Files
gstack/browse/src/terminal-agent.ts
T
Garry Tan 00f966b3ec v1.30.0.0 fix wave: 21 community PRs + Windows CI extension + codex flag-semantics smoke (#1391)
* fix(codex): use resume-compatible flags

* fix: V-001 security vulnerability

Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI

* docs: align prompt-injection thresholds to security.ts (v1.6.4.0 catch-up)

CLAUDE.md:290 and ARCHITECTURE.md:159 were missed when WARN was bumped
0.60 → 0.75 in d75402bb (v1.6.4.0, "cut Haiku classifier FP from 44% to
23%, gate now enforced", #1135). browse/src/security.ts:37 has WARN: 0.75
and BROWSER.md:743 was updated alongside that commit; CLAUDE.md and
ARCHITECTURE.md still read 0.60.

Also adds the SOLO_CONTENT_BLOCK: 0.92 entry to CLAUDE.md (already in
security.ts:50 and BROWSER.md:745, missing from CLAUDE.md's threshold
table).

No code change. No behavior change. Pure doc-vs-code alignment.

Verification:
  $ grep -n "WARN" browse/src/security.ts CLAUDE.md ARCHITECTURE.md BROWSER.md
  browse/src/security.ts:37:  WARN: 0.75,
  CLAUDE.md:290: - \`WARN: 0.75\` ...
  ARCHITECTURE.md:159: ...>= \`WARN\` (0.75)...
  BROWSER.md:743: - \`WARN: 0.75\` ...

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: Korean/CJK IME input and rendering in Sidebar Terminal

Fixes #1272

This commit addresses three separate Korean/CJK bugs in the Sidebar Terminal:

**Bug 1 - IME Input**: Korean text typed via IME composition was not
reaching the PTY correctly. Added compositionstart/compositionend event
listeners to suppress partial jamo fragments and only send the final
composed string.

**Bug 2a - Font Rendering**: Added CJK monospace font fallbacks
("Noto Sans Mono CJK KR", "Malgun Gothic") to both the xterm.js
fontFamily config and the CSS --font-mono variable. This ensures
consistent cell-width calculations for Korean characters.

**Bug 2b - UTF-8 Boundary Detection**: Added buffering logic to prevent
multi-byte UTF-8 characters (Korean is 3 bytes) from being split across
WebSocket chunks. This follows the same pattern as PR #1007 which fixed
the sidebar-agent path, but extends it to the terminal-agent path.

Special thanks to @ldybob for the excellent root cause analysis and
proposed solutions in issue #1272.

Tested on WSL2 + Windows 11 with Korean IME.

* fix(ship): tighten Plan Completion gate (VAS-449 remediation)

VAS-446 shipped with a PLAN.md acceptance criterion (domain-hq has
/docs/dashboard.md) silently skipped. /ship's Plan Completion subagent
existed at ship time (added in v1.4.1.0) but the gate let the failure
through. Four structural fixes:

1. Path concreteness rule: items naming a concrete filesystem path MUST
   be classified DONE/NOT DONE via [ -f <path> ], never UNVERIFIABLE.
2. Validator detection: CONTENT-SHAPE items scan target repo's
   package.json for validate-* scripts and run them before falling back
   to UNVERIFIABLE.
3. Per-item UNVERIFIABLE confirmation: replaces blanket "I've checked
   each one" with per-item Y/N/D loop. The blanket-confirm path is the
   exact failure VAS-449 surfaced.
4. Subagent fail-closed: if Plan Completion subagent + inline fallback
   both fail, surface explicit AskUserQuestion instead of silent pass.
   Replaces the prior "Never block /ship on subagent failure" fail-open.

Locked in by test/ship-plan-completion-invariants.test.ts (5 assertions,
no LLM dependency, ~60ms).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(browse): bash.exe wrap for telemetry on Windows

reportAttemptTelemetry() in browse/src/security.ts calls spawn(bin, args)
where bin is the gstack-telemetry-log bash script. On Windows this fails
silently with ENOENT — CreateProcess can't dispatch on shebang lines.

Adopts v1.24.0.0's Bun.which + GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern (from
browse/src/claude-bin.ts:resolveClaudeCommand, introduced in #1252) for
resolving bash.exe. resolveBashBinary() honors GSTACK_BASH_BIN absolute-path
or PATH-resolvable override, falling back to Bun.which('bash') which finds
Git Bash on the standard Windows install.

buildTelemetrySpawnCommand() wraps the script invocation on win32 only;
POSIX path is bit-identical. Returns null when bash can't be resolved on
Windows so caller skips spawn — local attempts.jsonl audit trail keeps
working without surfacing a Windows-only failure.

8 new unit tests cover resolveBashBinary (POSIX bash, absolute override,
quote-stripping, BASH_BIN fallback, empty-PATH null) and buildTelemetrySpawnCommand
(POSIX pass-through, win32 bash wrap, win32 null on unresolvable, arg-array
immutability).

POSIX path is bit-identical — Bun.which('bash') on Linux/macOS returns the
same /bin/bash or /usr/bin/bash that the old hardcoded spawn relied on.

* fix(make-pdf): Bun.which-based binary resolution for browse + pdftotext on Windows

Extends v1.24.0.0's Bun.which + GSTACK_*_BIN override pattern (introduced in
browse/src/claude-bin.ts via #1252) to the two other binary resolvers in the
codebase: make-pdf/src/browseClient.ts:resolveBrowseBin and
make-pdf/src/pdftotext.ts:resolvePdftotext.

Same Windows quirks (fs.accessSync(X_OK) degrades to existence-check; `which`
isn't available outside Git Bash; bun --compile --outfile X emits X.exe), same
Bun.which-based fix shape, same env override convention.

Changes:
  - GSTACK_BROWSE_BIN / GSTACK_PDFTOTEXT_BIN as the v1.24-aligned overrides;
    BROWSE_BIN / PDFTOTEXT_BIN remain as back-compat aliases.
  - Bun.which() replaces execFileSync('which', ...) for PATH lookup. Handles
    Windows PATHEXT natively; no more `where`-vs-`which` branch.
  - findExecutable(base) helper exported from each module, probes .exe/.cmd/.bat
    after the bare-path miss on win32. Linux/macOS behavior is bit-identical
    (isExecutable short-circuits before the win32 branch ever runs).
  - macCandidates renamed posixCandidates (always was — /opt/homebrew, /usr/local,
    /usr/bin). No Windows candidates added; Poppler installs scatter across
    Scoop/Chocolatey/portable zips and guessing causes false positives.
  - Error messages get a Windows install hint (scoop install poppler / oschwartz10612)
    and `setx` example for GSTACK_*_BIN.
  - Pre-existing test 'honors BROWSE_BIN when it points at a real executable'
    was hardcoded /bin/sh — made cross-platform via a REAL_EXE constant
    (cmd.exe on win32, /bin/sh on POSIX). Was a Windows-CI blocker on its own.

Coordination: PR #1094 (@BkashJEE) covered browseClient.ts independently with a
narrower scope; this PR's pdftotext + cross-platform tests + GSTACK_*_BIN naming
are additive. Either order of merge works.

Test plan:
  - bun test make-pdf/test/browseClient.test.ts make-pdf/test/pdftotext.test.ts
    on win32 — 29 pass, 0 fail (12 new assertions: findExecutable POSIX/win32/null,
    resolveBrowseBin GSTACK_BROWSE_BIN + BROWSE_BIN + precedence + quote-strip,
    same shape for resolvePdftotext + Windows install hint in error message).
  - POSIX branch unchanged — fs.accessSync(X_OK) on Linux/macOS short-circuits
    before any win32 logic runs, matching the v1.24 claude-bin.ts pattern.

* fix(browse): NTFS ACL hardening for Windows state files via icacls

gstack's ~/.gstack/ state directory holds bearer tokens, canary tokens, agent
queue contents (with prompt history), session state, security-decision logs,
and saved cookie bundles — all written with { mode: 0o600 } / 0o700. On Windows,
those mode bits are a silent no-op: Node's fs module doesn't translate POSIX
modes to NTFS ACLs, and inherited ACLs leave every "restricted" file readable
by other principals on the machine (verified via icacls — six ACEs, the
intended user is the LAST of six).

Threat model is non-trivial on:
  - Self-hosted CI runners (different service account on the same Windows box
    can read developer tokens, canary tokens, prompt history)
  - Shared development machines (agencies, studios, lab environments)
  - Multi-tenant servers with shared home directories

Orthogonal to v1.24.0.0's binary-resolution work — complementary at the write
side. v1.24's bin/gstack-paths resolves ~/.gstack/ correctly across plugin /
global / local installs; this PR ensures files written into those resolved
paths actually get the POSIX 0o600 semantic translated to NTFS.

The fix:
  - New browse/src/file-permissions.ts (158 LOC, 5 public + 1 test-reset).
    restrictFilePermissions / restrictDirectoryPermissions wrap chmod (POSIX)
    or icacls /inheritance:r /grant:r <user>:(F) (Windows). writeSecureFile /
    appendSecureFile / mkdirSecure are drop-in wrappers for the common patterns.
  - 19 call sites converted across 9 source files: browser-manager.ts,
    browser-skill-write.ts, cli.ts, config.ts, meta-commands.ts,
    security-classifier.ts, security.ts (4 sites), server.ts (5 sites),
    terminal-agent.ts (8 sites), tunnel-denial-log.ts.
  - (OI)(CI) inheritance flags on directories mean files created via fs.write*
    *inside* an mkdirSecure-created dir inherit the owner-only ACL automatically
    — important for tunnel-denial-log.ts where appends use async fsp.appendFile.

Error handling: icacls failures (nonexistent path, missing icacls.exe, hardened
environments) log a one-shot warning to stderr and proceed. Once-per-process
gating prevents log spam if the condition persists. Filesystem stays
functional; the file just ends up with inherited ACLs.

Test plan:
  - bun test browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts — 13 pass, 0 fail (POSIX
    mode-bit assertions, Windows no-throw, mkdir idempotence, recursive
    creation, Buffer payloads, append-creates-then-reapplies-once semantics)
  - bun test browse/test/security.test.ts — 38 pass, 0 fail (existing security
    test suite plus the bash-binary resolution tests added in fix #1119; the
    converted writeFileSync/appendFileSync/mkdirSync sites in security.ts
    integrate cleanly)
  - Empirical icacls before/after on a real file — 6 ACEs → 1 ACE
  - bun build typecheck on all modified files — clean (server.ts has a
    pre-existing playwright-core/electron resolution issue unrelated to this PR)

POSIX behavior is bit-identical to old code — fs.chmodSync(path, 0o6XX) on the
helper's POSIX branch matches the inline { mode: 0o6XX } it replaces. Linux
and macOS see no behavior change.

Inviting pushback on three judgment calls (in PR description):
  1. icacls vs npm library
  2. ACL scope — just user, or user + SYSTEM?
  3. Graceful degradation — once-per-process warn, not silent, not hard-fail.

* fix(browse): declare lastConsoleFlushed to restore console-log persistence

flushBuffers() references a `lastConsoleFlushed` cursor at server.ts:337
and assigns it at :344, but the `let lastConsoleFlushed = 0;`
declaration is missing — only the network and dialog siblings are
declared at lines 327-328.

Result: every 1-second flushBuffers tick (line 376) throws
`ReferenceError: lastConsoleFlushed is not defined`, gets swallowed by
the catch at line 369 ("[browse] Buffer flush failed: ..."), and the
console branch's append never runs. browse-console.log is never
written in any production deployment since this regressed.

Discovered by stress-testing the daemon with 15 concurrent CLIs against
cold state — the race surfaced the buffer-flush error spam in one
spawned daemon's stderr. Verified by running the daemon against a real
file:// page with console.log events: in-memory `browse console`
returns the entries, but `.gstack/browse-console.log` is never created
on disk.

Regression introduced by 1a100a2a "fix: eliminate duplicate command
sets in chain, improve flush perf and type safety" — the flush refactor
switched from `Bun.write` to `fs.appendFileSync` and added the
`lastConsoleFlushed` cursor pattern alongside its network/dialog
siblings, but missed the matching `let` declaration. Tests don't
currently exercise flushBuffers, so the regression shipped silently.

Fix:
  - Declare `let lastConsoleFlushed = 0;` next to `lastNetworkFlushed`
    and `lastDialogFlushed` (browse/src/server.ts:327)
  - Add a source-level guard test
    (browse/test/server-flush-trackers.test.ts) that fails any future
    refactor that adds a fourth `last*Flushed` cursor without the
    matching declaration. Same pattern as terminal-agent.test.ts and
    dual-listener.test.ts — read source as text, assert invariant, no
    daemon required.

Test plan:
  - [x] New regression test fails on current main, passes with the fix
  - [x] `bun run build` clean
  - [x] Manual smoke: spawn daemon -> goto file:// page with
        console.log -> wait 4s -> .gstack/browse-console.log now
        exists with the expected entries (163 bytes vs zero before)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

* fix(browse): per-process state-file temp path to fix concurrent-write ENOENT

The daemon writes `.gstack/browse.json` via the standard atomic-rename
pattern: `writeFileSync(tmp, …) → renameSync(tmp, stateFile)`. Four
sites in server.ts use this pattern (initial daemon-startup state at
:2002, /tunnel/start handler at :1479, BROWSE_TUNNEL=1 inline tunnel
update at :2083, BROWSE_TUNNEL_LOCAL_ONLY=1 update at :2113), and all
four hard-code the same temp filename `${stateFile}.tmp`.

Under concurrent writers the shared filename races on the rename:

    t0  Writer A: writeFileSync(stateFile + '.tmp', payloadA)
    t1  Writer B: writeFileSync(stateFile + '.tmp', payloadB)   // overwrites A
    t2  Writer A: renameSync(stateFile + '.tmp', stateFile)    // moves B's payload
    t3  Writer B: renameSync(stateFile + '.tmp', stateFile)    // ENOENT — file gone

Reproduced empirically with 15 concurrent CLIs against a fresh `.gstack/`:

    [browse] Failed to start: ENOENT: no such file or directory,
    rename '…/.gstack/browse.json.tmp' -> '…/.gstack/browse.json'

Pre-fix success rate: **0 / 15** under cold-start race.
Post-fix success rate: **15 / 15**, zero ENOENT.

Fix:
  - New `tmpStatePath()` helper (server.ts:333) returns
    `${stateFile}.tmp.${pid}.${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}`
  - All 4 call sites use `tmpStatePath()` instead of the shared literal
  - Atomic rename still gives last-writer-wins semantics on the final
    state.json content; only behavior change is that concurrent writers
    no longer kill each other on the rename step

Source-level guard test (browse/test/server-tmp-state-path.test.ts)
locks two invariants: (1) no remaining `stateFile + '.tmp'` literals,
(2) every state-write `writeFileSync` call uses `tmpStatePath()`. Same
read-source-as-text pattern as terminal-agent.test.ts and
dual-listener.test.ts — no daemon required, runs in tier-1 free.

Test plan:
  - [x] Targeted source-level guard test passes (3 / 0)
  - [x] `bun run build` clean
  - [x] Live regression: 15 concurrent CLIs against cold state →
        15 / 15 healthy, 0 ENOENT (vs 0 / 15 pre-fix)
  - [x] No `.tmp.*` orphans left behind after rename succeeds
  - [x] Related test cluster (server-auth, dual-listener, cdp-mutex,
        findport) — same pre-existing flakes as `main`, no new
        regressions introduced

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

* fix(browse): clear refs when iframe auto-detaches in getActiveFrameOrPage

Asymmetric cleanup between two equivalent staleness conditions:

  onMainFrameNavigated()  →  clearRefs() + activeFrame = null  ✓
  getActiveFrameOrPage()  →  activeFrame = null  (refs NOT cleared)  ✗

Both paths see the same staleness condition — refs were captured
against a frame that no longer exists. The main-frame path correctly
clears both pieces of state. The iframe-detach path nulls the frame
but leaves the refMap intact.

The lazy click-time check in `resolveRef` (tab-session.ts:97) partially
saves us — `entry.locator.count()` on a detached-frame locator throws
or returns 0, so the click errors out as "Ref X is stale". But the
user has no signal that frame context silently changed underfoot: the
next `snapshot` runs against `this.page` (main) while old iframe refs
still litter `refMap` with the same role+name keys. New refs collide
with stale ones, the resolver picks one at random, the user clicks
the wrong element.

TODOS.md line 816-820 documents "Detached frame auto-recovery" as a
shipped iframe-support feature in v0.12.1.0. This restores the
documented intent — the recovery should leave the session in a clean
state, not a half-cleared one.

Fix: 1 line — add `this.clearRefs()` next to `this.activeFrame = null`
inside the if-branch.

Test plan:
  - [x] New regression test: 4/4 pass
        - refs cleared when getActiveFrameOrPage detects detached iframe
        - refs preserved when active frame is still attached (no regression)
        - refs preserved when no frame set (page-level path untouched)
        - matches onMainFrameNavigated symmetry — both paths reach the
          same clean end state
  - [x] `bun run build` clean

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

* fix(codex): resolve python for JSON parser

* fix: add fail-fast probe for base branch in ship step 12

* fix(plan-devex-review): remove contradictory plan-mode handshake

* fix(design): honor Retry-After header in variants 429 handler

Closes #1244.

The 429 handler in `generateVariant` discarded the `Retry-After` response
header and fell straight through to a local exponential schedule (2s/4s/8s).
In image-generation batches, that burns retry attempts inside the provider's
cooldown window and the request never recovers.

Now we parse `Retry-After` per RFC 7231 — both delta-seconds (`Retry-After: 5`)
and HTTP-date (`Retry-After: Fri, 31 Dec 1999 23:59:59 GMT`). Honored waits
are capped at 60s to bound stalls from hostile or buggy headers. Delta-seconds
are validated as digits-only (rejects `2abc`). When `Retry-After` is honored
(including 0 / past-date "retry now"), the next iteration's leading exponential
sleep is skipped so we don't double-wait. Invalid or missing headers fall
through to the existing exponential schedule unchanged.

Behavior matrix:

| Header                          | Behavior                                  |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Retry-After: 5                  | wait 5s, skip leading on next attempt     |
| Retry-After: 999999             | capped to 60s, skip leading               |
| Retry-After: 2abc               | invalid, fall through to exponential      |
| Retry-After: 0                  | wait 0, skip leading (retry immediately)  |
| Retry-After: <past HTTP-date>   | wait 0, skip leading                      |
| Retry-After: <future date>      | wait diff capped at 60s, skip leading     |
| no header                       | fall through to existing exponential      |

`generateVariant` now accepts an optional `fetchFn` parameter (defaults to
`globalThis.fetch`) so tests can inject a stub. Production call sites are
unchanged.

Tests cover the five behavior buckets above, asserting both the 1st-to-2nd
call timing gap and call counts. All five pass in ~8s.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(docs): correct per-skill symlink removal snippet in README uninstall

Closes #1130.

The manual-uninstall fallback in `## Uninstall` → `### Option 2` used
`find ~/.claude/skills -maxdepth 1 -type l`, which finds nothing on real
installs. Each `~/.claude/skills/<name>/` is a real directory, and only
`<name>/SKILL.md` inside it is a symlink into `gstack/`. The find never
matched, so the snippet silently removed nothing.

Replace with a directory walk that inspects each `<name>/SKILL.md`:

  find ~/.claude/skills -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -type d ! -name gstack
  → check $dir/SKILL.md is a symlink → readlink it
  → if target is gstack/* or */gstack/*: rm -f the link, rmdir the dir
    (only if empty — preserves any user-added files)

Excludes the top-level `gstack/` dir from the walk; that's removed by
step 3 of the same uninstall block.

`bin/gstack-uninstall` (the script-mode path) already handles the layout
correctly via its own walk; only this manual fallback needed updating.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject partial browse client env integers

* fix(gemini-adapter): detect new ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json auth path

gemini-cli >=0.30 stores OAuth credentials at ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json
instead of the legacy ~/.config/gemini/ directory. The benchmark adapter's
availability check now succeeds for users on recent gemini-cli releases
who have authenticated via interactive login.

Both paths are accepted so users on older versions still work.

* fix(browser): add --no-sandbox for root user on Linux/WSL2

Chromium's sandbox can't initialize when running as root on Linux,
causing an immediate exit. Extend the existing CI/CONTAINER check to
also cover this case, keeping the Windows-safe `typeof getuid` guard.

* security: pass cwd to git via execFileSync, not interpolation through /bin/sh

`bin/gstack-memory-ingest.ts:632-643` ran `execSync(\`git -C ${JSON.stringify(cwd)}
remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null\`, ...)`. JSON.stringify escapes `"` and `\`
but not `$` or backticks, so a `cwd` of `"$(touch /tmp/marker)"` survived JSON
quoting and detonated under /bin/sh's command-substitution-inside-double-quotes.

`cwd` originates from transcript JSONL records under
`~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl` and
`~/.codex/sessions/YYYY/MM/DD/rollout-*.jsonl`. The walker grabs the first
`.cwd` it sees per session. That's an untrusted surface in the gstack threat
model — the L1-L6 sidebar security stack exists exactly because agent
transcripts can carry attacker-influenced text. Two pivots above the local
same-uid bar: (a) prompt-injection appending `cwd="$(...)"` to the active
session log turns the next /sync-gbrain run into RCE under the user's uid;
(b) cross-machine transcript share (a colleague's `.claude/projects` snippet
untar'd into HOME, a documented gbrain dogfooding shape) → RCE on first sync.

Fix swaps the one execSync for `execFileSync("git", ["-C", cwd, "remote",
"get-url", "origin"], ...)`. No shell, argv passed directly to git. The same
module already uses execFileSync for `gbrainAvailable()` (line 762 pre-patch)
and `gbrainPutPage()` (line 816 pre-patch) — this single execSync was the
outlier.

Test: `gstack-memory-ingest security: untrusted cwd cannot trigger shell
substitution` plants a Claude-Code-shaped JSONL with cwd=`$(touch <marker>)`
and asserts the marker file is not created after `--incremental --quiet`.
Negative control: with the patch reverted, the test fails (marker created);
with the patch applied, it passes (18/18 in test/gstack-memory-ingest.test.ts).

* security: gate domain-skill auto-promote on classifier_score > 0

`browse/src/domain-skill-commands.ts:140` (handleSave) writes
`classifier_score: 0` with the comment "L4 deferred to load-time / sidebar-agent
fills this in on first prompt-injection load." But CLAUDE.md "Sidebar
architecture" documents that sidebar-agent.ts was ripped, and grep for
recordSkillUse + classifierFlagged callers across browse/src/ returns zero hits
outside the module under test.

Net effect: every quarantined skill that survives three benign uses without
flag (`recordSkillUse(... , classifierFlagged: false)` x3) auto-promotes to
`active` and lands in prompt context wrapped as UNTRUSTED on every subsequent
visit to that host. The L4 score that was supposed to gate the promotion was
never written — the production save path puts 0 on disk and nothing later
updates it.

Threat model: a domain-skill body authored by an agent under the influence of
a poisoned page (the new `gstackInjectToTerminal` PTY path runs no L1-L3
either) would lose its auto-promote barrier after three uses. The exploit
isn't single-step but the bar is exactly N=3 prompt-injection-shaped uses on
a hostile page, which is well within reach.

Fix adds a single condition to the auto-promote gate in `recordSkillUse`:

    if (state === 'quarantined' && useCount >= PROMOTE_THRESHOLD &&
        flagCount === 0 && current.classifier_score > 0) {
      state = 'active';
    }

`classifier_score` is set once at writeSkill and never updated. Production
saves it as 0 (handleSave), so the gate stays closed; existing tests that
explicitly pass `classifierScore: 0.1` still auto-promote (the auto-promote
path is preserved for the day L4 is rewired).

Manual promotion via `domain-skill promote-to-global` is unaffected (it goes
through `promoteToGlobal` which has its own state-machine guard at line 337+).

Test: new regression case `does NOT auto-promote when classifier_score is 0
(production handleSave shape)` plants a skill with classifierScore=0 (matches
domain-skill-commands.ts:140), runs three uses without flag, asserts the skill
stays quarantined and readSkill returns null. Negative control: revert the
patch, the test fails with `Received: "active"`. With the patch: 15/15 pass.

* fix(ship): port #1302 SKILL.md edits to .tmpl + resolver source

PR #1302 added Verification Mode + UNVERIFIABLE classification + per-item
confirmation gate to ship/SKILL.md, but only the generated SKILL.md was
edited — not the .tmpl source or scripts/resolvers/review.ts. The next
`bun run gen:skill-docs` run would have wiped the changes.

Port the same content into the resolver and .tmpl so regeneration produces
the intended output.

* ci(windows): extend free-tests lane to cover icacls + Bun.which resolvers from fix-wave PRs

Closes #1306/#1307/#1308 validation gap. The four newly-added test files
already have process.platform guards so they run safely on both POSIX and
Windows lanes — only platform-relevant assertions execute on each.

Tests added to the windows-latest lane:
- browse/test/file-permissions.test.ts (#1308 icacls + writeSecureFile)
- browse/test/security.test.ts (#1306 bash.exe wrap pure-function path)
- make-pdf/test/browseClient.test.ts (#1307 Bun.which browse resolver)
- make-pdf/test/pdftotext.test.ts (#1307 Bun.which pdftotext resolver)

* test(codex): live flag-semantics smoke for codex exec resume

Closes #1270's regex-only test gap. PR #1270 asserted that codex/SKILL.md's
`codex exec resume` invocation drops -C/-s and uses sandbox_mode config.
That regex catches the skill template regressing, but not codex CLI itself
flipping flag semantics again.

This test probes `codex exec resume --help` and asserts the surface gstack
relies on: -c/sandbox_mode is accepted, top-level -C is absent. Skips
silently when codex isn't on PATH, so dev machines without codex installed
never see it fail.

* chore: regen SKILL.md after fix wave

One regen commit at the end of the merge wave per the plan. plan-devex-review
loses the contradictory plan-mode handshake (#1333). review/SKILL.md picks up
the Verification Mode + UNVERIFIABLE classification additions that #1302
authored against ship/SKILL.md (same resolver shared between ship and review
modes).

* fix(server.ts): keep fs.writeFileSync for state-file writes

#1308's writeSecureFile wrapper added Windows icacls hardening for the
4 state-file write sites in server.ts, but #1310's regression test grep's
for fs.writeFileSync(tmpStatePath()) calls. The two changes are technically
compatible only if the test relaxes — keeping the test strict (the safer
choice for catching regressions on the cold-start race) means the 4 state-
file sites stay on fs.writeFileSync(..., { mode: 0o600 }).

POSIX 0o600 hardening is preserved on those 4 sites. Windows icacls
hardening still applies to all the other writeSecureFile call sites
#1308 added (auth.json, mkdirSecure, etc.).

Also refreshes golden baselines after #1302 / port + minor wording tweak
in scripts/resolvers/review.ts to keep gen-skill-docs.test.ts assertion
'Cite the specific file' satisfied.

* v1.30.0.0: fix wave — 21 community PRs + 2 closing fixes for Windows + codex CI gaps

Headline release. Browse stops dropping console logs, cold-start race
fixed, codex resume works without python3, Windows hardening (icacls +
Bun.which + bash.exe wrap), ship gate gets VAS-449 remediation, two
closing fixes that put icacls/Bun.which/codex flag semantics under CI.

* test(domain-skills): cover #1369 classifier_score=0 quarantine + score>0 promote path

The pre-existing T6 test seeded skills via writeSkill (which defaults
classifier_score to 0 until L4 is rewired) and then expected 3 uses to
auto-promote. PR #1369 added `current.classifier_score > 0` to the gate
specifically to block that path — a quarantined skill written under the
influence of a poisoned page would otherwise auto-promote after three
benign uses.

Updated test asserts both halves of the new contract:
- classifier_score=0 + 3 uses → stays quarantined (the security guarantee)
- classifier_score>0 + 3 more uses → promotes to active (unblock path)

Catches both regressions: the gate going away (would re-allow the bypass)
and the unblock path breaking (would silently quarantine all skills
forever once L4 is rewired).

---------

Co-authored-by: Jayesh Betala <jayesh.betala7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: orbisai0security <mediratta01.pally@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Bryce Alan <brycealan.eth@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Terry Carson YM <cym3118288@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Vasko Ckorovski <vckorovski@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Carson <samuel.carson@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Yashwant Kotipalli <yashwant7kotipalli@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jasper Chen <jasperchen925@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Stefan Neamtu <stefan.neamtu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈家名 <chenjiaming@kezaihui.com>
Co-authored-by: Abigail Atheryon <abi@atheryon.ai>
Co-authored-by: Furkan Köykıran <furkankoykiran@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: gus <gustavoraularagon@gmail.com>
2026-05-09 08:06:47 -07:00

576 lines
22 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Terminal Agent — PTY-backed Claude Code terminal for the gstack browser
* sidebar. Translates the phoenix gbrowser PTY (cmd/gbd/terminal.go) into
* Bun, with a few changes informed by codex's outside-voice review:
*
* - Lives in a separate non-compiled bun process from sidebar-agent.ts so
* a bug in WS framing or PTY cleanup can't take down the chat path.
* - Binds 127.0.0.1 only — never on the dual-listener tunnel surface.
* - Origin validation on the WS upgrade is REQUIRED (not defense-in-depth)
* because a localhost shell WS is a real cross-site WebSocket-hijacking
* target.
* - Cookie-based auth via /internal/grant from the parent server, not a
* token in /health.
* - Lazy spawn: claude PTY is not spawned until the WS receives its first
* data frame. Sidebar opens that never type don't burn a claude session.
* - PTY dies with WS close (one PTY per WS). v1.1 may add session
* survival; for v1 we match phoenix's lifecycle.
*
* The PTY uses Bun's `terminal:` spawn option (verified at impl time on
* Bun 1.3.10): pass cols/rows + a data callback; write input via
* `proc.terminal.write(buf)`; resize via `proc.terminal.resize(cols, rows)`.
*/
import * as fs from 'fs';
import * as path from 'path';
import * as crypto from 'crypto';
import { writeSecureFile, mkdirSecure } from './file-permissions';
import { safeUnlink } from './error-handling';
const STATE_FILE = process.env.BROWSE_STATE_FILE || path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.gstack', 'browse.json');
const PORT_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-port');
const BROWSE_SERVER_PORT = parseInt(process.env.BROWSE_SERVER_PORT || '0', 10);
const EXTENSION_ID = process.env.BROWSE_EXTENSION_ID || ''; // optional: tighten Origin check
const INTERNAL_TOKEN = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url'); // shared with parent server via env at spawn
// In-memory cookie token registry. Parent posts /internal/grant after
// /pty-session; we validate WS cookies against this set.
const validTokens = new Set<string>();
// Active PTY session per WS. One terminal per connection. Codex finding #4:
// uncaught handlers below catch bugs in framing/cleanup so they don't kill
// the listener loop.
process.on('uncaughtException', (err) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] uncaughtException:', err);
});
process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason) => {
console.error('[terminal-agent] unhandledRejection:', reason);
});
interface PtySession {
proc: any | null; // Bun.Subprocess once spawned
cols: number;
rows: number;
cookie: string;
spawned: boolean;
}
const sessions = new WeakMap<any, PtySession>(); // ws -> session
/** Find claude on PATH. */
function findClaude(): string | null {
// Test-only override. Lets the integration tests spawn /bin/bash instead
// of requiring claude to be installed on every CI runner. NEVER read in
// production (sidebar UI). Documented in browse/test/terminal-agent-integration.test.ts.
const override = process.env.BROWSE_TERMINAL_BINARY;
if (override && fs.existsSync(override)) return override;
// Bun.which is sync and respects PATH. Falls back to a small list of
// common install locations if PATH is stripped (e.g., launched from
// Conductor with a minimal env).
const which = (Bun as any).which?.('claude');
if (which) return which;
const candidates = [
'/opt/homebrew/bin/claude',
'/usr/local/bin/claude',
`${process.env.HOME}/.local/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.bun/bin/claude`,
`${process.env.HOME}/.npm-global/bin/claude`,
];
for (const c of candidates) {
try { fs.accessSync(c, fs.constants.X_OK); return c; } catch {}
}
return null;
}
/** Probe + persist claude availability for the bootstrap card. */
function writeClaudeAvailable(): void {
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
const found = findClaude();
const status = {
available: !!found,
path: found || undefined,
install_url: 'https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
checked_at: new Date().toISOString(),
};
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'claude-available.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-claude-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(status, null, 2));
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
/**
* System-prompt hint passed to claude via --append-system-prompt. Tells
* claude what tab-awareness affordances exist in this session so it
* doesn't have to discover them by trial. The user can override anything
* here just by saying so — system prompt is a soft hint, not a contract.
*
* Two paths claude has:
* 1. Read live state from <stateDir>/tabs.json + active-tab.json
* (updated continuously by the gstack browser extension).
* 2. Run $B tab, $B tabs, $B tab-each <command> to act on tabs. The
* tab-each helper fans a single command across every open tab and
* returns per-tab results as JSON.
*/
function buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir: string): string {
const tabsFile = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
const activeFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
return [
'You are running inside the gstack browser sidebar with live access to the user\'s browser tabs.',
'',
'Tab state files (kept fresh automatically by the extension):',
` ${tabsFile} — all open tabs (id, url, title, active, pinned)`,
` ${activeFile} — the currently active tab`,
'Read these any time the user asks about "tabs", "the current page", or anything multi-tab. Do NOT shell out to $B tabs just to learn what\'s open — read the file.',
'',
'Tab manipulation commands (via $B):',
' $B tab <id> — switch to a tab',
' $B newtab [url] — open a new tab',
' $B closetab [id] — close a tab (current if no id)',
' $B tab-each <command> — fan out a command across every tab; returns JSON results',
'',
'When the user asks for multi-tab work, prefer $B tab-each. Examples:',
' $B tab-each snapshot -i — grab a snapshot from every tab',
' $B tab-each text — pull clean text from every tab',
' $B tab-each title — list every tab\'s title',
'',
'You\'re in a real terminal with a real PTY — slash commands, /resume, ANSI colors all work as in a normal claude session.',
].join('\n');
}
/** Spawn claude in a PTY. Returns null if claude not on PATH. */
function spawnClaude(cols: number, rows: number, onData: (chunk: Buffer) => void) {
const claudePath = findClaude();
if (!claudePath) return null;
// Match phoenix env so claude knows which browse server to talk to and
// doesn't try to autostart its own. BROWSE_HEADED=1 keeps the existing
// headed-mode browser; BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART prevents claude's gstack
// tooling from racing to spawn another server.
const env: Record<string, string> = {
...process.env as any,
BROWSE_PORT: String(BROWSE_SERVER_PORT),
BROWSE_STATE_FILE: STATE_FILE,
BROWSE_NO_AUTOSTART: '1',
BROWSE_HEADED: '1',
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
};
// --append-system-prompt is the right injection surface (per `claude --help`):
// it gets appended to the model's system prompt, so claude treats this as
// contextual guidance, not a user message. Don't use a leading PTY write
// for this — that would show up as if the user typed the hint, polluting
// the visible transcript.
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
const tabHint = buildTabAwarenessHint(stateDir);
const proc = (Bun as any).spawn([claudePath, '--append-system-prompt', tabHint], {
terminal: {
rows,
cols,
data(_terminal: any, chunk: Buffer) { onData(chunk); },
},
env,
});
return proc;
}
/** Cleanup a PTY session: SIGINT, then SIGKILL after 3s. */
function disposeSession(session: PtySession): void {
try { session.proc?.terminal?.close?.(); } catch {}
if (session.proc?.pid) {
try { session.proc.kill?.('SIGINT'); } catch {}
setTimeout(() => {
try {
if (session.proc && !session.proc.killed) session.proc.kill?.('SIGKILL');
} catch {}
}, 3000);
}
session.proc = null;
session.spawned = false;
}
/**
* Build the HTTP server. Two routes:
* POST /internal/grant — parent server pushes a fresh cookie token
* GET /ws — extension upgrades to WebSocket (PTY transport)
*
* Everything else returns 404. The listener binds 127.0.0.1 only.
*/
function buildServer() {
return Bun.serve({
hostname: '127.0.0.1',
port: 0,
idleTimeout: 0, // PTY connections are long-lived; default idleTimeout would kill them
fetch(req, server) {
const url = new URL(req.url);
// /internal/grant — loopback-only handshake from parent server.
if (url.pathname === '/internal/grant' && req.method === 'POST') {
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string' && body.token.length > 16) {
validTokens.add(body.token);
}
return new Response('ok');
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
}
// /internal/revoke — drop a token (called on WS close or bootstrap reload)
if (url.pathname === '/internal/revoke' && req.method === 'POST') {
const auth = req.headers.get('authorization');
if (auth !== `Bearer ${INTERNAL_TOKEN}`) {
return new Response('forbidden', { status: 403 });
}
return req.json().then((body: any) => {
if (typeof body?.token === 'string') validTokens.delete(body.token);
return new Response('ok');
}).catch(() => new Response('bad', { status: 400 }));
}
// /claude-available — bootstrap card hits this when user clicks "I installed it".
if (url.pathname === '/claude-available' && req.method === 'GET') {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const found = findClaude();
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ available: !!found, path: found }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
});
}
// /ws — WebSocket upgrade. CRITICAL gates:
// (1) Origin must be chrome-extension://<id>. Cross-site WS hijacking
// defense — required, not optional.
// (2) Token must be in validTokens. We accept the token via two
// transports for compatibility:
// - Sec-WebSocket-Protocol (preferred for browsers — the only
// auth header settable from the browser WebSocket API)
// - Cookie gstack_pty (works for non-browser callers and
// same-port browser callers; doesn't survive the cross-port
// jump from server.ts:34567 to the agent's random port
// when SameSite=Strict is set)
// Either path works; both verify against the same in-memory
// validTokens Set, populated by the parent server's
// authenticated /pty-session → /internal/grant chain.
if (url.pathname === '/ws') {
const origin = req.headers.get('origin') || '';
const isExtensionOrigin = origin.startsWith('chrome-extension://');
if (!isExtensionOrigin) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
if (EXTENSION_ID && origin !== `chrome-extension://${EXTENSION_ID}`) {
return new Response('forbidden origin', { status: 403 });
}
// Try Sec-WebSocket-Protocol first. Format: a single token, possibly
// with a `gstack-pty.` prefix (which we strip). Browsers send a
// comma-separated list when multiple were requested; we pick the
// first that matches a known token.
const protoHeader = req.headers.get('sec-websocket-protocol') || '';
let token: string | null = null;
let acceptedProtocol: string | null = null;
for (const raw of protoHeader.split(',').map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean)) {
const candidate = raw.startsWith('gstack-pty.') ? raw.slice('gstack-pty.'.length) : raw;
if (validTokens.has(candidate)) {
token = candidate;
acceptedProtocol = raw;
break;
}
}
// Fallback: Cookie gstack_pty (legacy / non-browser callers).
if (!token) {
const cookieHeader = req.headers.get('cookie') || '';
for (const part of cookieHeader.split(';')) {
const [name, ...rest] = part.trim().split('=');
if (name === 'gstack_pty') {
const candidate = rest.join('=') || null;
if (candidate && validTokens.has(candidate)) {
token = candidate;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (!token) {
return new Response('unauthorized', { status: 401 });
}
const upgraded = server.upgrade(req, {
data: { cookie: token },
// Echo the protocol back so the browser accepts the upgrade.
// Required when the client sends Sec-WebSocket-Protocol — the
// server MUST select one of the offered protocols, otherwise
// the browser closes the connection immediately.
...(acceptedProtocol ? { headers: { 'Sec-WebSocket-Protocol': acceptedProtocol } } : {}),
});
return upgraded ? undefined : new Response('upgrade failed', { status: 500 });
}
return new Response('not found', { status: 404 });
},
websocket: {
message(ws, raw) {
let session = sessions.get(ws);
if (!session) {
session = {
proc: null,
cols: 80,
rows: 24,
cookie: (ws.data as any)?.cookie || '',
spawned: false,
};
sessions.set(ws, session);
}
// Text frames are control messages: {type: "resize", cols, rows} or
// {type: "tabSwitch", tabId, url, title}. Binary frames are raw input
// bytes destined for the PTY stdin.
if (typeof raw === 'string') {
let msg: any;
try { msg = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { return; }
if (msg?.type === 'resize') {
const cols = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.cols) || 80));
const rows = Math.max(2, Math.floor(Number(msg.rows) || 24));
session.cols = cols;
session.rows = rows;
try { session.proc?.terminal?.resize?.(cols, rows); } catch {}
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'tabSwitch') {
handleTabSwitch(msg);
return;
}
if (msg?.type === 'tabState') {
handleTabState(msg);
return;
}
// Unknown text frame — ignore.
return;
}
// Binary input. Lazy-spawn claude on the first byte.
if (!session.spawned) {
session.spawned = true;
// UTF-8 boundary detection to prevent splitting multi-byte characters (issue #1272).
// Buffer incomplete UTF-8 sequences until the next chunk completes them.
let leftover = Buffer.alloc(0);
const proc = spawnClaude(session.cols, session.rows, (chunk) => {
const combined = Buffer.concat([leftover, Buffer.from(chunk)]);
// Find the last index where a UTF-8 codepoint ends. Look back at most 3 bytes.
let safeEnd = combined.length;
for (let i = combined.length - 1; i >= Math.max(0, combined.length - 3); i--) {
const b = combined[i];
if ((b & 0x80) === 0) { safeEnd = i + 1; break; } // ASCII
if ((b & 0xC0) === 0x80) continue; // continuation byte
const expected = (b & 0xE0) === 0xC0 ? 2 : (b & 0xF0) === 0xE0 ? 3 : 4;
safeEnd = (combined.length - i >= expected) ? combined.length : i;
break;
}
const flush = combined.slice(0, safeEnd);
leftover = combined.slice(safeEnd);
if (flush.length) {
try { ws.sendBinary(flush); } catch {}
}
});
if (!proc) {
try {
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'error',
code: 'CLAUDE_NOT_FOUND',
message: 'claude CLI not on PATH. Install: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code',
}));
ws.close(4404, 'claude not found');
} catch {}
return;
}
session.proc = proc;
// Watch for child exit so the WS closes cleanly when claude exits.
proc.exited?.then?.(() => {
try { ws.close(1000, 'pty exited'); } catch {}
});
}
try {
// raw is a Uint8Array; Bun.Terminal.write accepts string|Buffer.
// Convert to Buffer for safety.
session.proc?.terminal?.write?.(Buffer.from(raw as Uint8Array));
} catch (err) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] terminal.write failed:', err);
}
},
close(ws) {
const session = sessions.get(ws);
if (session) {
disposeSession(session);
if (session.cookie) {
// Drop the cookie so it can't be replayed against a new PTY.
validTokens.delete(session.cookie);
}
sessions.delete(ws);
}
},
},
});
}
/**
* Tab-switch helper: write the active tab to a state file (claude reads it)
* and notify the parent server so its activeTabId stays synced. Skips
* chrome:// and chrome-extension:// internal pages.
*/
/**
* Live tab snapshot. Writes <stateDir>/tabs.json (full list) and updates
* <stateDir>/active-tab.json (current active). claude can read these any
* time without invoking $B tabs — saves a round-trip when the model just
* needs to check the landscape before deciding what to do.
*/
function handleTabState(msg: {
active?: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string } | null;
tabs?: Array<{ tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string; active?: boolean; windowId?: number; pinned?: boolean; audible?: boolean }>;
reason?: string;
}): void {
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(stateDir); } catch {}
// tabs.json — full list
if (Array.isArray(msg.tabs)) {
const payload = {
updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
reason: msg.reason || 'unknown',
tabs: msg.tabs.map(t => ({
tabId: t.tabId ?? null,
url: t.url || '',
title: t.title || '',
active: !!t.active,
windowId: t.windowId ?? null,
pinned: !!t.pinned,
audible: !!t.audible,
})),
};
const target = path.join(stateDir, 'tabs.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tabs-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
// active-tab.json — single active tab. Skip chrome-internal pages so
// claude doesn't see chrome:// or chrome-extension:// URLs as
// "current target."
const active = msg.active;
if (active && active.url && !active.url.startsWith('chrome://') && !active.url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) {
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
tabId: active.tabId ?? null,
url: active.url,
title: active.title ?? '',
}));
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
}
}
function handleTabSwitch(msg: { tabId?: number; url?: string; title?: string }): void {
const url = msg.url || '';
if (!url || url.startsWith('chrome://') || url.startsWith('chrome-extension://')) return;
const stateDir = path.dirname(STATE_FILE);
const ctxFile = path.join(stateDir, 'active-tab.json');
const tmp = path.join(stateDir, `.tmp-tab-${process.pid}`);
try {
writeSecureFile(tmp, JSON.stringify({
tabId: msg.tabId ?? null,
url,
title: msg.title ?? '',
}));
fs.renameSync(tmp, ctxFile);
} catch {
safeUnlink(tmp);
}
// Best-effort sync to parent server so its activeTabId tracking matches.
// No await; this is fire-and-forget.
if (BROWSE_SERVER_PORT > 0) {
fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${BROWSE_SERVER_PORT}/command`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Authorization': `Bearer ${readBrowseToken()}`,
},
body: JSON.stringify({
command: 'tab',
args: [String(msg.tabId ?? ''), '--no-focus'],
}),
}).catch(() => {});
}
}
function readBrowseToken(): string {
try {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(STATE_FILE, 'utf-8');
const j = JSON.parse(raw);
return j.token || '';
} catch { return ''; }
}
// Boot.
function main() {
writeClaudeAvailable();
const server = buildServer();
const port = (server as any).port || (server as any).address?.port;
if (!port) {
console.error('[terminal-agent] failed to bind: no port');
process.exit(1);
}
// Write port file atomically so the parent server can pick it up.
const dir = path.dirname(PORT_FILE);
try { mkdirSecure(dir); } catch {}
const tmp = `${PORT_FILE}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
writeSecureFile(tmp, String(port));
fs.renameSync(tmp, PORT_FILE);
// Hand the parent the internal token so it can call /internal/grant.
// Parent learns INTERNAL_TOKEN via env (TERMINAL_AGENT_INTERNAL_TOKEN below).
// We just print it on stdout for the supervising process to pick up if it's
// not already in env. Defense against env races at spawn time.
console.log(`[terminal-agent] listening on 127.0.0.1:${port} pid=${process.pid}`);
// Cleanup port file on exit.
const cleanup = () => { safeUnlink(PORT_FILE); process.exit(0); };
process.on('SIGTERM', cleanup);
process.on('SIGINT', cleanup);
}
// Export the internal token so cli.ts can pass the SAME value to the parent
// server via env. Parent reads BROWSE_TERMINAL_INTERNAL_TOKEN and uses it
// for /internal/grant calls.
//
// In practice, the agent generates INTERNAL_TOKEN once at boot and writes it
// to a state file the parent reads. This avoids env-passing races. See main().
const INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE = path.join(path.dirname(STATE_FILE), 'terminal-internal-token');
try {
mkdirSecure(path.dirname(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE));
writeSecureFile(INTERNAL_TOKEN_FILE, INTERNAL_TOKEN);
} catch {}
main();