diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
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+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ You are a **principal Python engineer** maintaining a CLI tool and library for r
 - `noai/c2pa.py` — PNG chunk parser; use `extract_c2pa_chunk(path)` to get raw caBX payload, `has_c2pa_metadata(path)` to detect. Do not reimplement chunk parsing. `extract_c2pa_info(path)` sets `synthid_watermark`/`synthid_vendors` when the manifest is signed by a SynthID-using vendor, and `soft_binding`/`soft_binding_vendors` when a `c2pa.soft-binding` `alg` names a forensic-watermark vendor (`soft_binding_vendors_in(buffer)` is the shared byte-scan, used by both the PNG parser and the non-PNG binary path). PNG/caBX chunk reads are clamped to the remaining file size (`safe_length = min(length, remaining)`; skipped chunks use seek) so a malformed huge `length` cannot drive a multi-GB allocation (shared safety discipline matching `isobmff.scan_c2pa_region`).
 - `noai/constants.py` — PNG_SIGNATURE, C2PA_CHUNK_TYPE, C2PA_SIGNATURES, C2PA_ISSUERS, `SYNTHID_C2PA_ISSUERS` (issuers that pair SynthID with C2PA: Google, OpenAI), and `C2PA_SOFT_BINDINGS` (soft-binding `alg` prefix → forensic-watermark vendor: Adobe TrustMark, Digimarc, Imatag, Steg.AI, Microsoft, ...). Add a new issuer/binding here, not inline.
 - `metadata.py` — `scan_head(path, size=1MB)` is the shared input for every C2PA/AIGC/IPTC byte scan: first `size` bytes plus the payloads of any provenance metadata found beyond that window — for ISOBMFF, the late provenance boxes from `isobmff.scan_c2pa_region` (catches a manifest after a large `mdat`); for **PNG**, the late `tEXt`/`iTXt`/`zTXt`/`eXIf`/`iCCP` chunks from `_png_late_metadata` (catches an XMP/EXIF packet appended after a large `IDAT`, e.g. a TC260 AIGC label at ~2.7 MB). Behavior-neutral (`f.read(size)`) for non-ISOBMFF inputs and for any file that fits within `size`. Use it instead of `open().read(1MB)` for any new marker scan. `synthid_source(path)` returns the vendor name(s) if the C2PA manifest implies a SynthID pixel watermark, else None. Format-agnostic: PNG via the caBX parser, JPEG/WebP/AVIF/HEIF/JXL via a binary scan (C2PA marker + SynthID issuer + AI-source marker). `get_ai_metadata` surfaces the verdict, and `metadata --check` prints it as a callout. Both `get_ai_metadata` and `has_ai_metadata` guard the PIL open with `except Exception` (HEIC/unknown formats raise non-OSError) and fall through to the binary scan. `xai_signature(path)` detects xAI/Grok's EXIF-only scheme (`ImageDescription` = `Signature: <base64>` + UUID `Artist`); it feeds `has_ai_metadata`, `get_ai_metadata` (key `xai_signature`), and `identify`. `iptc_ai_system(path)` detects the IPTC Photo Metadata 2025.1 AI-disclosure XMP properties (`IPTC_AI_FIELD_MARKERS` = `AISystemUsed`/`AISystemVersionUsed`/`AIPromptInformation`/`AIPromptWriterName`) and returns the `AISystemUsed` generator name (or `"fields present"`). `remove_ai_metadata` routes **ISOBMFF video** (`.mp4`/`.mov`/`.m4v`) through the same `isobmff.strip_c2pa_boxes` as AVIF/HEIF (MP4 is ISOBMFF), and `_scrub_ai_exif` removes the xAI signature + AI-generator EXIF tags on JPEG output. `strip_c2pa_boxes` is **fail-safe** on a malformed box: it returns the original bytes unchanged with a logged warning instead of truncating the tail to EOF (detection-only `scan_c2pa_region` still stops at a malformed box). `_png_late_metadata` clamps each late-chunk read to the remaining file size (`safe_length = min(length, remaining)`) so a malformed `length` cannot drive a multi-GB allocation.
-- `identify.py` — the OpenAI rollout caveat is keyed on `_vendor_of(synthid) == "OpenAI"` (not a raw substring over the issuer + verdict blob). `identify(path)` aggregates every locally-readable signal (C2PA issuer→platform, C2PA soft-binding forensic-watermark vendor, IPTC "Made with AI" + IPTC 2025.1 `AISystemUsed`, embedded SD/ComfyUI params, SynthID proxy, xAI/Grok EXIF signature via `metadata.xai_signature`, the China TC260 AIGC label via `metadata.aigc_label`, the HuggingFace `hf-job-id` job marker via `metadata.huggingface_job`, the Samsung Galaxy AI editing marker via `metadata.samsung_genai`, the visible marks — Gemini sparkle plus the ByteDance Doubao 豆包AI生成 / Jimeng 即梦AI text marks via the `watermark_registry` — open invisible watermark, Adobe TrustMark via `trustmark_detector`) into one `ProvenanceReport`. `is_ai_generated` is True or None (never asserted False — stripped metadata is not proof of clean origin). The `hf_job`, visible-mark, and Samsung `samsung_genai` signals are **medium** confidence: each lifts an otherwise-Unknown verdict to a tentative AI (`hf_only` / `visible_only` / `samsung_only`, parallel branches; `visible_only` fires on any `visible_*` signal) but is excluded from the high-confidence `ai_from_metadata` set, so none overrides a hard metadata signal. **Visible-mark detection** (`check_visible`, signals `visible_sparkle` / `visible_doubao` / `visible_jimeng`): the Gemini sparkle keeps its own file-level path (`_visible_sparkle` → `gemini_engine.detect_sparkle_confidence`, promoted only at confidence ≥ `_SPARKLE_THRESHOLD` 0.5; corpus-tuned to separate Gemini sparkles ≥0.56 from non-sparkle ≤0.49), while Doubao/Jimeng reuse the registry detectors (`_visible_text_marks` → `watermark_registry`), each gated by its own engine NCC threshold via `MarkDetection.detected` (Doubao 0.4, Jimeng 0.45). Doubao/Jimeng are normally also caught by the TC260 AIGC metadata label, so the visible path is their stripped-metadata fallback. Visible marks set `platform` only when no harder signal already did, and (like the sparkle) are excluded from integrity-clash vendor claims. The cv2 dependency lives in the engines, not here. **`import identify` is deliberately light** (~21 MB; ~36 MB with cv2 loaded by a visible-mark run, ~106 MB for a full `check_visible` run): it imports only the pure `noai.c2pa`/`noai.constants` submodules, and `noai/__init__` is lazy (see "Test and lint"), so torch/diffusers are NOT pulled at import even in a full `gpu`/`detect` install — fits a 512 MB host. The heavy paths are opt-in: `check_invisible=True` needs the `detect`/`trustmark` extras (each pulls **torch**; TrustMark also **downloads weights**), so on a core-only deploy leave `check_invisible` off (it is a no-op there anyway). Before the lazy `__init__`, the mere presence of torch in the env inflated `import identify` to ~420 MB. **C2PA platform attribution is device-token-first, issuer-scan fallback** (`_device_platform` scans manifest bytes for `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM` tokens, then `_attribute_platform`/`_ISSUER_PLATFORM`). **Why, verified on real signed files 2026-05-26:** the old issuer-only byte-scan matched ANY issuer substring anywhere, so multi-entity manifests mis-attributed -- Leica→"Truepic" (a signing authority in the trust chain), Nikon→"Adobe Firefly" (XMP-toolkit "Adobe" + the sample's "Adobe_MAX" name), Pixel→"Google (Gemini)" ("Google LLC" cert org), Truepic→"Google". A distinctive device token wins instead. **Token distinctiveness is load-bearing:** bare `b"Truepic"` mis-fires (it appears in unrelated trust chains -- it mis-attributed the OpenAI `chatgpt-1.png` fixture), so the token is the specific `b"Truepic_Lens"` from the Lens SDK claim generator; likewise `b"Pixel Camera"` (cert CN) not bare `b"Pixel"`. `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM` lists ONLY tokens **verified against a real C2PA file**: Leica (`lc_c2pa`/`Leica Camera`), Nikon (`NIKON`), Pixel (`Pixel Camera` -- from a real Pixel 10 Pro file attached to c2pa-rs issue #1609/#1554), Sony (`sony.sig`/`sony.cert` -- Sony's own C2PA assertion namespace, verified on a real Sony PXW-Z300 file; NOT bare "Sony" which is a common EXIF Make), Truepic (`Truepic_Lens`). Canon/Bria have **no public direct-download C2PA sample** (checked exhaustively: GitHub issue/PR attachments, contentcredentials gallery, HF datasets -- all upload-to-verify or token-gated; Canon's only public file was a self-signed hobbyist CR3, not factory), so they stay unmapped until a real file is captured (same fixture discipline as Grok/Doubao). The Sony sample is video (MP4) -- our ISOBMFF C2PA path detects it; Sony Alpha stills likely share the `sony.*` namespace but are not separately verified. **Samsung Galaxy + ASUS Gallery live in a separate `_SIGNER_C2PA_PLATFORM` (scanned after `_device_platform`, before the issuer fallback), NOT in `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`** — verified on real signed files 2026-05-29. Reason: a Galaxy phone stamps BOTH its device cert AND a `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`/genAIType AI marker on a Generative-Edit image, so treating it as a "genuine camera capture" would false-fire integrity-clash rule 2 on every Galaxy AI edit. The signer tokens (`b"Samsung Galaxy"` cert org — distinct from the EXIF `SM-xxxx` model string on ordinary Samsung photos; `b"com.asus.gallery"` claim generator) only resolve the platform label; the AI verdict still comes from the source-type / genAIType. ASUS Gallery is a C2PA-signed edit with no AI marker, so it attributes the platform without asserting `is_ai`. **Samsung's `genAIType` (in the proprietary `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` JSON) is an undocumented Galaxy-AI editing marker** (`metadata.samsung_genai`, gated on the `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` container; non-zero value = AI tool used, values {1,5} observed): medium-confidence because the field has no public spec (verified 2026-05-29: absent from C2PA spec + Samsung docs), but it co-occurred with `trainedAlgorithmicMedia` in 3/3 verified files that record a source-type and was the SOLE AI marker on a Galaxy S24 file that omits the source type. Camera C2PA marks capture authenticity, not AI (Pixel carries `computationalCapture`, not `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`), so these never set `is_ai` -- that stays driven by digital-source-type. `c2pa.cbor_text_after` (now public) is best-effort for the `generator` detail string only and can be None when the manifest keys it `claim_generator_info` (Pixel). **Issuer→generator mapping is `is_ai`-gated** (`_attribute_platform(issuers, is_ai=c2pa_is_ai)`): a specific AI-generator platform is named only when the digital-source-type is `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`; on a non-AI source an issuer substring is treated as incidental (an "Adobe XMP" toolkit string in an *unmapped* Canon/Sony capture would otherwise mislabel it "Adobe Firefly"), so it degrades to the neutral "C2PA signer: X" label. Real Firefly/OpenAI/Google output carries the AI source-type, so it is unaffected (verified: chatgpt-1.png→OpenAI, firefly-1.png→Adobe Firefly still attribute). `_attribute_platform` defaults `is_ai=True` so the mapping stays unit-testable in isolation. Add capture-camera tokens to `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`, editing-app/AI-device signer tokens to `_SIGNER_C2PA_PLATFORM`, generator/issuer platforms to `_ISSUER_PLATFORM`, not inline. For non-PNG containers (JPEG/WebP/AVIF/HEIF/JXL) the caBX parser returns nothing, so issuer (`_issuers_in`) and generator (`_ai_tools_in`, reusing `C2PA_AI_TOOLS`) are recovered by binary-scanning the first MB. EXIF `Software` / `Make` / `Artist` / `ImageDescription` and XMP `CreatorTool` generator tags are read by `metadata.exif_generator` (PIL+piexif for any format PIL opens incl. AVIF, plus a container-agnostic XMP raw-byte scan that also covers HEIF/JXL), matched against `AI_GENERATOR_TOKENS` so ordinary editors (plain "Adobe Photoshop") and real-camera `Make` ("Apple"/"Canon") are not flagged. **Ideogram tags its output with EXIF `Make="Ideogram AI"`** (verified on a real download 2026-05-24) — that's why `Make` is read. **Integrity-clash detection** (`_integrity_clashes`, surfaced as `ProvenanceReport.integrity_clashes`, printed in red by `identify` and serialized to `--json`): contradictions between independent generator stamps are a laundering/spoofing tell. Two rules: (1) two or more distinct AI-origin vendors named by independent signals (e.g. C2PA OpenAI + EXIF `Make="Ideogram AI"`), and (2) a camera-capture C2PA device (`_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`) coexisting with any AI-generation marker. Vendor normalization is `_vendor_of` over `_AI_VENDOR_TOKENS` (so a C2PA "Google (Gemini)" issuer and a SynthID-Google proxy agree, while different vendors clash). **High-precision by design:** only hard generator stamps feed it (C2PA-issuer when source is AI, SynthID, EXIF/XMP generator, IPTC `AISystemUsed`, xAI, AIGC); the fuzzy visible sparkle and the open invisible watermark are **excluded** (the latter can be a by-product of our own SDXL removal pass). The c2pa vendor is classified from the issuer attribution / generator, NOT the resolved `platform` (a camera label like "Google Pixel" would mis-normalize to "Google"). All real single-origin fixtures (chatgpt/firefly/doubao/grok/mj) verified to produce **zero** clashes (false-positive guard in `test_identify.py::TestRealSamplesHaveNoClash`).
+- `identify.py` — the OpenAI rollout caveat is keyed on `_vendor_of(synthid) == "OpenAI"` (not a raw substring over the issuer + verdict blob). `identify(path)` aggregates every locally-readable signal (C2PA issuer→platform, C2PA soft-binding forensic-watermark vendor, IPTC "Made with AI" + IPTC 2025.1 `AISystemUsed`, embedded SD/ComfyUI params, SynthID proxy, xAI/Grok EXIF signature via `metadata.xai_signature`, the China TC260 AIGC label via `metadata.aigc_label`, the HuggingFace `hf-job-id` job marker via `metadata.huggingface_job`, the Samsung Galaxy AI editing marker via `metadata.samsung_genai`, the visible marks — Gemini sparkle plus the ByteDance Doubao 豆包AI生成 / Jimeng 即梦AI text marks via the `watermark_registry` — open invisible watermark, Adobe TrustMark via `trustmark_detector`) into one `ProvenanceReport`. `is_ai_generated` is True or None (never asserted False — stripped metadata is not proof of clean origin). The `hf_job`, visible-mark, and Samsung `samsung_genai` signals are **medium** confidence: each lifts an otherwise-Unknown verdict to a tentative AI (`hf_only` / `visible_only` / `samsung_only`, parallel branches; `visible_only` fires on any `visible_*` signal) but is excluded from the high-confidence `ai_from_metadata` set, so none overrides a hard metadata signal. **Visible-mark detection** (`check_visible`, signals `visible_sparkle` / `visible_doubao` / `visible_jimeng`): the Gemini sparkle keeps its own file-level path (`_visible_sparkle` → `gemini_engine.detect_sparkle_confidence`, promoted only at confidence ≥ `_SPARKLE_THRESHOLD` 0.5; corpus-tuned to separate Gemini sparkles ≥0.56 from non-sparkle ≤0.49), while Doubao/Jimeng reuse the registry detectors (`_visible_text_marks` → `watermark_registry`), each gated by its own engine NCC threshold via `MarkDetection.detected` (Doubao 0.4, Jimeng 0.45). Doubao/Jimeng are normally also caught by the TC260 AIGC metadata label, so the visible path is their stripped-metadata fallback. Visible marks set `platform` only when no harder signal already did, and (like the sparkle) are excluded from integrity-clash vendor claims. The cv2 dependency lives in the engines, not here. **`import identify` is deliberately light** (~21 MB; ~36 MB with cv2 loaded by a visible-mark run, ~106 MB for a full `check_visible` run): it imports only the pure `noai.c2pa`/`noai.constants` submodules, and `noai/__init__` is lazy (see "Test and lint"), so torch/diffusers are NOT pulled at import even in a full `gpu`/`detect` install — fits a 512 MB host. The heavy paths are opt-in: `check_invisible=True` needs the `detect`/`trustmark` extras (each pulls **torch**; TrustMark also **downloads weights**), so on a core-only deploy leave `check_invisible` off (it is a no-op there anyway). Before the lazy `__init__`, the mere presence of torch in the env inflated `import identify` to ~420 MB. **C2PA platform attribution is device-token-first, issuer-scan fallback** (`_device_platform` scans manifest bytes for `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM` tokens, then `_attribute_platform`/`_ISSUER_PLATFORM`). **Why, verified on real signed files 2026-05-26:** the old issuer-only byte-scan matched ANY issuer substring anywhere, so multi-entity manifests mis-attributed -- Leica→"Truepic" (a signing authority in the trust chain), Nikon→"Adobe Firefly" (XMP-toolkit "Adobe" + the sample's "Adobe_MAX" name), Pixel→"Google (Gemini)" ("Google LLC" cert org), Truepic→"Google". A distinctive device token wins instead. **Token distinctiveness is load-bearing:** bare `b"Truepic"` mis-fires (it appears in unrelated trust chains -- it mis-attributed the OpenAI `chatgpt-1.png` fixture), so the token is the specific `b"Truepic_Lens"` from the Lens SDK claim generator; likewise `b"Pixel Camera"` (cert CN) not bare `b"Pixel"`. `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM` lists ONLY tokens **verified against a real C2PA file**: Leica (`lc_c2pa`/`Leica Camera`), Nikon (`NIKON`), Pixel (`Pixel Camera` -- from a real Pixel 10 Pro file attached to c2pa-rs issue #1609/#1554), Sony (`sony.sig`/`sony.cert` -- Sony's own C2PA assertion namespace, verified on a real Sony PXW-Z300 file; NOT bare "Sony" which is a common EXIF Make), Truepic (`Truepic_Lens`). Canon/Bria have **no public direct-download C2PA sample** (checked exhaustively: GitHub issue/PR attachments, contentcredentials gallery, HF datasets -- all upload-to-verify or token-gated; Canon's only public file was a self-signed hobbyist CR3, not factory), so they stay unmapped until a real file is captured (same fixture discipline as Grok/Doubao). The Sony sample is video (MP4) -- our ISOBMFF C2PA path detects it; Sony Alpha stills likely share the `sony.*` namespace but are not separately verified. **Samsung Galaxy + ASUS Gallery live in a separate `_SIGNER_C2PA_PLATFORM` (scanned after `_device_platform`, before the issuer fallback), NOT in `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`** — verified on real signed files 2026-05-29. Reason: a Galaxy phone stamps BOTH its device cert AND a `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`/genAIType AI marker on a Generative-Edit image, so treating it as a "genuine camera capture" would false-fire integrity-clash rule 2 on every Galaxy AI edit. The signer tokens (`b"Samsung Galaxy"` cert org — distinct from the EXIF `SM-xxxx` model string on ordinary Samsung photos; `b"com.asus.gallery"` claim generator) only resolve the platform label; the AI verdict still comes from the source-type / genAIType. ASUS Gallery is a C2PA-signed edit with no AI marker, so it attributes the platform without asserting `is_ai`. **Samsung's `genAIType` (in the proprietary `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` JSON) is an undocumented Galaxy-AI editing marker** (`metadata.samsung_genai`, gated on the `PhotoEditor_Re_Edit_Data` container; non-zero value = AI tool used, values {1,5} observed): medium-confidence because the field has no public spec (verified 2026-05-29: absent from C2PA spec + Samsung docs), but it co-occurred with `trainedAlgorithmicMedia` in 3/3 verified files that record a source-type and was the SOLE AI marker on a Galaxy S24 file that omits the source type. Camera C2PA marks capture authenticity, not AI (Pixel carries `computationalCapture`, not `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`), so these never set `is_ai` -- that stays driven by digital-source-type. `c2pa.cbor_text_after` (now public) is best-effort for the `generator` detail string only and can be None when the manifest keys it `claim_generator_info` (Pixel). **Issuer→generator mapping is `is_ai`-gated** (`_attribute_platform(issuers, is_ai=c2pa_is_ai)`): a specific AI-generator platform is named only when the digital-source-type is `trainedAlgorithmicMedia`; on a non-AI source an issuer substring is treated as incidental (an "Adobe XMP" toolkit string in an *unmapped* Canon/Sony capture would otherwise mislabel it "Adobe Firefly"), so it degrades to the neutral "C2PA signer: X" label. Real Firefly/OpenAI/Google output carries the AI source-type, so it is unaffected (verified: chatgpt-1.png→OpenAI, firefly-1.png→Adobe Firefly still attribute). `_attribute_platform` defaults `is_ai=True` so the mapping stays unit-testable in isolation. Add capture-camera tokens to `_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`, editing-app/AI-device signer tokens to `_SIGNER_C2PA_PLATFORM`, generator/issuer platforms to `_ISSUER_PLATFORM`, not inline. For non-PNG containers (JPEG/WebP/AVIF/HEIF/JXL) the caBX parser returns nothing, so issuer (`_issuers_in`) and generator (`_ai_tools_in`, reusing `C2PA_AI_TOOLS`) are recovered by binary-scanning the first MB. EXIF `Software` / `Make` / `Artist` / `ImageDescription` and XMP `CreatorTool` generator tags are read by `metadata.exif_generator` (PIL+piexif for any format PIL opens incl. AVIF, plus a container-agnostic XMP raw-byte scan that also covers HEIF/JXL), matched against `AI_GENERATOR_TOKENS` so ordinary editors (plain "Adobe Photoshop") and real-camera `Make` ("Apple"/"Canon") are not flagged. **Ideogram tags its output with EXIF `Make="Ideogram AI"`** (verified on a real download 2026-05-24) — that's why `Make` is read. **Integrity-clash detection** (`_integrity_clashes`, surfaced as `ProvenanceReport.integrity_clashes`, printed in red by `identify` and serialized to `--json`): contradictions between independent generator stamps are a laundering/spoofing tell. Two rules: (1) two or more distinct AI-origin vendors named by **independent** signals (e.g. C2PA OpenAI + EXIF `Make="Ideogram AI"`), and (2) a camera-capture C2PA device (`_DEVICE_C2PA_PLATFORM`) coexisting with any AI-generation marker. **Independence is source-grouped (`_CLASH_SOURCE`, added 2026-06-02):** the C2PA issuer attribution (`c2pa`) and the SynthID proxy (`synthid`) are NOT independent — the proxy is inferred from the *same* manifest — so they share one source and two vendors named within a single manifest do not clash. This killed a false-positive class found on the spaces corpus: legitimate multi-actor manifests where a product wraps another vendor's engine (Microsoft Designer on OpenAI → `OpenAI, Microsoft`; Microsoft on Google → `Microsoft, Google LLC, Google C2PA Core Generator Library`) or an edit chain re-signs (Adobe over a Gemini original → Adobe c2pa + Google synthid) — 19 such files across the 2026-06-01/02 batches read as clashes before the fix. Rule 1 still fires when a manifest vendor disagrees with a genuinely independent stamp (EXIF/XMP generator, IPTC `AISystemUsed`, AIGC, xAI); each non-`c2pa`/`synthid` family is its own source (`test_identify.py::TestIntegrityClashes::{test_multi_actor_manifest_no_clash,test_manifest_vendor_vs_independent_signal_clashes}`). Vendor normalization is `_vendor_of` over `_AI_VENDOR_TOKENS` (so a C2PA "Google (Gemini)" issuer and a SynthID-Google proxy agree, while different vendors clash). **High-precision by design:** only hard generator stamps feed it (C2PA-issuer when source is AI, SynthID, EXIF/XMP generator, IPTC `AISystemUsed`, xAI, AIGC); the fuzzy visible sparkle and the open invisible watermark are **excluded** (the latter can be a by-product of our own SDXL removal pass). The c2pa vendor is classified from the issuer attribution / generator, NOT the resolved `platform` (a camera label like "Google Pixel" would mis-normalize to "Google"). All real single-origin fixtures (chatgpt/firefly/doubao/grok/mj) verified to produce **zero** clashes (false-positive guard in `test_identify.py::TestRealSamplesHaveNoClash`).
 - `watermark_registry.py` — **single catalog of known visible watermarks**, the unified "find known marks in their usual places, recognize, remove" entry. **Reverse-alpha based by policy**: a mark is listed only once a real alpha map has been captured for it, and removal inverts that map (`original = (wm - a*logo)/(1-a)`) — Gemini recovers cleanly with no inpaint (its sparkle alpha comes from a pure-black capture, so it is near-exact), while **Doubao and Jimeng both add an always-on THIN residual inpaint** over the glyph footprint (their text marks re-rasterize + jitter a few px per image, so a single capture cannot pixel-cancel them; the inpaint blends into the reverse-alpha-recovered pixels). Arbitrary-region inpainting still lives in `region_eraser`/`erase`. Each `KnownMark` ties a key to {usual `location`, `in_auto` flag, `recovery` (="reverse-alpha"), a `detect` adapter → uniform `MarkDetection`, a `remove` adapter}. Entries today: `gemini` (bottom-right sparkle), `doubao` (bottom-right "豆包AI生成"), and `jimeng` (bottom-right "★ 即梦AI"). `detect_marks` scans all; `best_auto_mark` picks the highest-confidence detection. **Cross-engine confidences aren't directly comparable**, so the gemini adapter applies the corpus-validated 0.5 sparkle threshold (`_GEMINI_AUTO_MIN_CONF`) for its `detected` flag — otherwise the gemini engine's loose internal threshold weakly fires (~0.36) on the Doubao text and hijacks `auto`. The shape-keyed Doubao/Jimeng NCC detectors don't cross-fire (jimeng scores ~0.22 on the Doubao strip, well under its 0.45 threshold), so `auto` picks the right one on a Doubao vs Jimeng image. `cli.cmd_visible` is registry-driven: `--mark auto` → `best_auto_mark`, `--mark <key>` → that mark; `--mark` choices come from `mark_keys()`. `_doubao_remove`/`_jimeng_remove` apply reverse-alpha only when the mark is detected AND `reverse_alpha_available`; outside that, removal is **skipped** (not inpainted). Add a new visible mark = one `KnownMark` entry + its engine (with a captured alpha map); do not re-add per-mark `if` branches in the CLI. **Alpha-on-save policy (issue #30):** `cli._write_bgr_with_alpha` rejoins the input's alpha plane **unchanged** — it must NOT zero alpha in the watermark bbox. Reverse-alpha (and `erase` inpaint) recover real pixels there, so zeroing alpha punched a transparent hole that renders as a solid **white box** on any non-transparent viewer (Gemini app exports are opaque RGBA, so every user hit it; regression-guarded by `test_visible_keeps_alpha_opaque_in_watermark_region`). The registry `remove()` still returns its region (used for `inpaint_residual` positioning), but the CLI no longer uses it to clear alpha.
 - `gemini_engine.py` — visible Gemini-sparkle remover/detector (cv2/numpy, no GPU). `detect_sparkle_confidence(path)` is the file-level entry point used by `identify.py`. The public entry points normalize a grayscale (2D) or RGBA (4-channel) input to BGR up front so a non-BGR image does not crash the cv2 pipeline. **Removal is reverse-alpha with an over-subtraction guard** (`remove_watermark` → `_reverse_alpha_blend`, else `_inpaint_footprint`): the sparkle alpha is computed (`alpha = max(R,G,B)/255`) from the bundled sparkle-on-black captures `assets/gemini_bg_{96,48}.png` (the capture max is ~130, NOT 255 — the sparkle is a ~51%-opaque white overlay, so `alpha` maxes at ~0.51, which is CORRECT for the capture, not under-exposed). The alpha is near-exact only when the real mark's effective opacity matches the capture, which holds on bright/flat backgrounds — re-verified clean on `demo_banana_before.png` 2026-05-31. **Issue #30 (dark-background black pit):** on a dark/textured background (e.g. grass, ~73) the real sparkle's effective opacity is LOWER than the captured 0.51, so the fixed-alpha reverse blend OVER-subtracts (`watermarked - a*logo` goes negative) and drives the footprint to black — the white sparkle becomes a black diamond. `remove_watermark` now detects this via `_reverse_alpha_oversubtracts` (fraction of footprint pixels with `alpha >= _FOOTPRINT_ALPHA` 0.1 whose numerator < 0 exceeds `_OVERSUB_FOOTPRINT_FRAC` 0.05) and **inpaints the footprint** (`_inpaint_footprint`, cv2 NS over the dilated alpha mask) from the surrounding pixels instead. **Behavior-neutral on the working case:** a bright background over-subtracts at ~0% so reverse-alpha is used and the output is byte-identical to before (verified: demo_banana 0.0 frac vs issue-#30 grass 0.61 frac; regression-guarded by `test_gemini_engine.py::TestOverSubtractionGuard`, which composites the sparkle at a reduced effective alpha to reproduce the mismatch). The registry's optional `inpaint_residual` (edge cleanup) is a no-op on a clean reverse-alpha removal; an earlier "Gemini smears" read was a misjudged soft-fur original, not an artifact. **The bg assets are now rebuilt from OUR OWN controlled captures** (`data/gemini_capture/captures/`, committed) by `scripts/visible_alpha_solve.py gemini`, which locates the 96px sparkle on the black capture and crops it to the two logo sizes; our capture matched the previously third-party-sourced `gemini_bg_96.png` to **NCC 0.9998**, validating the asset and making it reproducible. Gemini's multi-size fixed-slot model is genuinely different from the Doubao/Jimeng text-strip engines (so it stays a separate engine, not part of the shared-base refactor).
 - `doubao_engine.py` — visible Doubao "豆包AI生成" remover/detector (cv2/numpy, no GPU). `DoubaoEngine.locate` anchors a bottom-right box by **geometry** (mark scales with image WIDTH), `extract_mask` pulls the light, low-chroma glyphs (the detection candidate) using a per-pixel channel-spread proxy `sat = roi.max(axis=2) - roi.min(axis=2)` (no HSV conversion). `detect` is **shape-consistent**: it matches the bundled alpha glyph silhouette (`assets/doubao_alpha.png`) against the candidate via zero-mean normalized correlation (`_template_match_score`, cv2 `TM_CCOEFF_NORMED`), gated at `DETECT_NCC_THRESHOLD` 0.4 over a small `DETECT_MIN_COVERAGE` floor. Keying on glyph SHAPE (not coverage heuristics) fixed #23 (corpus FP 7/1243). **Removal = reverse-alpha + thin residual inpaint** (`remove_watermark_reverse_alpha`): `original = (wm - a*logo)/(1-a)` from the bundled alpha map + `_ALPHA_LOGO_BGR` (pure white) + `_ALPHA_*_FRAC` geometry, then a deliberately THIN inpaint (`_RESIDUAL_*`, `INPAINT_NS`) over the glyph footprint clears leftover edges without smearing. **Alpha is rebuilt by `scripts/visible_alpha_solve.py` (the careful gray-self solve: cubic background fit, mean over channels, full halo, unblurred), same recipe as Jimeng** — the captures are committed in `data/doubao_capture/captures/`. **Removal aligns ALWAYS** (no `_ALPHA_NATIVE_BAND` fast-path): it tries fixed geometry AND `_aligned_alpha_map`'s `TM_CCOEFF_NORMED` scale+position search and keeps the lower-residual one — the mark is re-rasterized and a few px off per image, so fixed geometry alone leaves a visible outline even at 2048. **The locate box (`WM_*`) is generous (0.22 wide, margins 0.004) and reaches close to the corner** — a tight box (the old 0.185 / margin 0.012) let a corner-ward shift fall OUTSIDE the alignment search, so the align missed and a readable outline survived; regression-guarded by `test_recovers_shifted_mark_on_texture` (composes the alpha shifted on a known texture; old box ~29 vs new ~1 mean residual). **Issue #13 follow-up defect (found 2026-05-31): the SHIPPED Doubao removal left a clearly READABLE "豆包AI生成" outline on the real `doubao-1.png` sample, while `detect` returned conf 0.0 (it is fooled by a thin outline) so `test_reverse_alpha_removes_mark` passed and the old "56/56 clean" claim was detector-measured, not visual.** Root cause: bad alpha (under-estimated, max ~0.65) + fixed-no-inpaint + tight box; the careful rebuild + always-align + thin inpaint + wide box takes it from a readable outline to faint texture-level traces (parity with Jimeng — a single capture cannot pixel-cancel a per-image re-rasterized mark). **Lesson: a detector-only removal test is insufficient; assert visual residual (the textured-shift test).** **`extract_mask` guards a degenerate ROI (`bh < 16 or bw < 16` -> empty mask, skips cv2):** the always-align removal scores each placement with a residual `detect(out)`, and on an extremely wide/short image (e.g. 2048x1, `test_wide_short_does_not_raise`) that fed cv2's GaussianBlur a ~1-px-tall ROI and **faulted natively on Windows py3.12 (access violation, non-deterministic — one CI cell went red while a re-run passed)**; the old at-native path never ran `detect` on degenerate sizes. Real images always clear the guard (the `WM_*` box floors are `max(16, …)` height / `max(40, …)` width), so it only short-circuits slivers. `reverse_alpha_available` is just "asset present"; the registry gates removal on `detect`. The shipped third-party `_refs/zhengsuanfa_doubao_alpha_120x20.png` is NOT a usable alpha (verified 2026-05-29). Arbitrary-region inpainting is `region_eraser`/`erase`.
diff --git a/src/remove_ai_watermarks/identify.py b/src/remove_ai_watermarks/identify.py
index b3666b8..0c934c4 100644
--- a/src/remove_ai_watermarks/identify.py
+++ b/src/remove_ai_watermarks/identify.py
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ never as "clean". See CLAUDE.md "SynthID detection is metadata-only".
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import itertools
 import logging
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
@@ -282,6 +283,17 @@ def _vendor_of(text: str | None) -> str | None:
     return None
 
 
+# Clash-detection provenance sources. Rule 1 (below) flags two AI vendors only
+# when they come from *independent* signals. The C2PA issuer attribution and the
+# SynthID proxy are NOT independent -- the proxy is inferred from the same C2PA
+# manifest -- so they share one source. A multi-actor manifest (a product wrapping
+# another vendor's engine, e.g. Microsoft+OpenAI or Microsoft+Google; or an edit
+# chain like Adobe over a Gemini original) legitimately names several vendors in
+# one valid chain and must not read as spoofing. Families not listed here are each
+# their own independent source (EXIF/XMP generator, IPTC AISystemUsed, AIGC, ...).
+_CLASH_SOURCE: dict[str, str] = {"c2pa": "c2pa_manifest", "synthid": "c2pa_manifest"}
+
+
 def _integrity_clashes(
     ai_vendors: dict[str, str], camera_label: str | None, *, camera_has_ai_marker: bool
 ) -> list[str]:
@@ -301,10 +313,18 @@ def _integrity_clashes(
     """
     clashes: list[str] = []
 
-    by_vendor: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
-    for family, vendor in ai_vendors.items():
-        by_vendor.setdefault(vendor, []).append(family)
-    if len(by_vendor) >= 2:
+    # Rule 1: two genuinely INDEPENDENT signals naming different AI vendors. Two
+    # families clash only when they belong to different provenance sources (see
+    # _CLASH_SOURCE) AND name different vendors -- so multiple vendors named within
+    # one C2PA manifest (c2pa issuer + synthid proxy) do not flag.
+    source = {fam: _CLASH_SOURCE.get(fam, fam) for fam in ai_vendors}
+    independent_conflict = any(
+        source[a] != source[b] and ai_vendors[a] != ai_vendors[b] for a, b in itertools.combinations(ai_vendors, 2)
+    )
+    if independent_conflict:
+        by_vendor: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
+        for family, vendor in ai_vendors.items():
+            by_vendor.setdefault(vendor, []).append(family)
         parts = [f"{vendor} (via {', '.join(sorted(fams))})" for vendor, fams in sorted(by_vendor.items())]
         clashes.append(
             "Conflicting AI-origin attributions from independent signals: "
diff --git a/tests/test_identify.py b/tests/test_identify.py
index dd2044d..47f8103 100644
--- a/tests/test_identify.py
+++ b/tests/test_identify.py
@@ -731,6 +731,28 @@ class TestIntegrityClashesHelper:
         # C2PA Google + SynthID-Google proxy is consistent, not a contradiction.
         assert _integrity_clashes({"c2pa": "Google", "synthid": "Google"}, None, camera_has_ai_marker=True) == []
 
+    def test_multi_actor_manifest_no_clash(self):
+        # A multi-actor C2PA manifest names a product + the engine it wraps in ONE
+        # valid chain (Microsoft Designer on OpenAI, Microsoft on Google, Adobe over
+        # a Gemini original). The c2pa issuer attribution and the SynthID proxy share
+        # the same manifest source, so the differing vendors must NOT read as a clash.
+        for c2pa_vendor, synthid_vendor in (("Microsoft", "OpenAI"), ("Microsoft", "Google"), ("Adobe", "Google")):
+            assert (
+                _integrity_clashes({"c2pa": c2pa_vendor, "synthid": synthid_vendor}, None, camera_has_ai_marker=True)
+                == []
+            )
+
+    def test_manifest_vendor_vs_independent_signal_clashes(self):
+        # A vendor named only inside the manifest still clashes with a genuinely
+        # independent stamp (here an EXIF/XMP generator tag) naming a third vendor.
+        clashes = _integrity_clashes(
+            {"c2pa": "Microsoft", "synthid": "Google", "exif_generator": "Ideogram"},
+            None,
+            camera_has_ai_marker=True,
+        )
+        assert len(clashes) == 1
+        assert "Ideogram" in clashes[0]
+
     def test_single_vendor_no_clash(self):
         assert _integrity_clashes({"c2pa": "OpenAI"}, None, camera_has_ai_marker=True) == []