diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 30c6b02..c1ba6e1 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -15,47 +15,61 @@ accepts **unauthenticated and unsigned XML property list (.plist) payloads**, ex
 
 
 ## Impact
-
 - **Arbitrary Provisioning:** Attackers can inject custom provisioning logic into the activation workflow.  
-
 - **Bypass Security:** MDM enrollment, signature checks, and user consent are fully bypassed.  
-
 - **Persistence:** Malicious profiles and configurations remain after activation.  
-
 - **Attack Vectors:** Exploitable remotely via captive portals, rogue access points, or compromised provisioning servers.  
-
 - **Techniques:** XML External Entity (XXE) injection, malformed payload acceptance, and silent background task injection.  
 
-
-
 Server responses confirm consistent **HTTP 200 OK** acceptance of illicit payloads without validation.
 
-
+---
 
 ## Risk
-
 - **Enterprise & Supply Chain:** Devices can be manipulated before reaching end users.  
-
 - **Stealth:** Changes are invisible to standard logs and forensic tools.  
-
 - **High Severity:** Exploitation requires no jailbreak or physical access.  
 
+---
 
+## Evidence (Artifact-Based)
+**Primary artifact:** `artifacts/mobileactivationd_sdcrt_baa_response.txt`  
 
-## Status
+Key observations from the server response:
+- `HTTP Status Code: 200 (no error)` — confirms the endpoint accepted the request.  
+- Headers: `Server: Apple`, `Host: humb.apple.com`, `HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS: 0`.  
+- Response body contained multiple PEM certificate blocks (`-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- …`).  
+- Timestamp in `Date:` header allows correlation with device/system logs.  
 
-- **Case Assigned:** CERT/CC acknowledged, **VRF#25-05-RCKYK** on **May 19, 2025**.  
+**Interpretation:** Instead of rejecting invalid/unsigned provisioning data, the server processed the request and returned cryptographic material, demonstrating insufficient validation.
 
-- **Vendor Response:** Apple remains **unresponsive** as of publication.  
+---
 
-- **Mitigation:** No patch available.  
+## Attack Surface & Technical Impact
+- **Pre-activation phase:** The flaw manifests before MDM enrollment or user consent.  
+- **Delivery vectors:** captive portals, rogue Wi-Fi/APs, compromised provisioning servers.  
+- **Technical outcomes:**  
+  - Arbitrary provisioning injection  
+  - Bypass of signature/consent enforcement  
+  - Persistent, stealthy configuration drift in caches such as `CloudKitAccountInfoCache` and `CommCenter`  
 
+---
 
+## Detection
+### Network Indicators
+- Responses from `humb.apple.com/humbug/baa` with `200 OK` and PEM certificate blocks.  
+- Presence of `HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS: 0` in response headers.
 
-## Recommended Actions
+### Host Indicators
+- Unexpected entries in:
+  - `CloudKitAccountInfoCache`  
+  - `CommCenter` modem/network configurations  
+- Profiles/configs applied post-activation without user or MDM actions.
 
-- Block or monitor traffic to `humb.apple.com/humbug/baa`.  
+### Safe Triage Commands
+```bash
+# Search response captures for certificate blocks
+grep -R "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----" /path/to/response_captures/
 
-- Inspect provisioning workflows for anomalies.  
-
-- Treat newly provisioned devices as potentially untrusted until a vendor fix is issued.
+# Look for humbug headers in activation logs
+grep -i "HUMBUG_XHEADER_STATUS" /var/log/mobileactivationd*