feat(docker): forward /etc/hosts entries to worker containers (#346)

* feat(auth): reuse preflight's authenticated session across agents

* fix(preflight): verify saved auth state parses and has cookies or origins

* fix(prompts): strip shared-session block when no auth is configured

* fix(shannon): store shared auth state in the per-session audit dir

* fix(prompts): write stub auth-state in pipeline-testing preflight

* fix(preflight): clear stale auth-state.json before validate-authentication

* fix(preflight): drop auth-state.json on workflow completion

* docs(claude): refresh auth-state.json description for new layout and cleanup

* refactor(prompts): drop unused PLAYWRIGHT_SESSION resolve in login instructions

* style(prompts): collapse verifySavedAuthState signature per biome

* refactor(prompts): require AUTH_STATE_FILE on authenticated runs

* style(prompts): trim numbered-step comments back to step headers

.env.example

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS=64000
 # Adaptive thinking is enabled automatically on Opus 4.6/4.7. Set to false to disable.
 # CLAUDE_ADAPTIVE_THINKING=false
 
+# Shannon forwards your machine's /etc/hosts entries into the worker container. Set to false to disable.
+# SHANNON_FORWARD_HOSTS=false
+
 # =============================================================================
 # OPTION 1: Direct Anthropic
 # =============================================================================

CLAUDE.md

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ Infra (Temporal) runs via `docker-compose.yml`. Workers are ephemeral `docker ru
 - `docker-compose.yml` — Infra only: `shannon-temporal` (port 7233/8233). Network: `shannon-net`
 - `Dockerfile` — 2-stage build (builder + Chainguard Wolfi runtime). Uses pnpm. Entrypoint: `CMD ["node", "apps/worker/dist/temporal/worker.js"]`
 - No `docker-compose.docker.yml` — host gateway handled via `--add-host` flag in CLI
+- `/etc/hosts` forwarding — at worker spawn, `forwardEtcHostsFlags` in `apps/cli/src/docker.ts` reads the host's `/etc/hosts` and emits one `--add-host` flag per valid user-added entry. Loopback IPs (`127.x`, `::1`) are rewritten to `host-gateway`; IPv6 addresses are bracketed. Disable per-scan via `SHANNON_FORWARD_HOSTS=false`. No-op on Windows native (WSL2 reads its own `/etc/hosts` via the Linux path).
 
 ### Worker Package (`apps/worker/`)
 - `apps/worker/src/paths.ts` — Centralized path constants (`PROMPTS_DIR`, `CONFIGS_DIR`, `WORKSPACES_DIR`)
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ Durable workflow orchestration with crash recovery, queryable progress, intellig
 ### Supporting Systems
 - **Configuration** — YAML configs in `apps/worker/configs/` with JSON Schema validation (`config-schema.json`). Supports auth settings (MFA/TOTP), URL/code rule scoping (`rules.avoid`/`rules.focus`), run-scope steering (`vuln_classes`, `exploit`), free-form `rules_of_engagement`, and post-hoc `report` filters (`min_severity`, `min_confidence`, `guidance`). `code_path` avoid rules are written into `~/.claude/settings.json` `permissions.deny` (`Read`/`Edit`) once per workflow by `apps/worker/src/temporal/activities.ts:syncCodePathDenyRules` so the SDK enforces them at the tool layer even in `bypassPermissions` mode. `vuln_classes`/`exploit` scope is locked into `session.json` on first run; resumes with a different scope fail fast (`persistOrValidateRunScope`). Credential resolution — local mode: env vars → `./.env`; npx mode: env vars → `~/.shannon/config.toml` (via `shn setup`)
 - **Prompts** — Per-phase templates in `apps/worker/prompts/` with variable substitution (`{{TARGET_URL}}`, `{{CONFIG_CONTEXT}}`). Shared partials in `apps/worker/prompts/shared/` via `apps/worker/src/services/prompt-manager.ts`, including `_code-path-rules.txt` (focus/avoid `[FILE]`/`[GLOB]` routing) and `_rules-of-engagement.txt` (free-text engagement rules). When `exploit: false`, `apps/worker/src/services/findings-renderer.ts` deterministically converts each `*_exploitation_queue.json` into a `*_findings.md` for report assembly — no LLM in the loop
-- **SDK Integration** — Uses `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` with `maxTurns: 10_000` and `bypassPermissions` mode. Adaptive thinking is enabled by default on Opus 4.6/4.7 (`supportsAdaptiveThinking` in `apps/worker/src/ai/models.ts`); disable per-scan via `CLAUDE_ADAPTIVE_THINKING=false` (env) or `core.adaptive_thinking = false` (npx TOML). Browser automation via `playwright-cli` with session isolation (`-s=<session>`). TOTP generation via `generate-totp` CLI tool. Login flow template at `apps/worker/prompts/shared/login-instructions.txt` supports form, SSO, API, and basic auth
+- **SDK Integration** — Uses `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk` with `maxTurns: 10_000` and `bypassPermissions` mode. Adaptive thinking is enabled by default on Opus 4.6/4.7 (`supportsAdaptiveThinking` in `apps/worker/src/ai/models.ts`); disable per-scan via `CLAUDE_ADAPTIVE_THINKING=false` (env) or `core.adaptive_thinking = false` (npx TOML). Browser automation via `playwright-cli` with session isolation (`-s=<session>`). TOTP generation via `generate-totp` CLI tool. Login flow template at `apps/worker/prompts/shared/login-instructions.txt` supports form, SSO, API, and basic auth. On authenticated whitebox scans, the `validate-authentication` preflight performs the single real login and saves the browser session to `auth-state.json` in the per-session audit directory (path from `authStateFile()` in `apps/worker/src/audit/utils.ts`, derived from `generateAuditPath()`). The validation activity (`apps/worker/src/services/validate-authentication.ts`) removes any stale file from a prior run before the agent runs and verifies the file parses and contains cookies or storage before the preflight is marked complete; `logWorkflowComplete` deletes it when the workflow ends so authenticated cookies don't sit on disk between scans. Agent prompts opt in to session reuse by `@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)` before their `<login_instructions>` block — the partial restores the session and falls through to the full login flow if verification fails. `vuln-auth`/`exploit-auth` omit the include and own their own login
 - **Audit System** — Crash-safe append-only logging in `workspaces/{hostname}_{sessionId}/`. Tracks session metrics, per-agent logs, prompts, and deliverables. WorkflowLogger (`apps/worker/src/audit/workflow-logger.ts`) provides unified human-readable per-workflow logs, backed by LogStream (`apps/worker/src/audit/log-stream.ts`) shared stream primitive
 - **Deliverables** — Saved to `deliverables/` in the target repo via the `save-deliverable` CLI script (`apps/worker/src/scripts/save-deliverable.ts`)
 - **Workspaces & Resume** — Named workspaces via `-w <name>` or auto-named from URL+timestamp. Resume detects completed agents via `session.json`. `loadResumeState()` in `apps/worker/src/temporal/activities.ts` validates deliverable existence, restores git checkpoints, and cleans up incomplete deliverables. Workspace listing via `apps/worker/src/temporal/workspaces.ts`

README.md

@@ -685,6 +685,12 @@ npx @keygraph/shannon start -u http://host.docker.internal:3000 -r /path/to/repo
 
 </details>
 
+**Custom hostnames in `/etc/hosts`:**
+
+If your local stack uses custom hostnames mapped in `/etc/hosts`, Shannon forwards those entries into the worker container at scan start:
+
+To disable, add `SHANNON_FORWARD_HOSTS=false` to `.env` (local mode) or export it in your shell: `export SHANNON_FORWARD_HOSTS=false`. In npx mode, the shell export is the only option since there's no `.env`.
+
 ### Output and Results
 
 All results are saved to the workspaces directory: `./workspaces/` (local mode) or `~/.shannon/workspaces/` (npx mode). Use `-o <path>` to copy deliverables to a custom output directory after the run completes.

apps/cli/src/docker.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 import { type ChildProcess, execFileSync, spawn } from 'node:child_process';
 import crypto from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
 import os from 'node:os';
 import path from 'node:path';
 import { setTimeout as sleep } from 'node:timers/promises';
@@ -145,6 +146,87 @@ function addHostFlag(): string[] {
   return [];
 }
 
+/**
+ * Names whose standard IPs aren't covered by `shouldSkipHostsIp`. Loopback names
+ * stay because their IPs (127.x, ::1) get rewritten — not skipped. Others like
+ * `broadcasthost` and `ip6-mcastprefix` are intentionally omitted: their IPs
+ * (255.255.255.255, ff00::/8) are already dropped at the IP filter.
+ */
+const HOSTS_SKIP_NAMES = new Set([
+  'localhost',
+  'ip6-localhost',
+  'ip6-loopback',
+  'ip6-localnet',
+  'host.docker.internal',
+  'gateway.docker.internal',
+  'kubernetes.docker.internal',
+]);
+
+function isLoopbackIp(ip: string): boolean {
+  return ip.startsWith('127.') || ip === '::1';
+}
+
+function shouldSkipHostsIp(ip: string): boolean {
+  if (ip === '0.0.0.0' || ip === '255.255.255.255') return true;
+  // Cloud metadata range — consistent with Shannon's SSRF guard
+  if (ip.startsWith('169.254.')) return true;
+  const lower = ip.toLowerCase();
+  if (lower.startsWith('fe80:') || lower.startsWith('ff')) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+function shouldSkipHostsName(name: string, hostname: string): boolean {
+  const lower = name.toLowerCase();
+  if (HOSTS_SKIP_NAMES.has(lower)) return true;
+  if (lower === hostname.toLowerCase()) return true;
+  if (lower.endsWith('.localhost')) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the host's /etc/hosts and emit --add-host flags so the worker resolves
+ * user-added entries the same way. Loopback IPs (127.x, ::1) are rewritten to
+ * `host-gateway` so they target the host's loopback instead of the container's.
+ */
+function forwardEtcHostsFlags(): string[] {
+  if (process.env.SHANNON_FORWARD_HOSTS === 'false') return [];
+  if (os.platform() === 'win32') return [];
+
+  let content: string;
+  try {
+    content = fs.readFileSync('/etc/hosts', 'utf-8');
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+
+  const hostname = os.hostname();
+  const flags: string[] = [];
+
+  for (const rawLine of content.split('\n')) {
+    const hashIdx = rawLine.indexOf('#');
+    const line = (hashIdx >= 0 ? rawLine.slice(0, hashIdx) : rawLine).trim();
+    if (!line) continue;
+
+    const tokens = line
+      .split(' ')
+      .flatMap((t) => t.split('\t'))
+      .filter(Boolean);
+    const ip = tokens[0];
+    const names = tokens.slice(1);
+    if (!ip || names.length === 0) continue;
+    if (shouldSkipHostsIp(ip)) continue;
+
+    const targetIp = isLoopbackIp(ip) ? 'host-gateway' : ip;
+    const formattedIp = targetIp.includes(':') ? `[${targetIp}]` : targetIp;
+    for (const name of names) {
+      if (shouldSkipHostsName(name, hostname)) continue;
+      flags.push('--add-host', `${name}:${formattedIp}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return flags;
+}
+
 export interface WorkerOptions {
   version: string;
   url: string;
@@ -176,6 +258,9 @@ export function spawnWorker(opts: WorkerOptions): ChildProcess {
   // Add host flag for Linux
   args.push(...addHostFlag());
 
+  // Forward user-added /etc/hosts entries into the worker
+  args.push(...forwardEtcHostsFlags());
+
   // UID remapping for Linux bind mounts
   if (os.platform() === 'linux' && process.getuid && process.getgid) {
     args.push('-e', `SHANNON_HOST_UID=${process.getuid()}`, '-e', `SHANNON_HOST_GID=${process.getgid()}`);

apps/worker/prompts/exploit-authz.txt

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ After exhaustive bypass attempts, determine:
 @include(shared/_rules.txt)
 </rules>
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/exploit-injection.txt

@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ Remember: An unproven vulnerability is worse than no finding at all - it wastes
 @include(shared/_rules.txt)
 </rules>
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/exploit-ssrf.txt

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ After exhaustive bypass attempts, determine:
 @include(shared/_rules.txt)
 </rules>
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/exploit-xss.txt

@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ After exhaustive bypass attempts, determine:
 @include(shared/_rules.txt)
 </rules>
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/pipeline-testing/validate-authentication.txt

@@ -1 +1,4 @@
-Return the structured verdict `{ "login_success": true }` and stop.
+Write a stub authenticated session via Bash so the preflight's saved-state check passes:
+  echo '{"cookies":[{"name":"stub","value":"x","domain":"example.com","path":"/"}],"origins":[]}' > {{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}
+
+Then return the structured verdict `{ "login_success": true }` and stop.

apps/worker/prompts/recon.txt

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ Areas to Focus On:
 
 @include(shared/_code-path-rules.txt)
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/shared/_shared-session.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<shared_authenticated_session>
+The preflight already logged in and saved the authenticated browser
+session to:
+
+  {{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}
+
+Restore it before doing anything else:
+
+  playwright-cli -s={{PLAYWRIGHT_SESSION}} state-load {{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}
+
+Then run verification (per the success_condition in your authentication
+config) to confirm the restored session is still valid:
+
+- If verification passes → SKIP the login flow below entirely and
+  proceed with your primary task. You are authenticated.
+- If verification fails → the saved session is stale. Fall through to
+  the full login flow below and perform it on your own browser session.
+  Do NOT overwrite {{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}.
+</shared_authenticated_session>

apps/worker/prompts/validate-authentication.txt

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@ This runs as a preflight check for our AI pentester. The user supplies credentia
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>
 
+<publish_session>
+After verification confirms login_success, save the authenticated browser session so the rest of the pipeline can reuse it instead of logging in again:
+
+  playwright-cli -s={{PLAYWRIGHT_SESSION}} state-save {{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}
+
+Run this only when login_success is true. Skip it on failure.
+</publish_session>
+
 <critical>
 - Submit each field (username, password, captcha, TOTP) exactly once.
 - Any rejection = auth error: return `login_success: false` and stop. Do not retry.

apps/worker/prompts/vuln-authz.txt

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Success criterion: A complete, code-backed analysis of every potential authoriza
 
 @include(shared/_code-path-rules.txt)
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/vuln-injection.txt

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ Success criterion: Complete source-to-sink traces detailing path, sanitizers, si
 
 @include(shared/_code-path-rules.txt)
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/vuln-ssrf.txt

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Success criterion: A complete source-to-sink trace for every identified SSRF vul
 
 @include(shared/_code-path-rules.txt)
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/prompts/vuln-xss.txt

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ Success criterion: Live confirmation of XSS execution for every vulnerability th
 
 @include(shared/_code-path-rules.txt)
 
+@include(shared/_shared-session.txt)
+
 <login_instructions>
 {{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}
 </login_instructions>

apps/worker/src/audit/audit-session.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ const sessionMutex = new SessionMutex();
  * AuditSession - Main audit system facade
  */
 export class AuditSession {
-  private sessionMetadata: SessionMetadata;
+  readonly sessionMetadata: SessionMetadata;
   private sessionId: string;
   private metricsTracker: MetricsTracker;
   private workflowLogger: WorkflowLogger;

apps/worker/src/audit/utils.ts

@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ export function generateSessionJsonPath(sessionMetadata: SessionMetadata): strin
   return path.join(auditPath, 'session.json');
 }
 
+/**
+ * Path to the shared authenticated browser session saved by the preflight
+ * validator and consumed by downstream agents via `_shared-session.txt`.
+ */
+export function authStateFile(sessionMetadata: SessionMetadata): string {
+  return path.join(generateAuditPath(sessionMetadata), 'auth-state.json');
+}
+
 /**
  * Generate path to workflow.log file
  */

apps/worker/src/services/agent-execution.ts

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import { fs, path } from 'zx';
 import { type ClaudePromptResult, runClaudePrompt, validateAgentOutput } from '../ai/claude-executor.js';
 import { getOutputFormat, getQueueFilename } from '../ai/queue-schemas.js';
 import type { AuditSession } from '../audit/index.js';
+import { authStateFile } from '../audit/utils.js';
 import { AGENTS } from '../session-manager.js';
 import type { ActivityLogger } from '../types/activity-logger.js';
 import type { AgentName } from '../types/agents.js';
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ export class AgentExecutionService {
     try {
       prompt = await loadPrompt(
         promptTemplate,
-        { webUrl, repoPath },
+        { webUrl, repoPath, AUTH_STATE_FILE: authStateFile(auditSession.sessionMetadata) },
         distributedConfig,
         pipelineTestingMode,
         logger,

apps/worker/src/services/prompt-manager.ts

@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ function renderReportFilterRules(report: ReportConfig | undefined): string {
 interface PromptVariables {
   webUrl: string;
   repoPath: string;
+  AUTH_STATE_FILE: string;
   PLAYWRIGHT_SESSION?: string;
 }
 
@@ -321,6 +322,12 @@ async function interpolateVariables(
       result = result.replace(/<rules_of_engagement>[\s\S]*?<\/rules_of_engagement>\s*/g, '');
     }
 
+    if (!config?.authentication) {
+      result = result.replace(/<shared_authenticated_session>[\s\S]*?<\/shared_authenticated_session>\s*/g, '');
+    } else {
+      result = result.replace(/{{AUTH_STATE_FILE}}/g, variables.AUTH_STATE_FILE);
+    }
+
     if (config?.authentication?.login_flow) {
       const loginInstructions = await buildLoginInstructions(config.authentication, logger, promptsBaseDir);
       result = result.replace(/{{LOGIN_INSTRUCTIONS}}/g, loginInstructions);

apps/worker/src/services/validate-authentication.ts

@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@
  * pipeline burns hours on broken auth.
  */
 
+import { readFile, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import type { JsonSchemaOutputFormat } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 import { runClaudePrompt } from '../ai/claude-executor.js';
 import type { AuditSession } from '../audit/index.js';
+import { authStateFile } from '../audit/utils.js';
 import type { ActivityLogger } from '../types/activity-logger.js';
 import type { AgentEndResult } from '../types/audit.js';
 import type { DistributedConfig, ProviderConfig } from '../types/config.js';
@@ -93,9 +95,12 @@ export async function validateAuthentication(input: ValidateAuthInput): Promise<
     loginType: authentication.login_type,
   });
 
+  const stateFile = authStateFile(auditSession.sessionMetadata);
+  await rm(stateFile, { force: true });
+
   const prompt = await loadPrompt(
     AGENT_NAME,
-    { webUrl, repoPath },
+    { webUrl, repoPath, AUTH_STATE_FILE: stateFile },
     distributedConfig,
     pipelineTestingMode ?? false,
     logger,
@@ -120,7 +125,14 @@ export async function validateAuthentication(input: ValidateAuthInput): Promise<
     providerConfig,
   );
 
-  const classification = classifyResult(result, authentication);
+  let classification = classifyResult(result, authentication);
+
+  if (classification.ok) {
+    const sessionCheck = await verifySavedAuthState(stateFile, logger);
+    if (!sessionCheck.ok) {
+      classification = sessionCheck;
+    }
+  }
 
   const endResult: AgentEndResult = {
     attemptNumber,
@@ -135,6 +147,62 @@ export async function validateAuthentication(input: ValidateAuthInput): Promise<
   return classification;
 }
 
+async function verifySavedAuthState(stateFile: string, logger: ActivityLogger): Promise<Result<void, PentestError>> {
+  let contents: string;
+  try {
+    contents = await readFile(stateFile, 'utf8');
+  } catch {
+    return err(
+      new PentestError(
+        `Preflight reported login success but did not save the authenticated session to ${stateFile}.`,
+        'validation',
+        true,
+        { stateFile },
+        ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED,
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+
+  let parsed: unknown;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(contents);
+  } catch (parseErr) {
+    const detail = parseErr instanceof Error ? parseErr.message : String(parseErr);
+    return err(
+      new PentestError(
+        `Preflight saved an authenticated session to ${stateFile}, but the file is not valid JSON: ${detail}`,
+        'validation',
+        true,
+        { stateFile, parseError: detail },
+        ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED,
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+
+  const cookieCount = countStorageEntries(parsed, 'cookies');
+  const originCount = countStorageEntries(parsed, 'origins');
+  if (cookieCount === 0 && originCount === 0) {
+    return err(
+      new PentestError(
+        `Preflight saved an authenticated session to ${stateFile}, but it contains no cookies or origins — the browser was not actually logged in.`,
+        'validation',
+        true,
+        { stateFile, cookieCount, originCount },
+        ErrorCode.AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED,
+      ),
+    );
+  }
+
+  logger.info('Preflight authenticated session saved', { stateFile, cookieCount, originCount });
+  return ok(undefined);
+}
+
+function countStorageEntries(parsed: unknown, key: 'cookies' | 'origins'): number {
+  if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) return 0;
+  const value = (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)[key];
+  return Array.isArray(value) ? value.length : 0;
+}
+
 function classifyResult(
   result: import('../ai/claude-executor.js').ClaudePromptResult,
   authentication: NonNullable<DistributedConfig['authentication']>,

apps/worker/src/temporal/activities.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import { writePlaywrightStealthConfig } from '../ai/playwright-config-writer.js'
 import { writeUserSettingsForCodePathAvoids } from '../ai/settings-writer.js';
 import { AuditSession } from '../audit/index.js';
 import type { ResumeAttempt } from '../audit/metrics-tracker.js';
-import { generateSessionJsonPath, type SessionMetadata } from '../audit/utils.js';
+import { authStateFile, generateSessionJsonPath, type SessionMetadata } from '../audit/utils.js';
 import type { WorkflowSummary } from '../audit/workflow-logger.js';
 import type { CheckpointContext } from '../interfaces/checkpoint-provider.js';
 import { DEFAULT_DELIVERABLES_SUBDIR, deliverablesDir } from '../paths.js';
@@ -926,7 +926,15 @@ export async function logWorkflowComplete(input: ActivityInput, summary: Workflo
   // 5. Write completion entry to workflow.log
   await auditSession.logWorkflowComplete(cumulativeSummary);
 
-  // 6. Clean up container
+  // 6. Drop the authenticated browser session
+  try {
+    await fs.rm(authStateFile(sessionMetadata), { force: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    const detail = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+    console.warn(`Failed to clean up auth-state.json: ${detail}`);
+  }
+
+  // 7. Clean up container
   removeContainer(workflowId);
 }
 

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -1010,8 +1010,8 @@ packages:
   fast-deep-equal@3.1.3:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-f3qQ9oQy9j2AhBe/H9VC91wLmKBCCU/gDOnKNAYG5hswO7BLKj09Hc5HYNz9cGI++xlpDCIgDaitVs03ATR84Q==}
 
-  fast-uri@3.1.0:
+  fast-uri@3.1.2:
-    resolution: {integrity: sha512-iPeeDKJSWf4IEOasVVrknXpaBV0IApz/gp7S2bb7Z4Lljbl2MGJRqInZiUrQwV16cpzw/D3S5j5Julj/gT52AA==}
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-rVjf7ArG3LTk+FS6Yw81V1DLuZl1bRbNrev6Tmd/9RaroeeRRJhAt7jg/6YFxbvAQXUCavSoZhPPj6oOx+5KjQ==}
 
   fdir@6.5.0:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-tIbYtZbucOs0BRGqPJkshJUYdL+SDH7dVM8gjy+ERp3WAUjLEFJE+02kanyHtwjWOnwrKYBiwAmM0p4kLJAnXg==}
@@ -2339,7 +2339,7 @@ snapshots:
   ajv@8.18.0:
     dependencies:
       fast-deep-equal: 3.1.3
-      fast-uri: 3.1.0
+      fast-uri: 3.1.2
       json-schema-traverse: 1.0.0
       require-from-string: 2.0.2
 
@@ -2560,7 +2560,7 @@ snapshots:
 
   fast-deep-equal@3.1.3: {}
 
-  fast-uri@3.1.0: {}
+  fast-uri@3.1.2: {}
 
   fdir@6.5.0(picomatch@4.0.4):
     optionalDependencies: