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Garry TanandClaude Fable 5
f96fd46b1c
An unqualified username handed to icacls is ambiguous: on a machine whose hostname equals the username (a common Windows setup), it resolves to the MACHINE account instead of the user. Combined with /inheritance:r, that leaves ~/.gstack with a single ACE matching nobody — the process that just "secured" the directory locks itself out, and icacls still reports success. Both icacls sites in the repo (restrictFilePermissions and restrictDirectoryPermissions in browse/src/file-permissions.ts — the only icacls call sites; setup has none) now grant via icacls' literal-SID form `*<SID>`, resolved once per process from System32\whoami.exe (pinned to System32 because a bare `whoami` under a bash-flavoured PATH picks up the MSYS build, which rejects /user). Fallback when the SID can't be resolved is the domain-qualified `USERDOMAIN\username` name, which is unambiguous where the bare username was not. Windows-only regression tests assert the hardened directory stays usable by the calling process (readdir + write), which is exactly the check that a not-toThrow assertion sailed past before. Contributed by @asizux2 (PR #2479); the same defect was independently fixed by @Icandi40, @chiragborse1, @IntegriGit and @voltapix26. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>