Repair image and metadata publication contracts, detection routing, research
artifact validation, release verification, and the published agent skill.
Refresh the dependency lock and reconcile documentation with verified behavior.
Add regression coverage and record the completed audit and corrected VideoSeal
measurements. Preserve the existing Accelerate and Lightning versions.
Validation: Ruff and Pyright pass; 2358 tests pass with 3 skipped. The maintenance
gate exits 2 on the documented Accelerate and Lightning security findings.
ComposioHQ accepted a submission with no adoption bar (PR 1841);
VoltAgent lists reject brand-new skills, and the openclaw list indexes
ClawHub entries only. Both re-attempts are deferred with their
re-entry criteria.
`skills/remove-ai-watermarks/` teaches a coding agent to drive the CLI on
content the user generated, and refuses stock-agency and other third-party
paid-asset marks. It ships with this repository rather than as a fifth release
surface, and installs through `npx skills add` in any harness or as a Claude
plugin from `.claude-plugin/marketplace.json`.
`scripts/probe.py` measures capability rather than presence: a found binary said
nothing about whether the build can run a visible-mark command, so it writes a
blank PNG with zlib and struct and runs the installed `visible` and `invisible`
on it. Exit 2 is a state only a working stack reaches, and `invisible` checks
its extra before detection, so a signal-free image answers in 0.23s with no
model download. That distinction matters: without CUDA, `all` writes nothing
with the invisible extra installed and writes a useful visible+metadata result
without it, and both exit 1.
The skill also carries what a weak model gets wrong. It must report only what a
command in the session actually did, because a run on a machine with no pixel
stack produced a finished-looking removal report, complete with a size table for
a file nobody wrote. It must not read exit 2 as a verdict, because Click's usage
errors share that code. And it must get explicit consent before
`verify-openai-synthid`, which uploads the user's image to a third party.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Victor Kuznetsov