feat: add npx CLI with monorepo, CI/CD, and ephemeral worker architecture (#256)

* feat: integrate npx CLI, CI/CD, and ephemeral worker architecture Bring in changes from shannon-npx: npx-distributable CLI package (cli/), semantic-release CI/CD workflows, ephemeral per-scan worker containers, TOML config support, setup wizard, and workspace management. Preserves all shannon-only changes: security hardening (localhost-bound ports, MCP env allowlist, path traversal guard), updated benchmarks (XBEN 19/31/35/44), README assets, and prompt injection disclaimer. Applies security hardening to cli/infra/compose.yml as well. * refactor: migrate to Turborepo + pnpm + Biome monorepo Restructure into apps/worker, apps/cli, packages/mcp-server with Turborepo task orchestration, pnpm workspaces, Biome linting/formatting, and tsdown CLI bundling. Key changes: - src/ -> apps/worker/src/, cli/ -> apps/cli/, mcp-server/ -> packages/mcp-server/ - prompts/ and configs/ moved into apps/worker/ - npm replaced with pnpm, package-lock.json replaced with pnpm-lock.yaml - Dockerfile updated for pnpm-based builds - CLI logs command rewritten with chokidar for cross-platform reliability - Router health checking added for auto-detected router mode - Centralized path resolution via apps/worker/src/paths.ts * fix: resolve all biome warnings and formatting issues - Remove unnecessary non-null assertions where values are guaranteed - Replace array index access with .at() for safer element retrieval - Use local variables to avoid repeated process.env lookups - Replace any types with unknown in functional utilities - Use nullish coalescing for TOTP hash byte access - Auto-format security patches to match biome config * fix: pin pnpm to 10.12.1 in Dockerfile for catalog support * fix: handle Esc cancellation in Bedrock setup flow Replace p.group() with individual prompts and per-field cancel checks, matching the pattern used by all other provider setup flows. * feat: add optional model customization to Anthropic setup * fix: resolve Docker bind mount permission errors on Linux Use entrypoint-based UID remapping instead of --user flag so the container's pentest user matches the host UID/GID, keeping bind-mounted volumes writable. Git config moved to --system level to survive remapping. * fix: show resumed workflow ID in splash screen URL When resuming a workflow, the Temporal Web UI link pointed to the old (terminated) workflow ID. Now extracts "New Workflow ID" from the resume header in workflow.log, falling back to the original ID for fresh scans. * style: fix biome formatting in docker.ts * fix: align TypeScript config types with JSON Schema - SuccessCondition.type: use schema values (url_contains, element_present, url_equals_exactly, text_contains) instead of stale values (url, cookie, element, redirect) - Authentication.login_flow: mark optional to match schema which does not require it * feat: mark GitHub release as latest during rollback * fix: use native ARM64 runners for Docker multi-platform builds Replace QEMU emulation with parallel native builds using a matrix strategy (ubuntu-latest for amd64, ubuntu-24.04-arm for arm64). Each platform pushes by digest, then a merge job creates the multi-arch manifest list before signing with cosign. * fix: resolve SessionMutex race condition with 3+ concurrent waiters * fix: skip POSIX permission check on Windows writeFileSync mode option is ignored on Windows, so config.toml gets 0o666 and the guard rejects it. * fix: resolve unsubstituted placeholders in report prompt Remove unused {{GITHUB_URL}} placeholder and wire up {{AUTH_CONTEXT}} with structured auth context (login type, username, URL, MFA status). * fix: remove duplicate environment gate from merge-docker job Move DOCKERHUB_USERNAME from vars to secrets so merge-docker can access credentials without its own environment scope. This eliminates the redundant double approval since build-docker already gates on release-publish. * fix: replace POSIX sleep binary with cross-platform async sleep execFileSync('sleep') is unavailable on Windows. Use node:timers/promises setTimeout instead, making ensureInfra async. * fix: use session.json for workflow ID on resume instead of parsing workflow.log On resume, workflow.log already exists with stale headers from the previous run. The CLI poll found '====' immediately and extracted the old workflow ID, producing a wrong Temporal Web UI URL. Read the workflow ID from session.json instead — the worker writes resume attempts there atomically. For fresh runs, poll until originalWorkflowId appears. For resumes, poll until a new resumeAttempts entry is appended. * feat: add custom base URL support for Anthropic-compatible proxies Support ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL + ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN to route SDK requests through LiteLLM or any Anthropic-compatible proxy. Adds TUI wizard option, TOML config mapping, credential validation, and preflight endpoint reachability check via SDK query. * fix: remove environment gates and add NPM_TOKEN to publish step * feat: add beta release and rollback workflows with cosign signing * fix: remove redundant checkout and pnpm steps from beta release workflow * docs: normalize README commands to mode-neutral shorthand Add a substitution note after Quick Start sections so all subsequent examples use bare `shannon` instead of mixing `./shannon` and `npx @keygraph/shannon`. Mode-specific commands (build, update, uninstall) get inline annotations. Also fixes a broken command in the Custom Base URL section. * fix: remove redundant `update` command Image is already auto-pulled by `ensureImage()` during `start` when the pinned version tag is missing locally. Manual `update` was unnecessary. * docs: add CLI package README stub * docs: update README setup instructions for dual CLI modes * docs: update announcement banner to npx availability * feat: migrate from MCP tools to CLI based tools (#252) * feat: migrate from MCP tools to CLI tools * fix: restore browser action emoji formatters for CLI output Adapt formatBrowserAction for playwright-cli commands, replacing the old mcp__playwright__browser_* tool name matching removed during migration. * fix: mount credential file to fixed container path for Vertex AI GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS was forwarded as-is to the container, causing the relative host path to resolve against the repo mount instead of the credentials mount. Now both local and npx modes mount the resolved file to /app/credentials/google-sa-key.json and rewrite the env var to match. * feat: add git awareness and optional description field to config * fix: drop redundant --ipc host flag from worker container * fix: align announcement banner URL with main branch * feat: add target URL reachability preflight check (#254) * Moving asset benchmark graph image to this folder * Move benchmark results to benchmark repo Windows Defender flags exploit code in the pentest reports as false positives, forcing every Windows user to add a Defender exclusion just to clone Shannon. * Updated README * fix: case-insensitive grep for semantic-release version probe * fix: harden supply chain security (#255) * fix: patch smol-toml and tsdown vulnerabilities Update smol-toml 1.6.0→1.6.1 (DoS via recursive comment parsing) and tsdown 0.21.2→0.21.5 (picomatch ReDoS + method injection). * fix: pin all unpinned dependency versions in Dockerfile Pins subfinder v2.13.0, WhatWeb v0.6.3 (switched from git clone to release tarball), schemathesis 4.13.0, addressable 2.8.9, claude-code 2.1.84, and playwright-cli 0.1.1 for reproducible builds. * fix: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs for supply chain security * fix: pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAs in beta and rollback workflows
2026-07-09 22:48:45 +02:00 · 2026-03-27 02:34:29 +05:30
parent 0d172f5e32
commit bc8fd203ed
4058 changed files with 7774 additions and 1189080 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+// Copyright (C) 2025 Keygraph, Inc.
+//
+// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3
+// as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+
+import { fs, path } from 'zx';
+import type { ExploitationDecision, VulnType } from '../types/agents.js';
+import { ErrorCode } from '../types/errors.js';
+import { err, ok, type Result } from '../types/result.js';
+import { asyncPipe } from '../utils/functional.js';
+import { PentestError } from './error-handling.js';
+
+export type { ExploitationDecision, VulnType } from '../types/agents.js';
+
+interface VulnTypeConfigItem {
+  deliverable: string;
+  queue: string;
+}
+
+type VulnTypeConfig = Record<VulnType, VulnTypeConfigItem>;
+
+type ErrorMessageResolver = string | ((existence: FileExistence) => string);
+
+interface ValidationRule {
+  predicate: (existence: FileExistence) => boolean;
+  errorMessage: ErrorMessageResolver;
+  retryable: boolean;
+}
+
+interface FileExistence {
+  deliverableExists: boolean;
+  queueExists: boolean;
+}
+
+interface PathsBase {
+  vulnType: VulnType;
+  deliverable: string;
+  queue: string;
+  sourceDir: string;
+}
+
+interface PathsWithExistence extends PathsBase {
+  existence: FileExistence;
+}
+
+interface PathsWithQueue extends PathsWithExistence {
+  queueData: QueueData;
+}
+
+interface PathsWithError {
+  error: PentestError;
+}
+
+interface QueueData {
+  vulnerabilities: unknown[];
+  [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+
+interface QueueValidationResult {
+  valid: boolean;
+  data: QueueData | null;
+  error: string | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Result type for safe validation - explicit error handling.
+ */
+export type SafeValidationResult = Result<ExploitationDecision, PentestError>;
+
+// Vulnerability type configuration as immutable data
+const VULN_TYPE_CONFIG: VulnTypeConfig = Object.freeze({
+  injection: Object.freeze({
+    deliverable: 'injection_analysis_deliverable.md',
+    queue: 'injection_exploitation_queue.json',
+  }),
+  xss: Object.freeze({
+    deliverable: 'xss_analysis_deliverable.md',
+    queue: 'xss_exploitation_queue.json',
+  }),
+  auth: Object.freeze({
+    deliverable: 'auth_analysis_deliverable.md',
+    queue: 'auth_exploitation_queue.json',
+  }),
+  ssrf: Object.freeze({
+    deliverable: 'ssrf_analysis_deliverable.md',
+    queue: 'ssrf_exploitation_queue.json',
+  }),
+  authz: Object.freeze({
+    deliverable: 'authz_analysis_deliverable.md',
+    queue: 'authz_exploitation_queue.json',
+  }),
+}) as VulnTypeConfig;
+
+// Pure function to create validation rule
+function createValidationRule(
+  predicate: (existence: FileExistence) => boolean,
+  errorMessage: ErrorMessageResolver,
+  retryable: boolean = true,
+): ValidationRule {
+  return Object.freeze({ predicate, errorMessage, retryable });
+}
+
+// Symmetric deliverable rules: queue and deliverable must exist together (prevents partial analysis from triggering exploitation)
+const fileExistenceRules: readonly ValidationRule[] = Object.freeze([
+  createValidationRule(
+    ({ deliverableExists, queueExists }) => deliverableExists && queueExists,
+    getExistenceErrorMessage,
+  ),
+]);
+
+// Generate appropriate error message based on which files are missing
+function getExistenceErrorMessage(existence: FileExistence): string {
+  const { deliverableExists, queueExists } = existence;
+
+  if (!deliverableExists && !queueExists) {
+    return 'Analysis failed: Neither deliverable nor queue file exists. Analysis agent must create both files.';
+  }
+  if (!queueExists) {
+    return 'Analysis incomplete: Deliverable exists but queue file missing. Analysis agent must create both files.';
+  }
+  return 'Analysis incomplete: Queue exists but deliverable file missing. Analysis agent must create both files.';
+}
+
+// Pure function to create file paths
+const createPaths = (vulnType: VulnType, sourceDir: string): PathsBase | PathsWithError => {
+  const config = VULN_TYPE_CONFIG[vulnType];
+  if (!config) {
+    return {
+      error: new PentestError(`Unknown vulnerability type: ${vulnType}`, 'validation', false, { vulnType }),
+    };
+  }
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    vulnType,
+    deliverable: path.join(sourceDir, 'deliverables', config.deliverable),
+    queue: path.join(sourceDir, 'deliverables', config.queue),
+    sourceDir,
+  });
+};
+
+// Pure function to check file existence
+const checkFileExistence = async (paths: PathsBase | PathsWithError): Promise<PathsWithExistence | PathsWithError> => {
+  if ('error' in paths) return paths;
+
+  const [deliverableExists, queueExists] = await Promise.all([
+    fs.pathExists(paths.deliverable),
+    fs.pathExists(paths.queue),
+  ]);
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ...paths,
+    existence: Object.freeze({ deliverableExists, queueExists }),
+  });
+};
+
+// Validates deliverable/queue symmetry - both must exist or neither
+const validateExistenceRules = (
+  pathsWithExistence: PathsWithExistence | PathsWithError,
+): PathsWithExistence | PathsWithError => {
+  if ('error' in pathsWithExistence) return pathsWithExistence;
+
+  const { existence, vulnType } = pathsWithExistence;
+
+  // Find the first rule that fails
+  const failedRule = fileExistenceRules.find((rule) => !rule.predicate(existence));
+
+  if (failedRule) {
+    const message =
+      typeof failedRule.errorMessage === 'function' ? failedRule.errorMessage(existence) : failedRule.errorMessage;
+
+    return {
+      error: new PentestError(
+        `${message} (${vulnType})`,
+        'validation',
+        failedRule.retryable,
+        {
+          vulnType,
+          deliverablePath: pathsWithExistence.deliverable,
+          queuePath: pathsWithExistence.queue,
+          existence,
+        },
+        ErrorCode.DELIVERABLE_NOT_FOUND,
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+
+  return pathsWithExistence;
+};
+
+// Pure function to validate queue structure
+const validateQueueStructure = (content: string): QueueValidationResult => {
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(content) as unknown;
+    const isValid =
+      typeof parsed === 'object' &&
+      parsed !== null &&
+      'vulnerabilities' in parsed &&
+      Array.isArray((parsed as QueueData).vulnerabilities);
+
+    return Object.freeze({
+      valid: isValid,
+      data: isValid ? (parsed as QueueData) : null,
+      error: null,
+    });
+  } catch (parseError) {
+    return Object.freeze({
+      valid: false,
+      data: null,
+      error: parseError instanceof Error ? parseError.message : String(parseError),
+    });
+  }
+};
+
+// Queue parse failures are retryable - agent can fix malformed JSON on retry
+const validateQueueContent = async (
+  pathsWithExistence: PathsWithExistence | PathsWithError,
+): Promise<PathsWithQueue | PathsWithError> => {
+  if ('error' in pathsWithExistence) return pathsWithExistence;
+
+  try {
+    const queueContent = await fs.readFile(pathsWithExistence.queue, 'utf8');
+    const queueValidation = validateQueueStructure(queueContent);
+
+    if (!queueValidation.valid) {
+      // Rule 6: Both exist, queue invalid
+      return {
+        error: new PentestError(
+          queueValidation.error
+            ? `Queue validation failed for ${pathsWithExistence.vulnType}: Invalid JSON structure. Analysis agent must fix queue format.`
+            : `Queue validation failed for ${pathsWithExistence.vulnType}: Missing or invalid 'vulnerabilities' array. Analysis agent must fix queue structure.`,
+          'validation',
+          true, // retryable
+          {
+            vulnType: pathsWithExistence.vulnType,
+            queuePath: pathsWithExistence.queue,
+            originalError: queueValidation.error,
+            queueStructure: queueValidation.data ? Object.keys(queueValidation.data) : [],
+          },
+        ),
+      };
+    }
+
+    return Object.freeze({
+      ...pathsWithExistence,
+      queueData: queueValidation.data as QueueData,
+    });
+  } catch (readError) {
+    return {
+      error: new PentestError(
+        `Failed to read queue file for ${pathsWithExistence.vulnType}: ${readError instanceof Error ? readError.message : String(readError)}`,
+        'filesystem',
+        false,
+        {
+          vulnType: pathsWithExistence.vulnType,
+          queuePath: pathsWithExistence.queue,
+          originalError: readError instanceof Error ? readError.message : String(readError),
+        },
+      ),
+    };
+  }
+};
+
+// Final decision: skip if queue says no vulns, proceed if vulns found, error otherwise
+const determineExploitationDecision = (validatedData: PathsWithQueue | PathsWithError): ExploitationDecision => {
+  if ('error' in validatedData) {
+    throw validatedData.error;
+  }
+
+  const hasVulnerabilities = validatedData.queueData.vulnerabilities.length > 0;
+
+  // Rule 4: Both exist, queue valid and populated
+  // Rule 5: Both exist, queue valid but empty
+  return Object.freeze({
+    shouldExploit: hasVulnerabilities,
+    shouldRetry: false,
+    vulnerabilityCount: validatedData.queueData.vulnerabilities.length,
+    vulnType: validatedData.vulnType,
+  });
+};
+
+// Main functional validation pipeline
+export async function validateQueueAndDeliverable(
+  vulnType: VulnType,
+  sourceDir: string,
+): Promise<ExploitationDecision> {
+  return asyncPipe<ExploitationDecision>(
+    createPaths(vulnType, sourceDir),
+    checkFileExistence,
+    validateExistenceRules,
+    validateQueueContent,
+    determineExploitationDecision,
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Safely validate queue and deliverable files.
+ * Returns Result<ExploitationDecision, PentestError> for explicit error handling.
+ */
+export async function validateQueueSafe(vulnType: VulnType, sourceDir: string): Promise<SafeValidationResult> {
+  try {
+    const result = await validateQueueAndDeliverable(vulnType, sourceDir);
+    return ok(result);
+  } catch (error) {
+    return err(error as PentestError);
+  }
+}