Files
iOS-18.5-Bluetooth-Privacy-…/Report.md
2025-09-28 18:03:42 -04:00

5.4 KiB
Raw Blame History

Bluetooth Hijacked for Silent Scanning and GPS Harvesting — iOS 18.5

Author: Joseph Goydish II Date of Discovery: June 24, 2025 Test Device: iPhone 14 Pro Max iOS Version: 18.5 Severity: High Tools Used: Apple Console.app (macOS) via USB Test Environment: Stock iOS (no jailbreak, no MDM, no third-party tools)

Log Evidence: (https://ia801505.us.archive.org/16/items/bluetooth-hacks-your-life/ios18.5_silent_tracking_console_capture.mov)

Summary

This report documents a reproducible series of system-level privacy violations in iOS 18.5, in which native Apple system daemons:

  • Expose Bluetooth trust metadata
  • Initiate background BLE scans without user interaction
  • Trigger GPS-based location harvesting without consent
  • Bypass user-facing privacy control mechanisms

All of these behaviors occur without any UI indicators, prompts, or active app involvement.

These findings were collected using Apples own diagnostic tools on a clean iPhone with no modifications. All activity observed was native to iOS and requires no third-party applications or tampering.


Vulnerability Details


VF-001 — Exposure of Bluetooth Trust Metadata

Component: audioaccessoryd

Description: This daemon exposes metadata for previously trusted Bluetooth Low Energy accessories, including Identity Resolving Keys (IRKs) and pairing states — even when those devices are powered off or disconnected.

Log Evidence:

Read IRK for device A8:BE:27:17:94:26 : result 0  
init cloud - found 0 paired LE devices in local keychain  

Impact:

  • Leaks historical device trust relationships
  • Enables passive tracking and identity correlation

VF-002 — Silent BLE Scanning

Component: SPCBPeripheralManager

Description: Accessing trust metadata triggers silent Bluetooth Low Energy scanning in the background, with no foreground app activity or user-visible indicators.

Log Evidence:

SPCBPeripheralManager: Created session for <<hash>>:com.apple.bluetoothd  
SPCBPeripheralManager: fetch duration: 17.61 ms  

Impact:

  • Device becomes passively discoverable
  • Enables silent environmental mapping or passive surveillance

VF-003 — Covert GPS Activation

Component: locationd

Description: GPS-based location harvesting is activated silently — with no consent dialog, app invocation, or system UI indicator.

Log Evidence:

"updateHarvestingAllowed", "isHarvestingEnabled":1  
"Harvesting is forced to be allowed,0"  

Impact:

  • Location data collected without user consent
  • Violates iOSs stated privacy protections

VF-004 — TCC Framework Bypass

Component: tccd

Description: By setting the preflight=yes flag, system processes bypass Apples TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) framework, which enforces permission checks for Bluetooth access.

Log Evidence:

TCCAccessRequest, service=kTCCServiceBluetoothAlways, preflight=yes, client_dict=(null)  

Impact:

  • Silent privilege escalation
  • Permission enforcement bypassed at the system level

VF-005 — Continued Trust Logic After Cryptographic Failure

Component: bluetoothd

Description: Even when access to keychain material fails (e.g., missing or corrupted crypto keys), trust metadata continues to be processed and surfaced.

Log Evidence:

Failed to query key chain magic key data ... result 150  
Read IRK for device C8:7B:23:93:6F:C7 : result 150  

Impact:

  • Trust logic proceeds in degraded security state
  • Weakens platform integrity and resilience

Behavioral Sequence

During a single session of console logging, the following occurred:

  1. audioaccessoryd accessed Bluetooth trust metadata
  2. SPCBPeripheralManager initiated BLE scans
  3. locationd activated GPS harvesting silently
  4. tccd bypassed the TCC framework using preflight=yes
  5. bluetoothd continued trust operations despite cryptographic failures

Together, these components form a passive telemetry pipeline that violates iOSs user-facing privacy model.


Risk Assessment

  • Metadata Exposure: Trust data is revealed even when no devices are connected.
  • Silent BLE Discovery: Background BLE scans occur with no user prompt.
  • Covert Location Access: GPS data is collected without indicators or consent.
  • Consent Bypass: TCC protections are silently bypassed.
  • Crypto Integrity Failure: Trust logic continues despite keychain or credential failure.

Reproducibility

  • Device: iPhone 14 Pro Max

  • OS Version: iOS 18.5

  • Tools: Apple Console.app (macOS)

  • Test Environment: Clean install with no jailbreak, MDM, or third-party apps

  • Observed Daemons:

    • audioaccessoryd
    • bluetoothd
    • tccd
    • locationd
    • SPCBPeripheralManager

Supporting Materials

  • Redacted console logs
  • Annotated log excerpts by vulnerability
  • Reproduction steps and configuration notes

Conclusion

The behaviors observed in iOS 18.5 reflect a coordinated system-level approach to collecting Bluetooth and GPS metadata without user awareness or consent. Key findings:

  • Trust metadata is exposed without visibility
  • BLE and GPS collection is silently triggered
  • TCC protections are bypassed at runtime
  • Cryptographic enforcement is not required to proceed

This design architecture poses a serious privacy risk, especially in high-security or adversarial environments. It challenges Apple's public privacy guarantees and opens the door to persistent, covert tracking of users.