mirror of
https://github.com/KeygraphHQ/shannon.git
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feat: Shannon 3.0 Agentic SAST (#433)
* feat(worker): add agentic static analysis Add the ten-stage Agentic SAST pipeline, confined repository tools, model runtime, prompt templates, and SARIF export. Make retries, repair sessions, reduced coverage, usage accounting, and model-output drift durable across Temporal replay and resume. Keep retry diagnostics in their actionable closed vocabulary. Package the Mantis-derived license material with the prompts that require it. * feat(worker): deduplicate static and runtime findings before exploitation Parse Agentic SAST SARIF into typed observations, enrich and route those observations, and reconcile them with pentest findings before exploitation. Publish deterministic exploitation queues with stable lineage, exact-path Git commits, retry-safe manifests, named drop reasons, and confined task formation. Reject duplicate producer IDs before commit and adopt either legal provenance shape after a lost acknowledgement. * feat(config)!: replace vuln_classes with agentic_sast Wire Agentic SAST and reconciliation into the main pipeline, persist their durable state, and add the Miscellaneous finding and exploitation lane. Make scan completion, cancellation, partial outcomes, resume identity, and report recovery use the integrated final workflow contract. Introduce the atomic finalization, ordering, renumbering, compaction, and output services that workflow calls. Keep completed Miscellaneous work and report drafts idempotent across resume, preserve public main's default-on exploit SARIF behavior, and describe stage-fallback candidates without claiming they were exported. BREAKING CHANGE: `vuln_classes` has been removed. Configs containing it now fail validation, and all five core pentest classes run on every scan. Workspaces created by Shannon 2.x cannot be resumed. Finish or discard in-flight scans before upgrading, then start a new workspace name. * perf: overlap static analysis and the Miscellaneous lane with the pentest Run Agentic SAST alongside vulnerability analysis and run Miscellaneous exploitation alongside the specialist exploitation lanes. Keep reconciliation dependent on the completed static-analysis result while preserving parallel work everywhere that has no data dependency. * feat(cli)!: default the scan target and add a JSON error contract List local scans, resolve the active or most recent workspace automatically, and make logs, status, and stop use one canonical scan identity. Add stable machine-readable failures, richer status output, explicit help errors, and seven-day Temporal retention. Treat absent Temporal pending-activity failures as absent whether the decoder represents them as `null` or missing. BREAKING CHANGE: `status --json` now returns a fixed `failureMessage`. Read `partialReasons`, `agenticSast`, and `workflow.log` for diagnostic detail. * feat(logging): trace tool calls and write a log per agent Record complete tool-call arguments in the workflow log and project each agent's events into its own durable log. Add agent listing and agent-specific log tailing while preserving byte-exact output and draining log handles before activities return. * feat(worker): standardize severity and reporting guidance in exploit prompts Give every exploit agent the same status, confidence, severity-reasoning, report-writing, credential-handling, and scope contract. Apply the same task-formation and SAST-enrichment procedure to the Miscellaneous lane. * feat(worker): disclose scan coverage and make reporting auditable Build on the retry-safe finalization foundation to preserve correct identities, source locations, scan dates, partial-coverage limitations, and consistent report JSON, Markdown, SARIF, and PDF output. Report Agentic SAST, reconciliation wall-clock time, stage usage, retry spend, and background work without duplicate or hardcoded totals. Keep report findings canonical, drop cross-class restatements, name enrichment losses, and render the executive-summary narrative in the PDF. * chore(license): attribute Mantis and Pi and refresh the docs Add the final Mantis and Pi notices, license copies, acknowledgements, and residual copyright updates. Update the README, maintained documentation, contributor guidance, and hand-maintained mirrors to describe Agentic SAST, reconciliation, the Miscellaneous lane, current CLI behavior, and the final release contract. Correct stale workspace and container guidance and annotate long-standing internals for maintainers. * fix(logging): treat a slash as a word separator in agent labels * feat(cli)!: rebuild scan status around model work - show Capella stages beneath the concurrent Agentic SAST phase - attach reconciliation time to the class row it feeds - hide completed bookkeeping and the duplicate miscellaneous wrapper - carry validated child-workflow progress into durable parent state - derive the terminal tree and status JSON from the same phase shape BREAKING CHANGE: `status --json` replaces phase `parallel` with `children` and `meta`, adds phase summaries and notes plus agent attachment fields, and removes the `analysis-engines` and `operational-work` phases. * fix(report): drop the empty Critical Findings section from the PDF summary * fix(sast): align Capella export with the submit-time code-path contract The export gate required every code_paths entry to be file:line, but submit only requires the primary sink to be file:line and accepts bare trace steps. A single malformed trace step therefore dropped an otherwise-valid finding at export. - add isValidPrimaryCodePath as the one shared primary-sink contract - validate only the primary at export; buildResult already drops unusable steps - route the submit-time validator through the same helper so the two cannot drift * feat(sast): tolerate hygiene-only Capella reductions instead of going partial A reduction only makes a run partial when it loses real coverage or a whole finding. Malformed model output, salvaged turn-limit work, and rejected duplicate verdicts are recorded as evidence but no longer flip the run to partial. - add reductionIsTolerable: partial only when genuine-loss counts are nonzero - drive runCapella's partial reasons and display coverage off non-tolerable ones - keep every reduction in agenticSast.reductions so nothing is lost as evidence * feat(logging): record the provider reason for a failed agent turn A failed provider turn collapsed to AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED/unknown with the underlying reason discarded, so a model-side rejection or safeguard was indistinguishable from a transport fault in the error log. - add safeProviderTurnDetails: write bounded, non-sensitive fields (provider, model, responseId, stop reason, tool-in-flight, category, retryable) to error.log - gate a sanitized errorMessage snippet behind SHANNON_DEBUG_PROVIDER_ERRORS, off by default - forward SHANNON_DEBUG_PROVIDER_ERRORS from the CLI into the worker container * fix(cli): keep shannon logs tailing through a Temporal blip - End the interactive tail on the log's own terminal marker or Ctrl-C, so a transient Temporal outage no longer aborts the command with exit 1. - Rebuild the memoized Temporal client after a failed poll: a wedged gRPC channel was cached forever, so "retrying…" could never reconnect. - Keep start --follow (CI) bounded — a genuinely dead Temporal still fails the run instead of hanging. * fix(worker): correct PDF finding reporting - Render OWASP category, authentication state, and remediation - Omit the redundant per-finding exploited status - Preserve canonical category and field ordering across report modes - Continue Proof of Impact numbering across embedded code blocks - Wrap long PDF code lines without changing canonical report content * fix: attribute a reconciliation failure to exploitation only - Stop marking a class's vulnerability-analysis agent failed when that agent succeeded and only reconciliation failed; the status tree now renders the analysis row completed and the exploitation row failed - Consume the worker's failedReconciliations signal in the CLI, which the mirrored PipelineState already declared but never read - Correct the class_reconciliation_failed message, which claimed the class's analysis results were still in the report when the class is excluded from it * fix(pi): give each task sub-session its own resource loader to prevent stale extension ctx * fix(prompts): scope exploit agents to in-band proof, mark OOB-only findings blocked * fix(cli): reject a shell credential that shadows a gateway config.toml key * fix(cli): make scan shutdown verifiable - preselect and persist workflow identity before worker launch - cancel first, then verify bounded Temporal termination - reconcile Docker workers with Temporal open workflows - fail closed on stale images and unavailable lifecycle state - mark cancellation only after confirmed shutdown * feat(cli): prompt for setup on a bare npx invocation with no credentials * fix(cli): don't blame anthropic when no credentials are configured at all * chore(release): bump beta base version to 3.0.0 * feat(cli): show a 'start your first scan' box in help on a TTY * docs: refresh README and platform overview for Shannon 3.0 - lead with the 3.0 launch note and rewrite key capabilities around security code analysis, the rebuilt terminal experience, native CI/CD, and PDF/SARIF - recast the editions table as Shannon Open Source against the Keygraph Enterprise Platform, stating open source is not a trial edition - rewrite the platform overview around exhaustive agentic SAST, canonical findings, automated remediation, targeted verification, and governance - add five product screenshots under assets/keygraph-platform/, referenced relative to docs/ * docs: add the Shannon naming section and swap in the 3.0 demo GIF - explain the Claude Shannon information-theory origin under "What is Shannon?" - point "Shannon in Action" at the 3.0 recording in assets/Shannon3GIF.gif Both taken from the README half of #438. * docs: document CI/CD integrations and the reconciled analysis pipeline - add a CI/CD Integrations section covering the official GitHub Action and GitLab component, pipeline artifacts, and exploit-only severity gates - redraw the architecture section as a Mermaid flow: agentic code analysis and recon feed finding reconciliation, then exploitation and reporting - describe open-source code analysis as a multi-stage agentic workflow and reserve parsed-code CPGs and exhaustive verification for Enterprise - sharpen the privacy wording: results stay local, but model requests carry source context to whichever endpoint you configure - drop the "not recommended" framing on local models and add a section on why Shannon complements rather than replaces human pentesters - regenerate llms-full.txt from the updated README and docs * docs: add the Photoview benchmark across three models - Add a "Shannon in Action" table for Photoview 2.4.0 runs on DeepSeek v4 Flash, Grok 4.6, and Claude Opus 5, each linking its PDF report and SARIF output - Store the per-model reports under benchmark/ - Link the (forthcoming) benchmark writeup from the section intro * docs: add the Shannon vs XBOW/Aikido Photoview benchmark writeup - Add docs/shannon-xbow-aikido-benchmark.md with methodology, per-model cost/coverage tables, and links to each model's report and SARIF - Link the writeup from the README "Shannon in Action" section * docs: link the benchmark announcement discussion from the README * fix(readme): restore theme-aware banner, badge, and buttons * feat!: trigger the Shannon 3.0 major release --------- Co-authored-by: ezl-keygraph <ezhil@keygraph.io>
This commit is contained in:
Arjun Malleswaran
co-authored by
ezl-keygraph
ezl-keygraph
parent
6108de3cfc
commit
9767ebe633
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// Copyright (C) 2026 Keygraph, Inc.
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//
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// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3
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// as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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import { ALL_AGENTS } from '../types/agents.js';
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import { ErrorCode, type PentestErrorType } from '../types/errors.js';
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export const WORKFLOW_PHASES = ['pre-recon', 'recon', 'vulnerability-exploitation', 'reporting'] as const;
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export type WorkflowPhase = (typeof WORKFLOW_PHASES)[number];
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export const LOGGABLE_AGENT_NAMES = [...ALL_AGENTS, 'validate-authentication'] as const;
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export type LoggableAgentName = (typeof LOGGABLE_AGENT_NAMES)[number];
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/** A log-safe error rendering: a known code paired with one of the fixed, generic messages below. */
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export interface SafeErrorDetails {
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readonly code: ErrorCode;
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readonly category: PentestErrorType;
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readonly message: string;
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}
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const SAFE_ERROR_MESSAGES: Readonly<Record<ErrorCode, string>> = {
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[ErrorCode.CONFIG_NOT_FOUND]: 'The requested configuration could not be loaded.',
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[ErrorCode.CONFIG_VALIDATION_FAILED]: 'The scan configuration is invalid.',
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[ErrorCode.CONFIG_PARSE_ERROR]: 'The scan configuration could not be parsed.',
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[ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED]: 'The agent could not complete its work.',
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[ErrorCode.OUTPUT_VALIDATION_FAILED]: 'The agent did not produce valid output.',
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[ErrorCode.GIT_CHECKPOINT_FAILED]: 'The scan checkpoint could not be saved.',
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[ErrorCode.GIT_ROLLBACK_FAILED]: 'The scan workspace could not be restored after a failed attempt.',
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[ErrorCode.PROMPT_LOAD_FAILED]: 'The agent instructions could not be loaded.',
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[ErrorCode.DELIVERABLE_NOT_FOUND]: 'The agent did not produce the required result.',
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[ErrorCode.REPO_NOT_FOUND]: 'The repository could not be opened.',
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[ErrorCode.TARGET_UNREACHABLE]: 'The target could not be reached.',
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[ErrorCode.AUTH_FAILED]: 'Authentication validation failed.',
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[ErrorCode.AUTH_LOGIN_FAILED]: 'The configured login could not be completed.',
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};
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const ERROR_CATEGORIES = new Set<PentestErrorType>([
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'config',
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'network',
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'prompt',
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'filesystem',
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'validation',
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'unknown',
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]);
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const AGENT_NAME_SET = new Set<string>(LOGGABLE_AGENT_NAMES);
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const WORKFLOW_PHASE_SET = new Set<string>(WORKFLOW_PHASES);
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const ERROR_CODE_SET = new Set<string>(Object.values(ErrorCode));
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export function isWorkflowPhase(value: string): value is WorkflowPhase {
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return WORKFLOW_PHASE_SET.has(value);
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}
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export function isLoggableAgentName(value: string): value is LoggableAgentName {
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return AGENT_NAME_SET.has(value);
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}
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/**
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* A workflow id safe to print in a log header or interpolate into a marker line. Falls back to
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* a fixed placeholder rather than throwing, since an unparseable id must not stop the log from
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* being written at all.
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*/
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export function safeWorkflowIdentifier(value: string): string {
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if (/^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:-]{0,127}$/u.test(value)) {
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return value;
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}
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return 'unknown';
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}
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export function containsControlCharacter(value: string): boolean {
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// Indexed scan, not a spread or regex: allocation-free over large tool arguments, and a
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// control-character regex literal is disallowed by lint.
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for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index += 1) {
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const code = value.charCodeAt(index);
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if (code <= 31 || code === 127) return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* True when a token looks like a credential, hash, or key rather than an identifier or word:
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* a long unbroken alphanumeric run, a long digit-bearing token, or a long hex string. Used to
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* fail-closed on secret-shaped search patterns and labels the agent may have just discovered.
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*/
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export function looksSecretShaped(value: string): boolean {
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if (/[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/u.test(value)) return true;
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const alphanumericLength = value.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/gu, '').length;
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if (/[0-9]/u.test(value) && alphanumericLength >= 12) return true;
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if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]{12,}$/u.test(value)) return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* The origin of a target URL, safe to print in a log header. Only `http`/`https` are accepted so
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* an exotic scheme (or credentials embedded in the URL) never reaches the log; anything else, or
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* anything unparseable, degrades to a placeholder instead of leaking the raw input.
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*/
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export function safeTargetUrl(value: string): string {
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if (containsControlCharacter(value)) return 'unavailable';
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try {
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const parsedUrl = new URL(value);
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if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'http:' && parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:') {
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return 'unavailable';
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}
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return parsedUrl.origin;
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} catch {
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return 'unavailable';
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}
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}
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/**
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* Map an error code to its fixed, pre-approved log message rather than logging the error's own
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* message text. The underlying error can carry a file path, a stack frame, or other repo-specific
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* detail; only the closed `SAFE_ERROR_MESSAGES` table is allowed into a log line. An unrecognized
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* code or category falls back to a generic entry instead of being dropped, so a fault always gets
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* a log line, just not one repeating unvetted text.
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*/
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export function safeErrorFromCode(code: ErrorCode, category: PentestErrorType = 'unknown'): SafeErrorDetails {
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const safeCode = ERROR_CODE_SET.has(code) ? code : ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED;
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return {
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code: safeCode,
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category: ERROR_CATEGORIES.has(category) ? category : 'unknown',
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message: SAFE_ERROR_MESSAGES[safeCode],
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};
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}
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/**
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* Recover a code and category from an error of unknown shape, then defer to
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* {@link safeErrorFromCode} for the actual safe rendering. The duck-typed field reads only ever
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* pick out values that are already in the closed code/category sets, so a caught error's message
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* or other properties can never flow through into the log.
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*/
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export function safeErrorFromUnknown(
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error: unknown,
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fallbackCode: ErrorCode = ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED,
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): SafeErrorDetails {
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let code = fallbackCode;
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let category: PentestErrorType = 'unknown';
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if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null) {
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const candidate = error as { readonly code?: unknown; readonly type?: unknown };
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if (typeof candidate.code === 'string' && ERROR_CODE_SET.has(candidate.code)) {
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code = candidate.code as ErrorCode;
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}
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if (typeof candidate.type === 'string' && ERROR_CATEGORIES.has(candidate.type as PentestErrorType)) {
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category = candidate.type as PentestErrorType;
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}
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}
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return safeErrorFromCode(code, category);
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}
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/**
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* Reduce a free-text human description (child-task description, active todo label) to a
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* short, safe semantic label, or `undefined` when it is structurally unsafe.
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*
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* Ordinary security vocabulary — `authorization`, `password`, `token` — is allowed; the
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* rejection is structural, not a word blocklist. Fail-closed: anything carrying a URL,
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* path, domain, assignment, colon, secret-shaped token, control character, or excessive
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* length is rejected rather than partially sanitized. A forward slash is treated as a word
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* separator (`XSS/Injection` → `xss injection`), not a path marker — real paths and URLs are
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* still rejected below by their `.`, `\`, `:`, or `@`.
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*/
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export function normalizeSemanticLabel(value: unknown): string | undefined {
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if (typeof value !== 'string' || containsControlCharacter(value)) return undefined;
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const collapsed = value.replace(/[\s/]+/gu, ' ').trim();
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if (collapsed.length === 0 || collapsed.length > 48) return undefined;
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// Paths, domains/filenames, assignments, colons, and addresses are structurally unsafe.
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if (/[.\\=:@]/u.test(collapsed)) return undefined;
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// A long unbroken alphanumeric run is secret/hash/base64-shaped, never a real word.
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if (/[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/u.test(collapsed)) return undefined;
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const words = collapsed.toLowerCase().split(' ');
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if (words.length > 6) return undefined;
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if (!words.every((word) => /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9'-]{0,19}$/u.test(word))) return undefined;
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if (words.some(looksSecretShaped)) return undefined;
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return words.join(' ');
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}
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