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13a7528697
Activity stream and inspector events SSE endpoints accepted the root
AUTH_TOKEN via `?token=` query param (EventSource can't send Authorization
headers). URLs leak to browser history, referer headers, server logs,
crash reports, and refactoring accidents. Codex flagged this during the
/plan-ceo-review outside voice pass.
New auth model: the extension calls POST /sse-session with a Bearer token
and receives a view-only session cookie (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, 30-min
TTL). EventSource is opened with `withCredentials: true` so the browser
sends the cookie back on the SSE connection. The ?token= query param is
GONE — no more URL-borne secrets.
Scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation, 10/10
confidence): the SSE session cookie grants access to /activity/stream and
/inspector/events ONLY. The token is never valid against /command, /token,
or any mutating endpoint. A leaked cookie can watch activity; it cannot
execute browser commands.
Components
* browse/src/sse-session-cookie.ts — registry: mint/validate/extract/
build-cookie. 256-bit tokens, 30-min TTL, lazy expiry pruning,
no imports from token-registry (scope isolation enforced by module
boundary).
* browse/src/server.ts — POST /sse-session mint endpoint (requires
Bearer). /activity/stream and /inspector/events now accept Bearer
OR the session cookie, and reject ?token= query param.
* extension/sidepanel.js — ensureSseSessionCookie() bootstrap call,
EventSource opened with withCredentials:true on both SSE endpoints.
Tested via the source guards; behavioral test is the E2E pairing
flow that lands later in the wave.
* browse/test/sse-session-cookie.test.ts — 20 unit tests covering
mint entropy, TTL enforcement, cookie flag invariants, cookie
parsing from multi-cookie headers, and scope-isolation contract
guard (module must not import token-registry).
* browse/test/server-auth.test.ts — existing /activity/stream auth
test updated to assert the new cookie-based gate and the absence
of the ?token= query param.
Cookie flag choices:
* HttpOnly: token not readable from page JS (mitigates XSS
exfiltration).
* SameSite=Strict: cookie not sent on cross-site requests (mitigates
CSRF). Fine for SSE because the extension connects to 127.0.0.1
directly.
* Path=/: cookie scoped to the whole origin.
* Max-Age=1800: 30 minutes, matches TTL. Extension re-mints on
reconnect when daemon restarts.
* Secure NOT set: daemon binds to 127.0.0.1 over plain HTTP. Adding
Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie back.
Add Secure when gstack ships over HTTPS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
161 lines
5.7 KiB
TypeScript
161 lines
5.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Unit tests for the view-only SSE session cookie module.
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*
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* Verifies the registry lifecycle (mint/validate/expire), cookie flag
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* invariants (HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, no Secure), token entropy, and
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* that scope is implicit (the registry has no cross-endpoint footprint
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* that could be used to escalate the cookie to a scoped token).
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect, beforeEach } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as path from 'path';
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import {
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mintSseSessionToken, validateSseSessionToken, extractSseCookie,
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buildSseSetCookie, buildSseClearCookie, SSE_COOKIE_NAME,
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__resetSseSessions,
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} from '../src/sse-session-cookie';
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const MODULE_SRC = fs.readFileSync(
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path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/sse-session-cookie.ts'), 'utf-8'
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);
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beforeEach(() => __resetSseSessions());
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describe('SSE session cookie: mint + validate', () => {
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test('mint returns a token and an expiry', () => {
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const { token, expiresAt } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(typeof token).toBe('string');
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expect(token.length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
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expect(expiresAt).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
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});
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test('mint uses 32 random bytes (256-bit entropy)', () => {
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// base64url of 32 bytes is 43 chars (no padding)
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(token).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/);
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});
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test('two mint calls produce different tokens', () => {
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const a = mintSseSessionToken();
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const b = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(a.token).not.toBe(b.token);
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});
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test('validate returns true for a just-minted token', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(validateSseSessionToken(token)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('validate returns false for an unknown token', () => {
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expect(validateSseSessionToken('not-a-real-token')).toBe(false);
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});
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test('validate returns false for null/undefined/empty', () => {
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expect(validateSseSessionToken(null)).toBe(false);
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expect(validateSseSessionToken(undefined)).toBe(false);
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expect(validateSseSessionToken('')).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('SSE session cookie: TTL enforcement', () => {
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test('TTL is 30 minutes', () => {
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// Assert via source — the actual constant is module-private
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expect(MODULE_SRC).toContain('const TTL_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000');
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});
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test('a token with artificially rewound expiry is rejected', () => {
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// Mint a token, then monkey-patch Date.now to simulate 31 minutes elapsed.
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const { token, expiresAt } = mintSseSessionToken();
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const originalNow = Date.now;
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try {
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Date.now = () => expiresAt + 1;
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expect(validateSseSessionToken(token)).toBe(false);
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} finally {
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Date.now = originalNow;
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}
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});
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});
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describe('SSE session cookie: cookie flag invariants', () => {
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test('Set-Cookie is HttpOnly', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(buildSseSetCookie(token)).toContain('HttpOnly');
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});
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test('Set-Cookie is SameSite=Strict', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(buildSseSetCookie(token)).toContain('SameSite=Strict');
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});
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test('Set-Cookie includes the token value', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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expect(buildSseSetCookie(token)).toContain(`${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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});
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test('Set-Cookie Max-Age matches TTL', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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// 30 minutes = 1800 seconds
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expect(buildSseSetCookie(token)).toContain('Max-Age=1800');
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});
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test('Set-Cookie does NOT set Secure (local HTTP daemon)', () => {
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const { token } = mintSseSessionToken();
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// Adding Secure would block the browser from ever sending the cookie
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// back to a 127.0.0.1 daemon over HTTP. If gstack ever moves to HTTPS,
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// add Secure then.
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expect(buildSseSetCookie(token)).not.toContain('Secure');
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});
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test('Clear-Cookie has Max-Age=0', () => {
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expect(buildSseClearCookie()).toContain('Max-Age=0');
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expect(buildSseClearCookie()).toContain('HttpOnly');
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});
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});
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describe('SSE session cookie: extract from request', () => {
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function mockReq(cookieHeader: string | null): Request {
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const headers = new Headers();
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if (cookieHeader !== null) headers.set('cookie', cookieHeader);
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return new Request('http://127.0.0.1/activity/stream', { headers });
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}
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test('extracts the token when cookie is present', () => {
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const req = mockReq(`${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=abc123`);
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expect(extractSseCookie(req)).toBe('abc123');
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});
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test('returns null when no cookie header', () => {
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const req = mockReq(null);
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expect(extractSseCookie(req)).toBeNull();
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});
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test('returns null when cookie header has no gstack_sse', () => {
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const req = mockReq('other=x; unrelated=y');
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expect(extractSseCookie(req)).toBeNull();
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});
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test('extracts gstack_sse from a multi-cookie header', () => {
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const req = mockReq(`other=x; ${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=real-token; trailing=y`);
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expect(extractSseCookie(req)).toBe('real-token');
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});
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test('handles tokens with base64url padding-like chars', () => {
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// real tokens contain A-Z, a-z, 0-9, _, -
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const req = mockReq(`${SSE_COOKIE_NAME}=AbCd-_xyz`);
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expect(extractSseCookie(req)).toBe('AbCd-_xyz');
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});
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});
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describe('SSE session cookie: scope isolation (prior learning cookie-picker-auth-isolation)', () => {
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test('the module exposes ONLY view-only functions, no scoped-token hooks', () => {
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// This is a contract guard: if someone later makes SSE session tokens
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// valid as scoped tokens (e.g., by exporting a helper that registers
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// them in the main token registry), a leaked cookie could execute
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// /command. The module must not import from token-registry.
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expect(MODULE_SRC).not.toContain("from './token-registry'");
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expect(MODULE_SRC).not.toContain('createToken');
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expect(MODULE_SRC).not.toContain('initRegistry');
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});
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});
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