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Scrub private infrastructure detail and move the GPU harnesses out
The Content Seal manifest named the production GPU worker in its provenance column and in two row keys, several docstrings described their sources as user uploads from the private corpus, and that corpus was called by the storage product holding it. Each is now what a public reader can check: a pipeline and strength, material that is not publication-cleared, and a private corpus. The corpus test follows the renamed rows. Deployment and tier detail goes the same way, since which backend each hosting tier can afford is a product decision, not a library fact. Twelve harnesses that need a cloud GPU account leave scripts/. The research pages that cite their findings name them as harnesses kept outside this repository and stop implying a reader can rerun them; the tracked inputs and recorded verdicts remain the durable record, and the offline analysis step stays here with its test. A development invariant states the rule so the next harness is not added back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ The optional TrustMark decoder downloads weights into its installed package dire
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### Known security-gate blocks
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`maintain.sh` fails while PyPI ships no fixed release for a transitive CVE. Current case (triaged 2026-08-17): `lightning` 2.6.5, pulled only by the optional `trustmark` extra, carries PYSEC-2026-3624 (RCE via `load_from_checkpoint` on an attacker-crafted checkpoint). The vulnerable API is unreachable here, because the TrustMark decoder loads only its own pinned weights downloaded from the TrustMark release, never a user-supplied checkpoint. The upstream fix is merged but unreleased, and ignores are never added, so run and report the remaining core checks (Ruff, Pyright, tests) separately until a fixed `lightning` release lands; bump it with `uv lock --upgrade-package lightning` as soon as one does.
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`maintain.sh` fails while PyPI ships no fixed release for a transitive CVE. Current case (triaged 2026-08-17): `lightning` 2.6.5, pulled only by the optional `trustmark` extra, carries PYSEC-2026-3624 (RCE via `load_from_checkpoint` on an attacker-crafted checkpoint). The vulnerable API is unreachable here, because the TrustMark decoder loads only its own pinned weights downloaded from the TrustMark release, never a user-supplied checkpoint. The upstream fix is merged but unreleased, and ignores are never added, so run and report the remaining core checks (Ruff, Pyright, tests) separately until a fixed `lightning` release lands; bump it with `uv lock --upgrade-package lightning` as soon as one does. The gate prints the same advisory twice, as PYSEC-2026-3624 and as its alias GHSA-qqmf-gpg7-g8gw (CVE-2026-58659); the `2022.6.15` fix version on the second row belongs to the retired calver line and is not an upgrade from 2.6.5, so neither row is actionable.
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## CI
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