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https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git
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Garry Tanandcapy-ai[bot]
4c6fa89cdc
* security: isolate every gstack Bun entry point from the audited checkout's .env and bunfig.toml Bun auto-loads .env, .env.local and .env.<NODE_ENV> from its cwd and runs a cwd bunfig.toml preload before the program starts. gstack runs inside the repo it audits, so a committed .env could steer state roots, the claude binary or spend caps, and a bunfig preload ran arbitrary code in every bin and hook. Every bun shebang, shell and skill caller, TypeScript spawn and compiled build now disables both (--no-env-file --config=/dev/null, bunIsolationArgs(), --no-compile-autoload-dotenv/bunfig), with a ratchet and hostile-fixture regressions. Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: name the directly executed scripts in the isolation ratchet Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: follow the isolation flags in touchfiles, copy lists, recipe assertions and the harness pin Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: keep browse/src/bun-child-config.ts unchanged so the native cookie qualification still binds Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(windows): the empty bunfig outlives its process so the timeline hook's detached repair child can read it Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * v1.91.159.0 security: gstack's Bun entry points ignore the audited repo's .env and bunfig.toml (S1) Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: plan-mode render pattern accepts the isolation flags Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: capy-ai[bot] <230910855+capy-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
46 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
Executable File
46 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env -S bun --no-env-file --config=/dev/null
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/**
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* Derive the Chrome extension ID from the "key" field in
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* extension/manifest.json.
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*
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* Chrome computes an extension's ID as the first 16 bytes of the SHA-256
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* hash of the DER-encoded public key, with each hex nibble mapped from
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* 0-9a-f to a-p (the "mpdecimal" alphabet). Pinning the public key in the
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* manifest pins the ID, which lets the browse server verify the Origin
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* header on POST /extension-token against a single known extension
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* identity (GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID in browse/src/extension-id.ts).
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*
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* The private half of the keypair is intentionally NOT in the repo — the
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* extension is loaded unpacked (or baked into Browser.app), so only the
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* public key is needed to pin the ID. Regenerating the keypair changes
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* the ID and requires updating both the manifest "key" and the
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* GSTACK_EXTENSION_ID constant.
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*
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* Usage: bun browse/scripts/extension-id.ts [path/to/manifest.json]
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*/
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import * as fs from 'node:fs';
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import * as path from 'node:path';
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const manifestPath = process.argv[2]
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?? path.join(import.meta.dir, '../../extension/manifest.json');
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const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(manifestPath, 'utf-8'));
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if (typeof manifest.key !== 'string' || manifest.key.length === 0) {
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console.error(`No "key" field in ${manifestPath}`);
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process.exit(1);
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}
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export function extensionIdFromPublicKey(publicKeyBase64: string): string {
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const der = Buffer.from(publicKeyBase64, 'base64');
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const hex = createHash('sha256').update(der).digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
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let id = '';
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for (const c of hex) {
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id += String.fromCharCode('a'.charCodeAt(0) + parseInt(c, 16));
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}
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return id;
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}
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console.log(extensionIdFromPublicKey(manifest.key));
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