* feat(worker): add agentic static analysis Add the ten-stage Agentic SAST pipeline, confined repository tools, model runtime, prompt templates, and SARIF export. Make retries, repair sessions, reduced coverage, usage accounting, and model-output drift durable across Temporal replay and resume. Keep retry diagnostics in their actionable closed vocabulary. Package the Mantis-derived license material with the prompts that require it. * feat(worker): deduplicate static and runtime findings before exploitation Parse Agentic SAST SARIF into typed observations, enrich and route those observations, and reconcile them with pentest findings before exploitation. Publish deterministic exploitation queues with stable lineage, exact-path Git commits, retry-safe manifests, named drop reasons, and confined task formation. Reject duplicate producer IDs before commit and adopt either legal provenance shape after a lost acknowledgement. * feat(config)!: replace vuln_classes with agentic_sast Wire Agentic SAST and reconciliation into the main pipeline, persist their durable state, and add the Miscellaneous finding and exploitation lane. Make scan completion, cancellation, partial outcomes, resume identity, and report recovery use the integrated final workflow contract. Introduce the atomic finalization, ordering, renumbering, compaction, and output services that workflow calls. Keep completed Miscellaneous work and report drafts idempotent across resume, preserve public main's default-on exploit SARIF behavior, and describe stage-fallback candidates without claiming they were exported. BREAKING CHANGE: `vuln_classes` has been removed. Configs containing it now fail validation, and all five core pentest classes run on every scan. Workspaces created by Shannon 2.x cannot be resumed. Finish or discard in-flight scans before upgrading, then start a new workspace name. * perf: overlap static analysis and the Miscellaneous lane with the pentest Run Agentic SAST alongside vulnerability analysis and run Miscellaneous exploitation alongside the specialist exploitation lanes. Keep reconciliation dependent on the completed static-analysis result while preserving parallel work everywhere that has no data dependency. * feat(cli)!: default the scan target and add a JSON error contract List local scans, resolve the active or most recent workspace automatically, and make logs, status, and stop use one canonical scan identity. Add stable machine-readable failures, richer status output, explicit help errors, and seven-day Temporal retention. Treat absent Temporal pending-activity failures as absent whether the decoder represents them as `null` or missing. BREAKING CHANGE: `status --json` now returns a fixed `failureMessage`. Read `partialReasons`, `agenticSast`, and `workflow.log` for diagnostic detail. * feat(logging): trace tool calls and write a log per agent Record complete tool-call arguments in the workflow log and project each agent's events into its own durable log. Add agent listing and agent-specific log tailing while preserving byte-exact output and draining log handles before activities return. * feat(worker): standardize severity and reporting guidance in exploit prompts Give every exploit agent the same status, confidence, severity-reasoning, report-writing, credential-handling, and scope contract. Apply the same task-formation and SAST-enrichment procedure to the Miscellaneous lane. * feat(worker): disclose scan coverage and make reporting auditable Build on the retry-safe finalization foundation to preserve correct identities, source locations, scan dates, partial-coverage limitations, and consistent report JSON, Markdown, SARIF, and PDF output. Report Agentic SAST, reconciliation wall-clock time, stage usage, retry spend, and background work without duplicate or hardcoded totals. Keep report findings canonical, drop cross-class restatements, name enrichment losses, and render the executive-summary narrative in the PDF. * chore(license): attribute Mantis and Pi and refresh the docs Add the final Mantis and Pi notices, license copies, acknowledgements, and residual copyright updates. Update the README, maintained documentation, contributor guidance, and hand-maintained mirrors to describe Agentic SAST, reconciliation, the Miscellaneous lane, current CLI behavior, and the final release contract. Correct stale workspace and container guidance and annotate long-standing internals for maintainers. * fix(logging): treat a slash as a word separator in agent labels * feat(cli)!: rebuild scan status around model work - show Capella stages beneath the concurrent Agentic SAST phase - attach reconciliation time to the class row it feeds - hide completed bookkeeping and the duplicate miscellaneous wrapper - carry validated child-workflow progress into durable parent state - derive the terminal tree and status JSON from the same phase shape BREAKING CHANGE: `status --json` replaces phase `parallel` with `children` and `meta`, adds phase summaries and notes plus agent attachment fields, and removes the `analysis-engines` and `operational-work` phases. * fix(report): drop the empty Critical Findings section from the PDF summary * fix(sast): align Capella export with the submit-time code-path contract The export gate required every code_paths entry to be file:line, but submit only requires the primary sink to be file:line and accepts bare trace steps. A single malformed trace step therefore dropped an otherwise-valid finding at export. - add isValidPrimaryCodePath as the one shared primary-sink contract - validate only the primary at export; buildResult already drops unusable steps - route the submit-time validator through the same helper so the two cannot drift * feat(sast): tolerate hygiene-only Capella reductions instead of going partial A reduction only makes a run partial when it loses real coverage or a whole finding. Malformed model output, salvaged turn-limit work, and rejected duplicate verdicts are recorded as evidence but no longer flip the run to partial. - add reductionIsTolerable: partial only when genuine-loss counts are nonzero - drive runCapella's partial reasons and display coverage off non-tolerable ones - keep every reduction in agenticSast.reductions so nothing is lost as evidence * feat(logging): record the provider reason for a failed agent turn A failed provider turn collapsed to AGENT_EXECUTION_FAILED/unknown with the underlying reason discarded, so a model-side rejection or safeguard was indistinguishable from a transport fault in the error log. - add safeProviderTurnDetails: write bounded, non-sensitive fields (provider, model, responseId, stop reason, tool-in-flight, category, retryable) to error.log - gate a sanitized errorMessage snippet behind SHANNON_DEBUG_PROVIDER_ERRORS, off by default - forward SHANNON_DEBUG_PROVIDER_ERRORS from the CLI into the worker container * fix(cli): keep shannon logs tailing through a Temporal blip - End the interactive tail on the log's own terminal marker or Ctrl-C, so a transient Temporal outage no longer aborts the command with exit 1. - Rebuild the memoized Temporal client after a failed poll: a wedged gRPC channel was cached forever, so "retrying…" could never reconnect. - Keep start --follow (CI) bounded — a genuinely dead Temporal still fails the run instead of hanging. * fix(worker): correct PDF finding reporting - Render OWASP category, authentication state, and remediation - Omit the redundant per-finding exploited status - Preserve canonical category and field ordering across report modes - Continue Proof of Impact numbering across embedded code blocks - Wrap long PDF code lines without changing canonical report content * fix: attribute a reconciliation failure to exploitation only - Stop marking a class's vulnerability-analysis agent failed when that agent succeeded and only reconciliation failed; the status tree now renders the analysis row completed and the exploitation row failed - Consume the worker's failedReconciliations signal in the CLI, which the mirrored PipelineState already declared but never read - Correct the class_reconciliation_failed message, which claimed the class's analysis results were still in the report when the class is excluded from it * fix(pi): give each task sub-session its own resource loader to prevent stale extension ctx * fix(prompts): scope exploit agents to in-band proof, mark OOB-only findings blocked * fix(cli): reject a shell credential that shadows a gateway config.toml key * fix(cli): make scan shutdown verifiable - preselect and persist workflow identity before worker launch - cancel first, then verify bounded Temporal termination - reconcile Docker workers with Temporal open workflows - fail closed on stale images and unavailable lifecycle state - mark cancellation only after confirmed shutdown * feat(cli): prompt for setup on a bare npx invocation with no credentials * fix(cli): don't blame anthropic when no credentials are configured at all * chore(release): bump beta base version to 3.0.0 * feat(cli): show a 'start your first scan' box in help on a TTY * docs: refresh README and platform overview for Shannon 3.0 - lead with the 3.0 launch note and rewrite key capabilities around security code analysis, the rebuilt terminal experience, native CI/CD, and PDF/SARIF - recast the editions table as Shannon Open Source against the Keygraph Enterprise Platform, stating open source is not a trial edition - rewrite the platform overview around exhaustive agentic SAST, canonical findings, automated remediation, targeted verification, and governance - add five product screenshots under assets/keygraph-platform/, referenced relative to docs/ * docs: add the Shannon naming section and swap in the 3.0 demo GIF - explain the Claude Shannon information-theory origin under "What is Shannon?" - point "Shannon in Action" at the 3.0 recording in assets/Shannon3GIF.gif Both taken from the README half of #438. * docs: document CI/CD integrations and the reconciled analysis pipeline - add a CI/CD Integrations section covering the official GitHub Action and GitLab component, pipeline artifacts, and exploit-only severity gates - redraw the architecture section as a Mermaid flow: agentic code analysis and recon feed finding reconciliation, then exploitation and reporting - describe open-source code analysis as a multi-stage agentic workflow and reserve parsed-code CPGs and exhaustive verification for Enterprise - sharpen the privacy wording: results stay local, but model requests carry source context to whichever endpoint you configure - drop the "not recommended" framing on local models and add a section on why Shannon complements rather than replaces human pentesters - regenerate llms-full.txt from the updated README and docs * docs: add the Photoview benchmark across three models - Add a "Shannon in Action" table for Photoview 2.4.0 runs on DeepSeek v4 Flash, Grok 4.6, and Claude Opus 5, each linking its PDF report and SARIF output - Store the per-model reports under benchmark/ - Link the (forthcoming) benchmark writeup from the section intro * docs: add the Shannon vs XBOW/Aikido Photoview benchmark writeup - Add docs/shannon-xbow-aikido-benchmark.md with methodology, per-model cost/coverage tables, and links to each model's report and SARIF - Link the writeup from the README "Shannon in Action" section * docs: link the benchmark announcement discussion from the README * fix(readme): restore theme-aware banner, badge, and buttons * feat!: trigger the Shannon 3.0 major release --------- Co-authored-by: ezl-keygraph <ezhil@keygraph.io>
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Configuration
Shannon can run without a configuration file, but configuration enables authenticated testing, scope guidance, rules of engagement, and report filtering.
Credential Precedence
Source-build mode resolves credentials from:
- Environment variables, such as
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=... ./.env
npx mode resolves credentials from:
- Environment variables
~/.shannon/config.toml, created bynpx @keygraph/shannon setup
Environment variables always win, so you can override saved config for a single session without editing files.
Create a Configuration File
Copy and modify the example configuration:
cp configs/example-config.yaml ./my-app-config.yaml
Run with:
npx @keygraph/shannon start -u https://example.com -r /path/to/repo -c ./my-app-config.yaml
Source-build equivalent:
./shannon start -u https://example.com -r /path/to/repo -c ./my-app-config.yaml
Basic Configuration Structure
# Describe your target environment.
description: "Next.js e-commerce app on PostgreSQL. Local dev environment; .env files contain local-only credentials."
# Every scan runs all five vulnerability classes.
# Agentic static analysis. `enabled` is its only setting.
# agentic_sast:
# enabled: "true"
# Skip the exploitation phase.
# exploit: "false"
# Free-form rules of engagement.
# rules_of_engagement: |
# - No password brute-force; cap login attempts at 5 per account.
# - Throttle to under 5 requests per second per endpoint; back off 60s on any 429.
# - Use placeholders like [order_id] in deliverables; no real data values.
authentication:
login_type: form
login_url: "https://your-app.com/login"
credentials:
username: "test@example.com"
password: "yourpassword"
totp_secret: "LB2E2RX7XFHSTGCK"
# Optional mailbox credentials for magic-link or email-OTP flows.
# email_login:
# address: "inbox@example.com"
# password: "mailbox-password"
# totp_secret: "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"
login_flow:
- "Type $username into the email field"
- "Type $password into the password field"
- "Click the 'Sign In' button"
success_condition:
type: url_contains
value: "/dashboard"
rules:
avoid:
- description: "AI should avoid testing logout functionality"
type: url_path
value: "/logout"
# code_path values are repo-relative file paths or globs.
# - description: "Out-of-scope vendored libraries"
# type: code_path
# value: "src/vendor/**"
focus:
- description: "AI should emphasize testing API endpoints"
type: url_path
value: "/api"
# Report options applied when assembling the final report.
# report:
# min_severity: low
# min_confidence: low
# guidance: |
# Drop findings about missing security headers and rate-limit gaps.
# sarif: "false"
Analysis Scope and Agentic SAST
Every scan runs all five analysis classes: Injection, Cross-Site Scripting, Authentication, Authorization, and Server-Side Request Forgery. The class set is fixed and has no configuration selector.
Agentic static analysis is opt-in:
agentic_sast:
enabled: "true"
enabled is the only setting. Omitting the block, or setting enabled: "false", turns agentic static analysis off;
"true" turns it on. Either way, all five vulnerability classes still run.
Agentic static analysis reads the repository for vulnerabilities before the pentest and passes what it finds into the exploitation phase. It adds model time and cost. If it fails, the pentest continues without its findings and the scan finishes as "partial".
Report Options
| Key | Effect |
|---|---|
min_severity |
Drops findings rated below this severity. Applies in both exploitative and analysis-only runs. |
min_confidence |
Drops findings rated below this confidence. Applies only when exploit is "false". |
guidance |
Free-text instruction to the report agent, such as which topics to exclude. |
sarif |
SARIF 2.1.0 log alongside the Markdown report. On by default for exploit runs; set "false" to opt out. Ignored when exploit is "false". |
Every finding carries a severity, but it does not mean the same thing in each mode: an exploitative run measures severity from what the exploit demonstrated, while an analysis-only run assesses it from the class of flaw and the impact it would have. An analysis-only finding carries a confidence rating alongside its severity, since nothing was proven. Setting min_confidence on an exploitative run is ignored, and Shannon logs a warning naming the threshold to use instead.
SARIF Output
On exploit-mode runs Shannon writes report.sarif next to Security-Assessment-Report.pdf at the workspace root by default, for upload to GitHub code scanning or any other SARIF consumer. No configuration is needed; set sarif: "false" to opt out.
report:
sarif: "false"
Each finding becomes one SARIF result, filed under a rule per vulnerability class (shannon/injection, shannon/xss, shannon/auth, shannon/authz, shannon/ssrf, and shannon/miscellaneous for findings outside those classes) and tagged with its OWASP Top Ten 2025 category. Results are anchored to the code location the analysis phase recorded, falling back to the HTTP entry point when the finding names no file. Severity maps onto SARIF's three levels: critical and high become error, medium becomes warning, everything else becomes note.
If the SARIF log cannot be written, the JSON and Markdown reports are still produced and the scan finishes as "partial".
The log is written only for exploitative runs. sarif is ignored when exploit is "false".
Supported rule types include url_path, subdomain, domain, method, header, parameter, and code_path.
Writing Login Flow
Log in once in a fresh private browser window. Write the steps in the same order you perform them:
- When typing into a field, reference the field by its exact label or placeholder.
- When clicking a button, reference the exact button text.
Supported placeholders:
$username$password$totp$email_address$email_password$email_totp
At runtime, Shannon replaces these placeholders with the credentials passed in the config.
login_flow:
- "Type $username in <exact email field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"
- "Type $password in <exact password field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"
- "If prompted for 2FA, type $totp in <exact code field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"