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Validate C2PA credentials before attribution

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Victor Kuznetsov
2026-08-15 11:31:59 -07:00
parent 8201ada070
commit 2eab24a2e1
18 changed files with 826 additions and 47 deletions
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docs/module-internals.md
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@@ -364,6 +364,30 @@ Regression coverage:
official `c2pa-python` reader first. Its byte-level PNG parser remains a fallback
for partial and synthetic fixtures that the official reader rejects.
Structured extraction is limited to the active manifest and the ingredient
manifests reachable from it. Validation is preserved as separate dimensions:
asset binding integrity, claim signature, signer trust, and signer certificate
validity. A matching asset hash and valid claim signature do not make an
untrusted or expired signer trusted. `identify` therefore assigns high confidence
only when all four dimensions validate, medium confidence to an intact but
untrusted or unvalidated claim, and no origin verdict to a hash/signature failure.
The failed claim remains in the marker inventory and keeps the removal gate
fail-safe because a post-signing container edit can invalidate C2PA without
removing a declared pixel watermark.
The structured walk also treats an exact known AI product in a reachable
`claim_generator` as an AI assertion. This covers update chains where the active
manifest names only `c2pa-tool` while a validated ingredient names Dreamina, and
Firefly chains that identify `Adobe_Firefly` without repeating a digital source
type. Unreachable manifests remain excluded.
The SDK default enables trust verification but supplies no production trust
anchors. Consequently, an installation without an explicitly maintained C2PA
trust bundle reports otherwise valid signer chains as untrusted and keeps their
attribution at medium confidence. Shipping or fetching an official trust bundle
requires a separate update, provenance, and availability policy; do not silently
convert `signingCredential.untrusted` into trusted based on a vendor-name match.
Vendor attribution comes from the registry in
[`_internal/constants.py`](../src/remove_ai_watermarks/_internal/constants.py). Derived
issuer and platform maps should not be maintained separately.