* feat(worker): record token, cache, and turn usage per agent * feat: replace model tiers with a single SHANNON_AI_MODEL across five providers * feat(cli): rebuild the setup wizard for provider and model selection * docs: document single-model selection and supported providers * feat(worker): use chat completions for OpenAI behind a custom base URL * feat: add SHANNON_AI_OPENAI_FORMAT to pick the wire API for OpenAI gateways * refactor(cli): drop endpoint path hints from the gateway format picker * feat(worker): enable pi in-session provider retry with retry-after backoff * refactor(worker): hand provider error classification to pi and drop the Anthropic ladders * refactor: remove the subscription retry preset and pipeline config section * fix(worker): validate Bedrock credentials with the same live probe as other providers * feat(worker): render the report from structured findings instead of agent-written markdown * fix(worker): dispose the credential probe session on every path * fix(worker): refuse to replace the assembled report with an empty one * refactor(worker): catch post-processing throws across the whole finalization block * revert(worker): drop the report zero-findings guard * docs(worker): correct the retry split and Bedrock credential claims * docs: regenerate llms-full.txt from current sources * feat(cli): build and run the npx flow from a clone * refactor(cli): flatten the setup summary output * feat(cli): reject runs with more than one provider configured * fix(worker): say a rejected bash call never ran * chore(cli): drop grok-4.3 and gpt-5.6-luna from the setup suggestions * feat(worker): capture structured finding locations for SARIF output * fix(worker): enumerate queue confidence so the report inherits it verbatim * feat(worker): give the reporting phase a mode-specific output schema * feat(worker): emit a SARIF 2.1.0 log for exploitative runs * fix(worker): correct SARIF locations and defer fingerprinting to the upload action * fix(worker): drop the confidence suffix from the analysis-mode summary list * feat(worker): give exploit findings a dedicated code location field * feat(worker): carry structured code locations from the vuln queue to the report * fix(worker): join code locations from the vuln queue instead of re-asking agents * fix(worker): spell out the finding_id to category mapping in the tool schema * feat: drop Google/Gemini as a supported AI provider * fix(worker): stop asking the report agent for code locations * docs: correct the provider list and drop the removed rate-limit settings * docs: add provider cyber safeguards and suggested models per provider * docs: document the SARIF output and the report rating thresholds
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Configuration
Shannon can run without a configuration file, but configuration enables authenticated testing, scope guidance, rules of engagement, and report filtering.
Credential Precedence
Source-build mode resolves credentials from:
- Environment variables, such as
export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=... ./.env
npx mode resolves credentials from:
- Environment variables
~/.shannon/config.toml, created bynpx @keygraph/shannon setup
Environment variables always win, so you can override saved config for a single session without editing files.
Create a Configuration File
Copy and modify the example configuration:
cp configs/example-config.yaml ./my-app-config.yaml
Run with:
npx @keygraph/shannon start -u https://example.com -r /path/to/repo -c ./my-app-config.yaml
Source-build equivalent:
./shannon start -u https://example.com -r /path/to/repo -c ./my-app-config.yaml
Basic Configuration Structure
# Describe your target environment.
description: "Next.js e-commerce app on PostgreSQL. Local dev environment; .env files contain local-only credentials."
# Limit which vulnerability classes run end-to-end.
# vuln_classes: [injection, xss, auth, authz, ssrf]
# Skip the exploitation phase.
# exploit: "false"
# Free-form rules of engagement.
# rules_of_engagement: |
# - No password brute-force; cap login attempts at 5 per account.
# - Throttle to under 5 requests per second per endpoint; back off 60s on any 429.
# - Use placeholders like [order_id] in deliverables; no real data values.
authentication:
login_type: form
login_url: "https://your-app.com/login"
credentials:
username: "test@example.com"
password: "yourpassword"
totp_secret: "LB2E2RX7XFHSTGCK"
# Optional mailbox credentials for magic-link or email-OTP flows.
# email_login:
# address: "inbox@example.com"
# password: "mailbox-password"
# totp_secret: "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"
login_flow:
- "Type $username into the email field"
- "Type $password into the password field"
- "Click the 'Sign In' button"
success_condition:
type: url_contains
value: "/dashboard"
rules:
avoid:
- description: "AI should avoid testing logout functionality"
type: url_path
value: "/logout"
# code_path values are repo-relative file paths or globs.
# - description: "Out-of-scope vendored libraries"
# type: code_path
# value: "src/vendor/**"
focus:
- description: "AI should emphasize testing API endpoints"
type: url_path
value: "/api"
# Report options applied when assembling the final report.
# report:
# min_severity: low
# min_confidence: low
# guidance: |
# Drop findings about missing security headers and rate-limit gaps.
# sarif: "true"
Report Options
| Key | Effect |
|---|---|
min_severity |
Drops findings rated below this severity. Applies only when exploit is "true". |
min_confidence |
Drops findings rated below this confidence. Applies only when exploit is "false". |
guidance |
Free-text instruction to the report agent, such as which topics to exclude. |
sarif |
Emits a SARIF 2.1.0 log alongside the Markdown report. Requires exploit: "true". |
A finding carries one rating or the other, never both: an exploited finding is rated by severity, an analysis-only finding by confidence. Setting the threshold that does not apply to the run is ignored, and Shannon logs a warning naming the one to use instead.
SARIF Output
Set sarif: "true" to write report.sarif next to Security-Assessment-Report.md at the workspace root, for upload to GitHub code scanning or any other SARIF consumer.
exploit: "true"
report:
sarif: "true"
Each finding becomes one SARIF result, filed under a rule per vulnerability class (shannon/injection, shannon/xss, shannon/auth, shannon/authz, shannon/ssrf) and tagged with its OWASP Top Ten 2025 category. Results are anchored to the code location the analysis phase recorded, falling back to the HTTP entry point when the finding names no file. Severity maps onto SARIF's three levels: critical and high become error, medium becomes warning, everything else becomes note.
The log is written only for exploitative runs. An analysis-only run rates findings by confidence and produces no severity, so there is nothing to populate level with; sarif is ignored when exploit is "false".
Supported rule types include url_path, subdomain, domain, method, header, parameter, and code_path.
Writing Login Flow
Log in once in a fresh private browser window. Write the steps in the same order you perform them:
- When typing into a field, reference the field by its exact label or placeholder.
- When clicking a button, reference the exact button text.
Supported placeholders:
$username$password$totp$email_address$email_password$email_totp
At runtime, Shannon replaces these placeholders with the credentials passed in the config.
login_flow:
- "Type $username in <exact email field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"
- "Type $password in <exact password field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"
- "If prompted for 2FA, type $totp in <exact code field label or placeholder>"
- "Click <exact button text>"