mirror of
https://github.com/KeygraphHQ/shannon.git
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5ff40f8c6f
* feat(worker): migrate agent runtime from Claude Agent SDK to pi harness * feat: remove Google Vertex AI provider support * fix(worker): route Bedrock and custom-base-URL providers from env * feat(prompts): instruct agents to call submit_exploitation_queue and submit_auth_result * fix(worker): count sub-agent cost and surface compaction failures * refactor(worker): rename claude-executor to pi-executor * feat(worker): pi-event-driven output formatting * fix(worker): gate adaptive thinking to Opus models, drop CLAUDE_THINKING_LEVEL * fix(worker): restore minLength/minItems on vuln-collector schemas * feat(worker): give task sub-agent write+bash, align tool descriptions * feat(worker): add glob custom tool and route code_path globs to it * refactor(prompts): use pi tool names (task, todo_write, read, bash, glob) * refactor(prompts): drop stale MCP terminology for collector tools * refactor(prompts): drop collector server names from deliverable instructions * fix(worker): restore minLength/minItems on pre-recon and exploit collector schemas * feat(worker): load playwright-cli skill via pi resource loader * refactor(cli): remove CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS config * build: drop @anthropic-ai/claude-code from worker image * docs: remove vertex references from llms context * docs(worker): update stale sdk comments * refactor(worker): unify provider precedence between preflight and executor * feat(worker): enforce bounded bash timeouts via pi extension * ci: bump the beta release line to 2.0.0 (#356) * fix(cli): pin npx command hints to beta tag * fix: render agent deliverables before the success commit so resume preserves them (#377) * feat(cli): restructure run folder and improve terminal UX (#383) * feat: surface report at run root and nest run internals under .shannon * feat: use plain-language wording in user-facing terminal messages * feat(cli): guide users to watch scan progress and surface report path on start * docs: sync run-folder layout and CLI wording across docs and comments * feat(cli): add version command reporting package version or git SHA * feat(cli): detect TTY for interactive prompts, color, and progress output * docs: document --yes flag, version command, and tty module * fix(cli): FORCE_COLOR precedence and plain uninstall --yes output * fix(cli): respect empty NO_COLOR * fix(cli): let NO_COLOR take precedence over FORCE_COLOR * docs: mark claude-code-router integration as removed * refactor(worker): converge shared core with shannon-oss (#388) * fix(worker): port keygraph shared-core correctness fixes * refactor(worker): adopt collectors/ and ai/pi/ layout; add task budget cap and cancellation * refactor(worker): drop inconsistent Collector "Server" suffix * refactor(worker): drop unused providerConfig/apiKey seams, resolve credentials from env only * refactor(worker): port oss code_path pattern expansion + external_directory allow * fix(worker): preserve dotfile paths in code_path avoid patterns (.env no longer stripped to env) * feat(worker): render Unprocessed Vulnerabilities section in exploit deliverable (align with oss) * feat(worker): request set_blind_spots for all vuln classes (align auth/ssrf with production prompts) * refactor(worker): adopt unified permissionSystem* naming and helper layout * refactor(worker): inline blind_spots into vuln deliverable section array * chore(worker): drop unused zod dependency (tree is typebox-native) * fix(worker): normalize base32 TOTP secret to accept padding and whitespace * refactor(worker): adopt shared toolResult helper and flatSchema naming in collectors * refactor(worker): use undefined over null in queue-schema builders * docs(worker): converge renderer/collector doc comments to current pi terminology * refactor(worker): adopt schema.ts cleanInput/stringEnum helpers in collectors * feat(worker): converge exploit-collector/renderer with vendored; capture and render overview for blocked findings * refactor(worker): converge session-tools/pipeline/exploitation-checker with vendored * refactor(worker): converge task-tool usage reporting with vendored onUsage callback * refactor(worker): converge structured output onto a submitTool executor channel * docs(worker): expand exploit-renderer docstring to match shannon-oss * docs(worker): adopt richer vuln-renderer docstring from shannon-oss * docs(worker): neutralize billing-detection wording for shannon-oss parity * fix(worker): verify checkpoint hash in the deliverables clone being reset * fix(worker): fail fast on malformed exploitation queue JSON * fix(worker): honor retryable flag when classifying exploitation-queue check failures * fix(worker): fail fast on corrupted session.json in run-scope validation * feat(worker): propagate Temporal cancellation signal into agent and auth pi sessions * fix(worker): mark exploit agent complete when exploitation is skipped so resume skips it * prompts: drop scan description from executive report prompt * refactor(worker): add createGenericSubmitTool for raw JSON-schema submit tools * refactor(worker): gate playwright-cli skill to browser agents via skillsOverride (adopt shannon-oss mechanism) * docs(worker): correct formatLogTime comment to UTC to match toISOString * refactor(worker): converge queue-schemas with shannon-oss (guarded count, decl order) * refactor(worker): converge task-tool with shannon-oss (byte-identical; modelRegistry optional) * fix(worker): use replaceLiteral for all prompt value insertions to prevent $-mangling * fix(worker): classify agent execution failures by error type instead of hardcoding validation * fix(worker): cap auth-failure detail at 250 chars to match shannon-oss * style(worker): apply biome formatting * refactor(worker): remove per-session task delegation cap from task tool * style(cli): collapse usage hint now that the beta tag is gone * chore: mark the pi harness migration as a breaking change BREAKING CHANGE: Google Vertex AI is no longer a supported provider. The CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX, ANTHROPIC_VERTEX_PROJECT, CLOUD_ML_REGION, and GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS environment variables, along with the use_vertex, vertex_project, and cloud_ml_region config.toml keys, are removed. Vertex users must switch to Anthropic, AWS Bedrock, or a custom Anthropic-compatible base URL. The CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS environment variable and the max_output_tokens config.toml key are also removed.
226 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
226 lines
8.0 KiB
TypeScript
// Copyright (C) 2025 Keygraph, Inc.
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//
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// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3
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// as published by the Free Software Foundation.
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import { fs, path } from 'zx';
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import type { ActivityLogger } from './types/activity-logger.js';
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import type { AgentDefinition, AgentName, AgentValidator, PlaywrightSession, VulnType } from './types/index.js';
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// Agent definitions according to PRD
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export const AGENTS: Readonly<Record<AgentName, AgentDefinition>> = Object.freeze({
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'pre-recon': {
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name: 'pre-recon',
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displayName: 'Pre-recon agent',
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prerequisites: [],
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promptTemplate: 'pre-recon-code',
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deliverableFilename: 'pre_recon_deliverable.md',
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modelTier: 'large',
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},
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recon: {
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name: 'recon',
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displayName: 'Recon agent',
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prerequisites: ['pre-recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'recon',
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deliverableFilename: 'recon_deliverable.md',
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},
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'injection-vuln': {
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name: 'injection-vuln',
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displayName: 'Injection vuln agent',
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prerequisites: ['recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'vuln-injection',
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deliverableFilename: 'injection_analysis_deliverable.md',
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},
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'xss-vuln': {
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name: 'xss-vuln',
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displayName: 'XSS vuln agent',
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prerequisites: ['recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'vuln-xss',
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deliverableFilename: 'xss_analysis_deliverable.md',
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},
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'auth-vuln': {
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name: 'auth-vuln',
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displayName: 'Auth vuln agent',
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prerequisites: ['recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'vuln-auth',
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deliverableFilename: 'auth_analysis_deliverable.md',
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},
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'ssrf-vuln': {
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name: 'ssrf-vuln',
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displayName: 'SSRF vuln agent',
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prerequisites: ['recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'vuln-ssrf',
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deliverableFilename: 'ssrf_analysis_deliverable.md',
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},
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'authz-vuln': {
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name: 'authz-vuln',
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displayName: 'Authz vuln agent',
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prerequisites: ['recon'],
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promptTemplate: 'vuln-authz',
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deliverableFilename: 'authz_analysis_deliverable.md',
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},
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'injection-exploit': {
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name: 'injection-exploit',
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displayName: 'Injection exploit agent',
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prerequisites: ['injection-vuln'],
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promptTemplate: 'exploit-injection',
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deliverableFilename: 'injection_exploitation_evidence.md',
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},
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'xss-exploit': {
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name: 'xss-exploit',
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displayName: 'XSS exploit agent',
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prerequisites: ['xss-vuln'],
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promptTemplate: 'exploit-xss',
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deliverableFilename: 'xss_exploitation_evidence.md',
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},
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'auth-exploit': {
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name: 'auth-exploit',
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displayName: 'Auth exploit agent',
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prerequisites: ['auth-vuln'],
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promptTemplate: 'exploit-auth',
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deliverableFilename: 'auth_exploitation_evidence.md',
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},
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'ssrf-exploit': {
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name: 'ssrf-exploit',
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displayName: 'SSRF exploit agent',
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prerequisites: ['ssrf-vuln'],
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promptTemplate: 'exploit-ssrf',
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deliverableFilename: 'ssrf_exploitation_evidence.md',
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},
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'authz-exploit': {
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name: 'authz-exploit',
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displayName: 'Authz exploit agent',
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prerequisites: ['authz-vuln'],
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promptTemplate: 'exploit-authz',
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deliverableFilename: 'authz_exploitation_evidence.md',
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},
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report: {
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name: 'report',
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displayName: 'Report agent',
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prerequisites: ['injection-exploit', 'xss-exploit', 'auth-exploit', 'ssrf-exploit', 'authz-exploit'],
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promptTemplate: 'report-executive',
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deliverableFilename: 'comprehensive_security_assessment_report.md',
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},
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});
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// Phase names for metrics aggregation
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export type PhaseName = 'pre-recon' | 'recon' | 'vulnerability-analysis' | 'exploitation' | 'reporting';
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// Map agents to their corresponding phases (single source of truth)
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export const AGENT_PHASE_MAP: Readonly<Record<AgentName, PhaseName>> = Object.freeze({
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'pre-recon': 'pre-recon',
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recon: 'recon',
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'injection-vuln': 'vulnerability-analysis',
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'xss-vuln': 'vulnerability-analysis',
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'auth-vuln': 'vulnerability-analysis',
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'authz-vuln': 'vulnerability-analysis',
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'ssrf-vuln': 'vulnerability-analysis',
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'injection-exploit': 'exploitation',
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'xss-exploit': 'exploitation',
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'auth-exploit': 'exploitation',
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'authz-exploit': 'exploitation',
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'ssrf-exploit': 'exploitation',
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report: 'reporting',
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});
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// Factory function for vulnerability queue validators.
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//
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// The analysis_deliverable.md is rendered via the writeDeliverable hook, which
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// AgentExecutionService runs after validateAgentOutput but before the success
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// commit — so a "both files exist" check here would race the renderer. The
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// validator only checks queue.json, written by the submit-tool path in
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// agent-execution.ts before this validator runs.
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function createVulnValidator(vulnType: VulnType): AgentValidator {
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return async (sourceDir: string, logger: ActivityLogger): Promise<boolean> => {
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const queueFile = path.join(sourceDir, `${vulnType}_exploitation_queue.json`);
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const queueExists = await fs.pathExists(queueFile);
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if (!queueExists) {
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logger.warn(`Queue validation failed for ${vulnType}: ${vulnType}_exploitation_queue.json missing`);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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};
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}
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// Exploitation agents — the evidence deliverable is rendered via the writeDeliverable
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// hook after the agent succeeds (before the success commit), so a file-existence check
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// here would race the renderer.
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//
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// VulnType is kept in the import surface for createVulnValidator above; this factory
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// returns a no-op validator parameterized only for symmetry with the vuln-side factory.
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function createExploitValidator(_vulnType: VulnType): AgentValidator {
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return async (): Promise<boolean> => true;
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}
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// Playwright session mapping - assigns each agent to a specific session for browser isolation
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// Keys are promptTemplate values from AGENTS registry
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export const PLAYWRIGHT_SESSION_MAPPING: Record<string, PlaywrightSession> = Object.freeze({
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// Runs before any agent — non-concurrent, so agent1 is safe to share
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'validate-authentication': 'agent1',
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// Phase 1: Pre-reconnaissance
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'pre-recon-code': 'agent1',
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// Phase 2: Reconnaissance
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recon: 'agent2',
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// Phase 3: Vulnerability Analysis (5 parallel agents)
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'vuln-injection': 'agent1',
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'vuln-xss': 'agent2',
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'vuln-auth': 'agent3',
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'vuln-ssrf': 'agent4',
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'vuln-authz': 'agent5',
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// Phase 4: Exploitation (5 parallel agents - same as vuln counterparts)
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'exploit-injection': 'agent1',
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'exploit-xss': 'agent2',
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'exploit-auth': 'agent3',
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'exploit-ssrf': 'agent4',
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'exploit-authz': 'agent5',
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// Phase 5: Reporting
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'report-executive': 'agent3',
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});
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// Direct agent-to-validator mapping - much simpler than pattern matching
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export const AGENT_VALIDATORS: Record<AgentName, AgentValidator> = Object.freeze({
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// Pre-reconnaissance agent — skipped tools surface as renderer placeholders, not
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// activity failures. The deliverable file is written by the renderer after the agent
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// succeeds, so a file-existence check here would race the renderer.
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'pre-recon': async (): Promise<boolean> => true,
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// Reconnaissance agent — validation lives in runReconAgent post-processing.
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// The deliverable file is written by the renderer after the agent succeeds, so a
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// file-existence check here would race the renderer.
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recon: async (): Promise<boolean> => true,
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// Vulnerability analysis agents
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'injection-vuln': createVulnValidator('injection'),
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'xss-vuln': createVulnValidator('xss'),
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'auth-vuln': createVulnValidator('auth'),
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'ssrf-vuln': createVulnValidator('ssrf'),
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'authz-vuln': createVulnValidator('authz'),
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// Exploitation agents
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'injection-exploit': createExploitValidator('injection'),
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'xss-exploit': createExploitValidator('xss'),
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'auth-exploit': createExploitValidator('auth'),
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'ssrf-exploit': createExploitValidator('ssrf'),
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'authz-exploit': createExploitValidator('authz'),
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// Executive report agent
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report: async (sourceDir: string, logger: ActivityLogger): Promise<boolean> => {
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const reportFile = path.join(sourceDir, 'comprehensive_security_assessment_report.md');
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const reportExists = await fs.pathExists(reportFile);
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if (!reportExists) {
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logger.error('Missing required deliverable: comprehensive_security_assessment_report.md');
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}
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return reportExists;
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},
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});
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