From f8f69ce4e8fde89045a03add92baeada85ea464d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joseph Goydish II Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2025 21:39:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] Delete .md --- .md | 96 ------------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 96 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .md diff --git a/.md b/.md deleted file mode 100644 index 9d335bb..0000000 --- a/.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,96 +0,0 @@ -# iOS TCC Framework Bypass via Unauthorized auth_reason=5 Grant Mechanism - -**Severity:** CRITICAL -**Submission Date:** 2025-12-11 UTC -**Researcher:** Joseph Goydish II - ---- - -## Executive Summary - -Critical TCC framework flaw in iOS 26.1 incorrectly assigns `auth_reason=5` (system bypass authority) to third-party applications, enabling silent access to iCloud services and undocumented telemetry without user consent or Privacy Settings visibility. Analysis of TCC database from iPhone 14 Pro Max reveals 5 unrelated third-party apps with unauthorized system-level grants—evidence indicates framework logic defect, not malicious app behavior. Immediate remediation required: revoke unauthorized grants and fix authorization assignment logic. - -**Database:** `sysdiagnose_2025.12.09_13-10-52-0500_iPhone-OS_iPhone_23B85/logs/Accessibility/TCC.db` -**SHA256:** `8c6fcd9e7c6ea44d9d2fab262887568978494b35eb298e2a92b0e92b47cef90a` - ---- - -## Evidence: Unauthorized auth_reason=5 Grants - -### SQL Query -```sql -SELECT client, service, auth_reason, datetime(last_modified, 'unixepoch') as last_modified -FROM access -WHERE auth_reason = 5 AND client NOT LIKE 'com.apple.%' AND client NOT LIKE 'developer.apple.%'; -``` - -### Third-Party Apps with System Bypass Authority - -| Application | Service | Last Modified | -|-------------|---------|---------------| -| com.ubercab.UberClient | kTCCServiceUbiquity | 2025-10-24T21:12:37Z | -| com.linkedin.LinkedIn | kTCCServiceUbiquity | 2025-01-17T04:49:48Z | -| com.kentoh.hackerfeed | kTCCServiceLiverpool | 2025-09-19T20:56:47Z | -| com.lifetimefitness.interests.ltfitness | kTCCServiceLiverpool | 2025-05-26T21:34:15Z | -| com.google.chrome.ios | kTCCServiceWebKitIntelligentTrackingPrevention | 2024-10-25T14:53:03Z | - -**Complete dataset:** `TCC_Anomalies_Sanitized.csv` (33 entries) - ---- - -## Technical Analysis & Root Cause - -### Framework Logic Flaw - -The TCC framework's authorization assignment routine incorrectly evaluates client authority and grants `auth_reason=5` (system bypass) to third-party applications that should only receive `auth_reason=2` (user consent) or `auth_reason=4` (entitlement-based). - -**Evidence of framework defect:** -- Five unrelated apps from different developers with no common functionality or SDK -- No exploit signatures or privilege escalation code detected -- Pattern persists across iOS updates (grants span Oct 2024 - Nov 2025) - -### Programmatic Grant Characteristics - -All unauthorized `auth_reason=5` grants share identical patterns indicating automated framework insertion without user interaction: -- `pid`: NULL (no process ID recorded) -- `boot_uuid`: UNUSED (not tied to specific boot session) -- `last_reminded`: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z (epoch = never reminded user) - -Normal TCC grants include PID, boot UUID, and reminder timestamps. Their absence confirms programmatic auto-grant outside standard consent flow. - -### Undocumented Service Access - -`kTCCServiceLiverpool`: -- Not documented in public TCC framework documentation -- Not visible in iOS Privacy Settings UI -- Accessed by 87 clients total (19 with `auth_reason=5`) -- Two third-party apps (HackerFeed, Lifetime Fitness) have unauthorized system bypass to this service - ---- - -## Recommended Remediation - -### Immediate Actions -1. Audit all `auth_reason=5` grants in TCC database; revoke unauthorized third-party app grants -2. Fix authorization logic: restrict `auth_reason=5` exclusively to Apple-signed system services -3. Force user re-consent for affected applications via standard TCC prompt flow -4. Add runtime assertion to detect and reject `auth_reason=5` assignment to non-system clients - -### Follow-Up Actions -5. Implement TCC audit logging: record all `auth_reason=5` assignments with call stack traces -6. Document `kTCCServiceLiverpool` in public TCC documentation or restrict to system services only -7. Add Privacy Settings visibility for actual authorization levels (developer mode) -8. Implement cryptographic binding between `auth_reason` value and client code signature - ---- - -## Reproduction - -1. Generate sysdiagnose on iOS 26.1 device -2. Extract `TCC.db` from `sysdiagnose_*/logs/Accessibility/` -3. Query: `SELECT client, service FROM access WHERE auth_reason = 5 AND client NOT LIKE 'com.apple.%';` -4. Expected: Third-party apps listed with system bypass authority (see attached CSV for reference) - ---- - -**End of Report**