Files
gstack/browse/src/url-validation.ts
T
Garry Tan c0f3c3a91a fix: security hardening + issue triage (v0.8.3) (#205)
* fix: check for bun before running setup (#147)

Users without bun installed got a cryptic "command not found" error.
Now prints a clear message with install instructions.

Closes #147

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: block SSRF via URL validation in browse commands (#17)

Adds validateNavigationUrl() that blocks non-HTTP(S) schemes (file://,
javascript:, data:) and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254,
metadata.google.internal). Applied to goto, diff, and newTab commands.
Localhost and private IPs remain allowed for local dev QA.

Closes #17

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: replace eval $(gstack-slug) with source <(...) (#133)

Eliminates unnecessary use of eval across all skill templates and
generated files. source <(...) has identical behavior without the
shell injection surface. Also hardens gstack-diff-scope usage.

Closes #133

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: rename /debug to /investigate to avoid Claude Code conflict (#190)

Claude Code has a built-in /debug command that shadows the gstack skill.
Renaming to /investigate which better reflects the systematic root-cause
investigation methodology.

Closes #190

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add unit tests for path validation helpers

validateOutputPath() and validateReadPath() are security-critical
functions with zero test coverage. Adds 14 tests covering safe paths,
traversal attacks, and prefix collision edge cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.8.3)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update /debug → /investigate references in docs

CLAUDE.md, README.md, and docs/skills.md still referenced the old
/debug skill name after the rename.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: harden URL validation against hostname bypasses (Codex P1)

Codex review found that metadata IPs could be reached via hex
(0xA9FEA9FE), decimal (2852039166), octal, trailing dot, and IPv6
bracket forms. Now normalizes hostnames before checking the blocklist
and probes numeric IP representations via URL constructor.

Also moves URL validation before page allocation in newTab() to
prevent zombie tabs on rejection (Codex P3).

5 new test cases for bypass variants.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 01:58:43 -05:00

68 lines
2.2 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* URL validation for navigation commands — blocks dangerous schemes and cloud metadata endpoints.
* Localhost and private IPs are allowed (primary use case: QA testing local dev servers).
*/
const BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS = new Set([
'169.254.169.254', // AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata
'fd00::', // IPv6 unique local (metadata in some cloud setups)
'metadata.google.internal', // GCP metadata
]);
/**
* Normalize hostname for blocklist comparison:
* - Strip trailing dot (DNS fully-qualified notation)
* - Strip IPv6 brackets (URL.hostname includes [] for IPv6)
* - Resolve hex (0xA9FEA9FE) and decimal (2852039166) IP representations
*/
function normalizeHostname(hostname: string): string {
// Strip IPv6 brackets
let h = hostname.startsWith('[') && hostname.endsWith(']')
? hostname.slice(1, -1)
: hostname;
// Strip trailing dot
if (h.endsWith('.')) h = h.slice(0, -1);
return h;
}
/**
* Check if a hostname resolves to the link-local metadata IP 169.254.169.254.
* Catches hex (0xA9FEA9FE), decimal (2852039166), and octal (0251.0376.0251.0376) forms.
*/
function isMetadataIp(hostname: string): boolean {
// Try to parse as a numeric IP via URL constructor — it normalizes all forms
try {
const probe = new URL(`http://${hostname}`);
const normalized = probe.hostname;
if (BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS.has(normalized)) return true;
// Also check after stripping trailing dot
if (normalized.endsWith('.') && BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS.has(normalized.slice(0, -1))) return true;
} catch {
// Not a valid hostname — can't be a metadata IP
}
return false;
}
export function validateNavigationUrl(url: string): void {
let parsed: URL;
try {
parsed = new URL(url);
} catch {
throw new Error(`Invalid URL: ${url}`);
}
if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
throw new Error(
`Blocked: scheme "${parsed.protocol}" is not allowed. Only http: and https: URLs are permitted.`
);
}
const hostname = normalizeHostname(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase());
if (BLOCKED_METADATA_HOSTS.has(hostname) || isMetadataIp(hostname)) {
throw new Error(
`Blocked: ${parsed.hostname} is a cloud metadata endpoint. Access is denied for security.`
);
}
}