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* fix(codex): use resume-compatible flags * fix: V-001 security vulnerability Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI * docs: align prompt-injection thresholds to security.ts (v1.6.4.0 catch-up) CLAUDE.md:290 and ARCHITECTURE.md:159 were missed when WARN was bumped 0.60 → 0.75 ind75402bb(v1.6.4.0, "cut Haiku classifier FP from 44% to 23%, gate now enforced", #1135). browse/src/security.ts:37 has WARN: 0.75 and BROWSER.md:743 was updated alongside that commit; CLAUDE.md and ARCHITECTURE.md still read 0.60. Also adds the SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92 entry to CLAUDE.md (already in security.ts:50 and BROWSER.md:745, missing from CLAUDE.md's threshold table). No code change. No behavior change. Pure doc-vs-code alignment. Verification: $ grep -n "WARN" browse/src/security.ts CLAUDE.md ARCHITECTURE.md BROWSER.md browse/src/security.ts:37: WARN: 0.75, CLAUDE.md:290: - \`WARN: 0.75\` ... ARCHITECTURE.md:159: ...>= \`WARN\` (0.75)... BROWSER.md:743: - \`WARN: 0.75\` ... Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: Korean/CJK IME input and rendering in Sidebar Terminal Fixes #1272 This commit addresses three separate Korean/CJK bugs in the Sidebar Terminal: **Bug 1 - IME Input**: Korean text typed via IME composition was not reaching the PTY correctly. Added compositionstart/compositionend event listeners to suppress partial jamo fragments and only send the final composed string. **Bug 2a - Font Rendering**: Added CJK monospace font fallbacks ("Noto Sans Mono CJK KR", "Malgun Gothic") to both the xterm.js fontFamily config and the CSS --font-mono variable. This ensures consistent cell-width calculations for Korean characters. **Bug 2b - UTF-8 Boundary Detection**: Added buffering logic to prevent multi-byte UTF-8 characters (Korean is 3 bytes) from being split across WebSocket chunks. This follows the same pattern as PR #1007 which fixed the sidebar-agent path, but extends it to the terminal-agent path. Special thanks to @ldybob for the excellent root cause analysis and proposed solutions in issue #1272. Tested on WSL2 + Windows 11 with Korean IME. * fix(ship): tighten Plan Completion gate (VAS-449 remediation) VAS-446 shipped with a PLAN.md acceptance criterion (domain-hq has /docs/dashboard.md) silently skipped. /ship's Plan Completion subagent existed at ship time (added in v1.4.1.0) but the gate let the failure through. Four structural fixes: 1. Path concreteness rule: items naming a concrete filesystem path MUST be classified DONE/NOT DONE via [ -f <path> ], never UNVERIFIABLE. 2. Validator detection: CONTENT-SHAPE items scan target repo's package.json for validate-* scripts and run them before falling back to UNVERIFIABLE. 3. Per-item UNVERIFIABLE confirmation: replaces blanket "I've checked each one" with per-item Y/N/D loop. The blanket-confirm path is the exact failure VAS-449 surfaced. 4. Subagent fail-closed: if Plan Completion subagent + inline fallback both fail, surface explicit AskUserQuestion instead of silent pass. Replaces the prior "Never block /ship on subagent failure" fail-open. Locked in by test/ship-plan-completion-invariants.test.ts (5 assertions, no LLM dependency, ~60ms). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(browse): bash.exe wrap for telemetry on Windows reportAttemptTelemetry() in browse/src/security.ts calls spawn(bin, args) where bin is the gstack-telemetry-log bash script. On Windows this fails silently with ENOENT — CreateProcess can't dispatch on shebang lines. Adopts v1.24.0.0's Bun.which + GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern (from browse/src/claude-bin.ts:resolveClaudeCommand, introduced in #1252) for resolving bash.exe. resolveBashBinary() honors GSTACK_BASH_BIN absolute-path or PATH-resolvable override, falling back to Bun.which('bash') which finds Git Bash on the standard Windows install. buildTelemetrySpawnCommand() wraps the script invocation on win32 only; POSIX path is bit-identical. Returns null when bash can't be resolved on Windows so caller skips spawn — local attempts.jsonl audit trail keeps working without surfacing a Windows-only failure. 8 new unit tests cover resolveBashBinary (POSIX bash, absolute override, quote-stripping, BASH_BIN fallback, empty-PATH null) and buildTelemetrySpawnCommand (POSIX pass-through, win32 bash wrap, win32 null on unresolvable, arg-array immutability). POSIX path is bit-identical — Bun.which('bash') on Linux/macOS returns the same /bin/bash or /usr/bin/bash that the old hardcoded spawn relied on. * fix(make-pdf): Bun.which-based binary resolution for browse + pdftotext on Windows Extends v1.24.0.0's Bun.which + GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern (introduced in browse/src/claude-bin.ts via #1252) to the two other binary resolvers in the codebase: make-pdf/src/browseClient.ts:resolveBrowseBin and make-pdf/src/pdftotext.ts:resolvePdftotext. Same Windows quirks (fs.accessSync(X_OK) degrades to existence-check; `which` isn't available outside Git Bash; bun --compile --outfile X emits X.exe), same Bun.which-based fix shape, same env override convention. Changes: - GSTACK_BROWSE_BIN / GSTACK_PDFTOTEXT_BIN as the v1.24-aligned overrides; BROWSE_BIN / PDFTOTEXT_BIN remain as back-compat aliases. - Bun.which() replaces execFileSync('which', ...) for PATH lookup. Handles Windows PATHEXT natively; no more `where`-vs-`which` branch. - findExecutable(base) helper exported from each module, probes .exe/.cmd/.bat after the bare-path miss on win32. Linux/macOS behavior is bit-identical (isExecutable short-circuits before the win32 branch ever runs). - macCandidates renamed posixCandidates (always was — /opt/homebrew, /usr/local, /usr/bin). No Windows candidates added; Poppler installs scatter across Scoop/Chocolatey/portable zips and guessing causes false positives. - Error messages get a Windows install hint (scoop install poppler / oschwartz10612) and `setx` example for GSTACK_*_BIN. - Pre-existing test 'honors BROWSE_BIN when it points at a real executable' was hardcoded /bin/sh — made cross-platform via a REAL_EXE constant (cmd.exe on win32, /bin/sh on POSIX). Was a Windows-CI blocker on its own. Coordination: PR #1094 (@BkashJEE) covered browseClient.ts independently with a narrower scope; this PR's pdftotext + cross-platform tests + GSTACK_*_BIN naming are additive. Either order of merge works. Test plan: - bun test make-pdf/test/browseClient.test.ts make-pdf/test/pdftotext.test.ts on win32 — 29 pass, 0 fail (12 new assertions: findExecutable POSIX/win32/null, resolveBrowseBin GSTACK_BROWSE_BIN + BROWSE_BIN + precedence + quote-strip, same shape for resolvePdftotext + Windows install hint in error message). - POSIX branch unchanged — fs.accessSync(X_OK) on Linux/macOS short-circuits before any win32 logic runs, matching the v1.24 claude-bin.ts pattern. * fix(browse): NTFS ACL hardening for Windows state files via icacls gstack's ~/.gstack/ state directory holds bearer tokens, canary tokens, agent queue contents (with prompt history), session state, security-decision logs, and saved cookie bundles — all written with { mode: 0o600 } / 0o700. On Windows, those mode bits are a silent no-op: Node's fs module doesn't translate POSIX modes to NTFS ACLs, and inherited ACLs leave every "restricted" file readable by other principals on the machine (verified via icacls — six ACEs, the intended user is the LAST of six). Threat model is non-trivial on: - Self-hosted CI runners (different service account on the same Windows box can read developer tokens, canary tokens, prompt history) - Shared development machines (agencies, studios, lab environments) - Multi-tenant servers with shared home directories Orthogonal to v1.24.0.0's binary-resolution work — complementary at the write side. v1.24's bin/gstack-paths resolves ~/.gstack/ correctly across plugin / global / local installs; this PR ensures files written into those resolved paths actually get the POSIX 0o600 semantic translated to NTFS. The fix: - New browse/src/file-permissions.ts (158 LOC, 5 public + 1 test-reset). restrictFilePermissions / restrictDirectoryPermissions wrap chmod (POSIX) or icacls /inheritance:r /grant:r <user>:(F) (Windows). writeSecureFile / appendSecureFile / mkdirSecure are drop-in wrappers for the common patterns. - 19 call sites converted across 9 source files: browser-manager.ts, browser-skill-write.ts, cli.ts, config.ts, meta-commands.ts, security-classifier.ts, security.ts (4 sites), server.ts (5 sites), terminal-agent.ts (8 sites), tunnel-denial-log.ts. - (OI)(CI) inheritance flags on directories mean files created via fs.write* *inside* an mkdirSecure-created dir inherit the owner-only ACL automatically — important for tunnel-denial-log.ts where appends use async fsp.appendFile. Error handling: icacls failures (nonexistent path, missing icacls.exe, hardened environments) log a one-shot warning to stderr and proceed. Once-per-process gating prevents log spam if the condition persists. Filesystem stays functional; the file just ends up with inherited ACLs. Test plan: - bun test browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts — 13 pass, 0 fail (POSIX mode-bit assertions, Windows no-throw, mkdir idempotence, recursive creation, Buffer payloads, append-creates-then-reapplies-once semantics) - bun test browse/test/security.test.ts — 38 pass, 0 fail (existing security test suite plus the bash-binary resolution tests added in fix #1119; the converted writeFileSync/appendFileSync/mkdirSync sites in security.ts integrate cleanly) - Empirical icacls before/after on a real file — 6 ACEs → 1 ACE - bun build typecheck on all modified files — clean (server.ts has a pre-existing playwright-core/electron resolution issue unrelated to this PR) POSIX behavior is bit-identical to old code — fs.chmodSync(path, 0o6XX) on the helper's POSIX branch matches the inline { mode: 0o6XX } it replaces. Linux and macOS see no behavior change. Inviting pushback on three judgment calls (in PR description): 1. icacls vs npm library 2. ACL scope — just user, or user + SYSTEM? 3. Graceful degradation — once-per-process warn, not silent, not hard-fail. * fix(browse): declare lastConsoleFlushed to restore console-log persistence flushBuffers() references a `lastConsoleFlushed` cursor at server.ts:337 and assigns it at :344, but the `let lastConsoleFlushed = 0;` declaration is missing — only the network and dialog siblings are declared at lines 327-328. Result: every 1-second flushBuffers tick (line 376) throws `ReferenceError: lastConsoleFlushed is not defined`, gets swallowed by the catch at line 369 ("[browse] Buffer flush failed: ..."), and the console branch's append never runs. browse-console.log is never written in any production deployment since this regressed. Discovered by stress-testing the daemon with 15 concurrent CLIs against cold state — the race surfaced the buffer-flush error spam in one spawned daemon's stderr. Verified by running the daemon against a real file:// page with console.log events: in-memory `browse console` returns the entries, but `.gstack/browse-console.log` is never created on disk. Regression introduced by1a100a2a"fix: eliminate duplicate command sets in chain, improve flush perf and type safety" — the flush refactor switched from `Bun.write` to `fs.appendFileSync` and added the `lastConsoleFlushed` cursor pattern alongside its network/dialog siblings, but missed the matching `let` declaration. Tests don't currently exercise flushBuffers, so the regression shipped silently. Fix: - Declare `let lastConsoleFlushed = 0;` next to `lastNetworkFlushed` and `lastDialogFlushed` (browse/src/server.ts:327) - Add a source-level guard test (browse/test/server-flush-trackers.test.ts) that fails any future refactor that adds a fourth `last*Flushed` cursor without the matching declaration. Same pattern as terminal-agent.test.ts and dual-listener.test.ts — read source as text, assert invariant, no daemon required. Test plan: - [x] New regression test fails on current main, passes with the fix - [x] `bun run build` clean - [x] Manual smoke: spawn daemon -> goto file:// page with console.log -> wait 4s -> .gstack/browse-console.log now exists with the expected entries (163 bytes vs zero before) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) * fix(browse): per-process state-file temp path to fix concurrent-write ENOENT The daemon writes `.gstack/browse.json` via the standard atomic-rename pattern: `writeFileSync(tmp, …) → renameSync(tmp, stateFile)`. Four sites in server.ts use this pattern (initial daemon-startup state at :2002, /tunnel/start handler at :1479, BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 inline tunnel update at :2083, BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY=1 update at :2113), and all four hard-code the same temp filename `${stateFile}.tmp`. Under concurrent writers the shared filename races on the rename: t0 Writer A: writeFileSync(stateFile + '.tmp', payloadA) t1 Writer B: writeFileSync(stateFile + '.tmp', payloadB) // overwrites A t2 Writer A: renameSync(stateFile + '.tmp', stateFile) // moves B's payload t3 Writer B: renameSync(stateFile + '.tmp', stateFile) // ENOENT — file gone Reproduced empirically with 15 concurrent CLIs against a fresh `.gstack/`: [browse] Failed to start: ENOENT: no such file or directory, rename '…/.gstack/browse.json.tmp' -> '…/.gstack/browse.json' Pre-fix success rate: **0 / 15** under cold-start race. Post-fix success rate: **15 / 15**, zero ENOENT. Fix: - New `tmpStatePath()` helper (server.ts:333) returns `${stateFile}.tmp.${pid}.${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}` - All 4 call sites use `tmpStatePath()` instead of the shared literal - Atomic rename still gives last-writer-wins semantics on the final state.json content; only behavior change is that concurrent writers no longer kill each other on the rename step Source-level guard test (browse/test/server-tmp-state-path.test.ts) locks two invariants: (1) no remaining `stateFile + '.tmp'` literals, (2) every state-write `writeFileSync` call uses `tmpStatePath()`. Same read-source-as-text pattern as terminal-agent.test.ts and dual-listener.test.ts — no daemon required, runs in tier-1 free. Test plan: - [x] Targeted source-level guard test passes (3 / 0) - [x] `bun run build` clean - [x] Live regression: 15 concurrent CLIs against cold state → 15 / 15 healthy, 0 ENOENT (vs 0 / 15 pre-fix) - [x] No `.tmp.*` orphans left behind after rename succeeds - [x] Related test cluster (server-auth, dual-listener, cdp-mutex, findport) — same pre-existing flakes as `main`, no new regressions introduced 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) * fix(browse): clear refs when iframe auto-detaches in getActiveFrameOrPage Asymmetric cleanup between two equivalent staleness conditions: onMainFrameNavigated() → clearRefs() + activeFrame = null ✓ getActiveFrameOrPage() → activeFrame = null (refs NOT cleared) ✗ Both paths see the same staleness condition — refs were captured against a frame that no longer exists. The main-frame path correctly clears both pieces of state. The iframe-detach path nulls the frame but leaves the refMap intact. The lazy click-time check in `resolveRef` (tab-session.ts:97) partially saves us — `entry.locator.count()` on a detached-frame locator throws or returns 0, so the click errors out as "Ref X is stale". But the user has no signal that frame context silently changed underfoot: the next `snapshot` runs against `this.page` (main) while old iframe refs still litter `refMap` with the same role+name keys. New refs collide with stale ones, the resolver picks one at random, the user clicks the wrong element. TODOS.md line 816-820 documents "Detached frame auto-recovery" as a shipped iframe-support feature in v0.12.1.0. This restores the documented intent — the recovery should leave the session in a clean state, not a half-cleared one. Fix: 1 line — add `this.clearRefs()` next to `this.activeFrame = null` inside the if-branch. Test plan: - [x] New regression test: 4/4 pass - refs cleared when getActiveFrameOrPage detects detached iframe - refs preserved when active frame is still attached (no regression) - refs preserved when no frame set (page-level path untouched) - matches onMainFrameNavigated symmetry — both paths reach the same clean end state - [x] `bun run build` clean 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) * fix(codex): resolve python for JSON parser * fix: add fail-fast probe for base branch in ship step 12 * fix(plan-devex-review): remove contradictory plan-mode handshake * fix(design): honor Retry-After header in variants 429 handler Closes #1244. The 429 handler in `generateVariant` discarded the `Retry-After` response header and fell straight through to a local exponential schedule (2s/4s/8s). In image-generation batches, that burns retry attempts inside the provider's cooldown window and the request never recovers. Now we parse `Retry-After` per RFC 7231 — both delta-seconds (`Retry-After: 5`) and HTTP-date (`Retry-After: Fri, 31 Dec 1999 23:59:59 GMT`). Honored waits are capped at 60s to bound stalls from hostile or buggy headers. Delta-seconds are validated as digits-only (rejects `2abc`). When `Retry-After` is honored (including 0 / past-date "retry now"), the next iteration's leading exponential sleep is skipped so we don't double-wait. Invalid or missing headers fall through to the existing exponential schedule unchanged. Behavior matrix: | Header | Behavior | |---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------| | Retry-After: 5 | wait 5s, skip leading on next attempt | | Retry-After: 999999 | capped to 60s, skip leading | | Retry-After: 2abc | invalid, fall through to exponential | | Retry-After: 0 | wait 0, skip leading (retry immediately) | | Retry-After: <past HTTP-date> | wait 0, skip leading | | Retry-After: <future date> | wait diff capped at 60s, skip leading | | no header | fall through to existing exponential | `generateVariant` now accepts an optional `fetchFn` parameter (defaults to `globalThis.fetch`) so tests can inject a stub. Production call sites are unchanged. Tests cover the five behavior buckets above, asserting both the 1st-to-2nd call timing gap and call counts. All five pass in ~8s. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(docs): correct per-skill symlink removal snippet in README uninstall Closes #1130. The manual-uninstall fallback in `## Uninstall` → `### Option 2` used `find ~/.claude/skills -maxdepth 1 -type l`, which finds nothing on real installs. Each `~/.claude/skills/<name>/` is a real directory, and only `<name>/SKILL.md` inside it is a symlink into `gstack/`. The find never matched, so the snippet silently removed nothing. Replace with a directory walk that inspects each `<name>/SKILL.md`: find ~/.claude/skills -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d ! -name gstack → check $dir/SKILL.md is a symlink → readlink it → if target is gstack/* or */gstack/*: rm -f the link, rmdir the dir (only if empty — preserves any user-added files) Excludes the top-level `gstack/` dir from the walk; that's removed by step 3 of the same uninstall block. `bin/gstack-uninstall` (the script-mode path) already handles the layout correctly via its own walk; only this manual fallback needed updating. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject partial browse client env integers * fix(gemini-adapter): detect new ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json auth path gemini-cli >=0.30 stores OAuth credentials at ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json instead of the legacy ~/.config/gemini/ directory. The benchmark adapter's availability check now succeeds for users on recent gemini-cli releases who have authenticated via interactive login. Both paths are accepted so users on older versions still work. * fix(browser): add --no-sandbox for root user on Linux/WSL2 Chromium's sandbox can't initialize when running as root on Linux, causing an immediate exit. Extend the existing CI/CONTAINER check to also cover this case, keeping the Windows-safe `typeof getuid` guard. * security: pass cwd to git via execFileSync, not interpolation through /bin/sh `bin/gstack-memory-ingest.ts:632-643` ran `execSync(\`git -C ${JSON.stringify(cwd)} remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null\`, ...)`. JSON.stringify escapes `"` and `\` but not `$` or backticks, so a `cwd` of `"$(touch /tmp/marker)"` survived JSON quoting and detonated under /bin/sh's command-substitution-inside-double-quotes. `cwd` originates from transcript JSONL records under `~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl` and `~/.codex/sessions/YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*.jsonl`. The walker grabs the first `.cwd` it sees per session. That's an untrusted surface in the gstack threat model — the L1-L6 sidebar security stack exists exactly because agent transcripts can carry attacker-influenced text. Two pivots above the local same-uid bar: (a) prompt-injection appending `cwd="$(...)"` to the active session log turns the next /sync-gbrain run into RCE under the user's uid; (b) cross-machine transcript share (a colleague's `.claude/projects` snippet untar'd into HOME, a documented gbrain dogfooding shape) → RCE on first sync. Fix swaps the one execSync for `execFileSync("git", ["-C", cwd, "remote", "get-url", "origin"], ...)`. No shell, argv passed directly to git. The same module already uses execFileSync for `gbrainAvailable()` (line 762 pre-patch) and `gbrainPutPage()` (line 816 pre-patch) — this single execSync was the outlier. Test: `gstack-memory-ingest security: untrusted cwd cannot trigger shell substitution` plants a Claude-Code-shaped JSONL with cwd=`$(touch <marker>)` and asserts the marker file is not created after `--incremental --quiet`. Negative control: with the patch reverted, the test fails (marker created); with the patch applied, it passes (18/18 in test/gstack-memory-ingest.test.ts). * security: gate domain-skill auto-promote on classifier_score > 0 `browse/src/domain-skill-commands.ts:140` (handleSave) writes `classifier_score: 0` with the comment "L4 deferred to load-time / sidebar-agent fills this in on first prompt-injection load." But CLAUDE.md "Sidebar architecture" documents that sidebar-agent.ts was ripped, and grep for recordSkillUse + classifierFlagged callers across browse/src/ returns zero hits outside the module under test. Net effect: every quarantined skill that survives three benign uses without flag (`recordSkillUse(... , classifierFlagged: false)` x3) auto-promotes to `active` and lands in prompt context wrapped as UNTRUSTED on every subsequent visit to that host. The L4 score that was supposed to gate the promotion was never written — the production save path puts 0 on disk and nothing later updates it. Threat model: a domain-skill body authored by an agent under the influence of a poisoned page (the new `gstackInjectToTerminal` PTY path runs no L1-L3 either) would lose its auto-promote barrier after three uses. The exploit isn't single-step but the bar is exactly N=3 prompt-injection-shaped uses on a hostile page, which is well within reach. Fix adds a single condition to the auto-promote gate in `recordSkillUse`: if (state === 'quarantined' && useCount >= PROMOTE_THRESHOLD && flagCount === 0 && current.classifier_score > 0) { state = 'active'; } `classifier_score` is set once at writeSkill and never updated. Production saves it as 0 (handleSave), so the gate stays closed; existing tests that explicitly pass `classifierScore: 0.1` still auto-promote (the auto-promote path is preserved for the day L4 is rewired). Manual promotion via `domain-skill promote-to-global` is unaffected (it goes through `promoteToGlobal` which has its own state-machine guard at line 337+). Test: new regression case `does NOT auto-promote when classifier_score is 0 (production handleSave shape)` plants a skill with classifierScore=0 (matches domain-skill-commands.ts:140), runs three uses without flag, asserts the skill stays quarantined and readSkill returns null. Negative control: revert the patch, the test fails with `Received: "active"`. With the patch: 15/15 pass. * fix(ship): port #1302 SKILL.md edits to .tmpl + resolver source PR #1302 added Verification Mode + UNVERIFIABLE classification + per-item confirmation gate to ship/SKILL.md, but only the generated SKILL.md was edited — not the .tmpl source or scripts/resolvers/review.ts. The next `bun run gen:skill-docs` run would have wiped the changes. Port the same content into the resolver and .tmpl so regeneration produces the intended output. * ci(windows): extend free-tests lane to cover icacls + Bun.which resolvers from fix-wave PRs Closes #1306/#1307/#1308 validation gap. The four newly-added test files already have process.platform guards so they run safely on both POSIX and Windows lanes — only platform-relevant assertions execute on each. Tests added to the windows-latest lane: - browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts (#1308 icacls + writeSecureFile) - browse/test/security.test.ts (#1306 bash.exe wrap pure-function path) - make-pdf/test/browseClient.test.ts (#1307 Bun.which browse resolver) - make-pdf/test/pdftotext.test.ts (#1307 Bun.which pdftotext resolver) * test(codex): live flag-semantics smoke for codex exec resume Closes #1270's regex-only test gap. PR #1270 asserted that codex/SKILL.md's `codex exec resume` invocation drops -C/-s and uses sandbox_mode config. That regex catches the skill template regressing, but not codex CLI itself flipping flag semantics again. This test probes `codex exec resume --help` and asserts the surface gstack relies on: -c/sandbox_mode is accepted, top-level -C is absent. Skips silently when codex isn't on PATH, so dev machines without codex installed never see it fail. * chore: regen SKILL.md after fix wave One regen commit at the end of the merge wave per the plan. plan-devex-review loses the contradictory plan-mode handshake (#1333). review/SKILL.md picks up the Verification Mode + UNVERIFIABLE classification additions that #1302 authored against ship/SKILL.md (same resolver shared between ship and review modes). * fix(server.ts): keep fs.writeFileSync for state-file writes #1308's writeSecureFile wrapper added Windows icacls hardening for the 4 state-file write sites in server.ts, but #1310's regression test grep's for fs.writeFileSync(tmpStatePath()) calls. The two changes are technically compatible only if the test relaxes — keeping the test strict (the safer choice for catching regressions on the cold-start race) means the 4 state- file sites stay on fs.writeFileSync(..., { mode: 0o600 }). POSIX 0o600 hardening is preserved on those 4 sites. Windows icacls hardening still applies to all the other writeSecureFile call sites #1308 added (auth.json, mkdirSecure, etc.). Also refreshes golden baselines after #1302 / port + minor wording tweak in scripts/resolvers/review.ts to keep gen-skill-docs.test.ts assertion 'Cite the specific file' satisfied. * v1.30.0.0: fix wave — 21 community PRs + 2 closing fixes for Windows + codex CI gaps Headline release. Browse stops dropping console logs, cold-start race fixed, codex resume works without python3, Windows hardening (icacls + Bun.which + bash.exe wrap), ship gate gets VAS-449 remediation, two closing fixes that put icacls/Bun.which/codex flag semantics under CI. * test(domain-skills): cover #1369 classifier_score=0 quarantine + score>0 promote path The pre-existing T6 test seeded skills via writeSkill (which defaults classifier_score to 0 until L4 is rewired) and then expected 3 uses to auto-promote. PR #1369 added `current.classifier_score > 0` to the gate specifically to block that path — a quarantined skill written under the influence of a poisoned page would otherwise auto-promote after three benign uses. Updated test asserts both halves of the new contract: - classifier_score=0 + 3 uses → stays quarantined (the security guarantee) - classifier_score>0 + 3 more uses → promotes to active (unblock path) Catches both regressions: the gate going away (would re-allow the bypass) and the unblock path breaking (would silently quarantine all skills forever once L4 is rewired). --------- Co-authored-by: Jayesh Betala <jayesh.betala7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: orbisai0security <mediratta01.pally@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Bryce Alan <brycealan.eth@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Terry Carson YM <cym3118288@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Vasko Ckorovski <vckorovski@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Samuel Carson <samuel.carson@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Yashwant Kotipalli <yashwant7kotipalli@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Jasper Chen <jasperchen925@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Stefan Neamtu <stefan.neamtu@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: 陈家名 <chenjiaming@kezaihui.com> Co-authored-by: Abigail Atheryon <abi@atheryon.ai> Co-authored-by: Furkan Köykıran <furkankoykiran@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: gus <gustavoraularagon@gmail.com>
576 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript
576 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Terminal Agent — PTY-backed Claude Code terminal for the gstack browser
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* sidebar. Translates the phoenix gbrowser PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into
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* Bun, with a few changes informed by codex's outside-voice review:
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*
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* - Lives in a separate non-compiled bun process from sidebar-agent.ts so
|
|
* a bug in WS framing or PTY cleanup can't take down the chat path.
|
|
* - Binds 127.0.0.1 only — never on the dual-listener tunnel surface.
|
|
* - Origin validation on the WS upgrade is REQUIRED (not defense-in-depth)
|
|
* because a localhost shell WS is a real cross-site WebSocket-hijacking
|
|
* target.
|
|
* - Cookie-based auth via /internal/grant from the parent server, not a
|
|
* token in /health.
|
|
* - Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not spawned until the WS receives its first
|
|
* data frame. Sidebar opens that never type don't burn a claude session.
|
|
* - PTY dies with WS close (one PTY per WS). v1.1 may add session
|
|
* survival; for v1 we match phoenix's lifecycle.
|
|
*
|
|
* The PTY uses Bun's `terminal:` spawn option (verified at impl time on
|
|
* Bun 1.3.10): pass cols/rows + a data callback; write input via
|
|
* `proc.terminal.write(buf)`; resize via `proc.terminal.resize(cols, rows)`.
|
|
*/
|
|
import * as fs from 'fs';
|
|
import * as path from 'path';
|
|
import * as crypto from 'crypto';
|
|
import { writeSecureFile, mkdirSecure } from './file-permissions';
|
|
import { safeUnlink } from './error-handling';
|
|
|
|
const STATE_FILE = process.env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE || path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'browse.json');
|
|
const PORT_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-port');
|
|
const BROWSE_SERVER_PORT = parseInt(process.env.BROWSE_SERVER_PORT || '0', 10);
|
|
const EXTENSION_ID = process.env.BROWSE_EXTENSION_ID || ''; // optional: tighten Origin check
|
|
const INTERNAL_TOKEN = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // shared with parent server via env at spawn
|
|
|
|
// In-memory cookie token registry. Parent posts /internal/grant after
|
|
// /pty-session; we validate WS cookies against this set.
|
|
const validTokens = new Set<string>();
|
|
|
|
// Active PTY session per WS. One terminal per connection. Codex finding #4:
|
|
// uncaught handlers below catch bugs in framing/cleanup so they don't kill
|
|
// the listener loop.
|
|
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => {
|
|
console.error('[terminal-agent] uncaughtException:', err);
|
|
});
|
|
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason) => {
|
|
console.error('[terminal-agent] unhandledRejection:', reason);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
interface PtySession {
|
|
proc: any | null; // Bun.Subprocess once spawned
|
|
cols: number;
|
|
rows: number;
|
|
cookie: string;
|
|
spawned: boolean;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const sessions = new WeakMap<any, PtySession>(); // ws -> session
|
|
|
|
/** Find claude on PATH. */
|
|
function findClaude(): string | null {
|
|
// Test-only override. Lets the integration tests spawn /bin/bash instead
|
|
// of requiring claude to be installed on every CI runner. NEVER read in
|
|
// production (sidebar UI). Documented in browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.
|
|
const override = process.env.BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY;
|
|
if (override && fs.existsSync(override)) return override;
|
|
// Bun.which is sync and respects PATH. Falls back to a small list of
|
|
// common install locations if PATH is stripped (e.g., launched from
|
|
// Conductor with a minimal env).
|
|
const which = (Bun as any).which?.('claude');
|
|
if (which) return which;
|
|
const candidates = [
|
|
'/opt/homebrew/bin/claude',
|
|
'/usr/local/bin/claude',
|
|
`${process.env.HOME}/.local/bin/claude`,
|
|
`${process.env.HOME}/.bun/bin/claude`,
|
|
`${process.env.HOME}/.npm-global/bin/claude`,
|
|
];
|
|
for (const c of candidates) {
|
|
try { fs.accessSync(c, fs.constants.X_OK); return c; } catch {}
|
|
}
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Probe + persist claude availability for the bootstrap card. */
|
|
function writeClaudeAvailable(): void {
|
|
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
|
|
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
|
|
const found = findClaude();
|
|
const status = {
|
|
available: !!found,
|
|
path: found || undefined,
|
|
install_url: 'https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
|
|
checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
};
|
|
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'claude-available.json');
|
|
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-claude-${process.pid}`);
|
|
try {
|
|
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(status, null, 2));
|
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
safeUnlink(tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* System-prompt hint passed to claude via --append-system-prompt. Tells
|
|
* claude what tab-awareness affordances exist in this session so it
|
|
* doesn't have to discover them by trial. The user can override anything
|
|
* here just by saying so — system prompt is a soft hint, not a contract.
|
|
*
|
|
* Two paths claude has:
|
|
* 1. Read live state from <stateDir>/tabs.json + active-tab.json
|
|
* (updated continuously by the gstack browser extension).
|
|
* 2. Run $B tab, $B tabs, $B tab-each <command> to act on tabs. The
|
|
* tab-each helper fans a single command across every open tab and
|
|
* returns per-tab results as JSON.
|
|
*/
|
|
function buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir: string): string {
|
|
const tabsFile = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
|
|
const activeFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
|
|
return [
|
|
'You are running inside the gstack browser sidebar with live access to the user\'s browser tabs.',
|
|
'',
|
|
'Tab state files (kept fresh automatically by the extension):',
|
|
` ${tabsFile} — all open tabs (id, url, title, active, pinned)`,
|
|
` ${activeFile} — the currently active tab`,
|
|
'Read these any time the user asks about "tabs", "the current page", or anything multi-tab. Do NOT shell out to $B tabs just to learn what\'s open — read the file.',
|
|
'',
|
|
'Tab manipulation commands (via $B):',
|
|
' $B tab <id> — switch to a tab',
|
|
' $B newtab [url] — open a new tab',
|
|
' $B closetab [id] — close a tab (current if no id)',
|
|
' $B tab-each <command> — fan out a command across every tab; returns JSON results',
|
|
'',
|
|
'When the user asks for multi-tab work, prefer $B tab-each. Examples:',
|
|
' $B tab-each snapshot -i — grab a snapshot from every tab',
|
|
' $B tab-each text — pull clean text from every tab',
|
|
' $B tab-each title — list every tab\'s title',
|
|
'',
|
|
'You\'re in a real terminal with a real PTY — slash commands, /resume, ANSI colors all work as in a normal claude session.',
|
|
].join('\n');
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Spawn claude in a PTY. Returns null if claude not on PATH. */
|
|
function spawnClaude(cols: number, rows: number, onData: (chunk: Buffer) => void) {
|
|
const claudePath = findClaude();
|
|
if (!claudePath) return null;
|
|
|
|
// Match phoenix env so claude knows which browse server to talk to and
|
|
// doesn't try to autostart its own. BROWSE_HEADED=1 keeps the existing
|
|
// headed-mode browser; BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents claude's gstack
|
|
// tooling from racing to spawn another server.
|
|
const env: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
...process.env as any,
|
|
BROWSE_PORT: String(BROWSE_SERVER_PORT),
|
|
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: STATE_FILE,
|
|
BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART: '1',
|
|
BROWSE_HEADED: '1',
|
|
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
|
|
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// --append-system-prompt is the right injection surface (per `claude --help`):
|
|
// it gets appended to the model's system prompt, so claude treats this as
|
|
// contextual guidance, not a user message. Don't use a leading PTY write
|
|
// for this — that would show up as if the user typed the hint, polluting
|
|
// the visible transcript.
|
|
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
|
|
const tabHint = buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir);
|
|
|
|
const proc = (Bun as any).spawn([claudePath, '--append-system-prompt', tabHint], {
|
|
terminal: {
|
|
rows,
|
|
cols,
|
|
data(_terminal: any, chunk: Buffer) { onData(chunk); },
|
|
},
|
|
env,
|
|
});
|
|
return proc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Cleanup a PTY session: SIGINT, then SIGKILL after 3s. */
|
|
function disposeSession(session: PtySession): void {
|
|
try { session.proc?.terminal?.close?.(); } catch {}
|
|
if (session.proc?.pid) {
|
|
try { session.proc.kill?.('SIGINT'); } catch {}
|
|
setTimeout(() => {
|
|
try {
|
|
if (session.proc && !session.proc.killed) session.proc.kill?.('SIGKILL');
|
|
} catch {}
|
|
}, 3000);
|
|
}
|
|
session.proc = null;
|
|
session.spawned = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Build the HTTP server. Two routes:
|
|
* POST /internal/grant — parent server pushes a fresh cookie token
|
|
* GET /ws — extension upgrades to WebSocket (PTY transport)
|
|
*
|
|
* Everything else returns 404. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 only.
|
|
*/
|
|
function buildServer() {
|
|
return Bun.serve({
|
|
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
|
|
port: 0,
|
|
idleTimeout: 0, // PTY connections are long-lived; default idleTimeout would kill them
|
|
|
|
fetch(req, server) {
|
|
const url = new URL(req.url);
|
|
|
|
// /internal/grant — loopback-only handshake from parent server.
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/internal/grant' && req.method === 'POST') {
|
|
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
|
|
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
|
|
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
|
|
}
|
|
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
|
|
if (typeof body?.token === 'string' && body.token.length > 16) {
|
|
validTokens.add(body.token);
|
|
}
|
|
return new Response('ok');
|
|
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /internal/revoke — drop a token (called on WS close or bootstrap reload)
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/internal/revoke' && req.method === 'POST') {
|
|
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
|
|
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
|
|
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
|
|
}
|
|
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
|
|
if (typeof body?.token === 'string') validTokens.delete(body.token);
|
|
return new Response('ok');
|
|
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /claude-available — bootstrap card hits this when user clicks "I installed it".
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/claude-available' && req.method === 'GET') {
|
|
writeClaudeAvailable();
|
|
const found = findClaude();
|
|
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ available: !!found, path: found }), {
|
|
status: 200,
|
|
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /ws — WebSocket upgrade. CRITICAL gates:
|
|
// (1) Origin must be chrome-extension://<id>. Cross-site WS hijacking
|
|
// defense — required, not optional.
|
|
// (2) Token must be in validTokens. We accept the token via two
|
|
// transports for compatibility:
|
|
// - Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (preferred for browsers — the only
|
|
// auth header settable from the browser WebSocket API)
|
|
// - Cookie gstack_pty (works for non-browser callers and
|
|
// same-port browser callers; doesn't survive the cross-port
|
|
// jump from server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port
|
|
// when SameSite=Strict is set)
|
|
// Either path works; both verify against the same in-memory
|
|
// validTokens Set, populated by the parent server's
|
|
// authenticated /pty-session → /internal/grant chain.
|
|
if (url.pathname === '/ws') {
|
|
const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
|
|
const isExtensionOrigin = origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://');
|
|
if (!isExtensionOrigin) {
|
|
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
|
|
}
|
|
if (EXTENSION_ID && origin !== `chrome-extension://${EXTENSION_ID}`) {
|
|
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try Sec-WebSocket-Protocol first. Format: a single token, possibly
|
|
// with a `gstack-pty.` prefix (which we strip). Browsers send a
|
|
// comma-separated list when multiple were requested; we pick the
|
|
// first that matches a known token.
|
|
const protoHeader = req.headers.get('sec-websocket-protocol') || '';
|
|
let token: string | null = null;
|
|
let acceptedProtocol: string | null = null;
|
|
for (const raw of protoHeader.split(',').map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
|
|
const candidate = raw.startsWith('gstack-pty.') ? raw.slice('gstack-pty.'.length) : raw;
|
|
if (validTokens.has(candidate)) {
|
|
token = candidate;
|
|
acceptedProtocol = raw;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fallback: Cookie gstack_pty (legacy / non-browser callers).
|
|
if (!token) {
|
|
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
|
|
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
|
|
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
|
|
if (name === 'gstack_pty') {
|
|
const candidate = rest.join('=') || null;
|
|
if (candidate && validTokens.has(candidate)) {
|
|
token = candidate;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!token) {
|
|
return new Response('unauthorized', { status: 401 });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const upgraded = server.upgrade(req, {
|
|
data: { cookie: token },
|
|
// Echo the protocol back so the browser accepts the upgrade.
|
|
// Required when the client sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol — the
|
|
// server MUST select one of the offered protocols, otherwise
|
|
// the browser closes the connection immediately.
|
|
...(acceptedProtocol ? { headers: { 'Sec-WebSocket-Protocol': acceptedProtocol } } : {}),
|
|
});
|
|
return upgraded ? undefined : new Response('upgrade failed', { status: 500 });
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return new Response('not found', { status: 404 });
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
websocket: {
|
|
message(ws, raw) {
|
|
let session = sessions.get(ws);
|
|
if (!session) {
|
|
session = {
|
|
proc: null,
|
|
cols: 80,
|
|
rows: 24,
|
|
cookie: (ws.data as any)?.cookie || '',
|
|
spawned: false,
|
|
};
|
|
sessions.set(ws, session);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Text frames are control messages: {type: "resize", cols, rows} or
|
|
// {type: "tabSwitch", tabId, url, title}. Binary frames are raw input
|
|
// bytes destined for the PTY stdin.
|
|
if (typeof raw === 'string') {
|
|
let msg: any;
|
|
try { msg = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { return; }
|
|
if (msg?.type === 'resize') {
|
|
const cols = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.cols) || 80));
|
|
const rows = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.rows) || 24));
|
|
session.cols = cols;
|
|
session.rows = rows;
|
|
try { session.proc?.terminal?.resize?.(cols, rows); } catch {}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (msg?.type === 'tabSwitch') {
|
|
handleTabSwitch(msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (msg?.type === 'tabState') {
|
|
handleTabState(msg);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
// Unknown text frame — ignore.
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Binary input. Lazy-spawn claude on the first byte.
|
|
if (!session.spawned) {
|
|
session.spawned = true;
|
|
// UTF-8 boundary detection to prevent splitting multi-byte characters (issue #1272).
|
|
// Buffer incomplete UTF-8 sequences until the next chunk completes them.
|
|
let leftover = Buffer.alloc(0);
|
|
const proc = spawnClaude(session.cols, session.rows, (chunk) => {
|
|
const combined = Buffer.concat([leftover, Buffer.from(chunk)]);
|
|
// Find the last index where a UTF-8 codepoint ends. Look back at most 3 bytes.
|
|
let safeEnd = combined.length;
|
|
for (let i = combined.length - 1; i >= Math.max(0, combined.length - 3); i--) {
|
|
const b = combined[i];
|
|
if ((b & 0x80) === 0) { safeEnd = i + 1; break; } // ASCII
|
|
if ((b & 0xC0) === 0x80) continue; // continuation byte
|
|
const expected = (b & 0xE0) === 0xC0 ? 2 : (b & 0xF0) === 0xE0 ? 3 : 4;
|
|
safeEnd = (combined.length - i >= expected) ? combined.length : i;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
const flush = combined.slice(0, safeEnd);
|
|
leftover = combined.slice(safeEnd);
|
|
if (flush.length) {
|
|
try { ws.sendBinary(flush); } catch {}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
if (!proc) {
|
|
try {
|
|
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
|
|
type: 'error',
|
|
code: 'CLAUDE_NOT_FOUND',
|
|
message: 'claude CLI not on PATH. Install: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
|
|
}));
|
|
ws.close(4404, 'claude not found');
|
|
} catch {}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
session.proc = proc;
|
|
// Watch for child exit so the WS closes cleanly when claude exits.
|
|
proc.exited?.then?.(() => {
|
|
try { ws.close(1000, 'pty exited'); } catch {}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
// raw is a Uint8Array; Bun.Terminal.write accepts string|Buffer.
|
|
// Convert to Buffer for safety.
|
|
session.proc?.terminal?.write?.(Buffer.from(raw as Uint8Array));
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
console.error('[terminal-agent] terminal.write failed:', err);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
close(ws) {
|
|
const session = sessions.get(ws);
|
|
if (session) {
|
|
disposeSession(session);
|
|
if (session.cookie) {
|
|
// Drop the cookie so it can't be replayed against a new PTY.
|
|
validTokens.delete(session.cookie);
|
|
}
|
|
sessions.delete(ws);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Tab-switch helper: write the active tab to a state file (claude reads it)
|
|
* and notify the parent server so its activeTabId stays synced. Skips
|
|
* chrome:// and chrome-extension:// internal pages.
|
|
*/
|
|
/**
|
|
* Live tab snapshot. Writes <stateDir>/tabs.json (full list) and updates
|
|
* <stateDir>/active-tab.json (current active). claude can read these any
|
|
* time without invoking $B tabs — saves a round-trip when the model just
|
|
* needs to check the landscape before deciding what to do.
|
|
*/
|
|
function handleTabState(msg: {
|
|
active?: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string } | null;
|
|
tabs?: Array<{ tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string; active?: boolean; windowId?: number; pinned?: boolean; audible?: boolean }>;
|
|
reason?: string;
|
|
}): void {
|
|
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
|
|
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
|
|
|
|
// tabs.json — full list
|
|
if (Array.isArray(msg.tabs)) {
|
|
const payload = {
|
|
updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
|
|
reason: msg.reason || 'unknown',
|
|
tabs: msg.tabs.map(t => ({
|
|
tabId: t.tabId ?? null,
|
|
url: t.url || '',
|
|
title: t.title || '',
|
|
active: !!t.active,
|
|
windowId: t.windowId ?? null,
|
|
pinned: !!t.pinned,
|
|
audible: !!t.audible,
|
|
})),
|
|
};
|
|
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
|
|
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tabs-${process.pid}`);
|
|
try {
|
|
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
|
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
safeUnlink(tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// active-tab.json — single active tab. Skip chrome-internal pages so
|
|
// claude doesn't see chrome:// or chrome-extension:// URLs as
|
|
// "current target."
|
|
const active = msg.active;
|
|
if (active && active.url && !active.url.startsWith('chrome://') && !active.url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) {
|
|
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
|
|
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
|
|
try {
|
|
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
|
|
tabId: active.tabId ?? null,
|
|
url: active.url,
|
|
title: active.title ?? '',
|
|
}));
|
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
safeUnlink(tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function handleTabSwitch(msg: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string }): void {
|
|
const url = msg.url || '';
|
|
if (!url || url.startsWith('chrome://') || url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) return;
|
|
|
|
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
|
|
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
|
|
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
|
|
try {
|
|
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
|
|
tabId: msg.tabId ?? null,
|
|
url,
|
|
title: msg.title ?? '',
|
|
}));
|
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
safeUnlink(tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Best-effort sync to parent server so its activeTabId tracking matches.
|
|
// No await; this is fire-and-forget.
|
|
if (BROWSE_SERVER_PORT > 0) {
|
|
fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${BROWSE_SERVER_PORT}/command`, {
|
|
method: 'POST',
|
|
headers: {
|
|
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
|
'Authorization': `Bearer ${readBrowseToken()}`,
|
|
},
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({
|
|
command: 'tab',
|
|
args: [String(msg.tabId ?? ''), '--no-focus'],
|
|
}),
|
|
}).catch(() => {});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readBrowseToken(): string {
|
|
try {
|
|
const raw = fs.readFileSync(STATE_FILE, 'utf-8');
|
|
const j = JSON.parse(raw);
|
|
return j.token || '';
|
|
} catch { return ''; }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Boot.
|
|
function main() {
|
|
writeClaudeAvailable();
|
|
const server = buildServer();
|
|
const port = (server as any).port || (server as any).address?.port;
|
|
if (!port) {
|
|
console.error('[terminal-agent] failed to bind: no port');
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write port file atomically so the parent server can pick it up.
|
|
const dir = path.dirname(PORT_FILE);
|
|
try { mkdirSecure(dir); } catch {}
|
|
const tmp = `${PORT_FILE}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
|
|
writeSecureFile(tmp, String(port));
|
|
fs.renameSync(tmp, PORT_FILE);
|
|
|
|
// Hand the parent the internal token so it can call /internal/grant.
|
|
// Parent learns INTERNAL_TOKEN via env (TERMINAL_AGENT_INTERNAL_TOKEN below).
|
|
// We just print it on stdout for the supervising process to pick up if it's
|
|
// not already in env. Defense against env races at spawn time.
|
|
console.log(`[terminal-agent] listening on 127.0.0.1:${port} pid=${process.pid}`);
|
|
|
|
// Cleanup port file on exit.
|
|
const cleanup = () => { safeUnlink(PORT_FILE); process.exit(0); };
|
|
process.on('SIGTERM', cleanup);
|
|
process.on('SIGINT', cleanup);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Export the internal token so cli.ts can pass the SAME value to the parent
|
|
// server via env. Parent reads BROWSE_TERMINAL_INTERNAL_TOKEN and uses it
|
|
// for /internal/grant calls.
|
|
//
|
|
// In practice, the agent generates INTERNAL_TOKEN once at boot and writes it
|
|
// to a state file the parent reads. This avoids env-passing races. See main().
|
|
const INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-internal-token');
|
|
try {
|
|
mkdirSecure(path.dirname(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE));
|
|
writeSecureFile(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE, INTERNAL_TOKEN);
|
|
} catch {}
|
|
|
|
main();
|