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* fix: remove auth token from /health, secure extension bootstrap (CRITICAL-02 + HIGH-03) - Remove token from /health response (was leaked to any localhost process) - Write .auth.json to extension dir for Manifest V3 bootstrap - sidebar-agent reads token from state file via BROWSE_STATE_FILE env var - Remove getToken handler from extension (token via health broadcast) - Extension loads token before first health poll to prevent race condition * fix: require auth on cookie-picker data routes (CRITICAL-01) - Add Bearer token auth gate on all /cookie-picker/* data/action routes - GET /cookie-picker HTML page stays unauthenticated (UI shell) - Token embedded in served HTML for picker's fetch calls - CORS preflight now allows Authorization header * fix: add state file TTL and plaintext cookie warning (HIGH-02) - Add savedAt timestamp to state save output - Warn on load if state file older than 7 days - Auto-delete stale state files (>7 days) on server startup - Warning about plaintext cookie storage in save message * fix: innerHTML XSS in extension content script and sidepanel (MEDIUM-01) - content.js: replace innerHTML with createElement/textContent for ref panel - sidepanel.js: escape entry.command with escapeHtml() in activity feed - Both found by security audit + Codex adversarial red team * fix: symlink bypass in validateReadPath (MEDIUM-02) - Always resolve to absolute path first (fixes relative path bypass) - Use realpathSync to follow symlinks before boundary check - Throw on non-ENOENT realpathSync failures (explicit over silent) - Resolve SAFE_DIRECTORIES through realpathSync (macOS /tmp → /private/tmp) - Resolve directory part for non-existent files (ENOENT with symlinked parent) * fix: freeze hook symlink bypass and prefix collision (MEDIUM-03) - Add POSIX-portable path resolution (cd + pwd -P, works on macOS) - Fix prefix collision: /project-evil no longer matches /project freeze dir - Use trailing slash in boundary check to require directory boundary * fix: shell script injection in gstack-config and telemetry (MEDIUM-04) - gstack-config: validate keys (alphanumeric+underscore only) - gstack-config: use grep -F (fixed string) instead of -E (regex) - gstack-config: escape sed special chars in values, drop newlines - gstack-telemetry-log: sanitize REPO_SLUG and BRANCH via json_safe() * test: 20 security tests for audit remediation - server-auth: verify token removed from /health, auth on /refs, /activity/* - cookie-picker: auth required on data routes, HTML page unauthenticated - path-validation: symlink bypass blocked, realpathSync failure throws - gstack-config: regex key rejected, sed special chars preserved - state-ttl: savedAt timestamp, 7-day TTL warning - telemetry: branch/repo with quotes don't corrupt JSON - adversarial: sidepanel escapes entry.command, freeze prefix collision * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.13.1.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: tone down changelog — defense in depth, not catastrophic bugs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
66 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
66 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Server auth security tests — verify security remediation in server.ts
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*
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* Tests are source-level: they read server.ts and verify that auth checks,
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* CORS restrictions, and token removal are correctly in place.
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
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import * as fs from 'fs';
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import * as path from 'path';
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const SERVER_SRC = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dir, '../src/server.ts'), 'utf-8');
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// Helper: extract a block of source between two markers
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function sliceBetween(source: string, startMarker: string, endMarker: string): string {
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const startIdx = source.indexOf(startMarker);
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if (startIdx === -1) throw new Error(`Marker not found: ${startMarker}`);
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const endIdx = source.indexOf(endMarker, startIdx + startMarker.length);
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if (endIdx === -1) throw new Error(`End marker not found: ${endMarker}`);
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return source.slice(startIdx, endIdx);
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}
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describe('Server auth security', () => {
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// Test 1: /health response must not leak the auth token
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test('/health response must not contain token field', () => {
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const healthBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/health'", "url.pathname === '/refs'");
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// The old pattern was: token: AUTH_TOKEN
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// The new pattern should have a comment indicating token was removed
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expect(healthBlock).not.toContain('token: AUTH_TOKEN');
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expect(healthBlock).toContain('token removed');
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});
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// Test 2: /refs endpoint requires auth via validateAuth
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test('/refs endpoint requires authentication', () => {
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const refsBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/refs'", "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'");
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expect(refsBlock).toContain('validateAuth');
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});
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// Test 3: /refs has no wildcard CORS header
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test('/refs has no wildcard CORS header', () => {
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const refsBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/refs'", "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'");
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expect(refsBlock).not.toContain("'*'");
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});
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// Test 4: /activity/history requires auth via validateAuth
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test('/activity/history requires authentication', () => {
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const historyBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/history'", 'Sidebar endpoints');
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expect(historyBlock).toContain('validateAuth');
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});
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// Test 5: /activity/history has no wildcard CORS header
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test('/activity/history has no wildcard CORS header', () => {
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const historyBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/history'", 'Sidebar endpoints');
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expect(historyBlock).not.toContain("'*'");
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});
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// Test 6: /activity/stream requires auth (inline Bearer or ?token= check)
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test('/activity/stream requires authentication with inline token check', () => {
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const streamBlock = sliceBetween(SERVER_SRC, "url.pathname === '/activity/stream'", "url.pathname === '/activity/history'");
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expect(streamBlock).toContain('validateAuth');
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expect(streamBlock).toContain('AUTH_TOKEN');
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// Should not have wildcard CORS for the SSE stream
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expect(streamBlock).not.toContain("Access-Control-Allow-Origin': '*'");
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});
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});
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