Files
shannon/apps/worker/src/services/exploit-renderer.ts
T
ezl-keygraph 5ff40f8c6f feat(worker): migrate agent runtime from Claude Agent SDK to pi harness (#389)
* feat(worker): migrate agent runtime from Claude Agent SDK to pi harness

* feat: remove Google Vertex AI provider support

* fix(worker): route Bedrock and custom-base-URL providers from env

* feat(prompts): instruct agents to call submit_exploitation_queue and submit_auth_result

* fix(worker): count sub-agent cost and surface compaction failures

* refactor(worker): rename claude-executor to pi-executor

* feat(worker): pi-event-driven output formatting

* fix(worker): gate adaptive thinking to Opus models, drop CLAUDE_THINKING_LEVEL

* fix(worker): restore minLength/minItems on vuln-collector schemas

* feat(worker): give task sub-agent write+bash, align tool descriptions

* feat(worker): add glob custom tool and route code_path globs to it

* refactor(prompts): use pi tool names (task, todo_write, read, bash, glob)

* refactor(prompts): drop stale MCP terminology for collector tools

* refactor(prompts): drop collector server names from deliverable instructions

* fix(worker): restore minLength/minItems on pre-recon and exploit collector schemas

* feat(worker): load playwright-cli skill via pi resource loader

* refactor(cli): remove CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS config

* build: drop @anthropic-ai/claude-code from worker image

* docs: remove vertex references from llms context

* docs(worker): update stale sdk comments

* refactor(worker): unify provider precedence between preflight and executor

* feat(worker): enforce bounded bash timeouts via pi extension

* ci: bump the beta release line to 2.0.0 (#356)

* fix(cli): pin npx command hints to beta tag

* fix: render agent deliverables before the success commit so resume preserves them (#377)

* feat(cli): restructure run folder and improve terminal UX (#383)

* feat: surface report at run root and nest run internals under .shannon

* feat: use plain-language wording in user-facing terminal messages

* feat(cli): guide users to watch scan progress and surface report path on start

* docs: sync run-folder layout and CLI wording across docs and comments

* feat(cli): add version command reporting package version or git SHA

* feat(cli): detect TTY for interactive prompts, color, and progress output

* docs: document --yes flag, version command, and tty module

* fix(cli): FORCE_COLOR precedence and plain uninstall --yes output

* fix(cli): respect empty NO_COLOR

* fix(cli): let NO_COLOR take precedence over FORCE_COLOR

* docs: mark claude-code-router integration as removed

* refactor(worker): converge shared core with shannon-oss (#388)

* fix(worker): port keygraph shared-core correctness fixes

* refactor(worker): adopt collectors/ and ai/pi/ layout; add task budget cap and cancellation

* refactor(worker): drop inconsistent Collector "Server" suffix

* refactor(worker): drop unused providerConfig/apiKey seams, resolve credentials from env only

* refactor(worker): port oss code_path pattern expansion + external_directory allow

* fix(worker): preserve dotfile paths in code_path avoid patterns (.env no longer stripped to env)

* feat(worker): render Unprocessed Vulnerabilities section in exploit deliverable (align with oss)

* feat(worker): request set_blind_spots for all vuln classes (align auth/ssrf with production prompts)

* refactor(worker): adopt unified permissionSystem* naming and helper layout

* refactor(worker): inline blind_spots into vuln deliverable section array

* chore(worker): drop unused zod dependency (tree is typebox-native)

* fix(worker): normalize base32 TOTP secret to accept padding and whitespace

* refactor(worker): adopt shared toolResult helper and flatSchema naming in collectors

* refactor(worker): use undefined over null in queue-schema builders

* docs(worker): converge renderer/collector doc comments to current pi terminology

* refactor(worker): adopt schema.ts cleanInput/stringEnum helpers in collectors

* feat(worker): converge exploit-collector/renderer with vendored; capture and render overview for blocked findings

* refactor(worker): converge session-tools/pipeline/exploitation-checker with vendored

* refactor(worker): converge task-tool usage reporting with vendored onUsage callback

* refactor(worker): converge structured output onto a submitTool executor channel

* docs(worker): expand exploit-renderer docstring to match shannon-oss

* docs(worker): adopt richer vuln-renderer docstring from shannon-oss

* docs(worker): neutralize billing-detection wording for shannon-oss parity

* fix(worker): verify checkpoint hash in the deliverables clone being reset

* fix(worker): fail fast on malformed exploitation queue JSON

* fix(worker): honor retryable flag when classifying exploitation-queue check failures

* fix(worker): fail fast on corrupted session.json in run-scope validation

* feat(worker): propagate Temporal cancellation signal into agent and auth pi sessions

* fix(worker): mark exploit agent complete when exploitation is skipped so resume skips it

* prompts: drop scan description from executive report prompt

* refactor(worker): add createGenericSubmitTool for raw JSON-schema submit tools

* refactor(worker): gate playwright-cli skill to browser agents via skillsOverride (adopt shannon-oss mechanism)

* docs(worker): correct formatLogTime comment to UTC to match toISOString

* refactor(worker): converge queue-schemas with shannon-oss (guarded count, decl order)

* refactor(worker): converge task-tool with shannon-oss (byte-identical; modelRegistry optional)

* fix(worker): use replaceLiteral for all prompt value insertions to prevent $-mangling

* fix(worker): classify agent execution failures by error type instead of hardcoding validation

* fix(worker): cap auth-failure detail at 250 chars to match shannon-oss

* style(worker): apply biome formatting

* refactor(worker): remove per-session task delegation cap from task tool

* style(cli): collapse usage hint now that the beta tag is gone

* chore: mark the pi harness migration as a breaking change

BREAKING CHANGE: Google Vertex AI is no longer a supported provider. The
CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX, ANTHROPIC_VERTEX_PROJECT, CLOUD_ML_REGION, and
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS environment variables, along with the
use_vertex, vertex_project, and cloud_ml_region config.toml keys, are
removed. Vertex users must switch to Anthropic, AWS Bedrock, or a custom
Anthropic-compatible base URL.

The CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS environment variable and the
max_output_tokens config.toml key are also removed.
2026-07-16 19:13:13 +05:30

232 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript

// Copyright (C) 2025 Keygraph, Inc.
//
// This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License version 3
// as published by the Free Software Foundation.
/**
* Deterministic exploit collector → markdown renderer.
*
* Single entry point renderExploitDeliverable(vulnClass, state, idToType)
* covers all 5 exploitation agents (injection, xss, auth, ssrf, authz). The
* per-class deltas are limited to title and ID prefix; every section, label,
* and sort rule is class-agnostic. Section headers and bolded field labels
* mirror the prescribed-Markdown skeleton from the existing exploit-*.txt
* prompts so downstream report-executive — which reads prose with bolded
* labels — sees the same structure it sees today.
*
* Field-label drift across the 5 prompts ("Evidence of Vulnerability" vs
* "Why We Believe This Is Vulnerable"; "Attempted Exploitation" vs
* "What We Tried") is canonicalized here to a single label per field across
* all classes.
*
* Sort order is owned by the renderer:
* - Successfully Exploited: severity desc (critical → low), then ID asc.
* - Potential / Validation Blocked: confidence desc (high → low), then ID asc.
*
* ## Unprocessed Vulnerabilities surfaces queue IDs the collector did not see —
* the v1 stand-in for required-call enforcement. The activity passes idToType
* (queue ID → vulnerability_type, built from queue.json) so each entry renders
* as `- {ID} ({vulnerability_type})`. Omitted when every queue ID was emitted.
*/
import type { AddExploitInput, VulnClass } from '../collectors/exploit-collector.js';
// ============================================================================
// PER-CLASS CONSTANTS
// ============================================================================
const TITLES: Record<VulnClass, string> = {
injection: 'Injection Exploitation Evidence',
xss: 'Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation Evidence',
auth: 'Authentication Exploitation Evidence',
ssrf: 'SSRF Exploitation Evidence',
authz: 'Authorization Exploitation Evidence',
};
// ============================================================================
// SORT ORDER
// ============================================================================
const SEVERITY_ORDER: Record<'critical' | 'high' | 'medium' | 'low', number> = {
critical: 0,
high: 1,
medium: 2,
low: 3,
};
const CONFIDENCE_ORDER: Record<'high' | 'medium' | 'low', number> = {
high: 0,
medium: 1,
low: 2,
};
type ExploitedEntry = Extract<AddExploitInput, { status: 'exploited' }>;
type BlockedEntry = Extract<AddExploitInput, { status: 'blocked' }>;
function sortExploited(entries: readonly ExploitedEntry[]): ExploitedEntry[] {
return [...entries].sort((a, b) => {
const sevDiff = SEVERITY_ORDER[a.severity] - SEVERITY_ORDER[b.severity];
if (sevDiff !== 0) return sevDiff;
return a.vulnerability_id.localeCompare(b.vulnerability_id);
});
}
function sortBlocked(entries: readonly BlockedEntry[]): BlockedEntry[] {
return [...entries].sort((a, b) => {
const confDiff = CONFIDENCE_ORDER[a.confidence] - CONFIDENCE_ORDER[b.confidence];
if (confDiff !== 0) return confDiff;
return a.vulnerability_id.localeCompare(b.vulnerability_id);
});
}
// ============================================================================
// FIELD FORMATTERS
// ============================================================================
function capitalize(value: string): string {
if (value.length === 0) return value;
return value[0]!.toUpperCase() + value.slice(1);
}
function renderNumberedList(steps: readonly string[]): string {
return steps.map((step, idx) => `${idx + 1}. ${step}`).join('\n\n');
}
// ============================================================================
// PER-FINDING RENDERERS
// ============================================================================
function renderExploitedFinding(entry: ExploitedEntry): string {
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push(`### ${entry.vulnerability_id}: ${entry.title}`);
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Summary:**');
lines.push(`- **Vulnerable location:** ${entry.vulnerable_location}`);
lines.push(`- **Overview:** ${entry.overview}`);
lines.push(`- **Impact:** ${entry.impact}`);
lines.push(`- **Severity:** ${capitalize(entry.severity)}`);
lines.push('');
if (entry.prerequisites != null && entry.prerequisites.length > 0) {
lines.push('**Prerequisites:**');
lines.push(entry.prerequisites);
lines.push('');
}
lines.push('**Exploitation Steps:**');
lines.push(renderNumberedList(entry.exploitation_steps));
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Proof of Impact:**');
lines.push(entry.proof_of_impact);
if (entry.notes != null && entry.notes.length > 0) {
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Notes:**');
lines.push(entry.notes);
}
return lines.join('\n');
}
function renderBlockedFinding(entry: BlockedEntry): string {
const lines: string[] = [];
lines.push(`### ${entry.vulnerability_id}: ${entry.title}`);
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Summary:**');
lines.push(`- **Vulnerable location:** ${entry.vulnerable_location}`);
lines.push(`- **Overview:** ${entry.overview}`);
lines.push(`- **Current Blocker:** ${entry.current_blocker}`);
lines.push(`- **Potential Impact:** ${entry.potential_impact}`);
lines.push(`- **Confidence:** ${entry.confidence.toUpperCase()}`);
lines.push('');
if (entry.prerequisites != null && entry.prerequisites.length > 0) {
lines.push('**Prerequisites:**');
lines.push(entry.prerequisites);
lines.push('');
}
lines.push('**Evidence of Vulnerability:**');
lines.push(entry.evidence_of_vulnerability);
lines.push('');
lines.push('**What We Tried:**');
lines.push(entry.what_we_tried);
lines.push('');
lines.push('**How This Would Be Exploited:**');
lines.push(renderNumberedList(entry.how_this_would_be_exploited));
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Expected Impact:**');
lines.push(entry.expected_impact);
if (entry.notes != null && entry.notes.length > 0) {
lines.push('');
lines.push('**Notes:**');
lines.push(entry.notes);
}
return lines.join('\n');
}
// ============================================================================
// SECTION RENDERERS
// ============================================================================
function renderExploitedSection(entries: readonly ExploitedEntry[]): string {
const heading = '## Successfully Exploited Vulnerabilities';
if (entries.length === 0) {
return [heading, '', '*No findings reached a definitive verdict in this category.*'].join('\n');
}
const blocks = sortExploited(entries).map(renderExploitedFinding);
return [heading, '', blocks.join('\n\n')].join('\n');
}
function renderBlockedSection(entries: readonly BlockedEntry[]): string {
const heading = '## Potential Vulnerabilities (Validation Blocked)';
if (entries.length === 0) {
return [heading, '', '*No findings reached a definitive verdict in this category.*'].join('\n');
}
const blocks = sortBlocked(entries).map(renderBlockedFinding);
return [heading, '', blocks.join('\n\n')].join('\n');
}
function renderUnprocessedSection(missingIds: readonly string[], idToType: ReadonlyMap<string, string>): string {
const heading = '## Unprocessed Vulnerabilities';
const sortedIds = [...missingIds].sort((a, b) => a.localeCompare(b));
const lines = sortedIds.map((id) => {
const type = idToType.get(id);
return type ? `- ${id} (${type})` : `- ${id}`;
});
return [
heading,
'',
'The following queue vulnerabilities did not receive a definitive verdict during this run:',
'',
lines.join('\n'),
].join('\n');
}
// ============================================================================
// PUBLIC ENTRY POINT
// ============================================================================
export function renderExploitDeliverable(
vulnClass: VulnClass,
state: readonly AddExploitInput[],
idToType: ReadonlyMap<string, string>,
): string {
const title = `# ${TITLES[vulnClass]}`;
if (state.length === 0 && idToType.size === 0) {
const body = '*No vulnerabilities were available in the queue for exploitation.*';
return `${title}\n\n${body}\n`;
}
const exploited = state.filter((e): e is ExploitedEntry => e.status === 'exploited');
const blocked = state.filter((e): e is BlockedEntry => e.status === 'blocked');
const emittedIds = new Set(state.map((e) => e.vulnerability_id));
const missingIds = [...idToType.keys()].filter((id) => !emittedIds.has(id));
const sections: string[] = [title, '', renderExploitedSection(exploited), '', renderBlockedSection(blocked)];
if (missingIds.length > 0) {
sections.push('');
sections.push(renderUnprocessedSection(missingIds, idToType));
}
return `${sections.join('\n').trimEnd()}\n`;
}