nescape, or SQL-sanitize it; a valid signature does not make it safe for SQL.\nUser IDs are opaque TEXT values, including punctuation and Unicode. The\nlookup has no integer/UUID cast or ID-format restriction; every nonempty\nstring is a valid identifier representation.\nAn existing ingress ownership guard checks the PaymentIntent ID against\nits stored opaque user-ID binding before invoking the handler. A mismatch\nis acknowledged with HTTP 200 and an event-correlated warning. This is an\nidentity comparison, not SQL-format validation; the adapter still forwards\nthe original string unchanged.\nThe existing webhook event guard deduplicates deliveries by Stripe event ID,\nand an existing per-user lock serializes payment updates.\nThe event guard acquires the existing per-user lock before checking the\ncommitted completion marker, and rechecks after any lock wait. It holds\nthat lock through the handler and completion bookkeeping; an overlapping\ncompleted duplicate does not invoke the handler.\nThe new handler runs inside those unchanged guards; this plan does not\nreplace signature verification, event deduplication, or update locking.\nThe existing user update assigns payment_status=paid and the payment intent\nID; it does not increment a balance or counter. Repeating the same payment\nintent assigns the same values, independently of the event-ID guard.\nThe existing lookup-result guard acknowledges unknown/deleted users with\nHTTP 200, logs the event, and stops before user updates or email fan-out.\nThe retained recipient-policy helper treats a nil or empty email address as\nskipped_missing_address: payment processing continues normally, and no mail\nclient call is attempted. It persists an event/user/PaymentIntent-correlated\nskip record, emits a structured warning, and increments the existing counter.\nThe existing notification runbook already covers that skip result: correct\nthe account address, then retry only its recorded notification using the\nsame PaymentIntent idempotency key. It never replays the payment for this case.\nThat recipient policy does not catch failures from sends to nonempty addresses;\nthe shared mail client still rethrows those exceptions to this handler.\nAccount deletion uses the same per-user lock. The handler holds it from\nlookup through update and inline email, so deletion either precedes lookup\n(the existing unknown/deleted-user path) or follows the handler; it cannot\nremove the user between lookup and update.\nThe ingress wrapper already logs event IDs, outcomes, and durations, with\nalerts for failed webhook processing. Those controls remain in place.\nThe existing DB and mail clients attach the adapter user ID and event ID\nto outcome traces, including update success and email delivery success or\nfailure. These shared clients rethrow exceptions unchanged; tracing does\nnot rescue email errors or change the inline email call below.\nThe shared mail client also publishes its delivery failure rate to the\nexisting dashboard and tested on-call alert, including caught exceptions.\nThe existing incident runbook uses the correlated DB and mail outcomes to\ndistinguish committed payments from failed notifications. It directs on-call\nto check provider status and retry only the failed notification through the\nexisting notification retry procedure, never replay the payment blindly.\nDB lookup/update exceptions propagate to that ingress wrapper, which logs\nthe failure and returns HTTP 500 so Stripe retries the event. The existing\nevent-ID dedup guard records completion only after the database transaction\ncommits; failed or rolled-back database attempts remain retryable.\nThe deployment already has a handler feature flag and a documented, tested\nrollback to the prior handler; this change uses that existing rollout path.\nThat documented manual rollout checklist already requires a staging\npayment-event replay for this handler and verification of the user update,\nemail delivery, and correlated outcome trace before enabling it broadly.\nThis is manual deployment verification, not automated handler regression\ncoverage; no new automated tests are planned in the Tests section below.\nThe existing notification contract sends one payment receipt per PaymentIntent,\nincluding a summary of the user orders. With zero orders it still sends one\nreceipt with an empty order summary; the order loop is data loading, never\none email or payment update per order. These product semantics are retained.\nThe shared mail client already derives a provider idempotency key from that\nPaymentIntent ID. The provider durably suppresses duplicate successful sends\nfor the same key across process crashes, webhook retries, and manual retries.\nBefore rethrowing a failed or timed-out send, that client durably records the\nnotification attempt for the existing retry procedure. The dashboard and\non-call alert already monitor failed-notification age and backlog after an\noutage clears, as well as failure rate; the runbook retries those records.\nThe existing mail-client deadline is one second, enforced by cancellation\nof the provider request with no inline retries. It raises MailTimeout on\nexpiry. The retained DB/ingress deadlines bound their combined work to two\nseconds, leaving headroom inside the existing ten-second webhook deadline.\nNeither deadlines nor retry records catch the mail exception for this handler;\nthe shared client still rethrows it to the inline caller described below.\nEvery existing event-correlated outcome trace includes the active handler\nidentity (prior or new), so rollout attribution is already available.\nIf a separate handler class is retained, its already-approved name is\n`Webhooks::StripePaymentWebhookHandler` in the application-owned namespace,\nnever the Stripe library namespace. This naming choice is settled; whether\nto add a separate implementation or reuse WebhookDispatcher remains open.\n\n## Architecture\nWe're adding a new `StripePaymentWebhookHandler` class that will handle Stripe webhooks.\nThis bypasses the existing `WebhookDispatcher` module — we want a clean\nnamespace separation.\n\n## Database access\nThe new endpoint reads `request.params.userId` directly into a raw SQL\nfragment for the lookup query.\n\n## Webhook fan-out\nOn payment success we update the user record AND fire a notification email.\nBoth happen inline; no error handling on the email leg.\n\n## Tests\nNone planned. We'll rely on the existing integration suite catching regressions.\n\n## Performance\nEach webhook lookup hits the database for the user, then fetches each\norder in a loop.",
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          "question": "D2 — R2: How should the handler build the user lookup query from `request.params.userId`?\nProject/branch/task: gstack-plan-count-ryKYNk on main; HOLD SCOPE CEO review of the Stripe payment handler plan.\nELI10: The webhook carries a user id as plain text. The plan pastes that text straight into a SQL string. The contracts say ids can contain any punctuation and that nothing upstream escapes them (PLAN.md:21-26). So a legitimate id with an apostrophe breaks the query, and an id shaped like SQL runs as SQL. Databases have a built-in way to pass values separately from the query text; using it costs nothing.\nStakes if we pick wrong: a real customer whose id contains a quote pays, Stripe says succeeded, and our app throws on every retry until Stripe gives up: they stay unpaid and nobody sees why except a 500 in the ingress log. If ids ever come from outside the app, it is a SQL injection against the payments database.\nRecommendation: A because a bound parameter is the standard-library answer (reuse ladder rung 2), it reuses the existing lookup, and it removes the whole failure class instead of guarding one call site; this maps to \"explicit over clever\" and \"bug fixes hit root cause\".\nCompleteness: A=10/10, B=5/10, C=1/10\nNet: A and B differ in whether the fix is structural (binding) or a hand-applied guard (escaping); C keeps a known break on legitimate ids.",
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              "description": "Pass `userId` as a bound parameter through the existing user lookup (ActiveRecord `where(id: user_id)` or `where(\"id = ?\", user_id)`); never interpolate it into SQL text. Carries its regression: a handler spec that resolves users whose ids contain `'`, `\"`, `;`, `--`, and Unicode, asserting the user is found and no exception is raised. Failure visibility: none needed, the failure class no longer exists; DB exceptions still propagate to the ingress 500 path. Effort: S (human: ~1h / CC: ~5 min). Risk: low. Reuse: existing lookup, no new code path. Maintenance: none. ✅ Removes both the availability bug (legitimate ids with quotes) and the injection surface in one structural change. ✅ Reuses the existing lookup exactly as the prior handler did, so behavior for every nonempty id matches the retained contract (PLAN.md:24-26). ❌ Requires the implementer to resist the plan's literal wording (\"raw SQL fragment\") and use the ORM/bound form instead."
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              "label": "B) Escape into raw SQL string",
              "description": "Keep a hand-built SQL string but wrap the value with the adapter's quoting (`connection.quote(user_id)`) before interpolation. Same regression spec as A. Effort: S (human: ~1h / CC: ~5 min). Risk: medium. Reuse: none, a second lookup path beside the existing one. Maintenance: every future edit to that string must remember to quote. ✅ Keeps the plan's raw-SQL shape if there is an unstated reason to avoid the ORM here. ✅ Correct quoting does handle punctuation and Unicode ids on mainstream adapters. ❌ A guard applied at one call site; the next person who edits the string can drop it silently, and it duplicates a lookup that already exists (DRY). ❌ Escaping correctness is adapter-specific and not verified by the plan."
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              "label": "C) Keep raw fragment as planned",
              "description": "Interpolate `request.params.userId` directly, as PLAN.md:110-112 states, with no test. Effort: S (zero extra work). Risk: high. Reuse: none. Maintenance: incident-driven. ✅ Zero deviation from the written plan. ✅ Works for ids that happen to contain no quote characters. ❌ Violates the retained contract that every nonempty string is a valid identifier (PLAN.md:24-26): ids with quotes throw on every delivery and that customer never becomes paid. ❌ Leaves a SQL injection surface on the payments database, contradicting PLAN.md:21-23."
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        "D2 — R2: How should the handler build the user lookup query from `request.params.userId`?\nProject/branch/task: gstack-plan-count-ryKYNk on main; HOLD SCOPE CEO review of the Stripe payment handler plan.\nELI10: The webhook carries a user id as plain text. The plan pastes that text straight into a SQL string. The contracts say ids can contain any punctuation and that nothing upstream escapes them (PLAN.md:21-26). So a legitimate id with an apostrophe breaks the query, and an id shaped like SQL runs as SQL. Databases have a built-in way to pass values separately from the query text; using it costs nothing.\nStakes if we pick wrong: a real customer whose id contains a quote pays, Stripe says succeeded, and our app throws on every retry until Stripe gives up: they stay unpaid and nobody sees why except a 500 in the ingress log. If ids ever come from outside the app, it is a SQL injection against the payments database.\nRecommendation: A because a bound parameter is the standard-library answer (reuse ladder rung 2), it reuses the existing lookup, and it removes the whole failure class instead of guarding one call site; this maps to \"explicit over clever\" and \"bug fixes hit root cause\".\nCompleteness: A=10/10, B=5/10, C=1/10\nNet: A and B differ in whether the fix is structural (binding) or a hand-applied guard (escaping); C keeps a known break on legitimate ids.": "A) Bind parameter via existing lookup (recommended)"
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      "answeredAt": "2026-09-16T23:12:47.138Z"
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