Files
shannon/apps/worker/src/ai/queue-schemas.ts
T
ezl-keygraph 1ce250d6a5 feat: multi-provider model support, SARIF output, and exploit-mode fixes (#402)
* feat(worker): record token, cache, and turn usage per agent

* feat: replace model tiers with a single SHANNON_AI_MODEL across five providers

* feat(cli): rebuild the setup wizard for provider and model selection

* docs: document single-model selection and supported providers

* feat(worker): use chat completions for OpenAI behind a custom base URL

* feat: add SHANNON_AI_OPENAI_FORMAT to pick the wire API for OpenAI gateways

* refactor(cli): drop endpoint path hints from the gateway format picker

* feat(worker): enable pi in-session provider retry with retry-after backoff

* refactor(worker): hand provider error classification to pi and drop the Anthropic ladders

* refactor: remove the subscription retry preset and pipeline config section

* fix(worker): validate Bedrock credentials with the same live probe as other providers

* feat(worker): render the report from structured findings instead of agent-written markdown

* fix(worker): dispose the credential probe session on every path

* fix(worker): refuse to replace the assembled report with an empty one

* refactor(worker): catch post-processing throws across the whole finalization block

* revert(worker): drop the report zero-findings guard

* docs(worker): correct the retry split and Bedrock credential claims

* docs: regenerate llms-full.txt from current sources

* feat(cli): build and run the npx flow from a clone

* refactor(cli): flatten the setup summary output

* feat(cli): reject runs with more than one provider configured

* fix(worker): say a rejected bash call never ran

* chore(cli): drop grok-4.3 and gpt-5.6-luna from the setup suggestions

* feat(worker): capture structured finding locations for SARIF output

* fix(worker): enumerate queue confidence so the report inherits it verbatim

* feat(worker): give the reporting phase a mode-specific output schema

* feat(worker): emit a SARIF 2.1.0 log for exploitative runs

* fix(worker): correct SARIF locations and defer fingerprinting to the upload action

* fix(worker): drop the confidence suffix from the analysis-mode summary list

* feat(worker): give exploit findings a dedicated code location field

* feat(worker): carry structured code locations from the vuln queue to the report

* fix(worker): join code locations from the vuln queue instead of re-asking agents

* fix(worker): spell out the finding_id to category mapping in the tool schema

* feat: drop Google/Gemini as a supported AI provider

* fix(worker): stop asking the report agent for code locations

* docs: correct the provider list and drop the removed rate-limit settings

* docs: add provider cyber safeguards and suggested models per provider

* docs: document the SARIF output and the report rating thresholds
2026-07-30 19:31:52 +05:30

197 lines
7.3 KiB
TypeScript

// Copyright (C) 2025 Keygraph, Inc.
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3
// as published by the Free Software Foundation.
/**
* TypeBox schemas + submit-tool factory for vulnerability exploitation queues.
*
* pi captures each vuln agent's structured queue via a `submit_exploitation_queue`
* custom tool whose parameters mirror the per-class schema below. Entry types are
* derived from the same schemas and consumed by the findings renderer.
*/
import { defineTool } from '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent';
import { type Static, type TObject, Type } from 'typebox';
import { stringEnum } from '../collectors/schema.js';
import type { AgentName } from '../types/agents.js';
import type { CapturedSubmitTool } from './submit-tool.js';
const ANALYSIS_NOTES_DESCRIPTION = 'Plain context for defenders (caveats, scope, what is at risk). Not attack steps.';
function optStr(description?: string) {
return Type.Optional(Type.String(description === undefined ? {} : { description }));
}
/**
* Base fields shared by every queue entry. `notes` gains guidance in analysis mode.
*
* `confidence` is enumerated so it reaches the report agent in the same casing the report
* schema accepts — an analysis-only run carries it through verbatim as its only rating.
*/
function baseFields(exploit: boolean) {
return {
ID: Type.String(),
vulnerability_type: Type.String(),
externally_exploitable: Type.Boolean(),
confidence: stringEnum(['high', 'medium', 'low'], {
description: 'Confidence that this is a real, reachable vulnerability.',
}),
code_locations: Type.Optional(
Type.Array(
Type.Object({
file: Type.String({ description: 'Repository-relative path, no leading slash.' }),
start_line: Type.Optional(Type.Integer({ minimum: 1 })),
end_line: Type.Optional(Type.Integer({ minimum: 1, description: 'Set when the flaw spans a range.' })),
role: stringEnum(['sink', 'source', 'guard'], {
description:
'sink where the flaw manifests, source where untrusted input enters, guard for a check ' +
'that is missing or misplaced.',
}),
symbol: Type.Optional(
Type.String({ description: 'Enclosing function or method, named as written in the code.' }),
),
}),
{ description: 'Every code site this finding touches, sink first.' },
),
),
notes: exploit ? optStr() : optStr(ANALYSIS_NOTES_DESCRIPTION),
};
}
const injectionFields = {
source: optStr(),
combined_sources: optStr(),
path: optStr(),
sink_call: optStr(),
slot_type: optStr(),
sanitization_observed: optStr(),
concat_occurrences: optStr(),
verdict: optStr(),
mismatch_reason: optStr(),
witness_payload: optStr(),
};
const xssFields = {
source: optStr(),
source_detail: optStr(),
path: optStr(),
sink_function: optStr(),
render_context: optStr(),
encoding_observed: optStr(),
verdict: optStr(),
mismatch_reason: optStr(),
witness_payload: optStr(),
};
const authFields = {
source_endpoint: optStr(),
vulnerable_code_location: optStr(),
missing_defense: optStr(),
exploitation_hypothesis: optStr(),
suggested_exploit_technique: optStr(),
};
const ssrfFields = {
source_endpoint: optStr(),
vulnerable_parameter: optStr(),
vulnerable_code_location: optStr(),
missing_defense: optStr(),
exploitation_hypothesis: optStr(),
suggested_exploit_technique: optStr(),
};
const authzFields = {
endpoint: optStr(),
vulnerable_code_location: optStr(),
role_context: optStr(),
guard_evidence: optStr(),
side_effect: optStr(),
reason: optStr(),
minimal_witness: optStr(),
};
// === Per-entry schemas (single vulnerability). Entry types derive from these. ===
const injectionEntry = () => Type.Object({ ...baseFields(true), ...injectionFields });
const xssEntry = () => Type.Object({ ...baseFields(true), ...xssFields });
const authEntry = () => Type.Object({ ...baseFields(true), ...authFields });
const ssrfEntry = () => Type.Object({ ...baseFields(true), ...ssrfFields });
const authzEntry = () => Type.Object({ ...baseFields(true), ...authzFields });
export type QueueCodeLocation = NonNullable<Static<ReturnType<typeof injectionEntry>>['code_locations']>[number];
export type InjectionFinding = Static<ReturnType<typeof injectionEntry>>;
export type XssFinding = Static<ReturnType<typeof xssEntry>>;
export type AuthFinding = Static<ReturnType<typeof authEntry>>;
export type SsrfFinding = Static<ReturnType<typeof ssrfEntry>>;
export type AuthzFinding = Static<ReturnType<typeof authzEntry>>;
const PER_TYPE_FIELDS: Partial<Record<AgentName, Record<string, ReturnType<typeof optStr>>>> = {
'injection-vuln': injectionFields,
'xss-vuln': xssFields,
'auth-vuln': authFields,
'ssrf-vuln': ssrfFields,
'authz-vuln': authzFields,
};
const VULN_AGENT_QUEUE_FILENAMES: Partial<Record<AgentName, string>> = {
'injection-vuln': 'injection_exploitation_queue.json',
'xss-vuln': 'xss_exploitation_queue.json',
'auth-vuln': 'auth_exploitation_queue.json',
'ssrf-vuln': 'ssrf_exploitation_queue.json',
'authz-vuln': 'authz_exploitation_queue.json',
};
/** Build the TypeBox submit-tool parameters for a vuln agent, or undefined for non-vuln agents. */
function queueSchema(agentName: AgentName, exploit: boolean): TObject | undefined {
const extra = PER_TYPE_FIELDS[agentName];
if (!extra) return undefined;
return Type.Object({
vulnerabilities: Type.Array(Type.Object({ ...baseFields(exploit), ...extra })),
});
}
/** Returns the queue filename for a vuln agent, or undefined for non-vuln agents. */
export function getQueueFilename(agentName: AgentName): string | undefined {
return VULN_AGENT_QUEUE_FILENAMES[agentName];
}
/** Build the pi submit tool that captures the exploitation queue for vuln agents. */
export function createQueueSubmitTool(agentName: AgentName, exploit = true): CapturedSubmitTool | undefined {
const schema = queueSchema(agentName, exploit);
if (!schema) return undefined;
let captured: unknown | undefined;
return {
tool: defineTool({
name: 'submit_exploitation_queue',
label: 'Submit Exploitation Queue',
description:
'Submit the final structured list of analyzed vulnerabilities for this class. Call exactly once when analysis is complete.',
promptSnippet: 'submit_exploitation_queue: record the final structured findings list (call once)',
promptGuidelines: [
'You MUST call submit_exploitation_queue exactly once as your final action.',
'Include every analyzed finding in the vulnerabilities array.',
],
parameters: schema,
async execute(_toolCallId, params) {
captured = params;
const count = Array.isArray((params as { vulnerabilities?: unknown }).vulnerabilities)
? (params as { vulnerabilities: unknown[] }).vulnerabilities.length
: 0;
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `Recorded ${count} findings.` }],
details: params,
terminate: true,
};
},
}),
getCaptured: () => captured,
directive:
'\n\nYou MUST call the submit_exploitation_queue tool exactly once as your final action ' +
'to deliver your structured exploitation queue. Do not output JSON as text. Fill every required parameter.',
};
}